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This thesis explores processes that have been described by scholars of transitional justice 
as post-war social repair. It interrogates the multifarious quests through which Lugbara 
people, living in the West Nile sub-region of north-west Uganda, seek to rebuild their 
intimate relationships and social lives, with recourse to explanations and therapies for 
suffering and misfortune. Scholars have recently found in such socio-cultural processes—
which traverse the cosmological, social and economic landscape of everyday life—
potential resources that could restore communal relations and assist post-war recovery. 
This thesis critically appraises this contention. 
 
Whilst scholars are invested in abstracting metaphysical meaning to map causal 
relationships, Lugbara people are simply seeking answers to misfortunes which 
continue to befall them as individuals, families, and collectives: enquiring about what 
issues are following them, and how addressing wrong acts may heal bodily suffering 
and social wounds. Since many sicknesses are regarded as a phenomenological signal of 
violations within families and clans— enquiring about their cases is occasion for to 
discuss notions of responsibility, loss and social peace.  For Lugbara people, managing 
misfortune and past injustices are entangled.  
 
To understand the healing landscape of the present, this thesis draws on the past.  A 
diachronic approach is deployed through re-evaluating writings on Lugbara ritual and 
practice described in Lugbara Religion by the mid-century anthropologist John 
Middleton. Like Middleton, this thesis is interested in how Lugbara people draw on logics 
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and explanations through interconsistent and pragmatic practice.  This thesis critically 
appraises the methodological underpinnings and gendered assumptions which produced 
particular knowledge about Lugbara peoples in Lugbara Religion, and which have been 
transposed onto subsequent studies of healing in the region. 
 
The body of this thesis presents novel ethnographic evidence which explores different 
faces of contemporary healing. Through a multi-sited ethnographic approach in villages 
across Arua and Maracha District, this enquiry explores how quests to “follow” suffering 
are structured amid unfolding post-war projects to revive – and resist – notions of Lugbara 
personhood and sociality premised on patriarchy and seniority. Concurrently, this thesis 
explores the fragility of these efforts in the face of ongoing loss, efforts that lead to the 
allocation of responsibility for illness through specific means and logics—that European 
scholars would term “witchcraft”. 
 
Placing the historical record in conversation post-war healing shifts, this thesis engages 
with how long-standing social institutions endure in relation to post-war recovery, albeit 
through dynamic interaction with logics of faith and law, and creative internal struggles 
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All translations used within this thesis follow the Ayivu variant of Lugbarati, except 
where interlocutors are directly quoted. See pp. 79-80 for discussion of dialectical 
variations. 
 
a’bi ancestors, grandfathers 
a’ii believe (accept) 
acife oracle 
da truth 
adra, abea, mua, yakani retributive forces 
Adro indigenous Divinity, Catholic God (maternal uncle) 
Adroa (Adro onzi) divine spirits, “small gods” 
Adroa o’bapiri God the Creator 
ala (onyiru) good (clean) 
ali bridewealth 
alio poverty (lack of money or people) 
ambavu lineage (where foot treads) 
andraleti Dialect of low Lugbara 
anya millet 
aruba sickness induced by taking family to court 
askari guard, soldier (KiS) 
atrita curse 
avuti transfer after death of women 
azi Work 
azo sickness 
azo okopi ku sickness which doesn’t end 
ba a person 
Balokole (or pomzifu) “Saved ones”  
ba’azaza mad person (orindi onzi) 
ba drapi ‘bori people who have died 
ba ti sickness from mouth 
ba wara, ba ambo elder 
dede grandmother 




e’yo issue, word, deed 
e’yo ada truth 
Ekizibiti evidence (KiS) 
enyata (enyanya, enata, ba yi) poison 
enyati family, household neighbourhood 
enzo lie 




jo jok witchcraft  (Alur) 
kafiri pagan (KiS) 
kaka maize 
kulia batu “people eaters” (Europeans) 
lire “that place” (Kampala) 
Lugbarati Lugbara language 
juru extended relatives 
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mairungi khat 
maku Sweet potatoes 
Mazi killing spirit 
ma mu yi going over the water (migrating over the Nile) 
mundu European (something far away) 
mundu aro medicine of the whites (clinical medicine) 
mundu’ba (governmeti, KiS) people of the Europeans, government officials 
Mungu God (Anglican Faith) 
nebi prophet (Arabic) 
nyoka curse 
o’dipi male relatives (within subclan) 
ole envy or indignation 
oleu Witch/ wizard 
ole ro invoke ghosts (1950) 
ojo healer 
oku married woman 
onata grumbling 
ondu sorghum (1950 – oracle) 
onzi bad (ev 
onziri the bad one, HIV/AIDS (also silimo, azo onzi) 
opi chief 
opi ozooni rainmaker 
opkoro strong/ strength (witchcraft) 
ori male ancestors or stone (sacrifice, snake) 
orindi spirit (formerly soul) 
ori ka ghostly vengeance 
osu beans 
oya (or kitaa, bari) communal work 




rua ala health (lit body which is clean) 
suru subclan/ clan 
tualu social harmony 
tukutuku (sima) Belgians 
uruleti dialect of high Lugbara 
Yakan, (ya to shake) colonial movement  
yi water (yi etia, beneath the water) 
za meat 







AIM African Inland Mission 
ARRH Arua Regional Referral Hospital 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN) 
FUNA Former Uganda National Army 
LCI Local Councillor 1 (Village Chairman) 
LCIII Local Councillor 3 (Sub-County Chairman) 
LCV Local Councillor 5 (District Chairman) 
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
NRA National Resistance Army 
NRM National Resistance Movement 
OPEC Pseudonym for Arua Smuggling Cartel 
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome 
TPDF Tanzanian People’s Defence Force 
UN United Nations 
UNLA Ugandan National Liberation Army 
UNRF Uganda National Resistance Movement 
URA Uganda Revenue Authorities 
WFP World Food Programme 
















This thesis explores processes that scholars of transitional justice have described as 
post-war social repair. It explores the multifarious quests through which Lugbara 
people, living in the West Nile sub-region of north-west Uganda, seek to rebuild their 
intimate relationships and social lives, with recourse to collective explanations for 
suffering and misfortune. Scholars have recently found in such socio-cultural 
processes—that traverse the cosmological, social and economic landscape of everyday 
life—potential resources that could restore communal relations, and assist post-war 
recovery. This thesis explores this contention in a post-conflict geography, where 
cosmological resources have been deeply embedded in experiences of reconstruction 
since the mid-1980s.  
Whilst scholars are interested in the social implications of the metaphysical, Lugbara 
people are simply seeking answers to misfortunes which continue to befall them as 
individuals, families, and collectives. Simply put, how are people concerned with what 
is following them? How can bodily suffering and social wounds be healed? 
 
“Every action has a repercussion here.”1  
For many Lugbara people, azo (sickness) and drilonzi (misfortune) have long held 
moral connotations, serving as signals of repercussions for social violations. Whilst 
clinical medicine provides answers to many maladies through tests or medication, azo 
okopi ku (‘sickness which doesn’t end’) or which culminates in dra (death) is often 
 
1 Commentary, co-worker, July 2016. 
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interpreted as signifying that ‘something is not right’ with respect to relations with the 
living or the dead.2 In addressing affliction, Lugbara people pursue health and well-
being, and seek an end to bodily or psychological suffering. Since processes of tracing 
and mending the ‘real’ cause of the e’yo (‘issue’, literally ‘word’ or ‘deed’) require 
collective clan participation and addressing a shared archive of intimate history, these 
processes represent efforts to simultaneously repair the social fabric and redraw the 
contours of social-moral worlds of the present. In so doing, Lugbara people define what 
it means to be ba (‘a person’), and to live in peaceable communion with others, a state 
defined by tualu (‘living together in harmony’).  
 
“Now you hear, so and so has died and you see the dead 
body over there working for someone. Your soul is taken. 
Nothing like this was here before the war.”3 
 
Following their return from exile in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lugbara people 
have recognised new agents and forces that cause suffering. These forces affect them 
not because of the deeds of an individual or their relations, but because of the envy and 
greed of others, who acquire resources for individual wealth and power. Post-return 
quests for health thus require managing human mediators of nefarious forces. This 
thesis explores the production of fears of human malevolence, alongside collective 
attempts to police new forms of internal terror. Achieving social harmony with respect 
to the cosmos often involves the violent remaking of a community’s limits.  
 
2 V. Das, Affliction: Health, Disease, Poverty. New York: Fordham UP, 2015. 
3 I, Elder, Maracha, 12/05/2017 (OJ). A full list of interviews conducted for this thesis and a guide to interpreting the 
data categorisation system can be found in the relevant section of the bibliography. 
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 This thesis explores how pursuits which Janzen has termed “quests for therapy” or 
which Ranger considers to constitute the “important practical work of reconstruction”, 
have been structured amid unfolding social projects that have sought to revive clan 
authority in the rural countryside.4 Concurrently, this thesis explores the fragility of  
efforts to structure society according to gerontocratic logics in the face of ongoing loss, 
efforts that lead to the allocation of responsibility for illness through specific means and 
logics—logics that European scholars would term ‘witchcraft’. 
In exploring transformations in these intimate worlds, this thesis too revisits the 
academic portrayal of these people, re-evaluating writings on Lugbara ritual and 
practice described in the influential volume Lugbara Religion by the mid-century 
anthropologist John Middleton. Premised on colonial anthropological approaches 
emphasising the primacy of ‘tradition’, works such as Middleton’s have been critiqued 
for epitomising what Troillott terms the “savage slot”: in emphasising cultural 
differences, these works produced “natives”, whilst ignoring both the violence of the 
colonial state and the anthropologist’s own position in producing bounded cultural 
worlds.5 Because Lugbara elders were involved in this project of constructing order, 
however, Middleton’s work provoked as much excitement as critique. This research 
revisits Lugbara Religion not as an objective portrayal of a society (since no such thing 
exists), but as an archive of intimate relations. It attends to the concealments within his 
 
4 J.M. Janzen, The Quest for Therapy: Medical Pluralism in Lower Zaire, University of California Press: Berkley, 1982; 
T. Ranger: Afterword: War, Violence and Healing in Zimbabwe, Journal of Southern African Studies, 18(3), 1992, 
pp.698-707, p.707 
5 M-R. Trouillot, ‘Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The Poetics and Politics of Otherness’, in Global 
Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 7-28. See also V. 
Das and D. Poole (eds.), Anthropology in the Margins of the State. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 
2004. 
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text, in light of subsequent theoretical developments.6 Concerned for the contemporary 
as well, this research furthermore explores how modernity has intersected with the 
social morphology of Lugbara clans, and their explanations for misfortune. Indeed, 
whether in the colonial era or the eras of Ugandan independence and civil war, these 
explanations (and their quests for healing) were never confined by a bounded locale, 
and have long been formed through encounters between people, the state, colonial 
pressures and entities, and market economies.7 I thus offer a novel diachronic 




This thesis is a multi-sited ethnography based on fourteen months of ethnographic 
fieldwork in the Arua and Maracha Districts of West Nile.8 As defined within the terms 
of the Ugandan Constitution, Lugbara people form the majority ethnic group within the 
sub-region, representing 3.3% of the country’s population, or 1.1 million people, living 
predominantly in these two districts. The core act of data collection involved 
investigating the management of suffering (individual and communal), unearthing its 
explanation, and tracing the outcomes of its resolution (or lack thereof). Much of this 
research involved interviews and focus groups that ‘followed’ efforts to manage 
suffering in a detached way, but at times I also witnessed the violence in homes and 
villages that emerged from efforts to address suffering and the past—including the riots 
that sought to overthrow the Roman Catholic bishop of Ediofe Diocese in September 
 
6 For the concepts of “concealment” in colonial ethnography, see A.J. Browne, 'The Alur-ization of Aidan Southall – 
Contested Ethnonymic Traditions in North-Western Uganda', History in Africa 45 (2018), pp. 221-244. 
7 B. Meyer, ’Comment on H. Englund and J. Leach, Ethnography and the Meta-Narratives of Modernity’, Current 
Anthropology, 41:2 (2000), pp. 241-242  
8 G.E. Marcus, ‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography’, Annual Review of 
Anthropology 24 (1995), pp. 95-117.  
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2016. This thesis describes these unfolding events in detail, and endeavours to 
understand both those actors who precipitated violence and those actors who resisted 
and lamented it. West Nile continues to be stereotyped as a “marginal place populated 
by inherently violent people”.9 This thesis rejects this characterisation, situating 
violence in the context of the denial of resources, healthcare, and recognition of 
Lugbara people’s claims for moral leadership.  
 
In recent decades, international donors and scholars alike have grown increasingly 
interested in how populations transition out of violent conflict and reconstruct peaceable 
methods of living together. In lieu of political transition, Northern Uganda has provided 
the case study par excellence to examine processes of social repair.10 Enquiries focusing 
on the post-war context of Acholiland, following the retreat of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in 2007, have unfolded as the field of transitional justice itself has been 
‘localised’.11 Increasingly, scholars seeking to understand how people forgive the 
wrongs of the past and move on focus not on formal courts and commissions but on 
local communities, and the messy politics of the ‘everyday’ through which forgiveness, 
or forgetting, is achieved.12 Such a shift marks a radical departure from the legal 
beginnings of transitional justice, and Western-centric ideas of justice.  
 
 
9 M. Leopold. Inside West Nile. Oxford: James Currey, 2005, p. 3. 
10 A. Macdonald, ‘Transitional justice and political economies of survival in post-conflict northern Uganda’, 
Development and Change 48:2 (2017), pp. 286-311. 
11 R. Shaw and L. Waldorf, ‘Introduction: Localizing Transitional Justice’, in R. Shaw and L. Waldorf (eds.), Localising 
Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP, 2010, pp. 3-26, p. 4. 
12 R. MacGinty, ‘Everyday peace: Bottom-up and local agency in conflict-affected societies’, Security Dialogue 45:6 
(2014), pp. 548–564. 
 23 
In Northern Uganda, the role of cosmologies has been newly positioned as a means for 
external actors to explore authentic local vocabularies of repair. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to this unfolding exploration through contributing evidence from West Nile, 
a region characterised as ‘post-conflict’ within Uganda’s development policy, but 
virtually neglected from present scholarly conversations about the North.13 The 
empirical evidence explored in this thesis comprises a powerful repository by which to 
view how community is made—or unmade—from the ground up, beyond the gaze of 
transitional justice entrepreneurs and international experts.14 Out of necessity, Lugbara 
people in this region have recovered from the past using their own resources; one key 
contribution herein is a response to the distinct lack of consideration for the role of clans 
in everyday peace-making within the transitional justice literature.15 
 
At first glance, themes of sickness and suffering may seem remote from enquiries into 
post-conflict transition or justice. Yet according to the precepts of their life-worlds, 
Lugbara people see no clear distinction between azo (sickness) and the acts of 
acknowledging and forgiving the wrongs of the past: inhabiting a world where wrongful 
acts, lies and neglect are punished through azo, Lugbara people contend that human 
malevolence of many different origins can bring about suffering. Sickness is thus an apt 
gauge of social repair, since it serves as a phenomenological signal of violations within 
families and clans—directly bringing into focus both notions of responsibility and loss 
of social peace. 
 
 
13 Government of Uganda, Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, 2007-2010.  
14 P.R. Alcalá and E. Baines, ‘Editorial Note’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 6:3 (2012), pp. 385–393. 
15 B. Meier, ‘’Death Does Not Rot’: Transitional Justice and Local ‘Truths’ in the Aftermath of the War in Northern 
Uganda’, Africa Spectrum 48:2 (2013), pp. 25–50. 
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In this way, this thesis enters debates about the role of cosmologies in 
transitional justice as well. Though scholars have equated metaphysical explanations for 
suffering and trauma as “resources for development”, this thesis cautions against such 
an abstraction.16 Interrogating the production and application of Lugbarati concepts of 
souls, spirits and witches, I argue that the utility of these concepts to Lugbara people 
lies in their malleability, the ability of explanations to reflect personalities and social 
circumstances.17 As has long been argued in relation to customary law, codifying 
concepts transforms their meaning and detaches explanations from the original context 
of validation.18 This thesis contends that scholars have cherry-picked aspects of 
cosmological worlds to make arguments regarding social restoration—but in deeply 
divided contexts, metaphysical explanations can be harnessed for inclusion as well as 
exclusion. Oftentimes, the same Lugbara healers mediating restorative rituals also 
recruited cosmological explanations to justify the violent ostracisation of people from 
their ancestral lands. Quests for responsibility can thus generate new forms of inter-
communal violence and injustice.  
 
This thesis furthermore urges the appreciation of cosmologies that transcend periods of 
conflict. Cosmological praxes often resonate with Lugbara populations because of their 
historical repetition, their recurrence through successive colonial and post-colonial 
struggles, bearing the historical imprint of early colonial prophets and Christian pastors 
alike in mediating meaning. Indeed, Lugbara people used historically-constituted scripts 
 
16 E. Baines, ’Spirits and social reconstruction after mass violence: rethinking transitional justice’, African Affairs 
109:436 (2010), pp. 409-430. 
17 P. Geschiere, The Modernity of Witchcraft. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1997. 
18  C. Leonardi, et al., Local Justice in Southern Sudan. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace and Rift 
Valley Institute, 2010. 
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to describe lingering “contagion” for disturbed souls or intra-clan debts that long 
predated present violent conflicts.19 In essence, justice or balance—according to 
Lugbara people themselves—requires considering the longue-durée of upheaval, rather 
than singular episodes. Much of this thesis therefore draws on the past to understand the 
present.  
 
Similarly, medical physicians have sought to understand the processes described in this 
thesis through the lens of trauma. To be clear: this research is not a study of illness or 
disease seeking to categorise healing pathways or taxonomies of affliction. Nor does it 
import Western concepts of ‘trauma’ or ‘PTSD’ into a context where such ideas have no 
direct referent. Instead, this research departs from recent calls to ground enquiries into 
repair in concepts relevant to those populations under investigation.20 Crucially, this 
enquiry takes what Whyte terms an “actor-oriented perspective”, working with a 
tapestry of local representatives including clan members, elders, diviners, pastors and 
even government officials to navigate how Lugbara people experience, analyse and act 
upon azo and drilonzi at the individual and collective level, and what such processes 
reveal about the changing nature of their society.21 Ultimately, the findings of this thesis 
contribute both to debates within transitional justice and development that focus on the 
nature of ‘everyday’ or the ‘ordinary’ in social repair, as well as trends in public health 
that challenge individualising psychological approaches to resilience.  
 
 
19 L. Meinert and L. Grøn, ‘It Runs in the Family’. Exploring Contagious Kinship Connections’, Ethnos 85:4 (2020), pp. 
581-594, p. 581. 
20 A. Macdonald, ‘From the ground up: what does the evidence tell us about local experiences of transitional 
justice’, Transitional Justice Review 1:3 (2015), pp. 72-121. 
21 S.R. Whyte, Questioning Misfortune: The Pragmatics of Uncertainty in Eastern Uganda. Cambridge UP: Cambridge 
Studies in Medical Anthropology, 1997. 
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To clarify these terms, I now explore the unfolding terrain of the current debate.  
  
 
1.2 Transitional Justice: Towards the ‘local’?  
 
In the three decades since its inception, the field of transitional justice has shifted 
considerably. A focus on institutional and legal reforms borne out of post-Cold War 
liberalism—instilled in truth commissions, prosecutions and reparations advocated in 
Latin America, Central Europe, Eastern Europe and South Africa—has shifted to 
encompass radically different mechanisms to deal with the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities and the aftermath of violent pasts.22 If transitional justice was once about 
regime change and democratic transition, since the early 2000s transitional justice has 
become enveloped in what MacGinty terms the “technocratic turn” of peace-building, 
applied by development and aid agencies alike as essential to the promotion of liberal 
democracies and post-conflict reconstruction.23 Macdonald equates the 
professionalisation of transitional justice to a “depoliticisation”, a “tool-kit” 
increasingly “copied and pasted” across different contexts, transitional or not, and 
where states may not function as primary guarantors of security. 24 In view of this 
expanding terrain, two substantive evolutions have emerged. On the one hand, scholars 
have advocated for international trials, and on the other, for the value of exploring local 
 
22 A. Macdonald, ‘Transitional justice and political economies of survival’. 
23 R. MacGinty, ‘Routine peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding’, Cooperation and Conflict 47:3 (2012), pp. 287–308. 
24 A. MacDonald, ‘Transitional justice and political economies of survival’, p. 287. A shift in donor policy has been 
accompanied by a scholarly acknowledgement that in post-conflict and borderland states, a cacophony of 
institutions are involved in delivering justice and security. See for example, V. Boege, et al., On Hybrid Political 
Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’, Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 8, 2008; 
R. Luckman and T. Kirk, ‘Security in hybrid political contexts: an end-user approach’, London School of Economics 
Justice and Security Research Programme working paper 2, 2012. Available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56358/>. 
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processes for social repair.25 Uganda has become a “paradigmatic case of transitional 
justice without transition”.26 
 
These shifts within transitional justice stem from wider neoliberal tendencies towards 
the de-emphasis of the state as the primary instigator of development and justice, but are 
also a pragmatic response to the realities of contemporary armed conflict. Forms of 
violence differ across contexts, but war and conflict increasingly occur less between 
states than within them. Whilst contested, Kaldor’s idea of “new wars” denotes this 
post-Cold War shift whereby conflict is disproportionately waged by intra-state groups, 
in places where the state has lost legitimacy.27 New wars are not fought on distant 
battlefields, but on internal war-scapes that increasingly imbricate civilians: recruited 
into rebel forces, subjected to acts of violence and retaliation, and displaced en masse 
into settlements (both domestically and across borders). As such, “new wars” result in 
devastating economic, social and psychological consequences for civilian populations, 
and fundamentally erode the everyday social fabric of families and communities.28 
Return entails new challenges of reintegration wherein “intimate enemies” are forced to 
live together, wherein populations have borne witness to horrific violence, or wherein 
populations must recover from the “social torture” of displacement.29 Recovery is not 
just about accountability for perpetrators of violence, but about negotiating a fraught 
 
25 Shaw and Waldorf, ‘Introduction’, p. 4. 
26 A. Macdonald, ‘Transitional justice and political economies of survival’, p. 292. 
27 M. Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2:1 (2013), pp. 
1-16. 
28 D. Summerfield, ‘The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions 
and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects’, Relief and Rehabilitation Network Network Paper 14, 1996. 
Available at < https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/1996/04/networkpaper014.pdf>. 
29 K. Theidon, Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012; C. Dolan, Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986-2006. New York and Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2009.  
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politics of mutuality after individuals and groups have occupied radically different roles 
within contemporary war-scapes, and after institutions of social solidarity have been 
undermined.  
 
The extension of transitional justice to the local has partly been pragmatic, premised on 
harnessing justice systems that actually exist. Yet in examining recovery following 
intra-state wars, observers have tended to use reductive frames to view African 
contexts, emphasising the utility of local mechanisms of deemed to be traditional, 
customary, community-based or indigenous.30 Early examples included the use of 
gacaca courts in Rwanda, which represented the promotion of traditional dispute 
resolution (albeit modernised) to manage the backlog of cases from the genocide. 
Comparable examples are the sanctioning of purification rites to reintegrate ex-
combatants in Mozambique and Sierra Leone.31 Even the World Bank has lauded such 
community-based systems as a “best-fit” solution.32 In other cases, however, traditional 
institutions are viewed as supplementary to other justice processes, or even privileged 
above international courts and tribunals.33 Yet donor consciousness can too easily 
assume causal links between the enactment of traditional justice and restoration of 
communal peace. The logic goes that whilst distanced forms of justice are inattentive to 
social repair and may promote renewed division, “traditional” forms of reconciliation or 
 
30 T. Allen and A. Macdonald, ‘Post-Conflict Traditional Justice: A Critical Overview’, London School of Economics 
Justice and Security Research Programme paper 3, 2013, p. 2. Available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56357/>.  
31 T. Bouta, G. Frerks, and I. Bannon, Gender, Conflict and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.  
32 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2011, p. 167; Allen and Macdonald, ‘Post-Conflict Traditional Justice’, p. 4. 
33 Macdonald, ‘From the ground up’, p. 103. 
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compensation are authentic, restorative avenues in post-war settings where neighbors 
depend on each other for social and economic support.34 
 
In Northern Uganda—a term generally referring to Acholiland, but also applied to West 
Nile and Karamoja—‘traditional justice’ is foregrounded in the government’s 2019 
Transitional Justice Policy, and has garnered the participation of many international 
donors and NGOs, funding cultural associations and elders. Often, the legitimacy of 
these activities rests on what Armstrong terms “culturalist claims”, advanced by elite 
Ugandan political and religious actors who emphasised Acholi people as inherently 
forgiving.35 The performance of public rituals, most popularly mato oput (drinking the 
bitter root), has showcased one culturally-specific means of delivering this forgiveness: 
in what Meier terms the “mato oput-hype”, after the cessation of hostilities, 
international, national and local aid agencies all sponsored the ritual.36 For external 
actors, mato oput emerged as the quintessential symbol of an enculturated project of 
transitional justice. Yet countless scholars have highlighted disconnects between the 
performance of mato oput and its meaningful significance at clan level.37 Not only was 
the actual purpose of mato oput (forgiveness following accidental killing) deemed 
illegitimate to cleanse the collective wrongdoing of war-crimes, but the fact that 
sacrificial animals were funded by NGOs delegitimised the entire process. Komujuni 
and Buscher note that rwodi (customary chiefs) became “brokers” caught between 
 
34 Shaw and Waldorf, ‘Introduction’, p. 4; N. Roht-Arriaza, ‘The new landscape of transitional justice’, in N. Roht-
Arriaza and J. Mariezcurrena (eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice. 
Cambridge UP, 2006, pp. 1-16, p. 12. See also A. Honwana, ‘Sealing the past, facing the future: Trauma healing in 
rural Mozambique’, Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives 3 (1998), pp. 75-81. 
35 K. Armstrong, ‘Justice without Peace? International Justice and Conflict Resolution in Northern Uganda’, 
Development and Change 45:3 (2014), pp. 589-607, p. 590. 
36 Meier, ‘Death Does Not Rot’, supra note 4. 
37 ibid. 28. See also D-N. Tshimba, ‘Beyond the Mato Oput Tradition: embedded contestations in transitional justice 
for post-massacre Pajong, northern Uganda,’ Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies 2:2 (2015), pp. 62-85. 
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donors, the Ugandan government, and Acholi communities in order to “capture aid”.38 
Moreover, as NGOs appropriated the ritual, it was both “desacralized” and 
“modernized”, separated from its cosmological context.39 Branch decries the agenda as 
grounded in approaches to “ethno-justice”, which absolves the state from its 
responsibility in perpetuating conflict, as well as from obligations to post-war 
development—isolating Acholi people from wider political reparations.40 In essence, 
mato oput satisfied the neo-colonial imaginations of external observers and donors, who 
then ignored its subsequent local impacts.41  
 
Approaching traditional justice through the prism of tradition has served to reify the 
local as a “level” or a “hermetically sealed” space that speaks with one voice—
“tradition”—at odds with the complexity and plurality of lived realities.42 Scholars such 
as Meier have argued this extrapolation of tradition may not engender reconciliation; for 
Alcalá and Baines, moreover, instrumentalising essentialised visions of tradition risks 
generating representational violence against those who have endured conflict.43 When 
communities are excluded as “active participants” from transitional justice mechanisms, 
furthermore, Lundy and McGovern ask whose interests those interventions serve.44 It is 
clear that on these grounds, only a deeper re-envisioning both of these concepts of 
 
38 S. Komujuni and K. Büscher, ’In search of chiefly authority in ‘post-aid’ Acholiland: transformations of customary 
authorities in northern Uganda’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 14:1 (2020), pp. 103-124, p. 104. 
39 Meier, ‘Death Does Not Rot’, p. 28. 
40 A. Branch, ‘The Violence of Peace: Ethnojustice in Northern Uganda’, Development and Change 45:3 (2014), pp. 
608-630. 
41 Meier, ‘Death Does Not Rot’; T. Allen, ‘Ritual (Ab)use? Problems with Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda’, in: 
N. Waddell and P. Clark (eds.), Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, London: Royal African Society, 
2008, pp. 47-53. 
42 R. MacGinty, ‘Everyday Social Practices and Boundary-Making in Deeply Divided Societies’, Civil Wars 19:1 (2017), 
pp. 4-25. 
43 Alcalá and Baines, ‘Editorial Note’, p. 386.  
44 P. Lundy and M. McGovern, ‘Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up’, Journal of Law 
and Society 35:2 (2008), pp. 265-292, p. 266. 
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locality and of these mechanisms can promote equity and social repair. It is to this re-
envisioning I now turn. 
 
1.3 The Everyday as Radical Reorientation  
 
Recognising the shortcomings of donor-driven approaches to local repair, an emerging 
literature has sought answers in the everyday processes. Scholars have increasingly 
demonstrated the dissonance between the normative underpinnings of transitional 
justice, and local understandings of reconciliation in post-conflict settings.45 These 
studies offer a powerful evidence base, but risk widening a division between intellectual 
(often Western) assumptions of transitional justice and local, practical outcomes on the 
ground.46 In response, a more radical approach takes the everyday as a point of 
departure to explore processes of social repair within reconstructing societies. These 
studies focus not on how transitional justice should look, nor on how groups rework 
transitional justice initiatives, nor even on alternative narratives to justice or 
reconciliation—but on the logics, practices and processes through which communities 
actually make life liveable following mass violence. Seeing great value in this 
approach, the present study is influenced by this body of work.  
 
 
45 In Sierra Leone, Shaw contrasts the western tradition of confession that dominates truth commissions, against 
notions of reconciliation among Mende communities premised upon the “attainment of a cool heart”. See R. Shaw, 
‘Memory Frictions: Localising the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone,’ International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 1:2 (2007), pp. 183 -207. Kelsall notes that the decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to 
deal with issues of magic and the occult in favour of “material” crimes meant its decisions made little sense to 
communities. See also T. Kelsall, Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, Cambridge UP, 2009.  
46 L. Moe, ‘Hybrid and ‘Everyday’ Political Ordering: Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy in Somaliland’, Journal 
of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 43:63 (2011), pp. 143-77. 
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By its own admission, this study of the everyday lacks a coherent theoretical basis. 
Scholars often depart from Das’ account of how victims remade their worlds after the 
extreme violence of the Partition of India in 1947.47 In an oft-cited passage, Das argues 
that “life was not recovered through some grand gestures in the realm of the 
transcendent but through a descent into the ordinary”.48 Subsequently, studies of ‘social 
suffering’ have explored the realities of how “communities resume the task of living” 
and remake local worlds after mass violence, resisting colonising narratives within the 
parameters of community or trauma.49 In essence, suffering is viewed not as the erasure 
of meaning, but as a starting point to create new meanings. Such studies regard 
suffering as it “transcends it [the body] as cultural representation, as transpersonal 
experience, and as the embodiment of collective memory”.50 Ordinary bodies, then, 
offer sites to study the production of cultural meaning. This thesis thus privileges the 
lived experience of suffering and charts the production of that socio-cultural meaning 
through action. 
 
Other scholars have followed MacGinty’s attempt to study the “banal” means though 
which peace is forged through everyday routines and practices.51 Reacting to the top-
down institutional approach within the field of International Relations, MacGinty and 
colleagues have sought creative methodologies to capture everyday encounters and 
civilities that contribute to peace. This shift has resulted in a substantive reorientation of 
 
47 Alcalá and Baines, ‘Editorial Note’. 
48 V. Das, Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2006. 
49 V. Das and A. Kleinman, ‘Introduction’, in V. Das, et al. (eds.), Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering, and 
Recovery. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001. pp. 1-30, p. 5. 
50 A. Kleinman, ‘’Everything That Really Matters’: Social Suffering, Subjectivity, and the Remaking of Human 
Experience in a Disordering World’, Harvard Theological Review 90:3 (1997), pp. 315-335, p. 316.  
51 MacGinty, ‘Everyday peace’.  
 33 
sites relevant to investigation: in Sierra Leone, taking notions of the ‘ordinary’ 
seriously, Martin notes that what may be most desired in post-war contexts is “a 
transition to a ‘new normal’”.52 In Sierra Leone’s Bombali District, “practicing 
normality” meant deliberately not engaging in the past, but rather partaking in future-
looking activities including agriculture and religious organisations. MacDonald too 
highlights the importance of “political economies of survival”, constituted by a range of 
customs, institutions, practices and knowledges through which collectives “self-secure”, 
which could include savings groups, ritual or prayer.53 
 
Altogether, studies departing from how social repair actually looks, rather than how 
some believe it ought to look, have yielded crucial lessons. Scholars have shown how 
within localities, multiple visions of repair and reconstruction can co-exist.54 Notions of 
‘moving forward’ may emphasise (amongst other things) political redress, a return to 
moral norms, a prioritisation of the material aspects of reconstruction or cleansing 
spiritual imbalances. Granted, post-war localities remain permeated by power dynamics. 
Negotiating return may involve reinstating normative logics based on patriarchy or 
custom, logics that advance the agency of power holders whilst limiting marginal social 
groups from enacting redress. Within divided societies MacGinty draws attention to 
processes of “boundary making and maintenance” or “everyday borderworks” that are 
an essential component of everyday peace-making, and maintaining social 
 
52 L.S. Martin, ‘Practicing Normality: An Examination of Unrecognizable Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Post-
Conflict Sierra Leone’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10:3 (2016), pp. 400-418. 
53 A. MacDonald, ‘Transitional justice and political economies of survival’, p. 287. 
54 S. Finnström, ‘Reconciliation Grown Bitter? War, Retribution, and Ritual Action in Northern Uganda’, in R. Shaw 
and L. Waldorf (eds.), Localising Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence. Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford UP, 2010, pp. 135-156. 
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orthodoxies.55 These processes may draw on pre-conflict social ideas (and may also 
arise within war-zones), yet following return provide a means for individuals to order 
their social worlds through the reification of categories. In Acholiland, these worlds are 
often legitimised on the basis of ‘tradition’, occurring away from the gaze of 
international experts, and are not inherently restorative. For example, Baines and 
Gauvin describe the fraught efforts with which two mothers advocated for their children 
born in the bush during the LRA war, seeking legitimacy from male clan elders to 
guarantee their children’s rights for the future. Porter, too, describes how Acholi visions 
of “social harmony” limit women from seeking redress for sexual violations during war. 
What emerges is a notion of the ‘everyday’ that is regulated and structured not by moral 
or juridical resolution, but by order-making. In contexts characterised by incomplete 
post-war transition, Marijan argues, these everyday peace-making strategies may be 
neither “progressive nor regressive”, but rather representative of attempts to navigate 
uncertainty. 56 Fundamentally, Alcalá and Baines argue that “everyday life is the site of 
violence, not just as it is imposed but also as it is embraced and reproduced”.57  
 
1.4 Cosmology as Resource for Everyday Repair? 
 
The realities of post-war contexts have required scholars and development workers to 
engage with local ontologies, namely, ideas of justice, security, safety and harm that 
differ from rationalist, Eurocentric ideas and conventional enquiries in development.58 
 
55 MacGinty, ‘Everyday peace’, p. 555; MacGinty, ‘Everyday Social Practices and Boundary-Making’. 
56 B. Marijan, ‘The politics of everyday peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland’, Peacebuilding 5:1 
(2017), pp. 67-81. 
57 Alcalá and Baines, ‘Editorial Note’, p. 388. 
58 In 1980, Goulet compared development experts to “one-eyed giants” who disavowed non-scientific modes of 
rationality in favour of secular, linear, economic prescriptions. See D. Goulet, ‘Development experts: The one-eyed 
giants’, World Development 8:7-8 (1980), pp. 481-489, p. 481. Goulet concludes that “A growing chorus of voices, in 
rich and poor countries alike, proclaim that full human development is not possible without regard for essential 
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In recognising cosmological resources such as spirits and concepts of pollution, 
Western scholars have found both culturally-constituted scripts of ‘trauma’ and a means 
of recovering the moral, social and psychological impacts of conflict. Since for many 
African peoples, spiritual and physical entities, and material and immaterial events are 
mutually entangled, external notions of justice and security must engage with the 
spiritual dimensions of everyday existence.59 This section reviews these encounters, 
paying particular attention to Northern Uganda and arguing that under the guise of the 
‘everyday’ returnees have exhibited a marked bias towards the ‘extraordinary features’ 
of cosmological meaning. 
 
Sylvester notes that “war experiences come in prosaic, profound, sickening, 
excruciating, and exhilarating ways”.60 War and its associated upheavals are commonly 
understood to result in profound imbalances in the cosmos. Possessing spirits and 
spiritual hauntings, often manifesting in profound physical or mental suffering, have 
been understood as individual ‘embodiments’ of wider wrongdoing, pain or grief.61 
Moving beyond the past necessitates acknowledging not just the physical impacts of 
war but the cleansing of social wounds through ritual or ceremonial means.62 Rituals 
 
religious values.” (p. 488). Two decades after Goulet’s proclamation, ver Beek labelled spirituality as a 
“development taboo”. K.A. Ver Beek, ‘Spirituality: a development taboo’, in D. Eade (ed.), Development and Culture, 
Oxford: Oxfam GB, 2002, pp. 60–77, p. 66. Jones and Petersen conclude that while much literature remains 
instrumental, it is primarily concerned with how FBOs “do development better”. See B. Jones and M.J. Petersen, 
‘Instrumental, Narrow, Normative? Reviewing recent work on religion and development’, Third World Quarterly 
32:7 (2011), pp. 1291-1306, p. 1291.  
59 R. O’Byrne. ‘Deities, Demons and Outsiders: The Cosmological Dimensions of (In)Security and (In)Justice in Pajok, 
South Sudan’, London School of Economics Justice and Security Research Programme paper 21, 2015. Available at < 
https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/deities-demons-and-outsiders-the-cosmological-
dimensions-of-in-security-and-in-justice-in-pajok-south-sudan>. 
60 C. Sylvester, ‘Pathways to experiencing war’, in C. Sylvester (ed.), Experiencing War, London: Routledge (War, 
Politics and Experience series), 2010, pp. 118-130, p.129. 
61 H. Berents, ‘An embodied everyday peace in the midst of violence’, Peacebuilding 3:2 (2015), pp. 1-14. 
62 V. Igreja, ‘Why are there so many drums playing until dawn?’ Exploring the role of Gamba spirits and healers in 
the post-war recovery period in Gorongosa, Central Mozambique’, Transcultural Psychiatry 40:4 (2003), pp. 459-
487. 
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serve important functions such as facilitating psycho-social reintegration or articulating 
the past through the vernacular of spiritual agents, so as to facilitate reconciliation with 
families.63 
 
A key depiction of these relationships is Igreja’s work in Gorongosa District, the 
epicentre of the Mozambiquan civil war between 1981-85. He describes a war-scape 
characterised by the forced recruitment of young men, by violence perpetuated between 
families, and by processes which Igreja terms the “disenfranchisement of the dead”. 
Here, unburied dead and unobserved mortuary practices created cosmological 
imbalances between the dead and the living.64 In the absence of state reparations but in 
view of these polluting influences, Igreja argues that gamba (pl. magamba) spirits 
provided a means for survivors to acknowledge and to collectively address wrongs 
committed during wartime. Magamba were understood to be the spirits of dead soldiers 
who returned to fight for justice among the living, and who generally possessed women, 
manifesting in physical injuries, torment and misfortunes. To resolve these possessions, 
survivors created “social spaces” to address war-related conflicts. Gamba healers 
facilitated ceremonies where families could voice unspoken war violations, often 
including events beyond the immediate source of possession. In essence, these 
gatherings served as moments to repair social infrastructure through acknowledging the 
past.65 “[I]n their struggle for truth and justice,” Igreja notes, “spirits powerfully 
bespeak the necessity of actively dealing with the horrors of civil war.”66 
 
63 S. McKay, ‘Reconstructing fragile lives: Girls' social reintegration in northern Uganda and Sierra Leone’, Gender 
and Development 12:3 (2004), pp. 19-30. 
64 Igreja, ‘Why are there so many drums playing until dawn?’, p. 465. 
65 ibid. p. 480. 
66 ibid. p. 481. 
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Similarly, in Northern Uganda, in Acholiland, numerous studies have highlighted the 
centrality of spiritual pollution in ordinary people’s experience of recovery.67 Incidences 
of cen, a form of ‘ghostly vengeance,’ often emanated from improperly-buried dead, 
resulting in hauntings and possession, as well as generalised misfortunes including 
disease and sickness. Wider transgressions against Acholi notions of the moral order—
acts known as kiir (‘abomination’) that include murder, improper burial, fighting, sex in 
the wilderness and unbridled anger or curses—resulted in a state of pollution that could 
befall relatives of both victim and perpetrator. Such forces could affect not just families 
but entire lineages until the act was ritually cleansed.68 For recent scholars investigating 
these dynamics, fears about moral transgressions tied to cen and kiir illustrate the 
multifaceted notions of violence enacted through war and through containment in 
displacement camps—as well as how the lingering after-effects of war disturbed 
everyday life post-return. 
 
Within transitional justice, Baines has articulated the relationship between socio-
cultural concepts such as cen and post-war recovery. For her, spirits such as cen and kiir 
exist as “expressions of injustice and reflect ordinary people’s attempts to seek moral 
renewal and social repair”.69 By acknowledging such micro-level social-cultural 
resources, Acholi people both atone individually and recognise collectively the wrongs 
of the past, to “renew the social fabric”.70 Spirits in general and cen in particular thus 
 
67 Baines, ‘Spirits and reconstruction after mass violence’, p. 419; L. Victor and H. Porter ‘Dirty things: spiritual 
pollution and life after the Lord’s Resistance Army’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 11:4 (2017), pp. 590-608. 
68 Baines, ‘Spirits and reconstruction after mass violence’. 
69 ibid. p. 409. 
70 ibid. p. 412. 
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provide a language that enables traversing the ordinary landscape of forgiveness. In 
exploring the causes of cen through visiting ajwaka (female diviner-healers), Acholi 
people can confront the palimpsest of victimhood and culpability, where “bystanders, 
collaborators, informants, [and] forced perpetrators” are able to acknowledge incredible 
acts of violence during the war. As such, Baines encourages an engagement with 
cosmologies as a resource for transitional justice.  
 
Following Baines, more and more studies using ethnography, survey methods or a 
combination of the two have documented the extent of cen, particularly among ex-
combatants who had spent time in the bush, where transgressions of the moral order 
were frequent.71 As such, Porter and Victor note than cen has “become a kind of 
shorthand for all spiritual malady”; frequently used by NGO workers or as a means to 
understand reintegration in Northern Uganda.72 Whilst the cosmological situation in 
Northern Uganda is unique—owing largely to the ‘spiritual order’ of the LRA, Joseph 
Kony’s international targeting of Acholi moral values and the reported enticement of 
intra-communal crimes—the fetishisation of singular concepts and their assumed links 
to social repair perhaps tell a cautionary tale.73 Such enquiries imply that cosmological 
concepts may be recruited for political agendas, or to embed transitional justice 
programming. Overwhelmingly, moreover, many studies of cen depart from particular 
 
71 T.S. Betancourt, et al., ‘A qualitative study of mental health problems among children displaced by war in 
northern Uganda’, Transcultural Psychiatry 46:2 (2009), pp. 238–256; C. Blattman and J. Annan ‘Child combatants in 
northern Uganda: Reintegration myths and realities’, in R. Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: 
Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war. London: Routledge Global Security Studies, 2009, pp. 103-126; B. 
Roberts et al. ‘An exploration of social determinants of health amongst internally displaced persons in northern 
Uganda’, Conflict and Health 3:10 (2009); F. Neuner, et al., ‘Haunted by ghosts: prevalence, predictors and 
outcomes of spirit possession experiences among former child soldiers and war-affected civilians in Northern 
Uganda’, Social Science & Medicine 75:3 (2012), pp. 548-554. 
72 Victor and Porter, ‘Dirty things’, p. 594. 
73 K. Titeca, ‘The spiritual order of the LRA’, in T. Allen and K. Vlassenroot (eds.), The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth 
and Reality. London: Zed Press, 2010, pp. 59-73. 
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groups of victims, often ex-combatants, or similar spaces—Allen notes widespread 
‘research fatigue’ within over-researched populations, often those residing near Gulu, in 
places accessible to researchers.74 For O’Byrne, furthermore, the extent of this concept 
means that the “cosmological has therefore been primarily understood as either 
providing a context for or a mechanism for dealing with this protracted violence.”75 
Writ large, then, extrapolating entire cosmological systems in the image of war 
represents a severly reductive approach to describing such systems. In this way Meier’s 
concerns about transitional justice are clearly visible in the ‘cen-hype’ as well. 
 
Based on a longer-term study, Victor and Porter note that cen is just one of many terms 
used to express cosmological imbalance.76 Their Acholi informants often applied the 
term ajwani (‘dirty things’) to denote an imbalance, which could result from a number 
of agents—not just cen, but from ajiji (haunting memory), tipu dano (spirits of living or 
dead people), ayweya (spirits in the environment), kwaro (ancestors), or from Christian 
demons, devils or Satan. Categories are discerned pragmatically, often according to 
available remedies.77 The multiplicity of guises in which cosmological agents travel 
between Acholi and Christian ontologies is the subject of two distinct studies: 
O’Byrne’s account of Acholi personhood in Pajok, South Sudan, and Ventevogel et 
al.’s work among South Sudanese returnees. In response to types of suffering 
comparable to cen (or, to the authors, to PTSD), these respondents identified wide-
ranging agents often related not to the atrocities of war but to intra-personal tensions. In 
 
74 T. Allen, et al., ‘What Happened to Children Who Returned from the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda?’, Journal 
of Refugee Studies, forthcoming, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez116.  
75 R.J. O’Byrne, Becoming Christian: Personhood and Moral Cosmology in Acholi South Sudan, PhD Thesis, 
Department of Anthropology, University College London, 2016, p. 67. 
76 Victor and Porter, ‘Dirty Things’. 
77 ibid., p. 594. 
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Kwajena, respondents identified moul as an affliction induced by spirits of dead people, 
but also by other malevolent spirits, curses or violating taboos, and classified wehie arir 
as related to sorcery or witchcraft. In Yei, affliction was explained as mamali, caused by 
witchcraft or attack by water/forest spirits, or ngengere, again caused by witchcraft.78 
Taken together, these examples clearly show that in other post-conflict settings, diverse 
cosmologies are ordered in response to traumatic suffering following repair.  
 
Scholars have furthermore questioned the inherently restorative potential of 
cosmological mechanisms. Weignik, foregrounding the violence of spiritual possession, 
urges against romanticising realities that involve the violent inhabitation of hosts, and 
healing practices that contribute as much to suffering as to restoration.79 Of post-war 
Zimbabwe, Jeater describes how ngozi spirits associated with ‘madness’ provided a 
means for families of victims and perpetrators to reconcile after war. Her subsequent 
work, with Mashinge Jr., documented how the demands of ngozi have subsequently 
been placed “on the market”, providing a means for victims to extort ever-increasing 
reparations following wrongdoing.80 To date, scholars have paid less attention to curses 
and other retributive uses of metaphysical agents. Examples such as ngozi both 
challenge ideas about the restorative focus within cosmologies and bring into focus the 
importance of reparations: Benyara describes how one family used the threat of ngozi 
 
78 P. Ventevogel, et al. ‘Madness or sadness? Local concepts of mental illness in four conflict-affected African 
communities’, Conflict and Health 7:3 (2013), pp. 1-16, p. 5. 
79 N. Weigink, ‘Violent Spirits and A Messy Peace: Against Romanticising Local Understandings and Practices of 
Peace in Mozambique’, in G. Millar (ed.), Ethnographic Peace Research. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 137-
157. 
80 D. Jeater and J.L. Mashinge Jr. ‘Can’t pay, won’t pay: occult conflicts over neoliberal social relations in 
contemporary Zimbabwe’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 2:2-3 (2017), pp. 263-278. In her extended work, 
Jeater describes how ngozi has come to mirror the interpretations of British colonists. Formerly, ngozi was not 
meant to punish perpetrators, but to encourage them to seek out victims’ families for restitution.  
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spirits, following a refusal to bury an assassinated family member involved in political 
resistance, to levy material compensation for a murder.81   
 
Further questions arise over which social realities are excluded for research enquiry.82 
Whilst transitional justice scholars have lauded the restorative potential in ‘spirits’, they 
have kept silent on the management of intra-personal harm and forces that constitute 
‘witchcraft’. That these forces are said to reside in the same cosmological universe only 
makes this silence louder.83 Among the few examples are Igreja’s later work, exploring 
the transmutation of memories of violence and modern witchcraft beliefs into 
accusations of cannibalism in post-conflict Mozambique. Among the same Gorongosa 
communities where cosmological resources had been championed as restorative, violent 
histories served exclusionary practices as well. In a similar vein, Allen documents an 
accusation of vampirism in post-war Gulu—in the very Acholi communities heralded as 
inherently forgiving.84  
 
Given these parallels, it is worth noting the growing international ‘anti-witchcraft 
movement’, led primarily by human-rights activists. Often in the same spaces where 
cultural resources are lauded as restorative, activists condemn culture as precipitating 
violence. Rather than harness entities for development, activists have sought to legislate 
 
81 E. Benyera, ‘Presenting ngozi as an Important Consideration in pursuing Transitional Justice for Victims: The Case 
of Moses Chokuda’, Gender and Behaviour 13:2 (2015), pp. 6760-6773. 
82 V. Igreja and B. Dias-Lambranca, ‘Restorative justice and the role of magamba spirits in post-civil war Gorongosa, 
central Mozambique’, in L. Huyse and M. Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: 
Learning from African Experiences, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008, 
pp. 61-84, p. 68. 
83 R. Reis, ‘Children enacting idioms of witchcraft and spirit possession as a response to trauma: therapeutically 
beneficial, and for whom?’ Transcultural Psychiatry 50:5 (2013), pp. 622-643. 
84 T. Allen, ‘Vigilantes, Witches and Vampires: How Moral Populism Shapes Social Accountability in Northern 
Uganda’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 22:3 (2015), pp. 360-386. 
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against harmful traditional practices. In 2017, the UN held its first Experts Workshop on 
Witchcraft and Human Rights in Geneva, where experts grappled with how to define 
and contextualise witchcraft, as well as how to assist those ostracized by accusations—
all driven at least in part by perceptions that violent anti-witchcraft action is increasing 
particularly in African countries and among diasporic populations.85 Whilst this agenda 
views socio-cultural resources as a potentially negative risk-factor, these well-meaning 
experts abstract these forces from their social context, reifying witchcraft or spirit 
possession as a “belief” or a “culture”. In removing events from the contexts in which 
they occur, activists within this field risk re-exoticising cultural resources within tropes 
of otherness long decried by critical scholars. Moreover, this human-rights based 
approach silences the views of those who fear themselves affected by witchcraft. 
 
To avoid these pitfalls, a more open-ended approach is required, one that foregrounds 
the interrelation between the metaphysical processes of ‘boundary making’ and forms of 
violence. Otherwise cosmological resources may be recruited without proper evaluation 
of their local resonance, and misinterpreted and misused as a result.  
 
1.5 Towards the Everyday in West Nile 
 
Within the Transitional Justice Policy of the Ugandan government, West Nile is 
classified as a “post-conflict” space where “armed rebellion ends, resumption of 
normality and realizing stability; development investment needed.”86 Such ideas have 
 
85 See J. Fontein, ‘’She appeared to be in some kind of trance’’: Anthropology and the question of unknowability in a 
criminal trial’, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4:1 (2014), pp. 75-103. There is an active debate between Gary 
Foxcroft and Adam Ashforth about the legal vs community perspective. 
86 Government of Uganda, Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, p. vii. 
 43 
power. Before I even arrived in Arua, numerous NGO representatives in Kampala 
categorised West Nile by its conflicts: one field officer for a national NGO presented 
me with a ‘conflict compendium’, created from the Government Transitional Justice 
Audit, which characterises Uganda’s peripheral regions by a series of upheavals. This 
guide, he suggested, was the best resource to understand developmental priorities in 
West Nile. One NGO worker warned me against travel to Arua, suggesting that 
“everyone is terrorised [by war] there”.87 Instead he suggested I should study the issue 
of the ‘lost counties’ in Baganda, an issue in Uganda’s post-conflict past. Jones has 
identified bifurcated development narratives that frame Northern Uganda as a post-
conflict region, and the south as a neoliberal success story.88 Such distinctions have 
longer legacies, dating from the military recruitment and underdevelopment of the 
North during the colonial period.89 Today, stereotypes about the North are reproduced 
through NGO work.  
 
Within national consciousness, West Nile and its people still remain linked to the 
sensationalised violence of Idi Amin Dada, who hailed from the region. In his first 
address to the nation regarding COVID-19, President Yoweri Museveni offered that 
past as comparison, saying that “The ‘Corona-virus’ that time was the Amin regime”.90 
Such references silence the suffering that befell West Nilers after Amin’s downfall in 
 
87 Comment, NGO worker, Kampala, March 2016. 
88 B. Jones, Beyond the State in Rural Uganda, Edinburgh UP, 2009. See also T. Allen, ‘Northern Uganda Revisited’, 
Africa 76:3 (2006), pp. 427-436. 
89 Allen, ‘Northern Uganda Revisited’. 
90 ‘LIVE: President Museveni statement on COVID-19’, The Independent, 18 March 2020. Available at < 
https://www.independent.co.ug/live-president-museveni-statement-on-covid-19/>. In an interesting counterpoint, 
Bobi Wine, Kyadondo East MP, recently compared Museveni to Amin: ‘Idi Amin was a dictator but he did not 
destroy the infrastructure, he did not condone corruption.” See A.R.A. Shaban, ‘Bobi Wine insists Museveni ‘drunk 
on power,’ worse than Amin’, www.africanews.com, 11 October 2010, available at < 
https://www.africanews.com/2018/10/11/bobi-wine-insists-museveni-drunk-on-power-worse-than-idi-amin/>.  
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1979, and the reprisals civilians faced at the hands of the soldiers of Obote II. A brief 
recap is helpful, as just as in Uganda’s post-independence wars, civilians were 
imbricated in the battleground of this political conflict. During 1980-81, Obote’s UNLA 
(particularly after the withdrawal of the TDPF) committed lootings, massacres, rapes 
and the destruction of property in the region. Violence intensified when civilians were 
caught in offensives between the UNLA and resistance from the former soldiers of 
Amin, in the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF 1). Between 1980-86, populations 
were displaced en masse across international borders. 
 
On March 28, 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA) arrived peaceably in Arua 
town. Following the creation of NRA leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s government, 
limited national efforts were made to redress the violations of the past. The new 
Ugandan government spearheaded one of the first national Truth Commissions, the 
Commission of Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights, which from 1986-94 gathered 
testimonies on human rights violations that had occurred since independence 
(December 1962 – January 1986). The results of the enquiry were never made public.91 
The installation of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) ushered in a period of 
alleged peace, but militant activity continued to destabilize civilians until the late 1990s. 
Rebel movements continued to operate despite rebuke: at a meeting on January 29, 
1986, elders formally cursed rebels who continued to fight the NRA government, 
should they kill civilians, rape women or loot property.92  
 
91 J.R. Quinn, ‘Social Reconstruction in Uganda: The Role of Customary Mechanisms in Transitional Justice’, Human 
Rights Review 8 (2007), pp. 389–407. 
92 Quoted by Jason Avutia in a June 1986 Interview with Brigadier Wilson Toko, the then-leader of rebel factions, at 
the White Rhino Hotel in Arua: Toko had requested permission to fight the advancing NRA government, which 
elders denied in favour of “love, peace and development”. See R. Drasimaku, ‘Lugbara now want a king’, New 
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From a political economy perspective, Bogner and Neubert argue that West Nilers have 
collectively been “denied justice”.93 Certainly, if history is assessed according to the 
normative tenets of transitional justice, wherein to rebuild society violent pasts must be 
recognised, and justice served in some form to perpetrators of civilian violence, this is 
the case.94 In the 2002 peace agreement with the UNRF II (Amin’s former soldiers), for 
example, terms favoured ex-combatants and infrastructure development for Yumbe (one 
of the main aims of the UNRF II was ending the region’s ‘backwardness’). Given their 
ties to development, veterans commanded respect and acknowledgement for their role 
as fighters.95 Yet the agreement contained neither provisions for reparations for civilian 
victims, nor mention of punishing perpetrators. The authors do acknowledge a degree of 
subsequent political transformation, namely the creation of Yumbe District—formerly 
Arua District—a concession to the Aringa subgrouping of West Nile’s population (the 
same section that was home for most members of the UNRF II). Simultaneously, this 
endeavor served as a form of ‘post-conflict governance’, a means for the Ugandan state 
apparatus to establish itself along a remote border.  
 
The agreements yielded other changes as well. During this research period, the Aringa 
Lugbara group (formerly known as the ‘Muslim Lugbara’), culturally ceded from the 
wider, predominantly Christian Lugbara population, appointing their own king. In 
 
Vision, 29 July 2014, available at <https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1305586/lugbara-king>. See also Interview 2, 
Jason Avutia, Lugbara Agofe26/10/2016.   
93 A. Bogner and G. Rosenthal, ‘The "Untold" Stories of Outsiders and Their Significance for the Analysis of (Post-) 
Conflict Figurations. Interviews with Victims of Collective Violence in Northern Uganda (West Nile)’, Forum 
Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 15:3 (2014), Article 4. 
94 Quinn, ‘Social Reconstruction in Uganda’ 
95 Bogner and Neubert, ‘Negotiated Peace’, pp. 64-5. 
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essence, the processes described were remote from Lugbara people, though the creation 
of Yumbe District inspired other aspirations for autonomy from county groups within 
Arua District. In 2010, Maracha District (formerly Maracha County), with its majority 
Lugbara population, ceded from the wider Arua District. During this research, Terego 
County too was pursuing claims for separation. Despite expectations that Maracha 
District would bring services closer to the poor, most residents suggested that beyond 
the creation of a District Headquarters at Nyadri, this shift in status had brought little 
change to their lives.  
 
Armstrong’s culturalist claims regarding forgiveness, have on occasion, been evidenced 
by activists in West Nile’s past. Northern Ugandan elites have drawn on the peace-
making processes of West Nile as emblematic of the restorative potential of traditional 
resources. In 1986, Lugbara elders were involved in an inter-tribal reconciliation 
ceremony called omo tong (‘the bending of spears’), to signify the cessation of “war or 
fighting between Acholi and Ma’di, Kakwa, Lugbara, or Alur of West Nile”.96 This 
meeting signified an end to revenge killings between Acholi people (under Amin), and 
Lugbara people (under Obote II). Those present took oaths not to fight each other, and 
ate together. Archbishop Odama of Gulu Diocese, an advocate for the restorative 
potential of traditional justice, lauded the event as archetypal traditional justice:  
We have looked at the different tribes here, for example Alur, Acholi, Lugbara, 
Jonam, and we discovered that in all these groups they have reconciliation rites, 
even though they may call them by different names and their approaches vary… 
On that day we experienced peace and reconciliation and we bent spears as a 
gesture of an end to war, and today the bent spears are still here as you can see 
them.97 
 
96 J.R. Quinn, ‘The Thing behind the Thing: Christian Responses to Traditional Practices of Acknowledgement in 
Uganda’, Review of Faith & International Affairs 8:1 (2010), pp. 3-12. 
97 Interview 19/01/10 cited in E.O. Opong, NGO Peacebuilding in Northern Uganda: Interrogating Liberal Peace from 
the Ground, PhD Thesis, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2012, p. 259. 
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Leopold, a historical anthropologist confined to Arua in the late 1990s, described a 1992 
rite of purification—rua edezu or angu edezu (to cleanse ‘the body’, or ‘the place’, 
adapted from post-feud rituals in the colonial period)—performed by a Council of 
Elders to lift a historical curse placed on Lugbara collaborators with the Belgians. The 
curse was blamed for the loss of life since this time, and the ritual involved reciting the 
names of those killed in West Nile thereafter.98 Both rituals—the rua edezu and the 
gomo tong—were undertaken by elders who would be considered part of an Aruan 
educated elite. Unlike donor-driven ideals, these events entangle ideas of ritual with 
longer historical oppression, and represent pragmatic coalitions of functionaries in order 
to address the past. Yet these public rituals reveal little about everyday repair. These 
were not everyday mechanisms, which NGO analysts have struggled to describe. One 
ICC report, written by a Teregian contributor who extends the Acholi focus on 
‘traditional’ reconciliation to Lugbara groups, lists systems of family and elder 
mediation that deal with land, adultery and poisoning. It is not entirely clear how these 
systems could be recruited into donor agendas, especially as these systems appear to be 
punitive, rather than restorative. 
 
One final development worth noting has been donor funding for “cultural associations”. 
Among the Lugbara, this funding has benefited the Lugbara Kari, formed by elders who 
participated in gomo tong, as well as county-level elders’ associations—the Ayivu 
Elders and the Maracha Elders. These associations, which have written constitutions 
and administrative positions (including a “women’s officer”), primarily act as conduits 
 
98 Leopold reports that the curse condemned those who collaborated with the government to death. Leopold 
recalls that it contains the words: “She will affect him. He will fail. He will get his fate.” Very similar terms were used 
in ritual curses during the present research.  
 48 
for donor funding. One Ayivu elder explained, “We are an arm of government”.99 The 
work of these organisations resembles government style “sensitisations”, interventions 
that impose ideas of development through worship and training services. During this 
research, the Ayivu Elders were predominantly focused on service-provision and 
capacity building with South Sudanese people displaced to nearby border settlements, 
rather than on Lugbara “host communities”.100 County-level associations, premised on 
former colonial chieftaincies and post-colonial state-led efforts to develop cultural 
representation, were embroiled in crises of legitimacy in part because of the fragility of 
state-sponsored efforts to build representation through “inventing” tradition in a 
segmentary society.101 Indicating the disconnect between these associations and 
everyday life, one participant in this research expressed appreciation that I as a 
researcher had not stopped at elders’ associations, but had come to learn from 
communities themselves.  
 
In short, neither political analysis, nor cultural claims, nor the NGO industry have 
revealed much of substance about everyday social repair in this region. As Clark and 
Palmer note, generalized narratives of victimhood collapse enquiries into local and 
socio-cultural frames that follow different conflicts.102 Indeed, the Lugbara war story is 
ill-encapsulated by narratives of total victimhood. Prior to fleeing the UNLA, many 
Lugbara people witnessed horrific acts of torture and killing. The ensuing conflict 
destroyed missions, health facilities, government building and homes in Arua and 
 
99 I2, Mike Agondua, Leader of Ayivu Elders, 20/10/2016. 
100 I, SNV Programme Manager, Arua, 05/05/2016. 
101 J. Odama, ‘Lugbara-Kari blames OPM over refugee killings’, West Nile Web, 23 September 2020. Available at 
<https://www.westnileweb.com/news-a-analysis/arua/lugbara-kari-blames-opm-over-refugee-killings>. 
102 P. Clark and N. Palmer, ‘Introduction: Challenging Transitional Justice’, in N. Palmer, P. Clark, and D. Granville 
(eds.), Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, pp. 1-16, pp. 6-8. 
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across the countryside. Many former solders under Amin were, however, involved in 
resistance, and today former rebels do not hide their status. Indeed, as in Yumbe, they 
often occupy prominent public positions (including in the LRA peace negotiations). 
That said, rebels were largely drawn from Muslim fighters loyal to Amin, rather from 
Christian Lugbara (many of whom Amin purged from his army during the early years of 
his rule). Whilst the return from exile has involved the physical, moral and social 
rebuilding of lives and livelihoods—a major line of enquiry for this research—it has not 
involved dealing with ‘mass perpetrators’ in the midst of everyday life.  
 
Whilst the post-Amin years featured profound destruction, which continued to be a 
feature of rebel insurgences along the border throughout the 1990s, many Lugbara 
people today do not see those decades as characterised solely by conflict (as external 
interveners and scholars such as Leopold suggest).103 This pragmatic approach to repair 
is reflected in studies of the informal trade, in which many Lugbara men were able to 
use their exile connections to their advantage. Striking among life histories were the 
inequalities experienced during the war and after return. Many Maracha families 
described the post-war years as representing struggles similar to exile: people laboured 
to establish farming, and continued to die in large numbers.104 Though statistics from 
the region are not available, given trends in Uganda more widely it is likely that many 
deaths clustered in households were caused by AIDS. In a framework where individual 
or family loss constitutes a collective loss to the clan, the immediate period of return 
thus ushered in localised upheavals which my interlocutors compared to the horrors of 
 
103 For a detailed account see R. Day, The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda, Comparative Politics, 43(4), 
(2011), p.439-458 
104 Bogner and Rosenthal, ‘The "Untold" Stories’, p. 4. 
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war. Amidst these tragedies, West Nilers were positioned amidst shifting aid flows to 
the East in Acholiland from the mid-1990s, (and latterly to the North in response to the 
South Sudanese war). One survivor of a massacre at Ombaci, the site of confrontation 
between the UNLA army and rebel troops, decried this lack of material support: “As 
human beings, you get jealous. In Gulu, they are doing workshops. You get jealous of 
their goats, cows—they get things there. But why are we here ignored? We suffered in 
Ombaci—we spilt the same blood as them over there, yet we get nothing”.105 
 
This thesis explores these moments to reflect on what it means to embark on everyday 
life following unacknowledged conflicts. It reflects on “ordinary” acts which do not 
necessarily pertain to periods of armed conflict in order to account for social repair. In 
order to do so, I depart from a influential study of Lugbara society conducted years 
before the abovementioned wars, a study conducted when healing practices lay at the 
centre of the creation and maintenance of a socio-cultural world. In so doing, I seek to 
document issues of change and continuity away from the confines of the transitional 
justice remit.  
 
1.6 Change, Continuity and Ritual in Historic Context 
 
As Knighton notes in his longue-durée study of Karamoja socio-cultural worlds, 
anthropologists are often more invested in transferring the findings of research 
synchronically than diachronically.106 As noted in the first section of this introduction, 
 
105 I, Survivor, 25/05/2016 (OJ).  
106 B. Knighton, ‘Globalizing Trends or Identities through Time? The longue durée in Karamojong 
Ethnography’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 1:3 (2007), pp. 466-483. 
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however, any investigation of Lugbara society today requires calibration against the 
pole of John Middleton’s work, which provides a means to explore change and 
continuity. Whilst Middleton was involved in an anthropological project that sought to 
salvage cultures amid their dissolution, the present study (specifically Chapter Three) 
encourages a reading of Middleton’s work showcasing how elders strove to preserve 
particular moral understandings against change. Cleansing sickness, repairing 
relationships and death all sought to instil these ideas.107 Revisiting Middleton’s work, 
then, is not intended to contrast a simplified past with a more complex present, but 
rather to explore continuities in how Lugbara elders have exercised agency amid social 
flux. It compares post-return responses to strategies which existed before them. 
 
Three decades after Middleton, Allen explored the potential of healing processes to 
employ significant violence, working among Ma’di communities who neighbour the 
Lugbara. Whilst Middleton’s work elucidated order in a time of relative stability, 
Allen’s was undertaken amidst the extreme difficulties of return from war. In the village 
where Allen resided, two female suspects were violently tortured to death, an event that 
opened up many more cases of such killings. 108 In seeking to explain this violence, 
Allen contested contemporary accounts of violence such as Turnbull’s Mountain 
People—in which Turnbull set aside sociological analysis to instead explain horrific 
events during famine as stemming from individualist practices that abnegated family 
and communal bonds—and Harrell-Bond’s Imposing Aid, which ascribes violent acts of 
mob justice to nutritional deficiencies and the failure of the humanitarian system. 
 
107 J. Middleton, ‘Lugbara Death’, in M. Bloch and J. Parry (eds.), Death and the Regeneration of Life. Cambridge UP, 
1982, pp. 134-154. 
108 T. Allen, ‘The Violence of Healing’, Sociologus 47:2 (1997), pp. 101-128. 
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Rather, Allen describes violent events in the context of an archive of moral knowledge, 
“often not spoken of, by lying just beneath the surface of daily activity”.109  
  
To make this claim, Allen, like later scholars interested in post-war recovery, has 
engaged the idea of a “cultural archive” offered by James in The Listening Ebony. 110 
James explains how the Uduk people in South Sudan endured dramatic changes, 
including the incursion of Christianity and Islam, with reference to a body of moral 
knowledge about Uduk ways of being. In the face of change, this knowledge persists as 
a means of validation. Borrowing from Foucault, James advanced the idea of a “cultural 
archive”, a corpus of notions which constitute the moral world of being Uduk, but 
which “do not necessarily form, in themselves a system or an articulated theory, but like 
an archive, may constitute a lasting base of past reference and future validation. They 
may at times rest dormant but on occasion be drawn upon for the formation of new 
discourse”.111 This cultural archive—expressed partly through commitment to the 
religious practices of the ‘Order of Ebony’—provided a means to endure change. Whilst 
society is continually in flux, bodies of knowledge that define people as individuals and 
as collectives endure.  
 
Whilst James ties ideas of the cultural archive to the person and the body, Allen 
explores the notions of shared patrilineage, made manifest in payments of bridewealth, 
spirit possession and healing. But like James, Allen reads these ideas as moralities that 
 
109 T. Allen, ‘Violence and Moral Knowledge: Observing Social Trauma in Sudan and Uganda’, Cambridge Journal of 
Anthropology 13:2 (1988/1989), pp. 45-66, pp. 48-9. 
110 J. De Berry. Life after Loss: A Study of Post-War Recovery in Teso, PhD Thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, 
LSE, 1999. 
111 W. James, The Listening Ebony: Moral Knowledge, Religion, and Power among the Uduk of Sudan. Oxford UP, 
1988, p. 6. 
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are continually encoded in response to changing circumstances, serving to redraw 
contours of inclusion and exclusion within Ma’di communities. Whilst, like Middleton, 
Allen searches for the locus of the moral economy below constructed ethnicities, he 
engages with ideas of kaka, or ‘clans’ in a more flexible sense. In the context of post-
exile return, he links the violent purge of female poisoners to the non-payment of 
bridewealth, which placed accused women outside of kaka and into the context of 
death—historical fears of inyinya (poisoning) thus led to these violent evictions. 
Crucially, community members did not fully condemn this violence, and those 
individuals who performed the killing were not held to account. Allen concludes that: 
“women, it seems, have consistently become casualties in the process of establishing 
networks of accountability”.112 Allen’s reading draws on Girard’s ideas of the scapegoat 
to illuminate the functions of violence: since this violence drew on archives of shared 
knowledge, the killings served as a cathartic means of rebuilding community in difficult 
circumstances. 
 
Middleton and Allen locate the maintenance of order—or its breakdown—in shared 
cultural resources. Whilst Middleton emphasises the possibilities for internal order-
making in the suppression of masculine ambition regarding ancestry and notions of ru 
(respect), Allen understands wider cultural mechanisms through which marginal people 
can be excluded from communities. Both works bring into focus the continuing 
important of ritual praxis—particularly tied to bridewealth and funerary rites, as well as 
performances of possession, integral to understanding the present research. This thesis 
finds notions of the cultural archive useful to interrogate social repair. Cases of 
 
112 Allen, ‘Violence and Moral Knowledge’, p. 63. 
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misfortune demand an interrogation of shared histories, of an accumulated repository of 
knowledge passed through clans relating to moral codes and ritual praxis. In the ritual 
field, this knowledge remains important because it is intimate: cultural archives relate 
not just to rituals, but to intimacies; of personalities and proclivities of living and dead 
relatives, debts and transfers following marriage and death, and histories and reparations 
done or undone between clans. This thesis is interested too in processes through which 
these histories are passed on through generations, in processes which Feuchtwang calls 
“intimate transmission”. It is concerned with culture, but as it pertains to the 
specificities of any person’s situations, extending in space and time.113 This thesis 
appreciates how, notions of personhood and belonging can remain powerful even if 
unfulfilled through ritual practice, existing as ideas which “follow”.  
 
In approaching the practical work of construction, this study is inspired by the turn to 
pragmatic action advocated by Whyte. With reference to the management of suffering 
among Nyole people in Eastern Uganda, Whyte proposes this pragmatic approach as an 
antidote to earlier functional approaches, which for her represented a ‘spectator theory 
of knowledge’ (cf. Dewey), making ceremony (and certainties) out of the experiential 
aspects of suffering. 114 Whilst suffering is engaged in the deciphering of social 
meaning, Whyte writes against an anthropology of practical reason premised the 
prioritisation of fixed cultural patterns.115 Rather, Whyte is concerned with how 
 
113 S. Feuchtwang, ‘Haunting Memory: The Extension of Kinship Beyond the Nation’, in C.D. Cesari and A. Rigney 
(eds.), Transnational Memory. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 271-286. 
114 S. R. Whyte, (1989). ‘Anthropological approaches to African misfortune: from religion to medicine’, in A. 
Jacobson-Widding and D. Westerlun (eds.), Culture, experience and pluralism: essays on African ideas of illness and 
healing. Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthopology, 1989, pp. 289-301. See also S.R. Whyte, Questioning 
Misfortune: The Pragmatics of Uncertainty in Eastern Uganda. Cambridge UP: Cambridge Studies in Medical 
Anthropology, 1997, p. 3. 
115 Whyte, ‘Questioning Misfortune’, p.3. 
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pragmatic approaches to addressing suffering mark an occasion to explore notions of 
personhood and social identity, collapsing boundaries between intellectual, spiritual and 
pursuits. As such, Whyte explores how Nyole people express agency through 
questioning suffering and assessing the causes of misfortune through what is at stake 
within their local moral worlds. Unlike Nyole peoples, the politics of asking among 
Lugbara people relies not on individualising divinatory traditions (though these do 
feature), but on coming together as collectives to ask, and decipher, the cause of 
misfortune. This thesis is thus interested in how individuals and collectives practically 
search for explanation to act within the overall framework of Lugbara society, it also 
considers how individuals act when these attempts fail. 
 
Simultaneously, other scholars have noted how war and political violence relate to 
radical cultural changes. Jones for example, encapsulates the embrace of born-again 
Pentecostalism in post-war Teso, which provided a new script for ordinary people to 
break with the horrors of the past.116 Behrend, more interested in local realities of 
affliction, describes how the interventions of lay Charismatic Catholic movements 
produced new fears of occult forces in Torro, Western Uganda, amidst startling death 
rates from AIDS.117 Whilst both authors find evidence for transitions in pre-war 
contexts, these studies indicate how the emergence of new institutions produce and 
reframe cultural repertories. The studies of Middleton, James, Allen and Whyte were 
undertaken among populations who had resisted conversion to Christianity (or Islam). 
Following return, many Lugbara people converted to Christianity, or embraced the 
 
116 Jones, ‘Beyond the State’. 
117 H. Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals: The Catholic Church, Witch-Hunts, and the Production of Pagans in Western 
Uganda. Suffolk: James Currey, 2011. 
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forms of born-again Christianity described by Jones and Behrend. People also recognise 
new forms of terror, which have infiltrated local society, and are feared because they 
have no precedent in lineage histories or experience. In understanding struggles over 
community, this thesis argues it is necessary to account for the influence of changing 
religious, and state institutions, and how these changes do, or do not interface with 
intimate archives. These entanglements are central in understanding evolution in 
sometimes violent forms of boundary-making in the context of the state-law. In efforts 
to remake community, Lugbara people reference not just intimate histories or ways of 
being, but engage “modern” technologies to make evidentiary claims as to the presence 
of the “enemy”. This thesis is thus interested in how new movements promote particular 
fears as to insiders to gain legitimacy post-war, as well as in historical struggles to 
define wrongdoing with reference to the state. To use Mogensen’s terms, this thesis 
understands culture as a forum where “multiple voices compete”.118 It is interested in 
pragmatic quests to define suffering, amidst increasing institutional complexity: in what 
Porter terms the “choreography” through which Lugbara people attempt social repair.119  
 
1.6 Sites, Methods and Reflections 
 
The fieldwork for this research comprised a total of fourteen months, split into three 
phases: May–July 2016, September–July 2017, and December–January 2018. These 
phases require some explanation, since the research design intentionally sought to 
respond to scholarly calls to creatively capture everyday dynamics.120 Whilst this study 
 
118 H.O. Mogensen, ‘The Resilience of Juok: Confronting Suffering in Eastern Uganda’, Africa 72:3 (2002), pp. 420-
436. 
119 H. Porter, ‘Moving toward ‘home’: love and relationships through war and displacement’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies (forthcoming). 
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was designed as a means of investigating social repair, the physical sites of inquiry and 
what Amit terms their “limits” were constructed in conversation with events on the 
ground.121  
 
The first phase dealt primarily with the NGO landscape and area cultural associations. 
After several months spent in Arua town and environs, it was evident that the post-war 
reconciliation projects onto which southern NGO workers put so much emphasis were 
not forthcoming. Members of the Ayivu Elders Association, who contributed much to 
the formation of this research, seldom referred to the war, but did reference the 
legitimacy of clans, cursing, theft and other cases pertinent to the study. One of Ayivu’s 
elders, himself having had anthropological training, began to ask questions about ‘John’ 
[Middleton], and on his request I convened a focus group that reassessed the 
representations within Lugbara Religion. Despite decrying representations of their 
ancestors’ “religion” (since Christianity now constituted dini), elders keenly re-enacted 
oracular consultations they had witnessed as young boys. Later conversations entangled 
notions of sickness with justice; provoked by the possibilities of order-making within 
Lugbara Religion, these elders lamented post-exile changes in moral behaviour, and the 
increasing burden of sickness on their communities. 
 
After the focus group, I visited elders in their homes, taking detailed life histories, and 
developed a network of contacts, interviews and discussions in two villages on Arua’s 
periphery. Both elders and the village Local Councillor I (LCI) were enthusiastic that I 
should view processes “in the community”. On the ground, elders remained revered not 
 
121 V. Amit, Constructing the Field: Ethnographic Fieldwork in the Contemporary World. London: Verso, 2000, p. 6. 
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for their secular roles in cultural associations, but as repositories of wisdom in issues of 
land and family, as well as for the mystical power of their curses.122 I continued to 
collect histories of bringing out e’yo (words or issues) into the public arena via sittings, 
reinforcing hierarchies of age that have long ordered communities, and found that the 
realities of power differed greatly from the bureaucratised authority presented in 
associations: rather, clan authority was reinforced through the exercise (or suggestion) 
of mystical power. Seven elders with whom relations were formed during this research, 
took on roles as advisors. Throughout this research, I visited them repeatedly to discuss 
the findings of this research. 
 
Simultaneously, Christian groups were a prominent feature of the local moral landscape. 
Meetings typically began with prayers to mungu for protection and good fortune, and 
often I was asked if I was “saved.” Rather than imposing ideas of how social repair 
should look, these discussions pointed to scripts of moral probity and power beyond my 
initial formulations. Just as analysts have urged scholars to avoid assuming the primacy 
of the state in local functioning at Uganda’s borders, so too have they urged the 
avoidance of assuming traditional justice exists as a “cohesive and homogenised 
alternative to formal systems”.123 In West Nile, sittings that responded to misfortune 
connected reparations of bodies, or familial disputes to public discussions of moral 
probity drawing on bodies of customary, Christian and legal logics. Moreover, the 
physical assembling of sittings was also transient: in view of a particular affliction or 
issue, the routine of a homestead could be disrupted by ecstatic healing prayers, a 
 
122 For example, in my first months of field notes, fears about curses were raised on thirty-one separate occasions. 
Concerns about bridewealth were registered in thirteen.  
123 Allen and Macdonald, ‘Post-Conflict Traditional Justice’, p. 2. 
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funeral, or a delegation of elders sitting to resolve a dispute. Religious crusades could 
radically alter the daily rhythm of village life, as could improvised meetings to evict 
witches or poisoners. Far from static attachment to particular sites, sittings appeared in 
response to local crises of sickness, accusations or moral violations. These impromptu 
gatherings generated discussions of cosmological forces, past histories and moral 
norms, all refined with respect to the social landscape of the present.  
 
Returning to Arua in September 2016, my second phase of research found a different 
mood, partly because of the issues facing Bishops Drandua and Odoki detailed in 
Chapter Nine. Inspired by the events of phase one, and the events of Ediofe, the 
research method switched to observing, documenting and interviewing events witnessed 
in sittings and other healing encounters. Cases I witnessed included witchcraft 
accusations, evictions, curses, land disputes, accusations of adultery, séances of 
diviners, religious crusades and healing ministries. Witnessing was key to understanding 
communal politics, enabling me to comprehend certain proceedings and ask relevant 
questions about others. Following Kapferer, the event—whether healing a body or 
disciplining behaviour—was foregrounded as the central tool in ethnographic analysis, a 
means by which I as an outsider could glimpse the complexities of cosmology and 
social relations.124 Das discusses “critical events”, which—rather than serving as a mere 
template for wider cases—serve as “openings to new potentialities in the formation of 
social realities.”125 Just as Das engages with conversations and media discourses around 
key events, I too documented the cacophony of perspectives emerging in response. Like 
 
124 B. Kapferer, ‘Introduction’, in B. Kapferer and L. Meinert (eds.), In the Event – Toward an Anthropology of Generic 
Moments. New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2015, pp. 1-28, pp. 1-2. 
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Das, I found that critical events were always sites of struggle in which differing ideas 
clashed with competing bodies of knowledge: frequently, clan histories, biblical 
knowledge and law. Events were thus a way to understand both the ordering of social 
life in critical moments, as well as to chart the difficulties in reconciling normative 
agendas based on Lugbara identity. Localities rarely proved the “limit” to enquiries, so 
to fully understand and historicise these events, I conducted interviews afterwards with 
pastors, sub-county parish chiefs, youth groups and others within and beyond sites.126 
Where relevant, local print and radio media were also recorded.  
 
During the long second phase the geographical location of the research also shifted 
beyond Arua. Building on my connections, I continually visited one clan in Maracha, 
and a second clan in Terego.127 From my base in Maracha, intentionally located near 
where Middleton had stayed seventy years prior, I was introduced to numerous 
surrounding communities, and followed emerging forms of anti-witchcraft action across 
the sub-county. Whilst many authorities were anxious about an outsider documenting 
witchcraft in a region already stigmatised within national schemas, many officials in 
Maracha were eager for me to engage with issues of public safety that were ignored by 
higher state authorities. One LC of Maracha noted that researchers usually “just ask 
their questions—this is the first time that anyone has come to talk to us and has allowed 
us to talk openly about these burning issues that are affecting our community.”128 An 
LCIII, moreover, expressed concern that evictions needed “critical evaluation”.129 As 
 
126 Amit, Constructing the Field, p. 6. 
127 In Terego, hostility between the clan and surrounding neighbours prevented similar freedoms, but I was able to 
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128 FG, Ovujo, 30/05/2016 (OJ). 
129 I, LCIII, Nyadri, 18/02/2017. 
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Finnström noted in documenting Acholi cosmology, my role was rarely the evaluator 
these officials anticipated, but more of a “child” learning about causal explanations and 
frameworks for suffering.130 This learning was encouraged by groups involved in 
evictions, who wanted to express realities which were suppressed by state authorities. 
 
Additionally to tracing village events, I spent periods with two diviner-healers in Arua 
District. Since these were fora dominated by women, it was difficult to visit specialists 
in the sites where I was conducting long-term observations with elders. In meeting 
diviner-healers in Arua, however, I was able to access safe spaces where women 
articulated fears regarding misfortune. Elsewhere, I continued to meet with contacts in 
Arua, tracing familial dynamics and participating in household discussions where 
invited, as well as repeatedly interviewing six elders who lived in the sub-counties 
surrounding Arua town in order to develop a coherent baseline of data. Many insights 
arose from informal chats, though I never discussed the details of my observations with 
different communities, instead recording my notes in a private field diary whether I was 
working at my home base or in transit.  
 
This mobile methodology responds to scholarly calls to study spiritual power on an 
“awkward scale”, what Comaroff and Comaroff here refer to the co-mingling of local, 
regional and transnational knowledge. Capturing the global and the local in the 
ethnographic gaze, I sought to directly engage the forms of authority mediating and 
localising Christianity and law: Ugandan pastors using Nigerian Pentecostal texts to 
 
130 S. Finnström, ‘In and Out of Culture: Fieldwork in War-torn Uganda’, Critique of Anthropology 21:3 (2001), pp. 
247-258. 
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explain possession in Maracha, and elders improvising upon extant national law to 
respond to clan deviance.131 This multi-sited method responded furthermore to the 
unique dimensions of the context: to the aforementioned transience of spaces of 
reparation, to the mobility of Lugbara people, and to previous scholarship based on a 
single clan or healer. Indeed, previous researchers had reduced the noise of external 
logics to advance a cultural uniformity directly at odds with the contestations I had 
witnessed during the first phase of the research.132 Granted, multi-sited methods receive 
critique for the partial picture they offer the researcher, but developing a network of 
diverse sites afforded me the advantage that I was always invited to witness events. 
Though I did “parachute in” to many offices of authorities, and frequently moved from 
town to village, these invitations granted me entry to covert events such as clan sittings 
and divinatory séances—covert given both the critical commentary of Christian actors 
and outcomes that can contradict individual rights. Moreover, though an accepted part 
of everyday life, these were spaces where participants were addressing long-term 
suffering, issues with intimacy or where wrongdoers were forced to testify in front of 
communal members. Whilst not hidden, necessarily, these events retained an element of 
secrecy: the presence of an outsider was unusual. 
 
The third and final phase of fieldwork involved following up on cases, and verifying 
findings with elders who had served as key advisors throughout the research process. 
Overall, during this research, I conducted 233 interviews and 47 focus groups (many of 
 
131 J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, ‘Ethnography on an Awkward Scale: Postcolonial Anthropology and the Violence of 
Abstraction’, Ethnography 4:2 (2003), pp. 147-179. 
132 E.g. Middleton and Barnes-Dean. As discussed in Chapter Three, these works stand in stark contrast to 
ethnographic enterprises of missionaries, who report a plurality of spiritual forces, that increased as clinical 
medicine was established. 
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which were impromptu, happening in homesteads or trading centres), and documented 
58 cases of attending to suffering within clans and 30 cases of divinatory healing. 
 
Any presentation of local reality is in fact a representation, based on “intersubjective” 
content generated at the intersection of researcher and participant(s).133 Being a white 
outsider in these intersections carries particular connotations in West Nile, thus it is here 
necessary to broach my own positionality. In Lugbarati, white Europeans are known as 
mundu, which literally means something ‘distant’, or ‘far away’. One Anglican priest 
told me that mundu identified someone who “walked differently”.134 An alternative 
origin of mundu might be from the Lingala word “rifle”.135 Such derivations point to a 
distance between Europeans and local populations that has historically fostered a lack of 
accountability and violence. Alongside this connotation, after recent humanitarian 
encounters, mundu has become associated with the distribution of resources. I was 
given the name Aykoro (joy), which is partly a cynical expression regarding the arrival 
of resources. Both this word mundu and the local archive of experiences with whiteness 
signified an inscription of difference that no amount of rapport-building would erase. 
Though I built solidarities and friendships with many different Lugbara of different 
ages, attended a church, registered in a village, and learnt basic Lugbarati, I could 
always be placed outside local life. In research sites I was not a stranger, but given the 
continual porosity of compounds and villagers by relatives and friends, I could always 
be mundu.  
 
 
133 M. Jackson, The Politics of Storytelling: Violence, Transgression, and Intersubjectivity. Copenhagen: Museum 
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My position as a single woman researcher, moreover, troubled stated moral norms about 
family. In Lugbarati, zamva (woman) literally means ‘meat (za) to be eaten (mva)’. The 
movement of unmarried women and female traders provoked continual comment from 
elders, as did loitering (of anyone) around markets and trading centres, perceived as 
“idleness”. Though it is now an idealised fiction that women should remain in the home, 
and many women trade for survival, men decry their free movement and the perceived 
erosion of home life. Even in households of female teachers or government officials, 
gendered hierarchies are affirmed through household labour, the serving and 
consumption of food and in the ways in which women address men. Yet my daily 
routine was not structured by the discipline informing local moral norms. Often I was 
invited to eat with elders whilst women looked on from papyrus mats, and whilst for 
many women giving testimony before elders was a source of fear, given my privilege as 
a foreigner I was able to directly pose questions of elders. My desire to understand local 
realities continually superseded the constraints of hierarchy within them.  
 
During my fieldwork I also worked with four different research assistants, who acted 
not only as translators, but as key interlocutors in revealing the meaning of statements 
said and unsaid. Mwambari notes that research assistants occupy particular positions in 
the generation of knowledge, and my assistants, at different stages of life and members 
of different Christian movements, had diverse opinions on notions of custom, 
possession and witchcraft.136 These divergent perspectives emerged in what Arhem 
terms “participant reflection”, addressing cases in reflective group discussions.137 Such 
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137 Cited in S. Finnström, Living With Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda. 
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reflections have great utility in researching cosmological concepts different from the 
lifeworld of the researcher; Finnström describes how relationships built with assistants 
can lead to “intercultural understandings” that facilitate greater understanding of the 
gaps between two epistemological groundings.138 Additionally, Lugbara people related 
to me more readily on account of my connections to my assistants. This work is 
indebted to their insights—indeed, I quote them directly at several points in this 
thesis—and the openings into local life they provided. 
 
As Rutherford notes, in the field of action the politics between researcher and the-
researched interfaces with political struggles within communities.139 My assistants 
continually highlighted the difference between the hospitality I received as an outsider 
and the suspicion with which people treated each other: in my assistants’ words, “They 
[the informants] did not love each other”. Leopold, similarly, draws attention to a report 
written by a committee of elderly men describing the “evil things…that we West Nilers 
are capable of doing to each other”.140 Indeed, my presence often elicited mention of 
envy from my interlocutors. One elder summarised: “I am telling you this because white 
people don’t have envy like black people have”.141 Envy, as I detail in later chapters, is 
a chief motivator for spiritual malice. As an outsider I was usually placed beyond the 
limits of this malice—I could not be affected by curses, or by many forms of witchcraft 
which “followed families”, nor could I inflict them. Whilst my identity served as a 
 
138 Finnström, ‘In and out of culture’. 
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dichotomy against which my informants constituted themselves, these statements reveal 
insights into the internal politics Rutherford highlights.  
 
The complexities of researching invisible power—whether in Christianity, spirit 
possession or witchcraft—have been discussed as extensively as the forces themselves 
have been described.142 It is common in anthropological accounts to speak of a moment 
of gestalt, when a magical underbelly of invisible meaning, previously invisible, 
suddenly becomes apparent.143 In Arua, this world was never hidden: such discussions 
are public, and people openly speak about many aspects of spiritual affliction. 
Acknowledging the presence of this world necessitated a consideration of ethics that 
Roxburgh terms “spiritual care.”144 Lugbara people I met, including my co-workers, 
tangibly experienced the effects of external forces, though I could neither feel their 
effects nor believe myself affected by them. Yet the fears of my assistants regarding 
particular eating-places, hills, markets and homes that did not “fear God” directed the 
path of this research. My assistants’ trepidations were productive, revealing local 
contours about ala (‘good’) and onzi (‘bad’) powers, and the ambiguities inbetween. 
Reflexively, this meant that the moral contours of Lugbara society mediated my access 
to that society: much of this research was conducted in households deemed to be ala, or 
God-fearing, with people cognisant of the forms of propriety described above. A visit to 
an ojo (witchdoctor) who advertised throughout Arua was unthinkable, as were 
encounters with herbalists and Christian diviners who had not been verified as ala by 
my colleagues. Even when healers had been verified, ambiguities continued. Whilst two 
 
142 See for example H. West, Ethnographic Sorcery. University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
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144 S. Roxburgh, ‘Witchcraft and supernatural harm: navigating spiritual ethics in political science 
research’, Qualitative Research 19:6 (2019), pp. 703–717.  
 67 
of my assistants sought counsel from female diviner-healers, with one offering her a 
regular tithe, another feared the source of her power, asking “Were her visions truly 
Christian?”145 After a message during a cleansing service that someone present in her 
church doubted her power, moreover, this colleague refused to revisit her. These 
reactions allowed me to discern the complexity of religious contestation, and to 
disentangle the moral codes both of women and men, and of nominal and Saved 
Christians (a distinction unpacked in Chapter Four). 
 
Clan leaders and diviner-healers were well versed both in concealing and legitimating 
mystical abilities. Many Christians were proficient in “giving testimony”, which 
Peterson regards as an ethnographic enterprise in itself, refining social moral contours 
through personal experience of sin, conversion and recovery.146 Yet many seeking 
reparations were less confident: some were struggling with misfortunes or sickness. 
Often these fears were close to the surface, thus explaining problems in spirits provided 
what Jackson terms “a vital human strategy for sustaining a sense of agency in the face 
of disempowering circumstances.”147 Roxburgh notes that spiritual care is continually 
negotiated, and given the plurality of forms metaphysical power can take, a single 
strategy can never suffice: my discussions necessitated speaking to others, careful 
introductions, continual empathy, and at times, withdrawal. Given the sensitivity of 
discussions, particularly surrounding death, throughout this research the protection of 
participants was always placed above accessing data.  
 
 
145 Personal Conversation with Co-worker, May 2017. 
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Anthropologists have noted that the presence of an outsider can serve to confirm occult 
fears, and have noted instances where outsiders become embroiled in occult drama. 
Harrell-Bond’s palpable fear upon encountering a bag of powder thought to be 
poisonous during a spate of mass-evictions in the 1980s only served to confirm its 
potency.148 In the Lugbara context, where danger has long been associated with spirits 
taking the form of a white person, my sudden presence could have presented a burden 
for local leaders trying to maintain order in their constituencies (it being a strange 
coincidence for white outsiders to appear in the midst of panic), and could directly 
affect the fate of suspects.149 Consulting diviner-healers also served to legitimate 
prayers as treatment for conditions which, in my background, would necessitate medical 
attention. For this reason too, I chose to visit particular places repeatedly rather than 
spontaneously, and to repeatedly explain my status of researcher.  
 
Interviews in this research were conducted in both English and Lugbara, with my 
assistants acting as translators given my only basic command of Lugbarati. Where 
necessary we explored the context of translations, as well as the development of certain 
terms which have evolved over time. For example: 
Lugbarati 1950s 1970s 2016/7 Maracha variant 









Adro Divine Spirit/ 
God in its early 
refractions 
God Christian God in 
Catholic tradition 




aspect of the 
Divinity 




ole envy envy envy  
 
148 T. Allen, ‘Understanding Alice: Uganda's Holy Spirit Movement in context’, Africa 61:3 (1991), pp. 370-399; 
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Ancestor ritual/ traditional 
religion.  
Orijo = church; 
orindi = spirit 
 









enyata/ enyaya poison poison poison Enata (poison also 
used) 
 
Tracing the evolution and derivation of terms offered significant insight into changing 
local meanings. Whilst some sentiments have persisted (ole, enyata), other meanings 
have been altered by Christian evangelism and by imports of regional knowledge. 
Moreover, Lugbarati is a tonal language, with specific words bearing different meanings 
depending on the context. In the same way, whether a substance promotes health or 
harm, depends on the sentence: thus aro (‘medicine’) can be aro onzi or aro ala, just as 
orindi (‘spirit’) can be orindi onzi or orindi ala, depending on what it does to people. 
The context-specific nature of words provides an apt metaphor for the manner in which 
deeds and sickness are assessed within their social context. During participant 
reflection, the social context continually elicited discussions of translation and terms.  
 
Finally, it is important to note what this thesis is not. Much of the evidence discussed 
herein could be subsumed under the category of “structural violence”.150 Legacies of 
violence and underdevelopment have resulted in a chronically-underfunded public 
health system: biomedical care is accessed largely on a testing basis for specific 
conditions (malaria, typhoid, HIV/AIDS), and people manage many chronic conditions 
simply with antibiotics or painkillers. There is a fundamental shortage of diagnostic 
 
150 P. Farmer, ‘An Anthropology of Structural Violence’, Current Anthropology 45:3 (2004), pp. 305-325. 
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care, such that, as one physician noted, “chronic conditions go unattended”.151 This 
research project was approved by UNCST as a study of social repair and justice—not of 
public health or medicine—and it is within this remit that I embark. Throughout this 
research, Lugbara people addressed physical and psychological suffering through the 
dual frame of bodily restoration and social peace.152 Following Das and Whyte, I 
emphasise affliction as an everyday state through which life is endured.153  
 
This thesis argues that the explanation of suffering lies at the core of historical and 
contemporary Lugbara society, in that explaining sickness has endured as a means 
through which local society is brought together as well as torn apart. “Our society is 
sick,” one Lugbara elder said, lamenting the changes modernity has brought. Indeed, the 
pursuit of health is characterised by a host of emotional states—amongst them, pain, 
ritual, celebration and indeterminate waiting. This host, and its endurance through time, 
serves as the core body of data for this thesis.  
 
1.7 Structure of Chapters  
 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. 
  
Part I explores histories of healing, reappraising Middleton’s Lugbara Religion and 
exploring broader histories of healing.  
 
151 I, Doctor ARRH, 18/06/2017. 
152 These findings crucially challenge recent WHO approaches to “traditional medicine”, which assume 
that indigenous therapies complement clinical treatment. As this thesis shows, this assumptions 
neglects continual evolution in “traditional” therapies, and neglects the broader social contexts in which 
these therapies are enacted. See, WHO, Traditional Medicine Strategy 2014-2023, WHO: Geneva, 2013. 
153 Das, Affliction, p. 4. 
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Chapter Two places Arua and Maracha Districts in their historical context, outlining the 
turbulent phases of violence in the early colonial period, and exploring how the colonial 
government of the Ugandan Protectorate set in motion post-colonial legacies of 
underdevelopment. Overall, this chapter argues that violence and state formation have 
transformed, but not eroded, the intimate governance of clans, which is today redefined 
through by-laws as well as misfortunes that follow those who invite the state to 
intervene in familial affairs.  
 
Chapter Three revisits John Middleton’s Lugbara Religion. Exploring the intellectual 
and methodological underpinnings of the work, this chapter argues that its enduring 
value lies in the intimacy with which the anthropologist depicts an inter-consistent 
world. In Middleton’s account, misfortune was used to enforce internal discipline, to 
manage inter-generational tensions, and to bolster the authority of clan elders. Lugbara 
Religion depicts not a discrete ‘religious’ world, but a lived system of practice that 
maintained its cohesion against the disruptive social policies of the colonial state. 
Significant here is the attention Middleton paid to how clans structure everyday life, a 
structure that is a central focus for later chapters. 
 
Chapter Four explores healing as a site of moral struggle, through foregrounding 
historical encounters with divine prophets, Christian missionaries, Lugbara evangelists 
and post-exile charismatic leaders. As Christianity was enculturated throughout the 
colonial period, the explanation of suffering became a pivotal site upon which 
conversion depended. The chapter explores how colonial interventions permeate 
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through religious efforts to repair society post-war, noting the uncertainties that 
surround the channelling of divine power by ordinary Lugbara people.  
 
Part II describes the evolution of attempts to ‘follow’ misfortunes, and restore social 
relations amidst chronic suffering.  
 
Chapter Five explores how clan authorities have re-institutionalised the management of 
misfortune, following the return from wartime exile. Echoing the system of practice 
described by Middleton, the chapter argues that affliction has been brought into 
conversation both with debts owed to disturbed souls and with rites past and present. 
Couched in terms of intra-lineage responsibility, misfortune now lies at the centre of 
flows of village resources. Yet processes of recovery that rely on members’ (primarily 
males’) commitment to social solidarities are now in crisis on their own terms. This 
chapter illuminates the increasing gaps between those who believe debts and dues are 
‘following them’, and the material and social distances between elders who serve as 
arbiters of intimate knowledge and instigators of repair. This chapter furthermore 
introduces notions of sicknesses of contagion that echo throughout the concepts of 
curses, witchcraft and poison described in the following chapters.  
 
Chapter Six revisits the spiritual labour of female diviners. With diviners once portrayed 
as ambiguous, asocial characters, this chapter argues divinatory revelations work within 
the framework of patriarchy that forms the normative basis of Lugbara society, land 
distribution and household conduct. Read in conjuction with the preceding chapter, 
these studies explore the transformation of ‘traditional’ arbiters of misfortune amid 
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Christian critique, highlighting the fragmentation of normative social structures and 
inequalities that are a feature of post-exile reconstruction.  
 
Part III explores post-war transitions in efforts to explain sudden death. These chapters 
critically assess the production of evidence for claims of inter-personal responsibility, 
transitions in mourning rites and negotiations with the state.  
 
Chapter Seven explores the post-war emergence of mazi, a form of witchcraft that is 
understood to convert familial sacrifices into money. The chapter explores the multi-
scalar production of these ideas, and the divergence between moral discourse and on-
the-ground, inter-communal struggles of healing and evidence that produce the witch. In 
sum, this chapter reveals the emergent politics of generational contestation that 
challenges normative ideas of order. 
 
Chapter Eight extends the exploration of sudden deaths to an analysis of poisoning 
claims. As with mazi, these accusations take shape following sudden deaths, but tracing 
suspects relies on intimate historical and familial knowledge, as well as material 
evidence of applying poisonous substances. The chapter explores furthermore how 
evictions of witchdoctors accused of such poisoning serve as encounters wherein clans 
negotiate and imagine state authority.  
 
Finally, Chapter Nine explores the violence that ensued following the 2016 death of the 
Catholic bishop and war-protector Frederick Drandua. This chapter explores the 
politicisation of collective suffering, and explores the role of violence as a force for 
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post-war healing and memory. Following this final chapter, the appendices to the thesis 
provide supplementary material, including a booklet of supporting images that elucidate 
the worlds described in this thesis. 
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Loyalties still lie to the family, to the tribe, or at most to the district, and there is 
much suspicion of the intentions of other groups… there is as yet but little sign of 
any sense of Uganda nationality or citizenship.  
 





This chapter explores the history of the West Nile sub-region, focusing specifically on 
how external intrusions, state-building and war have transformed the social organisation 
vested in Lugbara clans living along the Uganda/DRC border from the precolonial 
period to the present.  
 
In conventional historiographies by European and Ugandan scholars, West Nile is 
positioned as peripheral to the development of the Ugandan state, or as a violent, 
conflict-prone periphery, indelibly ascribed with the violence of Amin’s regime.155 The 
only comprehensive history of the region, Leopold’s Inside West Nile (2005), explores 
how successive waves of violence are perceived as bestowing a “curse” on the region’s 
people.156 Through the telling of episodic upheavals, intended to disrupt associations of 
 
154 West Nile District Report 1957, TA Personal Archive, Loaned from Entebbe, Uganda p. 147. 
155 For example, R. Reid, A History of Modern Uganda (Cambridge UP, 2017), and P. Mutibwa, Uganda Since 
Independence (Africa World Press, 1992). Making explicit this distinction, A.B.K. Kasozi describes that prior to 
independence, the Ugandan state could be thought of as consisting of four “concentric rings”: Buganda being the 
core region of capital accumulation, surrounded by a “semi-periphery of cash-crop growing regions (including 
Busoga), Bunyoro to which many West Nilers migrated, followed by labour supply regions including West Nile and 
the North (Karamoja is characterised as an unincorporated area). See A.B.K. Kasozi, Social Origins of Violence in 
Uganda, 1964-1985 (London: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1994), p. 117. 
156 Leopold, Inside West Nile. 
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West Nilers with violent militancy since the early colonial period, his account 
perpetuates a picture of a territory structured solely by external impositions, with little 
reference to how people themselves experienced change. Leopold’s post-structural 
approach stands in stark contrast to the frames which Lugbara elders selected in the 
present research to tell their histories, through the development and migration of clans. 
Whilst these origin myths could have been regarded as ‘mythico-histories’, telling 
history through the prism of the clan marks an important resistance to Eurocentric focus 
on political histories, and introduces the importance of a ‘cultural consciousness’ 
developed in this thesis.157  
 
In privileging the continuity of local institutions, this chapter is interested in how social 
forms have been shaped by the specificities of West Nile’s history. As suggested by the 
opening quotation, this disconnectedness is rooted in the colonial past: five years prior 
to independence in 1962, Lugbara residents recognised internal boundaries, based on 
connections to families or to local government, rather than to the wider Ugandan state. 
Today Lugbara-speakers refer to Kampala simply as lire (‘that place’), which is 
accessed ma mu yi (‘by going over the water’), indicating the Ugandan capital’s 
continuing conceptual remoteness from everyday life. Colonial borders moreover 
divided Ugandan Lugbara from kin in Congo; resisting these changes, local connections 
to Eastern DRC often feature prominently in everyday commerce, security and kinship. 
 
West Nile’s isolation from wider Uganda is often explained by geographical distance—
Arua town, West Nile’s regional capital and the centre of British rule, lies 420km away 
 
157 S. Rasmussen, ‘Mythico-History, Social Memory, and Praxis: Anthropological Approaches and Directions’, History 
Compass 7 (2009), pp. 566-582, p. 570. 
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from the capital, separated from the central and southern regions by Murchison National 
Park and the Nile River—or by cultural differences, as populations in West Nile speak 
distinct languages, and lack the heritage of centralised authority present in Bagandan 
and Bunyoro kingdoms. West Nile was incorporated within British Protectorate 
boundaries in 1914, only three decades after control of the Bagandan Kingdom had 
been established. As this chapter shows, the isolation of West Nile has resulted not just 
from geography or its social tapestry, but from colonial policies of deliberate isolation 
and internal neglect.  
 
Between 1914-62, West Nile was designated a closed district, which served as a “labour 
reserve” for the recruitment of young men to military forces and for plantation work 
outside the district.158 Colonial policies produced a sense of political and economic 
marginalisation that has endured to the present, and that has been compounded by post-
independence upheavals.159 After the overthrow of Amin in 1979, civilians in West Nile 
(here referred to as “West Nilers”) suffered violent reprisals for the acts of his regime. 
In the 1980s, people fled en masse as “liberation” forces pillaged the region’s districts.  
 
Since a return from exile in the 1980s, the expansion of local government under 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement has contributed to widespread perceptions 
that the state should guarantee health, protection and security. Yet throughout this 
research, family heads and elders were equally involved in projects to reconstruct suru 
(clans) and moral development through new laws and sanctions. In so doing, visions of 
 
158 M. Leopold, ‘Crossing the line: 100 years of the North-West Uganda/South Sudan border’, Journal of East African 
Studies 3:3 (2011), pp. 464-478, p. 469. 
159 Leopold, ‘Crossing the line’, pp. 464-478. 
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rota (development), based on collective cooperation, flourished in the absence of state 
protections. Indicative of this self-reliance is the dual meaning of alio (poverty), which 
connotes not simply a lack of things, but a lack of people. This chapter traces the 
historical basis for internal structures of reliance. 
 
To lay the groundwork for this thesis, this chapter takes a long view of history among 
Lugbara clans. The first section begins by reconstructing the nature of pre-colonial 
institutions, and experiences of plunder and epidemic diseases (1880-1920). With the 
onset of Protectorate rule in 1920, the chapter then explores the establishment of a new 
administration and the changes wrought by outsiders and British colonists, from 1920-
1962. The third section of the chapter explores the upheavals of the post-colonial 
period, focusing specifically on war, displacement, and its aftermath from the 1960s to 
the 1980s. Finally, the chapter concludes by focusing on how clan authority has been re-
institutionalised following the return from exile. Overall, this chapter sets the 
institutional history that structures quests to manage misfortune described in the 
following chapters.  
 
Before proceeding, a note on terms is necessary. As this chapter indicates, the Lugbara 
identity—a term that has no literal meaning in Lugbarati—was introduced during the 
years of the British Protectorate. Prior to this, and during the early years of British rule, 
groups which would become known as the Lugbara were documented variously as the 
Lubari, Lugwari, Lugwari and Logbara. Whilst common ancestry was recognised in 
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origin myths, people identified by their clan or sub-clan of origin. 160 Whilst for the first 
two sections of this chapter the notion of a “Lugbara identity” is anachronistic, the term 
Lugbara is used simply for consistency’s sake.  
 
Similarly, the term “clan” warrants attention. According to Middleton, in the 1950s 
Lugbara people distinguished between suru as clan or sub-clan, and enyati (literally 
‘bread-breakers’), as the smaller cluster of households that cooperated in collective 
labour, and dwelt under the sanction of the ancestors.161 In the present research, suru is 
used to denote clan and sub-clan, with sub-clan delimited similarly to Middleton’s 
clusters. Enyati, by contrast, is here used flexibly to describe households, and 
occasionally neighbourhood. For consistency, sub-clan is used refers to groups of 3-4 
generations of genealogically-related men, namely, the level at which group sanction 
and cooperation exists both in the past and today.  
 
2.2 Reconstructing Precolonial Society 
 
The clans that today constitute the Lugbara ethnic group originated from migrations of 
people from Bari-lands in the present-day Rejaf-Juba region of South Sudan.162 Lugbara 
origin myths are rich in migratory history, centred on the arrival of populations in the 
territory marked by two mountains, Mt Wati (then Eti) and Mt Liru.163 According to 
these myths, groups formed from the migrations of two hero-ancestors, Jaki and 
 
160 I.O. Acidri, The Impact of British Colonial Policies on the Lugbara of Arua District 1914-62, MA Dissertation, 
Department of History and Political Science, Kyambogo University, 2016, p.41. 
161 Enyati could also be called ori’ba, translated as ‘people of ancestors.’ 
162 A. Alidri, ‘Traditional Wisdom in Land Use and Resource Management among the Lugbara of Uganda: A Historical 
Perspective’, SAGE Open 6:3 (2016), pp. 1-13.  
163 Mt Wati is located in Terego sub-county, Arua District, and Mt Liru lies on the border of Koboko/Maracha 
Districts, separating Lugbara speakers from Kakwa speakers. 
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Dribidu. Jaki was the son of Yeke, who was descended from Gborogboro, the first man 
on earth, who settled near Mt Liru, on which he died. Jaki is regarded as the ancestor of 
the Kakwa people and the High Lugbara, who spoke a dialect of Lugbara (uruleti) 
similar to Keliko and Logo groups, who were the original inhabitants of the area.164 
Dribidu was the ancestor of the Low Lugbara, who spoke andraleti, a language closer to 
Ma’di (some Ma’di clans also trace their origins to him).  
 
According to legend, Dribidu is said to have arrived with animals from Luo-land via 
Sudan, settling near the slopes of Mt Wati to graze his animals. Here Dribidu met a 
leper woman, Ofanyaru, whom he married after curing her sores with foreign 
treatments.165 After paying bride-wealth, the marriage was legitimated, and their sons 
founded the Lugbara clans. Jaki and Dribidu had many sons, who produced the first 
Lugbara clans, and their graves remain on Mt Wati and Mt Liru. Though centuries old, 
these myths are replete with the ideas of mutuality, gender complementarity and healing 
raised in this thesis.166 Additionally, these myths are emblematic of the fluidity of 
identities in West Nile: with the Lugbara sharing origins with the Kakwa and the Ma’di, 
and the group itself featuring a diversity of languages and customs.167 
 
Shiroya dates the arrival of settler groups to the late 16th century. He describes the 
period between the late 1700s and mid-1800s as a time of “Lugbaraization,” wherein 
 
164 Middleton, The Lugbara of Uganda, pp. 22-3.  
165 This narrative was offered by elders of several Maracha clans. 
166 Finnström, Living with Bad Surroundings.  
167 Bearing testament to such diverse origins and assimilation with neighbours, in the 1950s the missionary-turned-
ethnographer J.P. Crazzolara distinguished between two broad linguistic zones: urule'bati (high-land language) 
associated with the southern Ayivu County (including Vurra and Maracha), and andrele'bati (low-people language) 
associated with the east, with Terego. 
 82 
the slow fusion of migrant settlers led to the consolidation of a shared language, 
customs and social philosophies.168 Precolonial Lugbara society, he suggests, was 
accepting of newcomers: inter-ethnic trade existed, with Lugbara exchanging livestock 
and foodstuffs for iron hoes from Lendu blacksmiths. As populations migrated away 
from the Wati-Liru heartland further south, trade with Alur-speaking groups arose. 
Anyavu Market in Alurland was established by c.1870, where salt from Bunyoro and 
fish from Packwach were exchanged with food and livestock.169 Though based on 
subsistence farming, these trades bolstered local economies.  
 
During this period, Lugbara society had a largely acephalous structure. In the absence of 
centralised authority, everyday governance and subsistence was forged through 
settlement and solidarity within small patrilocal clusters, under the overall jurisdiction 
of an elder (ba wara, ba ambo). Usually, this unit did not surpass 3-4 generations of 
male relatives (known as o’dipi), plus their wives and children. Membership of these 
clusters included dead ancestors (ori), who heard the words of elders—a topic discussed 
in detail in later chapters—and punished the disobedience of the living with sickness.  
 
Land being relatively abundant in the pre-colonial period, these clusters took the form 
of nucleated settlements, with dwellings surrounded by grazing lands for cattle and 
fields where sim sim, millet, sorghum, and root crops were grown. Agricultural labour 
was gendered, with specific tasks denoted for men and women. Additional labour was 
 
168 O.J.E. Shiroya, ‘The Lugbara States - Politics, Economics and Warfare in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries’, Transafrican Journal of History 10:1/2 (1981), pp. 125-137, p.129. 
169 Trade was most intense with the group that would become the Ma’di-Ayivu (as opposed to the Ma’di to the 
east), a group that shared language with the Lugbara but which would be divided from them by colonial policy. 
Today the language of Ma’di-Ayivu is comprehensible to Lugbara speakers (more so than the Ma’di of Moyo).  
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provided by family members: kitaa (also bari, ‘work’) involved several family heads 
labouring in each other’s fields, a practice known as oya (communal labour) performed 
in return for food.170 As families expanded, clusters would migrate away from their 
original clusters to less-populated areas. Patterns of settlement were flexible, and 
directly responsive to land pressures: when the carrying capacity of the land was 
exceeded, new settlements would form.  
 
Settlement clusters were not isolated from wider society. As evident in the origin myth 
of the Low Lugbara, marriage rites were central to suturing the social landscape 
together. The transfer of ali (bridewealth) from the husband’s people to the wife’s 
people fostered a sense of obligation between sub-clans. Since clan intermarriage had 
long been prohibited on account of it presaging misfortune, unions often involved 
couplings beyond the nearby social horizon, meaning that men and women were 
typically affiliated with a wide-ranging group of relatives. Relations were affirmed too 
through rites at death, where, after the death of a married woman, avuti (one bull) was 
paid to compensate the woman’s clan. Outstanding dues at marriage or death could be a 
source of mock or real conflicts. These wider categories of relation, which also 
extended to neighbourhoods, were known collectively as juru. Disputes over land or 
women often resulted in feuds between younger clansmen. Elders emphasised wider 
connections as a strategy to mitigate violence.  
 
Feuds between sub-clans, often involving traditional weaponry of bows and arrows, 
sometimes smeared with poisonous sap, were not uncommon. Most fighting was 
 
170 Acidri, Impact of British Colonial Policies, pp. 34-5. 
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between small groups of men, who would creep up on enemy parties with arrows. 
Reports of killing were often exaggerated, whereas in reality, Middleton notes, “[t]he 
shouting of abuse was often as important a way of letting off steam as actual wounding 
and killing”.171 In cases of persistent feuding between sub-clans (as well as during 
droughts and famine), rainmakers (opi ozooni), distributed at clan level, adjudicated 
between parties.172 Since rainmakers fled from Europeans, little is known about their 
roles in administering justice, yet in the precolonial period, records suggest these figures 
played critical roles in managing famine and inter-clan wars.173  
 
The basic morphology of precolonial Lugbara social structure was forged through 
segmented clans and sub-clans, with enyati forming the pattern of settlement. In 
essence, this structure was fluid and amorphous, responding to land and food security, 
as well as struggles for internal authority and conflicts between clans. Customary and 
ritual traditions were by no means uniform across the territory, even across the Wati-
Liru heartland that would become designated as Lugbaraland by the first outsiders. In 
the precolonial period, any notion of a coherent Lugbara tribal group was a fiction.  
 
2.3 Slavery, Ivory and Belgian Colonialism (1880 – 1911)  
 
From roughly 1880 on, Lugbara populations became incorporated into wider political 
and economic systems. The following three decades would mark the arrival of sporadic 
 
171 Middleton, The Lugbara of Uganda, p. 56. 
172 L. Avua (1968) found that rainmakers played a considerable role in peace-time politics, and considerable 
variation in practices of rainmaking across Lugbaraland. In the early years of Protectorate rule, Assistant DC Driberg 
extracted rainstones from Maracha clans that resembled those used in Bari lands (Archival source: Pitt Rivers 
Museum). 
173 Shiroya, ‘The Lugbara States’, challenges notions of statelessness, arguing that by the 19th century, in select parts 
of Terego and Maracha, corporate groups were consolidated under the jurisdiction of an opi who made political 
decisions for the wider unit (p. 130). 
 85 
violence that surpassed the relative restraint of local feuds. Whilst the impact of these 
upheavals and epidemic disease was profound, external actors made no effort to 
administer, or alter, the-pre-existing social tapestry. What follows is a brief overview of 
this period. 
 
In the 1880s, Arabic slave raiders from Turco-Egyptian Sudan established posts among 
Kakwa communities north of Lugbaraland, launching excursions to abduct men, 
women, and children into a regional “tripartite trade” in people, guns and ivory.174 The 
precise impact of these slavers on Lugbara populations remains unquantified. Middleton 
suggests that Lugbara populations were protected from the worst raids by their distance 
from Southern Sudan, with most abductions concentrated within today’s Kakwa, Kuku, 
and Ma’di communities that lay geographically closer.175 Elders in the present research 
suggested that Northern populations in Maracha and Terego were subjected to sporadic 
raiding.176 Stigand suggests that Kakwa rather than Arabic slavers took people and 
cattle from Lugbara groups near Mt Wati, but these raids happened after the turn of the 
19th century.177 Whilst it is impossible to determine the slavers’ impact, as in the wider 
region, during this period outsiders were largely feared. The resonance of this period is 
demonstrated by the fact that subsequent outsiders appearing across Lugbaraland would 
be known by as kulia batu (‘people eaters’).178  
 
174 Leopold, ‘Crossing the line’, p. 465. See also Middleton, ‘Some Effects of Colonial Rule among the Lugbara’, in 
Victor Turner (ed.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Volume 3 (Cambridge UP, 1971). For a wider history of regional 
processes see C. Leonardi, ‘Paying ‘buckets of blood’ for the land: Moral debates over economy, war and state in 
Southern Sudan’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 49:2 (2011), pp. 215-240. 
175 See, for example, Middleton, ‘Social Change among the Lugbara of Uganda’, Civilisations 10:4 (1960), pp. 456-
496. 
176 FG, Terego Elders, 08/06/2016 (OJ). 
177 C.H. Stigand, Equatoria: The Lado Enclave. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1934, p. 89. 
178 J. Dobson, Daybreak in West Nile. West Nile: African Inland Mission, 1964; I, Elder, Arua, 10/05/2016 (OJ); FG, 
Terego, Elders, 08/06/2016 (OJ). 
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Following slave raiders came explorers. Junker, a Russian explorer, entered the 
“country of the Lubari” in 1877, his diaries featuring the first recorded use of the 
name.179 In 1876, General Gordon, a British officer serving in Sudan, established an 
outpost at Wadelai (Moyo). In 1887, Emin Pasha, a German doctor turned Sudanese 
administrator, retreated to this post after fleeing the Madhist insurrection in Sudan. 
Emin employed Lugbara servants, and his Nubi troops raided northern Lugbara groups 
for subsistence. The subsequent Relief Expedition to recover Emin generated much 
controversy in Europe for the violence Europeans inflicted on local porters, which 
reportedly featured excessive flogging, torture, and cannibalism.180 After leaving, Emin 
left his corpus of slave soldiers from Southern Sudan, who would form the Nubi, or 
Nubian, group. Later descendants of this group would be used as soldiers within the 
colonial army, and as chiefs to administer the Lugbara under British rule.181  
 
Whilst these ventures failed significantly to alter the predominance of clans and sub-
clans, Lugbara groups nevertheless experienced radical changes through the epidemic 
diseases outsiders introduced.182 From 1890, outbreaks of cerebro-spinal meningitis 
 
179 Annual Report, ‘Dr. Junker's Journey in the Nyam Nyam Country’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 
and Monthly Record of Geography, 3:5 (1881), pp. 301-305, p. 301. This challenges Crazzolara’s idea that ‘Logbara’ 
was introduced under the Belgian administration, extrapolated from the name of a small clan living in Aringa 
District (cited in A.G. King, A History of West Nile District, Uganda: the effects of political penetration upon the 
eastern Alur and Lugbara between 1860 and 1959. D.Phil, Department of History, University of Sussex, 1972, p. v.).  
180 J. Jameson, Story of the Rear Column of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition. London: R.H Porter, 1890.  
181 Cf. M. Leopold, ‘Legacies of Slavery in North-West Uganda: The Story of the 'One-Elevens'’, Africa 76:2 (2006), 
pp. 180-199. Though descended from Emin’s soldiers, the Nubi identity became an elective one, defined by learning 
the Kunubi language, conversion to Islam, and the pursuit of a military calling. Many Lugbara thus opted to become 
Nubi. In 2017, talks between Nubi and Lugbara leaders to merge the cultural institutions of both groups were 
ongoing.  
182 M. Lyons, ‘From 'Death Camps' to Cordon Sanitaire: The Development of Sleeping Sickness Policy in the Uele 
District of the Belgian Congo, 1903-1914’, Journal of African History 26:1 (1985), pp. 69-91. 
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became endemic in dry seasons, as well as outbreaks of smallpox and plague.183 
Rinderpest wiped out cattle herds from 1890-1920.184 Mass mortality of humans and 
cattle swiftly altered the distribution of authority and agricultural productivity, resulting 
in famines (particularly severe in 1895) and the mass migration of northerners to the 
south.185 Epidemic diseases were tied both to Europeans and to Adro, the Lugbara 
divinity.186 Since mortality could not be explained through ancestral therapies, elders in 
the North visited a Kakwa prophet, Rembe, whose sacred Yakan water was believed to 
confer immunity from new diseases.  
 
Alongside these vast changes, Emin’s relief expedition had alerted European colonists 
to the economic potential of the region. Britain, France, Belgium and Germany 
competed diplomatically for territorial controls over the area, and eventually Belgian 
colonisers gained control. Under the Belgian Free State, Lugbara clans were 
encompassed within the Lado Enclave, along with South Sudan’s Equatoria Province 
and part of today’s Central African Republic. In 1900, Belgians set up an outpost in 
Ofude (Maracha), and later a second station at Alenzori to the west. To give an 
impression of the extent of the administration, by 1907 these posts were staffed by just 
seven Belgians, though 250 Congolese askari were deployed to pillage surrounding 
populations for sustenance. Indicative of the fear these soldiers engendered is their local 
title, tukutuku, after the discharging of a rifle, or sima, a derogatory label connoting the 
 
183 J. Middleton, ‘The Yakan or Allah Water Cult among the Lugbara’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 
of Great Britain and Ireland 93:1 (1963), pp. 80-108. 
184 Middleton, ‘Some Effects of Colonial Rule’, p. 8. 
185 King, A History of West Nile District, p. 45. 
186 Middleton, ‘The Yakan or Allah Water Cult’. 
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hiss of a snake.187 Today, clans in the vicinity of Ofude still record violent murders by 
the regime within their lineage histories.188  
 
In the countryside around Ofude, Belgians appointed opi (chiefs). Belgians took those 
appointed to represent the “traditional aristocracy,” but opi were not elders or 
rainmakers—rather, they were men who had become established through Yakan, 
outside lineage hierarchies. In an interview for this research, the great-grandson of one 
chief, Kamure, recollected the detail of his ancestors’ employ, recalling that “his main 
duties were to collect ornaments—gold, cattle, chicken, eggs—for the Belgians… The 
Belgians never introduced things like schools, hospitals—they were just collecting 
wealth, not any other things.”189 Opi were regarded with suspicion, as collaborators who 
served the Belgian troops for personal gain rather than for clan interests.190  
 
Today, elders sharply contrast Belgian rule with the British Protectorate rule that 
followed. Unlike the British, the Belgians “did not bring order.”191 By 1911, the Belgian 
post at Ofude stood abandoned, and Lugbara territories were overrun by ivory and 
elephant poachers.192 Whilst one such hunter described the lack of regulation as 
engendering a “veritable paradise” for hunting parties, local populations were often 
terrorised by expeditions, and on occasion hunting parties burnt whole villages.193 
 
187 A. King, ‘The Yakan Cult and Lugbara Response to Colonial Rule’, Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa 5:1 
(1970), pp. 1-25. 
188 I, Elder, Alipi, 07/03/2017. 
189 I, Elder, Azipi 14/03/2017 (OJ). 
190 M. Leopold, ‘’Why Are We Cursed?’: Writing History and Making Peace in North West Uganda’, Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute 11:2 (2005), pp. 211-229. 
191 FG, Maracha Elders, 28/06/2016. 
192 R.E. McConnell, ‘Notes on the Lugwari tribe of Central Africa’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 55 
(1925), pp. 439-467, p. 439. 
193 C.H. Stigand, Hunting the Elephant in Africa, Safari Media Africa (1913). Select individuals were employed as 
porters to carry equipment and tusks; see W.B. Foran, ‘Edwardian Ivory Poachers over the Nile’, African Affairs 57: 
227 (1958), pp. 125-134. 
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Poachers adopted similar patterns of pillage and violent extraction as the slave raiders 
and Belgian colonists before them.  
 
Leopold promotes the idea of history as a “curse” upon West Nilers, and such a 
description adequately describes the encounters between Lugbara clans and outsiders up 
to this point. In slavers, poachers and Free State militaries, populations had been 
exposed to sporadic, brutal violence, and similar patterns of extractions. Whilst no 
attempt had been made to directly introduce any semblance of administration, allowing 
sub-clans to retain a position as the primary institution of governance, everyday life had 
been irreparably changed by disease, theft and slaughter. Prior to 1911, Lugbara clans 
had radically different experiences of mediating with colonising forces: clan leaders in 
the north had significantly more knowledge of both the perils and opportunities that 
outsiders could bring. As the next section shows, this divergent local history would feed 
into the dynamics of British rule. 
 
2.4 Indirect rule under the British Protectorate (1914 – 1962) 
 
Under the terms of the 1906 Anglo-Congolese Agreement, in 1911 Belgium ceded 
Lugbara territories to British control, administered as part of the Kajo Keji District of 
Southern Sudan. Though still remote from administrative centres, this incorporation 
brought an end to the free reign of ivory poachers in the region.194 In 1914, Lugbara 
clans were incorporated into the boundaries of the Ugandan Protectorate as the West 
Nile District, separating Lugbara clans in what is now both Uganda and Congo (often 
 
194 Foran, ‘Edwardian Ivory Poachers’. 
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severing settlements of kin in the process). Clans on the Ugandan side of the border 
were placed under the control of a District Commissioner, with West Nile initially 
administered as Arua, Nebbi and Yumbe Districts, and with Lugbara populations 
contained within Arua District. With the district headquarters located in Arua, in the 
south—rather than Ofude at this juncture—clans were subject to “close administration” 
through indirect rule.195 Designated as a ‘closed district’ with power vested in the 
Provincial Commissioner to regulate out-migration and to control movement within 
intra-district boundaries, this administration would have profound effects on Lugbara 
populations.196 
 
Though Lugbara populations had been afforded a “warlike” reputation by Belgian 
officials (perhaps on account of local resistance to violent rule), British administrators 
debunked such qualities. Stigand, in his pseudo-ethnographic account of the Lado 
Enclave, writes: “The Lugware are not a warlike people as far as I can see, whatever has 
been said to the contrary. Cohesion, and a military organisation, are essential to a 
warlike people, qualities which the Lugware lack altogether.”197 Seeking to impose 
governance and “order”, Protectorate officials were more concerned with the lack of 
centralised authority within the segmentary social structure. By contrast to Alur groups 
organised into chiefdoms in the South, the observed imprecision between “tribes” and 
overall authority fed the administrators’ racial consciousness. One early survey 
 
195 Whilst Leopold, Inside West Nile, notes that Arua means prison (aru), Acidri notes that this term derived prior to 
British arrival. Reportedly, Aru served as a place where clans held captives during the 19th century.  
196 T. Allen, A Study of Social Change and Upheaval Among the Ma’di of Uganda, PhD Thesis, Department of Social 
Anthropology, University of Manchester, 1996, p. 118. 
197 Stigand, Equatoria, p. 80.   
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eschewed the Lugbara’s sophisticated agricultural techniques, for example, to describe 
them as “among the least advanced of the African tribes”.198  
 
Inspired by the challenge of bringing an “unchartered” territory within the Protectorate, 
the first District Commissioner of the British Protectorate, Alfred Evelyn Weatherhead 
(1914-22), zealously attempted to initiate indirect governance.199 Given the fluid nature 
of identities in West Nile, constructing divisions between and within groups required 
significant creative license. The amorphous social context of sub-clans bore little 
relevance to the neat tribal distinctions that preoccupied British administrators. In ethnic 
terms, unlike other Ugandan districts that loosely conformed to a single linguistic and 
cultural group, West Nile featured considerable diversity. One initial survey identified 
eight tribal groups and languages, listed in order of size: Lugwari, Ma’di, Ai-ivu, Alur, 
Ma’di, Okebu, Kakwa and Lendu. But these “tribal” boundaries were not distinct: 
people speaking similar languages did not always live together, just as significant 
intermarriage and exchange took place between groups. Simply put, a fixed notion of 
tribe did not exist.200 Despite considerable ambiguities, county boundaries to separate 
West Nile’s dominant linguistic groups—the Lugwari, Alur, Kakwa, and Ma’di—were 
simply imposed. At this point, the Lugbara identity became a reality attached to new 
territorial distinctions and the distribution of resources. 
 
 
198 McConnell, ‘Notes on the Lugwari tribe’, p. 467. 
199 Weatherhead spent 275 days of his first year of appointment touring the district and adjudicating inter-clan 
feuds—for which he garnered respect from Lugbara elders, who afforded him the title of Jerekedi and led to his 
incorporation into mythical schemas. Even today, several elders marked their histories by the arrival of 
Weatherhead. King, ‘A History of West Nile District’, p. 255. 
200 Allen, ‘A Study of Social Change’  
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Despite his efforts, the first years of Weatherhead’s administration presented particular 
difficulties. He confessed in one early report to have “bitten off enough for two mouths 
with full sets of teeth to chew.”201 Weatherhead’s tenure, and indeed the early years of 
colonial rule generally, would be defined by two primary dynamics: resistance from 
Lugbara groups, followed by a gradual if fitful acceptance, in which missions played a 




In the early phases of resistance to Protectorate rule, southern and northern Lugbara 
clans differed considerably in their response. In the south, the administration was 
viewed as a “glorified band of elephant poachers who would pass on very shortly.”202 
Upon encountering Protectorate parties, people fled to the bush, with several Ayivu 
clans mounting an attack on the District Headquarters in Arua.203 In response, 
Weatherhead and his Assistant DC Driberg took hostages to Arua Prison, and levied 
fines on resistors.204 Among the southern clans, Weatherhead struggled to find even 
“can-be” chiefs, given the significant migration to the area from the North under the 
Belgians: as he wrote in 1914-15, “the Lugwari are utterly unorganised, there are no 
chiefs, and it is impossible often to locate even a village headman.”205 As a result, 
Weatherhead appointed agents or Lugbara from other areas to act as sub-county chiefs. 
 
In the North, however, Lugbara men received the new officials with hospitality. 
Officials found the former Belgian opi to command the attention of wider clans, and 
 
201 Archival source: Annual Report on the West Nile District for 1914-15, pp. 10-11. 
202 ibid. p. 9. 
203 King, ‘The Yakan Cult’, p. 3.  
204 In these endeavours Weatherhead was assisted by Assistant Commissioner Driberg, a man notorious for both 
violence and fabrication.  
205 Archival source: Annual Report 1914-1915, p. 5. 
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thus appointed these men as sub-county chiefs under the new system. As early as 1917, 
local officials had instigated communal road-building and introduced taxation in kind. 
As King noted, this apparent complicity had, however, been a “superficial” period of 
calm.206 In 1919, colonial authorities were troubled by purported anti-colonial, militant 
activities related to Yakan—or, as the District officers termed it, the “Allah Water 
Cult.” An important background to note is the resurgence of epidemic disease in the 
early years of the Protectorate: in July 1917, 110 deaths from cerebrospinal meningitis 
were recorded in the southern Lugbara regions, but by the end of the year officials had 
given up counting, simply recording fatalities as “rife”.207 A devastating district-wide 
famine also occurred in 1917. The protective immunity attributed to Yakan acquired 
new resonance, its head dispensers being leaders of the movement, mediating between 
local populations and the state.  
 
Protectorate officials were less interested in acknowledging responses to suffering than 
in the rumour that Yakan’s adherents were engaging in militant activities, including 
receiving rifles through membership. Versed in colonial resistance variously from 
Dinka populations and Emin Pascha’s troops in the 1880s, Yakan was interpreted by 
administrators as a form of Islamic-inspired resistance, which had become the colonial 
administrators’ “bogeyman.”208 When reports suggested the presence of Yakan-linked 
resistance in Udipi (Maracha), British officials violently suppressed the movement, 
reportedly hanged its prophet-leader Rembe, and deported the Yakan chiefs, replacing 
 
206 King, ‘The Yakan Cult’, p. 6. 
207 King, ‘A History of West Nile District’, p. 366. 
208 King, ‘The Yakan Cult’, argues that this resemblance is evidence more of “cultural borrowing” than of 
connections between regional cults (p. 10).  
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them with Nubi chiefs loyal to the Protectorate.209 Though subsequent evidence suggests 
that Yakan’s militant dimensions were over-exaggerated, this demonstration of state 
power ushered in a new phase of acceptance of colonial rule. In quashing Yakan, the 
Protectorate removed a substantial threat that could have significantly challenged the 
ritual authority of clan elders: by 1918, Yakan had instead become linked to the 




After this initial period of pacification in the 1910s, overt resistance to Protectorate rule 
from Lugbara diminished from the 1920s on. The Lugbara historian Lulua Odu 
pragmatically reflects: “[t]here was little the people could do to reverse the trend of 
events. Eventually they had to submit and accept the changes of the new order.”210 Over 
the following four decades, Protectorate governance would impose new forms of 
identity, law and economic activities on Lugbara people.  
 
As noted above, British rule introduced a new political geography of counties and sub-
counties. For Lugbara communities, their consolidation within Arua District did not 
readily translate to a coherent self-perception of tribal identity. Allen, in his 
historiography of the creation of the Moyo District, describes how Catholic missions 
and government became infused with a sense of “being Ma’di.”211 Yet among Lugbara 
speakers, throughout the colonial period a wider ethnic identity was entangled with 
distinct sub-county identities that grouped together people speaking similar dialects. 
 
209 Nubi troops had proved their loyalty through military service, and could also communicate with officials in 
English (or Kiswahili). Indeed, the historiography of Yakan overwhelmingly relies on the testimony of one Nubi, 
Fadimulla Murjan, who emphasised its militant aspects. See Leopold, Inside West Nile.  
210 Lulua Odu, cited in Leopold, Inside West Nile, p. 71. 
211 Allen, ‘A Study of Social Change’. 
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Moreover, for many in the countryside, the District Headquarters in Arua remained 
remote, with much of the work of government taking place at the sub-county level. In 
1919, sub-county divisions included Aringa, Adumi, Ayivu, Bondo, Logiri, Luku, 
Koboko, Maracha, Ofude and Terego. These boundaries were revised over the colonial 
period to become Aringa, Ayivu, Vurra, Terego and Maracha. Given the pertinence of 
these identities, the redrawing of boundaries was often contested. For example, the 
subsuming of Ofude into Maracha Sub-County in 1948 caused bitterness among 
Ofudians, who protested that they had lost their chief. But the salience of these 
identities is such that one Lugbara biographer describes Lugbara identity as conforming 
to the collective of thirteen clans: six in Uganda, including Aringa, Ayivu, Ma’di, 
Vurra, Terego and Maracha.212 County boundaries are today substituted with the limits 
of clan descent. As Leonardi notes, “borderland inhabitants play a crucial role in giving 
meaning and value to national boundaries on the ground”: state boundaries are infused 
with a sense of identity.213 
 
In this new system, rural communities encountered new laws at the sub-county level. 
Whilst the DC and county chiefs, known as Sultans or opi, operated from Arua, daily 
administration involved sub-county chiefs known as a wakil or joago, educated men 
who served as a figurehead of government to rural clans. Further down, parish chiefs 
(wakungu) and village headmen reported to these wakil. The introduction of new laws, 
fines, and punishments, based not on social connections between parties but on the 
Ugandan Penal Code, were often a key feature of elders’ memories of the colonial 
 
212 Aiko [pseudonym], “Lugbara Kari (The House of Lugbara), Lugbara Culture Blog, 23 November 2009. Available 
online:<http://lugbaraculture.blogspot.com/2009/11/lugbara-kari-house-of-lugbara_23.html>   
213 C. Leonardi, ‘Patchwork States: The Localization of State Territoriality on the South Sudan–Uganda Border, 1914–
2014’, Past & Present 248:1 (2020), pp. 209–258, p. 211. 
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period. As a Lugbara scholar notes, state laws often criminalised aspects of society.214 
In view of the public punishments enacted by officials in the municipality, several 
elders remarked that caning was learnt from the British. Rural elders furthermore 
remembered government intervention in a host of disputes involving land, family and 
witchcraft, as well as fines for new categories of civil issues—including tax evasion, 
non-compliance with sleeping sickness inspections and communal labour.  
 
The arrival of these courts, and the prohibition on feuds, brought important changes to 
inter-clan relations. Disputes over land, adultery and bridewealth—which would 
previously have been settled through feuding—were now settled through the moot 
courts presided over by parish or sub-county chiefs.215 Life histories suggest that elders 
actively drew on these systems, though Middleton suggests the personalities of officials 
often led to variable functioning of these lower courts. Court settlements led to 
punishments for offenders, through fines or sentences unrelated to social connection, 
and were imposed onto clan forms of resolution. Those sub-county chiefs who 
spearheaded the new systems amassed cattle wealth and large homes, and were 
described by lineage elders as opkoro, connoting a strength tied to witchcraft, or as 
mundu’ba (people of the Europeans). For lineage elders, sub-county chiefs lay outside 
the traditional system. 
 
A final fundamental change during the Protectorate period was the exposure of ordinary 
West Nilers to the monetary economy. From the outset, West Nile District had to 
 
214 W.O. Balikuddembe, Interview w Alidri Agatha, ‘You are not criminal. It is the state criminalising you’, DDRN 
Research Network.  Available online:< https://ddrn.dk/you-are-not-criminal-it-is-the-state-criminalising-you/> 
215 Middleton, The Lugbara of Uganda, p. 54. 
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generate revenue for the colonial administration, which involved instituting a poll tax, 
beginning in 1918.216 Given the lack of a monetary economy prior to 1914, instituting 
these measures proved difficult. Maracha elders recall fleeing over the Congo border to 
escape tax collection, and throughout the Protectorate period, tax evasion was one of the 
most common offences brought before courts.217 To pay their taxes, young men were 
now forced to migrate, join the army, or move to the south to labour on sugar and sisal 
plantations owned by Indian and European capitalists, or even in the Kilembe copper 
mines in Western Uganda. These flows of migration continued through the Protectorate 
period until after independence in 1962: of the 183,000 Lugbara counted in a 1948 
census, 12,200 resided outside of West Nile. In 1953, 27% of adult males in Maracha 
and 21% in Ayivu were employed as migrants. Whilst migration altered the balance of 
power for young men, at home, exposure to the monetary economy was limited by the 
overall restrictions of colonial policy.  
 
2.4.3: Missions as Collaborators 
 
As Protectorate rule solidified, the colonial state found an important partner in non-state 
actors: namely, Christian missionaries, who would become important providers of 
education and biomedicine, allowing selected Lugbara people to participate in emerging 
notions of Western modernity. Though this history is discussed in detail in Chapter 
Four, no overview of the region would be complete without a brief mention. 
 
 
216 King, in ‘The Yakan Cult’, regards tax collection as “the most vivid symbol of government”, noting that the Yakan 
Cult revived in tandem with the first efforts to collect tax in 1918. 
217 Belgians introduced taxation in the western Lugbara region in 1912, but throughout their occupation in 
Lugbaraland extracted grain and livestock as tribute. The first store that opened in Arua operated through the 
exchange of crops for salt, soap, and cloth. In the first report of the District, Weatherhead notes the only currency 
in circulation was that paid out to those employed by the administration (1914/5 Annual Report, p. 2). 
 98 
Weatherhead invited Anglican missionaries under the African Inland Mission to Arua in 
1917, initially to assist in famine relief.218 In 1918, AIM missionaries were followed by 
the Italian-speaking Comboni Fathers of the Catholic Church, also known as the Verona 
Fathers. As elsewhere in Uganda, Anglicans were understood to have a closer 
relationship with the colonial state than the Catholics: elders explained that “The 
Protestant church and the DC were working together.”219 In the early years, white 
missionaries often met the same hostility as state officials. Take the following account 
of a Catholic elder aged 102, Zakayo, who witnessed their arrival, and who was 
“forcibly baptised”:  
Actually the missionaries, when they came to Africa, they were forcibly making 
people convert. It was not a choice. They would pick you here, take you to 
Ediofe and baptise you. People were forced. They take you to either Ediofe or 
Mvara, depending on who found you first… I have forgotten the month. I saw 
missionaries with guns, when Padro Lino Negaretto came to build this church, 
he was moving with a gun. When he arrived on the church premises, he had a 
bag, the gun was in the bag. I saw it with my eyes.220  
 
Rural populations resisted conversion; in their first decades in West Nile, missions had 
more success in evangelising a local elite through mission education. As indicative of 
the scale of their efforts, by the 1940s AIM missionaries had instigated 60 primary 
schools, 12 junior secondary schools, Mvara Senior Secondary School, and a teacher 
training college.221 La Salandra notes that the Protestant approach downplayed 
sacraments and baptisms, instead focusing on social works such as medical care and 
school.222 Catholics too opened up primary and secondary schools across Arua, in 
 
218 Unlike the rest of Uganda, Anglican missionaries were provided by the AIM, rather than the Church Missionary 
Society. 
219 FG, Ombavu, 07/03/2016 (OJ). 
220 I, Elder, Arua, 10/04/2017 (OJ). 
221 Dobson, Daybreak in West Nile. 
222 Fr. Toni La Salandra, The History of the Catholic Church in West Nile, Comboni Missionary (n.d). 
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addition to multiple vocational training institutes. Until 1963, churches were responsible 
for the supervision of all schools in West Nile.223  
 
Missions were also the main provider of medical services. Though there was already a 
government hospital and several dispensaries, the founding of Kuluva Hospital and its 
leprosy unit in the early 1950s was significant both in providing public health and as a 
site of Christian evangelism. Even today, though much of the structure has fallen into 
disrepair and the hospital is overcrowded, Kuluva is widely regarded as the leading 
provider of medical services in the region, above the Regional Referral Hospital. The 
Catholic Fathers also opened Ovujo Hospital, the largest medical facility in today’s 
Maracha District, which remains under their care.  
 
Both Anglican and Catholic missions operated according to a hierarchical structure, 
with mission headquarters in Arua presiding over parishes as they were gradually 
established. Whilst throughout the colonial period missions were regarded largely as an 
elite force, educating government civil servants and providing new options for young 
men wishing to break from lineage authority, church planting nevertheless occurred at 
an impressive rate in the countryside from the late 1930s on—a subject detailed at 
length in Chapter Four.  
 
Leopold emphasises the colonial period as a time of rupture, yet Lugbara elders today 
speak of the colonial period as a time of relative prosperity. This comment refers both to 
 
223 This also had the impact of excluding Muslims from education, and thus restricting progression within the 
colonial model. Meagher notes that the result was the emphasis on trade for the progression of Muslim West 
Nilers: K. Meagher, ‘The hidden economy: informal and parallel trade in Northwestern Uganda’, Review of African 
Political Economy 17:47 (1990), p. 66. 
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the upheavals that preceded the British administration and those that followed it. 1920-
1962 marked a period of relative predictability and prosperity for Lugbara clans: 
epidemic diseases subsided (Lugbara regions being less affected by sleeping sickness 
than other parts of the district), and the legal frameworks of the state, together with the 
services of missions, provided a degree of regularity to people’s lives.  
 
Though incorporated within an overall extractive framework that generated new forms 
of inequality, in the countryside, clan elders were able to mediate many judicial and 
economic changes, preventing cases from reaching official courts (and avoiding fines 
and punishments). Young male migrants often sought the permission of their elders 
prior to move south, and decisions to migrate were often based on the financial needs of 
family clusters.224 Clans thus transformed in relation to the new administration, 
remaining key decision-makers in everyday life. One Lugbara scholar, Acidri, offers a 
useful comment on the impact of colonial changes. “Lugbara social relations and 
traditions based on kinship ties and intermarriages were not related to the whites in any 
way during this period [of] 1914-1962… the Lugbara never ate meat together with the 
British”.225  
 
2.5: War, Displacement, and Exile: Upheaval and Insecurity 
 
 
224 Similarly, Middleton notes that in some locales, fighting persisted as a means of settling disputes, despite 
Protectorate legislation. 
225 Acidri, The Impact of British Colonial Policies, p. 65. British authorities did not invent a system of centralised 
authority, unlike for example, in Acholiland. In 1922, an Alur prince, Jalwere Jalasiga, was appointed as Agofe Obim, 
a figurehead for the multi-ethnic district, with this post rotating around different ethnic representatives throughout 
the Protectorate period. Whilst in response to upheavals of the post-colonial period the Agofe emerged as a 
peacemaker, in general this position bore little relation to everyday life.  
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At the arrival of independence in 1962, West Nile remained under-developed compared 
to wider Uganda.226 From 1962 on, the opening-up of regional boundaries increased the 
volume of commerce through Arua, yet the modernising visions of Milton Obote failed 
to engender significant economic change to rural Lugbara clans, which remained 
centred on subsistence agriculture. The fate of West Nilers would irrevocably change 
following Obote’s overthrow in 1971, by the then-Army Commander Idi Amin Dada, a 
Nubi soldier who hailed from West Nile. During Amin’s rule, few substantive 
developments (beyond an airfield and a satellite) accrued to the region as whole, 
through the prominence of West Nilers in the army increased.227 A Maracha priest 
summarised that “[During Amin’s rule] people did not want to go to school, they just 
wanted to join the army. The army was not following the rules—they could rob you, kill 
you for property, they were mistreating civilians—getting money was easy for 
soldiers.”228 From 1975 this form of employ diminished, when internal fighting saw 
Nubi soldiers targeting their Lugbara and Ma’di counterparts. Yet West Niler troops 
were held accountable for the massacres of Acholi and Langi troops documented during 
Amin’s regime.  
 
Despite the limited local developmental gain, Amin’s tenure did not bring the same 
economic devastation to West Nile recorded across wider Uganda.229 Moreover, West 
Nilers were spared the torture enacted by Amin’s agents elsewhere in the country. The 
 
226 M. Leopold, ‘Sex, violence and history in the lives of Idi Amin: Postcolonial masculinity as masquerade’, Journal 
of Postcolonial Writing 45:3 (2009), pp. 321-330.  
227 United States Government, ‘The Anguish of Northern Uganda - Section 2’ (1997), available online at: 
<https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/anguish-northern-uganda-section-2>. The report notes that the spoils of 
businesses confiscated from 50,000 Asians in 1972 were disproportionately shared by Amin's individual allies, 
rather than being used for development in West Nile. 
228 I, Reverend, Maracha, 02/05/2017. 
229 B. Jones, Beyond the State in Rural Uganda. Edinburgh UP, (2009) 
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senseless violence of his regime, exemplified by events such as the murder of the 
Anglican Archbishop Janani Luwum, and reports of cannibalism and other violent 
murders, have been sensationalised by Ugandan and European scholars.230 Today, many 
elders are reluctant to discuss the past. One elder recalled finding bodies dumped in 
Lukuma, Terego, suspected to be the work of Amin’s secret service: “So many bodies 
were found there… You do not even know who it is[.] In various places in Terego there 
were bodies found, no one knew who they were.”231 Yet since West Nilers did not 
experience the level of violence reported elsewhere in Uganda, their memories of Amin 
and his agents have differed from accepted narratives. In interviews conducted for this 
research, some elders referred to Amin as “our brother”, whilst others praised the 
“strong” state under his regime, which dealt with “mini-skirts” and poisoners, for 
example.232 By contrast to the present, elders recalled Amin’s regime as a time of 
relative order: “He [Amin] was a good leader. His problem was that he was not 
educated. If he had been educated like Obote and Museveni… Still he tried. With no 
education he did a lot… The current leadership—he [Museveni] is disguising himself as 
bringing democracy, but he is a dictator. His rule is punishment.”233 These mixed 
memories point in part to Amin’s origins within the region, but more broadly to the 
tragedies that befell West Nilers after Amin’s overthrow.  
 
In October 1978, Amin mounted the ill-fated “Kagera War,” attempting to invade 
Tanzania. In response, a combined force of the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force 
(TPDF) and the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA)—mainly Obote’s former 
 
230 Leopold, ‘Sex, violence, and history’. 
231 I, Elder/wife, Abrici, 05/10/2016 (OJ). 
232 FG, Maracha, 28/06/2016 (OJ). 
233 I, Elder, Druyer, 17/10/2016 (OJ). 
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soldiers—entered Uganda.234 The liberation force moved from Kampala through 
southern Uganda, as Amin’s former troops fled north to West Nile. Harrell-Bond notes 
that though efforts were made to disarm Amin’s troops and issue them with surrender 
certificates, many found the offer “galling,” and fled from the liberation forces.235 
Fearing reprisals, civilians too fled the South to return home.  
 
The Liberation Forces entered Arua in June 1979. Whilst many Ugandans 
acknowledged the TDFP/ UNLA force as freeing people from the tyranny of Amin’s 
rule, West Nilers did not. Because of prior attacks on Acholi and Langi soldiers, heavily 
represented in Obote’s forces, West Nilers collectively anticipated reprisals. As one 
elder explained, “We suffered because he [Amin] was from here, from us—though he 
was a Kakwa by tribe.”236 In response to the arrival of the Liberation Forces, by the end 
of 1979, over 30,000 West Nilers had fled to exile in Sudan, and 50,000 to Zaire.237 At 
this stage, many people opted to remain within Uganda: fearing food insecurities, many 
remembered hiding from soldiers during daytime.238 Local populations endeavoured to 
maintain normalcy, with 8000 school-aged students remaining enrolled in secondary 
schools.239 In interviews, elders echoed the established position of contemporary 
 
234 Throughout his rule, Obote and troops loyal to him had lived in exile in Tanzania. President Nyerere had allowed 
the country to lie at the centre of efforts to consolidate forces to oust Amin. In response, Amin embarked on what 
was described as a “war of adventure” into Tanzania. This attack was short-lived, but entailed both casualties and 
the destruction of property. 
235 B.E. Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid. Oxford UP, 1986. She describes how many found these instructions “galling,” 
instead joining rebel factions. 
236 I, Terego Chief, 3/07/2016. 
237 J. Crisp, ‘Ugandan Refugees in Sudan and Zaire: The Problem of Repatriation’, African Affairs 85:339 (1986), pp. 
163-180, p. 164. 
238 Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid. 
239 ibid. p. 40. 
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reports, that the initial forces were involved in looting and destruction, but did not 
actively target civilians.240 
 
As the TPDF withdrew, leaving the UNLA as the sole military presence, the security 
situation rapidly deteriorated in West Nile. Elders remember this “second war” as a time 
of extreme violence, when “the Acholi people were in charge. It was a kind of revenge 
mission for them to kill the Lugbaras.”241 The intensification of conflict through 1980 
was nominally blamed on quashing resistance from Amin’s former soldiers, who had 
formed rebel groups to oppose the UNLA. As Amin’s troops had fled home, two 
resistance factions operated in West Nile: the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), 
largely comprised of Aringa speakers from northern West Nile, and the Former Uganda 
National Army (FUNA), comprised mainly of Kakwa-speakers from the western parts 
of West Nile.242 Today, Lugbara people refer to these groups as “rebels,” guerrillas, 
azaka (because of their head coverings which served as a means of identification), or 
“Aringa” (because rebels hailed from the Muslim-Lugbara).  
 
After Obote’s re-election in late 1980, he made a rare public speech vowing to eradicate 
the “cult of killing” that had emerged in Amin’s Uganda, through “…hunt[ing] the 
terrorists and bandits in every district, in every county, in every village and in every 
home.”'243 This call referred specifically to West Nile, and indeed, throughout 1980-81, 
civilians became caught in the crossfire. When the rebel groups occupied Arua in 
 
240 Refugee Law Project, ‘Working Paper No. 12 – Negotiating Peace: Resolution of conflicts in Uganda’s West Nile 
region.’ First published 30 June 2004. Available online at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-
project-working-paper-no-12-negotiating-peace-resolution-conflicts-ugandas>. 
241 I, Elder, Arua, 10/05/2016 (OJ). 
242 United States Government, ‘The Anguish of Northern Uganda.’ 
243 Reuters, ‘Obote Vows to End Ugandan Cult of Killing’, New York Times, 21 August 1981, Section A, p. 2. 
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October 1980, the UNLA intensified the killing and rape of civilians thereafter, 
including the killing of six people and one nun at the Ediofe Mission.244 Crisp’s account 
of events in 1980-81 describes allegations that old and disabled people had been stoned 
to death, that whole families were burnt in their huts, and that dismembered bodies were 
displayed on branches of trees.245 As a result of this violence, hundreds of thousands of 
West Nilers sought safety in Sudan and Congo. Violence even found missions, bishops, 
and clergy, a key reason why many West Nilers today describe war as a punishment 
from God. A key event was the Ombaci Massacre in 1981, when UNLA soldiers 
opened fire on 1500 people sheltering in the mission, killing 53 civilians who were then 
buried in mass graves. 
 
In all, close to 500,000 West Nilers fled into exile.246 Leopold notes that the exile of 
West Nilers in Sudan remains one of the most analysed refugee movements in African 
history.247 Yet with the exception of Tim Allen’s work, scholars have taken 
international organisations as the object of their analysis. Harrell-Bond’s Imposing Aid 
documents the emergency response in Kajo Keji, exposing the failure of the 
organisations to provide food security and safety, as well as the internal tension wrought 
by “forced urbanisation” of refugee populations within settlements.248 Despite these 
failings, and the conclusions that many survived by their own ingenuity as refugees in 
 
244 Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid, p. 41. 
245 Crisp, ‘Ugandan Refugees in Sudan and Zaire’, pp. 164-5. I chose not to press any of my informants on the 
violence they witnessed, based on the fact that among a group of survivors of the Ombaci massacre, there were 
active campaigns for financial compensation. The reactivation of this consciousness seemed to be the result of the 
intervention of an international NGO, which had collected the names of survivors as well as the testimonies of some 
survivors, which had been collated into a short pamphlet (which I have consulted). My presence was directly 
associated with these prior efforts, and survivors, now elderly, remained hopeful of compensation.  
246 Crisp, ‘Ugandan Refugees in Sudan and Zaire’. 
247 Leopold, ‘Crossing the Line’. 
248 Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid, p.40 
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Sudan, West Nilers were now “visible”.249 By contrast, many Lugbara people in Ayivu 
and Maracha fled not to Sudan, but over the closer border to then-Zaire. Here, exile was 
largely “self-styled,” and though UNHCR had mounted an assistance programme, most 
settled outside of camps. In total, it is estimated that between 200,000-300,000 
Ugandans fled to Zaire.250 Little attention has been paid to these dynamics.  
 
Men and women who remembered exile in Congo recalled displacement as a time when 
people were thrown on their own resources; challenges and opportunities differed 
markedly affording to personal connections. Lugbara clans residing near the border, 
many of whom share kinship connections with Congolese clans, referred to exile as a 
time when “we stayed with our family”.251 Lodging and access to land was provided by 
relatives, and some families were able to intermittently cross over the border to harvest 
food from their gardens. Others fled as entire clans. One Maracha elder explained:  
[We] went to exile in 1979, came back in 1982. Everyone went in this clan. We 
went together in one day. If you are in a clan like this you go together, if you 
live far from your clan you go alone. [During] that time, if you remain home you 
will be killed. Many animals were stolen in Congo, others died of sickness. The 
lucky ones came back with one or two. Many lost everything.252  
 
Those lacking connections rented land in Arua town or in the Congolese countryside. 
These uncertain surroundings presented many problems, including theft, violence, and 
intimidation from the Congolese sudas (soldiers). At various points, the UNLA entered 
Zaire to terrorise civilians.253 In this self-reliant and atomised landscape of exile, elders 
explained that Congolese churches, or impromptu churches improvised by exile 
 
249 ibid. p. 8. 
250 ibid. p. 42. 
251 I2, Elderly Women, Abrici, Arua, 25/09/2016 (OJ). 
252 FG, Nyarire, 13/03/2017 (OJ). 
253 Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid, p. 50. 
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Ugandan clergy under trees, played a key role in creating community and distributing 
material and spiritual aid. During this period the ascension of the church as provider 
significantly challenged the roles of clans in providing protection, but some elders still 
recalled convening funerary rites and encouraging marriages, to mitigate the threat of 
cattle theft between clans.  
 
During exile, clan hierarchies were also challenged by the participation of young men 
and women in trade. Many Lugbara people remember being involved in petty trade, 
women in kwete brewing, or trade in foodstuffs at markets. The increase in exchange 
translated into visible developments in the landscape of displacement: Ariwara market 
was established in Zaire in 1979 to facilitate transactions between Ugandans and 
Congolese. The increasing involvement of younger generations in trade rather than 
agriculture promoted anxiety in elders: unlike colonial forms of migration that were (to 
an extent) mediated by family decision-making, recalling the exile period today, elders 
lament how young people were exposed to new “lifestyles.” Similarly, whilst many 
families sought to survive, exile simultaneously provided a moment for businessmen to 
participate in a lucrative trade in commodities over the Uganda/Congo border. Studies 
in the 1990s by MacGaffey and Meagher document the smuggling of gold, coffee, 
animals, vehicles, fuel and tea over the Uganda/Congo border, with this “triangular 
trade” extending between NE Congo, NW Uganda and up to Kenya.254  
 
 
254 J. MacGaffey, The Real Economy of Zaire. London & Philadelphia: James Currey & University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1991; Meagher, ‘The hidden economy’.  
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Unlike the “involuntary” return of Ugandans in Sudan documented by Allen, return 
from Congo was gradual, with many returning from mid-1982 onwards.255 In 1983, 
Congolese soldiers administered a “notice to quit” to self-settled refugees, presenting 
Ugandans with a choice either to return or to move to Sudan.256 For returnees from 
Congo, the experience yielded highly unequal outcomes for resettlement. This disparity 
is reflected in an FAO survey from the late 1980s that documented huge divergences in 
income across Arua District. These inequalities are made plain through a consideration 
for those included in cross-border trade, and those for whom return constituted a re-
establishment of agriculture, which produced profound distinctions between town and 
the countryside. As Arua town’s markets flooded with commodities, and trade shifted 
from basic commodities to fuel, manufactured goods and even Chinese motorcycles, 
many farmers struggled to re-establish prosperity. Whilst involvement at different levels 
of trade—for example in cartels such as the ‘OPEC boys’—proffered a means to access 
cash, this trade did little to improve the lives of many farmers. Moreover, this trade was 
by nature secret, as making profit relied on taking advantage of tax differentials 
between borders, and on the relative isolation of West Nile in the 1980 and 90s which 
prevented effective policing from the Uganda Revenue Authorities.257  
 
This world of trade remained remote from the realities of most rural families. One 
elderly woman explained that people survived through “God’s mercy alone.” Many 
struggled to rebuild their lives through ‘digging’ for subsistence and selling their 
surplus in local markets. Following return, this production was increasingly organised 
 
255 Leopold, ‘Crossing the line’, p. 472; Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid, p. 46. 
256 Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid, p. 51.  
257 K. Titeca, ‘Tycoons and contraband: Informal cross-border trade in West Nile, north-western Uganda’, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 6:1 (2012), pp. 47-63. 
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not within sub-clans, but at the level of the household. Collective forms of labour (oya) 
were barely functioning.258 Allen has described the difficulties for Ma’di refugees in 
Moyo; similarly, in the decades following exile, given the reputation of West Nilers in 
Uganda, opportunities to migrate to the South for work were curtailed.  
 
Moreover, as noted in Chapter One, throughout the 1980s and 1990s Lugbara 
populations living along the Uganda/Congo border continued to suffer from ongoing 
insecurity. Of this new rebel activity, an LC of Maracha recalled:  
When they were moving, if they were to find you—you might be digging in the 
garden—they will capture you and they will say ‘you join us and fight against 
the government.’ Then they would select some soldiers to take the abducted 
people back to camp. They would also come at night, break down doors and 
abduct.259 
 
Whilst this violence had a distinct spatiality, elders more often referenced the violence 
of suffering in the two decades following return, whereby public health services had 
been decimated. New patterns of death emerged, where family members perished one 
by one. The trauma of these memories is evident in this account of one Ayivu man: 
My parents died of HIV/AIDS. The 1979 war drove them apart: Mum took off 
to Bunia where she worked and Dad found safe refuge in Arua town after 
eloping with a Congolese lady there. We were left in the hands of an aunt. The 
family reunited fully in 1983 after the end of great turbulent moments. Both my 
parents came back with kids born out of wedlock. They did not live together as 
man and woman for long. They engaged in accusations and counter-accusations 
and constant fights over the source of HIV, the dreaded disease in the family. By 
the time I knew of it, I had already succumbed to the sickness, as little 
knowledge was known in regard to safeguarding against this disease—by then 
we called it onziri (the bad unwelcomed one). My three siblings born of 
Congolese parents were born HIV/AIDS positive. I fended for the family with 
no proper source of income. We lost both siblings at a tender age… My parents 
and siblings died in my arms and in a bad way. They exhibited unbearable pains 
and horrible symptoms with some oozing blood from bodily outlets, others 
 
258 Allen, ‘A Study of Social Change’, pp. 251-3. 
259 FG, Buramali, 09/07/2016 (OJ).  
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having no control over their bowels, others rotting while alive, boils on [their] 
body… They were buried like dogs.260  
 
One public health worker reported that these deaths, now presumed to be from AIDS, 
were previously attributed to witchcraft, as well as to curses and unpaid bridewealth that 
were said to follow families. That deaths and suffering tended to cluster around 
particular families surely reinforced fears about contagion and family connections, fears 
described in Chapter Five.  
 
Overall, in the decades following the return from exile, deep inequalities between town 
and countryside emerged: whilst traders engaged in what Titeca calls the “indigenous 
way to provide development” in lieu of formal state assistance, many rural households 
struggled to make ends meet. 261 Within the structure of the clan, the household became 
the central unit of security, with disparities echoing those experienced during exile.  
 
2.6: Livelihoods and Authority in the Present Day 
 
Present-day West Nile remains politically marginalised, apparent in the denial of 
infrastructure to the region. Only in 2017 was the spinal road that traverses the western 
perimeter of the district fully tarmacked, connecting people to the wider district.262 In 
the countryside, only homes that can afford solar panels have access to power. The 
arrival of the road reflects West Nile’s changing political leadership: over the last two 
electoral cycles, NRM or independent candidates have won seats in Arua Municipality, 
and in selected rural county seats. By way of reward for their shifting political loyalties, 
 
260 I, Arua Trader, 01/2018 (TO). 
261 Titeca, ‘Tycoons and contraband’, p. 50. 




the central government has afforded some “obedient” counties District status. These 
campaigns have drawn on colonial sub-county boundaries, to assert developmental 
claims to autonomy. In 2006, Maracha Sub-County, led by its NRM MP, asserted its 
autonomy from Arua District, seceding to become its own District.263 During this 
research, Teregians too were hopeful their county would gain District status: people and 
local politicians desired these new districts, hoping that the reallocation of budgets from 
Arua would “bring services to the poor.” The creation of Maracha District has led to the 
creation of an expansive (but unfinished) headquarters in Nyadri as well as the 
employment of an attachment of civil servants servicing the new district. While rural 
populations were initially hopeful about what a new district might mean, a decade’s 
lack of progress has given rise to the consensus that the promised benefits have brought 
little change to their everyday lives.  
 
Whilst many Lugbara homes feature teachers, civil servants, businesspeople, soldiers or 
security guards, agricultural production continues to pervade everyday life. According 
to the 2014 Census, 94.4% of households in Maracha District were primarily involved 
in agricultural practices.264 Reflecting its introduction under the Protectorate rule as an 
anti-famine crop, cassava is the main subsistence crop, with other staples including osu 
(beans), maku (sweet potatoes), kaka (maize), anya (millet), ondu (sorghum) and funyo 
(groundnuts). More ambitious growers cultivate cabbages, onions, peppers and chillies. 
Lugbara people continue to keep livestock, including chickens, goats, and sheep, and 
 
263 Terego was initially included, but rejoined Arua in 2011.  
264 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, National Population and Housing Census (2014), ‘Maracha Census Profile’, p. 27. 
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when affordable, cattle. Agricultural production is organised at the level of the 
household, but most homes sell and buy imported foodstuffs. 
 
Inequalities pervade agricultural practice. On the one hand, wealthier men buy farms of 
many acres in southern sub-counties (Vurra is known as the “food basket”), often 
employing relatives as labourers and guards. Aruan men who live away from their 
ancestral lands frequently employ rural relatives, often clan sisters, to plant and harvest 
crops for them “at home.” Fluctuating prices provide potentially lucrative opportunities 
for those who have larger fields and who can afford transport: a bag of cassava can 
move between 90,000 and 150,000 UGS (25$/40$) between the season of planting and 
harvesting (respectively). Yet poorer households increasingly struggle to meet basic 
subsistence needs. Population increases, particularly in Maracha District and parts of 
Arua District, have also put significant pressure on land, leading to conflicts between 
and within clans and families. Moreover, climate change and the instability of rains 
makes planting seasons increasingly hard to predict.265 That some Maracha residents 
decried “famine in homes” in 2017, and rumours of deaths from the premature 
consumption of the cassava crop, is indicative of these emergent issues.266  
 
Since a return from exile, in certain Maracha and Ayivu counties some households have 
opted to cultivate mairungi (khat). In recent years, markets for tobacco have also 
diminished. Growers reported that from 2014 companies refused to buy their crop on 
account of its low grade. Given the arduous nature of cultivating the crop, many have 
 
265 I, LCV Maracha, 16/03/2017.  
266 Radio Pacis Daily News Broadcast, 01/2019.  
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turned away from the trade, with the exception of parts of Terego. During this research, 
many young men worked as contractors, drivers or administrators for international 
NGOs servicing South-Sudanese refugees—although it was widely perceived that the 
bulk of these jobs were given to Bagandans rather than West Nilers, an injustice that led 
to violent resistance at the Imvepi refugee camp in Terego. Thus even despite land 
shortages and change, for many Lugbara who lack secondary or university education, 
subsistence agriculture continues to be the only practice that provides a modicum of 
certainty.  
 
The continued focus on production organised at the household level has generated 
significant anxieties following the return from exile. Elders lament the indiscipline of 
younger generations, who often eschew agricultural labour for trading opportunities or 
“mairungi-eating”. Such concerns offer a scapegoat for the perceived decline in 
productivity, as well as mark a commentary on elders’ loss of authority. Numerically, 
young men far outnumber their elders: in 2014, 86.7% of the population of Arua 
District was below 40 years of age, with only 3.5% over 60.267 Elders in some Maracha 
District clans reported heightened violence from their juniors, blaming the consumption 
of drugs and alcohol for their lack of restraint. Modernity is seen as challenging 
hierarchies based on age, and elders frequently have to rely on un-cooperative or absent 
sons. The involvement of women too has brought significant changes to household 
relations: women increasingly sell surplus in county markets and trading centres, as well 
as participate in regional trade, importing foodstuffs from Ariwara in Congo to sell 
locally, or engaga (small fish) from Panyimur. Though most Lugbara men accept their 
 
267 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, National Population and Housing Census (2014), ‘Arua District’, p. 5. 
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wives’ new roles given the need to raise cash for school fees and healthcare, new forms 
of mobility create moral discontents. A Catholic priest, Father Ambrose, summarised 
popular sentiment: “These women who are in business, they go in[to] business [and] 
abandon [their] home. They can stay one week outside buying fish or other produce. 
The home will look like a home without mother… She abandons the husband.”268 
Across the countryside, elders lamented the breakdown of marriages and the moral 
problems which had emerged since the return from exile.  
 
In response to these moral fears, and to the perceived crisis of households abrogating 
collective responsibilities, elders (and often invested married sons) have sought to re-
institute the clan as a disciplinary institution. Elders remain arbiters of land, marriage, 
and familial discipline, but in view of challenges to their words, a recent innovation in 
everyday order-making has arisen: most clans across Arua and Maracha have now 
adopted a semi-bureaucratised structure to promote moral order and peace. Since 2010, 
clans have adopted by-laws (written in English) that denote obligations and 
performances, mimicking the procedures of local government. Elders who head the clan 
are often given the position of “Advisor,” supported by aspiring and able married sons, 
who may be given titles such as ‘Clan Leader’ and ‘Assistant Leader’ (mirroring titles 
given to local officials). Clan meetings are considered an essential demonstration of 
unity; these self-made regulations include prohibitions on theft, witchcraft, quarrelling 
and drinking (see Appendix D), and make plain the importance of morality and restraint 
in intimate relations. Echoing colonial courts, violations are punishable by caning and 
fines, though clan leaders recognise that enforcing these punishments is often difficult. 
 
268 I, Catholic Father, 23/21/2017. 
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Often these by-laws are stamped by sub-counties. In other contexts, elders have turned 
to curses, drawing on mystical sanctions formerly used against violence and killing in 
the colonial period. During this fieldwork a feud between two clans in Ayivu District 
following an allegation of killing resulted in the displacement of one clan over the 
Congolese border. Reviving clan authority has thus drawn both on bureaucratic and 
spiritual tools, and sometimes on violence.  
 
Clan authority has also been carved out amidst the establishment of local government. 
Following the decentralisation blueprints for Uganda, the local councillor systems run 
from village (LCI) to parish (LCII) to sub-county (LCIII) to district (LCV).269 The 
Local Councillor 1 (LCI) plays a fundamental role in everyday order-making, and is 
expected to bring development projects to the village level. LCIIIs often become 
involved in more complex cases, as do parish chiefs and sub-county chiefs. The chief 
system, inherited from the colonial era, exists separately from and yet parallel to the LC 
system: chiefs are technical government staff and receive a regular government salary, 
and are increasingly appointed through government recruitment. As in the past, 
“embedded officials,” who live where they serve, are seen as closer to the people than 
higher government actors, and their allegiance to communities often pits leaders against 
the state. Sub-counties remain the highest level at which most rural villages access 
services, but everyday affairs usually involve the LC and an assemblage of local 
officials drawn from the LC or technical chief system. 
 
 
269 LCII and LCIV positions do exist, but I did not personally meet any of these officials.  
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Crucially, whilst this local government infrastructure exists, the arbitration of disputes 
often directly encourages the involvement of elders. Beyond the immediate environs of 
Arua town, most Lugbara people are afforded access to land through patrilineage, just 
as access to women remains mediated through men; as such, clans play a central role in 
arbitrating resources. Cases of “land wrangles”—a common term which Kandle notes 
disguises the potential violence of boundary disputes—are often passed back from sub-
counties to be settled “at home.”270 Government officials often take the role of 
witnesses or mediators, but verdicts frequently rely on the wisdom of elders who have 
knowledge of the land, of migrations and of the boundaries in question. Those who fail 
to respect elders’ verdicts on land may incur a curse, which may result in death. One 
Lugbara saying holds that “if you fight over land, the land will eat you”.  
 
Along with church councils, elders continue to play a central role in the resolution of 
family disputes, particularly in cases of adultery or violence between husband and wife. 
Indeed, taking conflicts between married couples or between brothers to the local 
government or police is believed to enact a misfortune called aruba—explained as 
manifesting leprosy-like sores, a persistent cough, or a generalised state of misfortune. 
Reversing aruba necessitates a cleansing ceremony, where animals are transferred by 
the party who sought the intervention of the court, with the elders then offering 
forgiveness after a shared meal. In the precolonial period, aruba was thought to 
manifest after brothers entered into continuous feuding, but today reflects a wider belief 
that going to court challenges the social balance between those related by blood. Of this 
 
270 M. Kandle, “We are Refugees in Our Own Homeland": Land Dispossession and Resettlement Challenges in Post-
Conflict Teso, Uganda. PhD Thesis, Department of Cultural Anthropology, City University of New York, 2014.  
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system, elder Jaddar Olekua commented, “This system continues to be used to resolve 
conflicts and to take deterrent disciplinary measures against individuals or persons who 




Taking the vantage point of the lineage, this chapter has situated political, social, and 
economic change for Lugbara peoples in historic context, foregrounding the reliance on 
local institutions to illuminate the subsequent chapters of this thesis. Simply put, for 
many Lugbara men and women, the clan continues to be the most important institution 
in times of crisis. Turning to clan members provides a means of inquiring into and 
resolving misfortune, and though the institution of the clan has been much transformed 
through colonial and postcolonial policies, groups continue to seek protection and rights 
through identification with the lineage. Yet Lugbara people also draw upon systems of 
local government and religious institutions in efforts to restore social imbalances.  
 
Whilst scholars have caricatured West Nile as a “vacuum” of authority, this research 
has documented how different state, religious and clan actors are sought in particular 
contexts. Subsequent chapters of this thesis detail these actors’ roles: Chapter Four 
focuses specifically on how Christian institutions have interfaced with clans, and 
Chapter Eight details expectations of state intervention into accusations of poisoning, 
acts deemed criminal and beyond the scope of clan punishment. The next chapter 
 
271 Quoted in C. Aluma, ‘Lugbara Clan leaders decry oppressive norms’, West Nile Web, 2 October 2019. Available 
online at <https://www.westnileweb.com/news-a-analysis/arua/lugbara-clan-leaders-decry-oppressive-norms>. Of 
course, aruba also makes it difficult to report cases of gender-based violence, as highlighted by recent interest from 
Oxfam: see P.I. Chandini, ‘Hear my noise in the storm!’, Oxfam Blog, 19/03/2020, available online at 
<https://uganda.oxfam.org/latest/blogs/hear-my-noise-storm> 
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elucidates in greater depth how clans responded to the changes of the colonial period 









Institutionalising Explanation: Ancestors and 
Ethnography in the Colonial-Context 
 
 
“I had hardly realised that the Lugbara, although at first sight hardly a very 
religious people, discussed matters and concepts that we would call 







Having laid a historical groundwork for Lugbara people in West Nile in the previous 
chapter, this chapter turns now to the central enquiry of this thesis: the management of 
misfortune. According to anthropological record, during the last decade of Protectorate 
rule, the dominant means of explaining sickness was through the activities of watchful, 
usually male, ancestors in the lineage, usually activated by the words of elders. 
Detailing how this “cult of the dead” operated in theory and in practice, this chapter also 
explores how this mode of explaining sickness was institutionalised in a key 
ethnographic text, John Middleton’s Lugbara Religion, first published in 1960. 
Accordingly, this analysis begins not merely by describing the indigenous healing 
system as a baseline from which to interpret present-day practices of health-seeking, but 
by appreciating how the colonial ethnographic mode produced particular truths, limits 
and systemisations in its analysis.  
 
Considering the substantial critique of the structural-functionalist approach to 
anthropology and its modes of representation, this chapter offers a specific reading of 
 
272 J. Middleton, The Study of the Lugbara: Expectation and Paradox in Anthropological Research, New York, Holy 
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Middleton’s work.273 One the one hand, this analysis approaches Lugbara ritual practice 
not as an enduring tradition, but as a pragmatic response to construct social solidarities 
and control human ambition, against the legacies of upheaval described in the preceding 
chapter. On the other, this chapter deconstructs the framing of this world as religious, 
instead understanding how a healing system, embedded in everyday life, was remade 
through social hierarchies and the words of elders. Approaching the ancestral system as 
lived, rather than discrete, permits an understanding of how expressions of power have 
endured long after ancestral shrines were abandoned during the war.  
 
This chapter begins by situating the production of Middleton’s text within its 
contemporary intellectual and methodological context. It then describes the dominant 
mode through which responsibility for chronic sickness—this “cult of the dead”—was 
ascertained in the 1950s. It goes on to explore how the realities of practice, yield 
important insights into the present. Finally, major studies into health and healing 
amongst Lugbara populations have built on Middleton’s analysis: whilst scholars have 
built on empirical aspects of his work, this chapter urges a reading of Lugbara Religion 
as a theoretical text. An engagement with the interconsistency of Lugbara Religion 
permits an exploration of how traces of this system exist in the present.  
 
3.2 Lugbara Religion and the Ethnographic Gaze 
 
Middleton’s research was positioned at the centre of an unfolding discipline of 
anthropology. For his D.Phil, he enrolled at the Oxford Institute of Social 
Anthropology, headed at the time by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, who was also his 
 
273 A. Abramson and M. Holbraad, ‘Contemporary Cosmologies, Critical Reimaginings’, Religion and Society: 
Advances in Research 3 (2012): pp. 35-50. 
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supervisor.274 Evans-Pritchard’s ethnographies had set the tone for European studies of 
African belief, and even today scholars continue to revisit and reinterpret these 
studies.275 His Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande (1937), which 
presented witchcraft beliefs as a coherent empirical system that served to explained 
misfortune, is widely regarded as the foundational study in the study of African 
cosmology and witchcraft. In its contemporary context, the text was lauded as moving 
the study of occult practice beyond the realm of superstition, serving “to de-exoticise 
what may otherwise be deemed as exotic and strange.”276 Evans-Pritchard was deeply 
concerned with how Azande belief systems were sustained and validated through 
practice: as Kapferer noted, “Azande practice was not a mere passive object for the 
demonstration of alien knowledge and theory, but was itself a source of knowledge and 
made active in both opening up horizons of understanding and challenging other 
analytic construction of the nature of human experience.”277 Witchcraft has an alternate 
rationality, continually self-reinforced through lived experience; as a system of practice, 
accusations of witchcraft moreover provided a medium for Azande “commoners” to 
resolve disputes amongst themselves: accusations were made publicly, and were, in a 
sense, benign.278   
 
 
274 This cohort contained scholars including Godfrey Lienhardt, John Beattie, Mary Douglas, and Frank Girling, who, 
in different ways, would shape the contours of colonial African anthropology.  
275 See, for example, Thomas Beidelman who hails Evans-Pritchard as “the greatest ethnographer of all time”—cited 
in J.W. Burton, ‘The Ghost of Malinowski in the Southern Sudan: Evans-Pritchard and Ethnographic Fieldwork’,  
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 127:4 (1983), pp. 278- 289, p. 278. Many anthropologists 
continue to explore Evans-Pritchard’s texts for new meanings, e.g. M.A. Mills, ‘The opposite of witchcraft: Evans-
Pritchard and the problem of the person’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 19:1 (2013), pp. 18-33. 
276 B. Kapferer, ‘Introduction: Outside All Reason: Magic, Sorcery and Epistemology’, Social Analysis: The 
International Journal of Anthropology 46:3 (2002), pp. 1- 30, p. 3. 
277 ibid. p. 4. 
278 Whilst the shortened version describes Azande beliefs in witchcraft as a coherent system of misfortune, his 
extended works explore questions of scepticism—both on the part of the anthropologist and the Azande 
themselves.  
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Evans-Pritchard’s Nuer Religion (1940) further influenced Middleton’s ethnography of 
Lugbara people. Middleton acknowledges this debt, and the cosmological similarities 
between the two groups, writing that “Evans-Pritchard once said to me—he didn’t write 
it, as far as I know—that what we study is the concept and exercise of power: the Nuer 
saw their lives as guided by the power of spirits, and the Lugbara saw theirs as guided 
by the power of the ancestors.”279 Taking the detailed heuristic of a segmentary society 
developed by his supervisor among Nuer populations, Middleton operationalised this 
heuristic to describe Lugbara social organisation.280 As in Nuer Religion, Middleton 
presents a ritual system in great length. Yet Middleton’s central argument differed from 
the “ideational studies” of his predecessor.281 Whereas Evans-Pritchard presented the 
Nuer belief in spirits and divinities as a theological system, Middleton’s analysis was 
thoroughly sociological. Middleton observed that, for Lugbara populations, belief and 
ritual only made sense with reference to its social context. Cosmology as an abstract 
resource bore little relevance. In contrast to Evans-Pritchard’s study, which emphasised 
a system of belief, Middleton concluded that “[The] Lugbara have no set of inter-
consistent beliefs as to the nature of man and the world. Their beliefs are significant in 
given situations and their consistency lies in the way in which they are used in ritual 
action.”282 In this recognition, Lugbara Religion ultimately bears more resemblance to 
the analytic of Azande witchcraft, with a similar focus on knowledge production, on 
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questions of practical action, and on preserving a corpus of indigenous belief against 
external change. 
 
Middleton’s interest in social structure was influenced by subsequent developments in 
anthropology. By the 1940s, a group of scholars known as the structural-functionalists 
had taken Evans-Pritchard’s approach in a more theoretical direction. This group of 
anthropologists were primarily interested not in questions of validating knowledge, but 
in the social functions of belief systems, and of witchcraft in particular.283 Within these 
studies, witchcraft beliefs persisted because of their social use, serving as a “social-
strain gauge” that served to reinforce order in small-scale societies. The father of the 
structural-functionalists (who collectively became known as the ‘Manchester School’), 
Max Gluckman, was also a faculty member at Oxford during Middleton’s enrolment. 
The following recollection from Middleton is revelatory of the shaping of his research 
prior to his fieldwork: 
I was offered, one afternoon, a choice: to work among the Lugbara with Evans-
Pritchard (E.-P. used to say they were closely related to the Azande—he called 
them the Lug-bwaaaa-ra) or among the Ndebele with Gluckman. They sat there 
opposite me and waited for my reply. Max Gluckman never held that decision 
against me and always counted me as one of his followers, which I have always 
regarded myself as being.284 
 
Elements of structural-functionalism deeply influenced Middleton’s understanding of 
Lugbara ritual. Indeed, one anthropological reviewer, Gellner, described Lugbara 
Religion as “a classic of the [structural-functionalist] genre… where “religion was seen 
as the cement of society.”285 In the Lugbara context, social order was maintained not 
 
283 For a summary see M. Douglas, ‘Introduction: Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic’, in M. Douglas 
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through witchcraft accusations (though such events did feature), but via elders’ 
interpretations of sickness sent by lineage ancestors. Middleton explains that this “cult 
of the dead”, his term for the process through which ancestral wrath is made manifest in 
relation to the acts of the living, “provides a logically consistent system and explains 
most sickness and provides a social and psychological response to it; it also provides 
sanctions against anti-social behaviour.”286 Of funerary rites too, Middleton concludes, 
“A death disturbs the continuity of the lineage and mortuary rites are performed in order 
to restore this continuity”.287 This language of functionalism threads throughout 
Lugbara Religion. Additionally, Middleton was deeply invested in comparisons of 
belief systems and social control between locales—a central endeavour of small-scale 
studies—later co-editing a volume on comparative witchcraft and sorcery beliefs with 
Phillip Winter.288 Such endeavours did advance anthropological theories, but often at 
the expense of acknowledging the diversity of vocabularies and beliefs between 
contexts.289 
 
In the context of African independence movements in the mid-1960s, and with the rise 
of post-structural and postmodern thinking within anthropology, functionalist 
approaches soon became subject to multiple critiques. Critics condemned the projection 
of colonial imaginaries of tribe and indigeneity, as well as the denial of power dynamics 
between researcher/researched in these “salvage ethnographies”.290 Moreover, 
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functionalist theories were eschewed as reductionist, offering limited explanatory power 
to describe societies undergoing rapid change. Reviewing the contribution of this work 
in the 1970s, Mary Douglas concluded that “[the] relation between belief and society, 
instead of appearing as infinitely complex, subtle and fluid, was presented as a control 
system with a negative feedback.”291 Having reduced witchcraft to mere social tensions, 
functional approaches were gradually abandoned.  
 
Yet to reject Middleton’s work wholesale as an outmoded theory would neglect the 
detail and subtlety of his engagement, and the nuance within his ethnography.292 Indeed, 
Lugbara Religion contains several elucidations of ritual action. Whilst the first three 
chapters describe how the “cult of the dead” functioned to maintain social order, a 
subsequent 100-page section called “The Field of Ritual Action” serves as a 
biographical account of how a group of elderly informants negotiated and practiced this 
system. Within these descriptions—which are almost entirely free from theory and read 
as a local archive—one can easily encounter struggles with intimacy, uncertainty, and 
pragmatic responses to change, all pertinent themes in studies in social healing to the 
present. That said, assumptions underpinning anthropology during the colonial era still 
engendered a particular ethnographic gaze: as noted, functionalism was both a theory 
and a method. I now turn to explore these entanglements in Middleton’s fieldwork and 
writing. 
 




291 Douglas, ‘Introduction’, p. xiv. 
292 Contemporary critics commented that Lugbara Religion contained too much descriptive detail. 
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3.3.1 Selecting Spaces and Voices 
 
 
The “whole society” approach to which Middleton subscribed relied on a pseudo-
scientific delineation of territory, whereby events in a small locale, usually a rural 
village, were extrapolated to represent approximate realities for the wider tribal group. 
Middleton used the segmentary heuristic to describe political relations in a ‘stateless’ 
society—as Evans-Pritchard had developed with Nuer descent groups—to discern 
complex pattern of social relations greeting him in Lugbaraland. On the one hand, this 
approach, intended to facilitate synchronic analysis between societies, neglected to 
consider the historical relations unique to each space. Kuper argues that a myopic view 
of the patrilineage as dominating social interactions deeply obscured other connections, 
for example through marriage or to the wider neighbourhood.293  
 
In Middleton’s works which adopt a descriptive approach to the wider landscape, these 
connections appear to have deep implications in everyday life, not just in the 
management of misfortune. In The Study of the Lugbara: Expectation and Paradox in 
Anthropological Research, for example, Middleton describes the complexity of ties 
between members of family clusters and other relatives, known collectively as juru 
(beyond the sanction of ancestors). He also notes the importance of connections 
developed through bridewealth payments. In the realm of healing, however, a landscape 
of prophets and diviners beyond blood relations received substantively less analysis. 
Indeed, on occasion, Middleton himself became involved in the management of 
sickness, evidence that connections beyond the lineage were consulted as a matter of 
 
293 Kuper, ‘Lineage Theory’. 
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pragmatism. Coherence relied on the ethnographer’s erasure of wider connections and 
religious innovations beyond the clan. 
 
That said, family connections have their own legacies that endure to the present. Within 
sub-clans, Lugbara people were subject to forms of sickness that were sent to them 
because of their blood ties. Whilst other healers were consulted by choice, enyati were 
theatres of mystically-induced discipline and healing to which ordinary people were 
automatically bound. Though in Lugbara Religion Middleton presents clusters as closed 
systems, these spaces were in fact permeated by other debates about healing as well.  
 
The “benign” perspective Middleton promoted regarding ancestral sickness reflects not 
only the (relative) stability of the colonial context, but the fact that his key interlocutors 
were elderly men with access to power. Moreover, there were clear parallels between 
elders’ ideas of enforcing a social order, and the functional approach to anthropology 
that imagined such a state could exist. Middleton’s admiration of his elderly men is 
evident; one description of a disobedient son of his chief informant is revealing: “[h]e 
was regarded as a good-for-nothing, wearing smart clothes, seducing girls and getting 
drunk in the company of his seniors.”294  
 
Middleton’s work almost entirely excludes women, an omission whose responsibility he 
defers: “Since women have lower status than men in terms of lineage responsibilities, 
men would frequently say that I was wasting my time in writing down the names of 
women.”295 Elders’ words were said to carry more weight than those both of their sons 
 
294 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 159. 
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and of women, and Middleton’s ethnography portrays the views of those with power, 
rather than those subject to the elders’ discipline. A radically different view of 
cosmology would have been presented either from female diviners or from members of 
Christian spirit cults that operated in parallel to ancestral systems during this period (cf. 
Chapter Four). Overall, however, Middleton’s work reflects notions of order-making 
embodied in elders’ ideals. In interpreting his work, his insights must be read as 
reflecting notions of dominant power holders in society. 
 
3.3.2: Under-theorisation of external change 
 
A key criticism of colonial anthropology—and of the stateless society framework—is 
its portrayal of indigenous systems solely through the erasure of external change. The 
focus on small-scale units, in addition to downplaying wider social connections, 
precluded a focus on the state. For Das and Poole, the study of “stateless” societies in 
the colonial period was little more than a “quest to find order or reason… [which] 
makes use of a language of order that is inherited from—and indeed part of—the 
modern European state.”296As discussed in the previous chapter, and as highlighted 
below in Araka’s history, these changes had profound effects by the 1950s.  
 
The anthropological paradigm (in tandem with colonial theories of ideas of state power) 
meant that tradition remained the central focus of Middleton’s analysis. Yet other, more 
radical anthropologists working in Uganda around the same time as Middleton offered 
divergent portrayals, rejecting the functionalist approach and adopting critical views 
both on tradition and tribe. Adrian Southall, based in neighbouring Alurland during 
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Middleton’s tenure in Lugbaraland, presents a belief system ruptured by the colonial 
state and missions.297 In later publications based on his experiences in Alurland, 
Southall expressed disdain for the privileging of political systems based on “tribe” to 
the occlusion of other forms of political organisation.298 Frank Girling too, who enrolled 
at Oxford with Middleton, presented an Acholi society ruptured and centralised around 
an “all-powerful district commissioner.”299 For him, the Acholi identity, far from being 
traditional, was inherently modern. So controversial were Girling’s findings that he 
struggled to pass his D.Phil. Finally, Otok p’Bitek, a Ugandan scholar who denounced 
the whole study of anthropology at Oxford as a racist enterprise, failed his D.Phil.300 
The experiences of these latter two men clearly elucidate the potential dangers for any 
academic who too boldly challenged the core assumptions of the African 
anthropological focus on primitive societies which had been disrupted by colonial 
states. Even so, these anthropologists began to answer certain questions at the periphery 
of Lugbara Religion: questions regarding the spatiality of change, the invention of tribe, 
and the impact of the colonial administration.  
 
Unlike his peers who revisited their methods, Middleton defended his approach. In an 
interview five decades after the publication of Lugbara Religion, he decried new trends 
in anthropological writing premised on representations: 
Accounts of a writer’s own sensibilities in the lives of the ordinary people are 
not ethnographies but travelogues. We are onlookers, guests, perhaps friends, 
comparativists, but it is those who are our hosts who are the objects of what we 
do, and it is for them as well as ourselves that we do it. We should recall the 
words of Georges Condominas, who wrote that the ethnographer should be the 
 
297 A. Southall, Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination. Cambridge: Heffer, 1956.  
298 Southall, ‘The Illusion of Tribe’. 
299 T. Allen, ‘Introduction – colonial encounters in Acholiland and Oxford: the anthropology of Frank Girling and 
Okot p'Bitek’, in T. Allen (ed.), Lawino's People: the Acholi of Uganda. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2019, pp. 1-29, p. 21. 
300 ibid. p. 34. 
 131 
historian of the subproletariat of the Third World: I agree with him. Surely we 
can do better than merely look at ourselves?301 
 
This not to say Middleton did not attend to issues of change. Over the course of his 
career Middleton became increasingly attentive to changes in government, as well as 
prophetic authority. His published books on the Lugbara present change in different 
ways: Lugbara of Uganda provides a descriptive portrait of other aspects of society, 
including colonial courts and missions, whilst The Study of the Lugbara also engages 
with the assistance of chiefs and officials in Arua in Middleton’s own research.  
 
The chief value of Middleton’s insight lies not in ethnographies such as Girling’s, 
which account for spatially-unfolding change, but rather how changes were refracted 
through personal relationships. In Lugbara Religion, the most detailed account, the 
imprint of external changes are clearly in view. The Araka family (a pseudonym) in 
central Maracha, where Middleton worked over a 15-month period, had been deeply 
affected by change. Lying close to Ofude, clans in the area had experienced both the 
violence of Belgian rule and the impacts of epidemics, and had learnt “the words of 
Yakan”. An elder today recalled the spread of epidemic disease that caused the entire 
cluster to relocate in 1919: “We left that place because people were suffering from din 
dia (plague), people were dying at night. In the morning you find so-and-so has 
died.”302 By the arrival of Protectorate rule, Araka had lost almost one-third of its 
members, and all but three of its cattle. As noted earlier, it was in view of the intimate 
traumas of the early 20th century that elders conceived of the 1950s as a period of 
relative calm. Though far from Arua, by 1949 Middleton’s Arakans recognised the 
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political geography of sub-counties, and several male members of the cluster were 
employed by the colonial administration. The influence of Christianity, however, was 
less established, since Northern Lugbara generally experienced mission evangelism less 
directly than in the South. On arriving in Vurra, Middleton was actively dissuaded by 
AIM missionaries in the region, lest his work revive the “pagan” practices they had 
been trying to suppress for four decades.  
 
From a consideration of this highly local portrait of the effects of the past, we can 
conclude that the stability of ancestral systems resulted from a particular moment. 
Middleton was documenting life in a “colonial society,” rather than a traditional one. As 
noted in Chapter Two, promoting discipline within the lineage was simultaneously a 
means of preserving elders’ authority and avoiding new punishments introduced under 
state law. Other changes (restricting movement and prohibiting feuds) had also created a 
context of relative regularity, and the sub-county administration worked in tandem with, 
rather than replaced, the authority of clan elders. Clans had thus reacted and responded 
to the colonial framework, rather than being timeless, traditional structures.  
 
Through a consideration of the traces of external change noted in Middleton’s extended 
analysis, we can consider how colonial structures resounded through the minutiae of 
human interactions: Lugbara elders explained that it was Europeans who had first begun 
to “spoil their land.”303 Elders turned to the conservative ritual system both in spite of 
and because of the local effects of these encounters. A common refrain in Middleton’s 
work is that the words of the ancestors were known to elders, in contrast to the words of 
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the divinity and the English laws of the state. To foreground a conclusion in the 
background of Lugbara Religion: “Lugbara society is not a closed system, and changes 
occur in it due not only to recurrent deaths but also to factors that are outside it. 
Although men cannot prevent death, they can cope with it in terms of their own 
religious system and their notions about the ideal structure of their society.”304 
  
 3.3.3 Language and Representation 
 
Alongside its other impacts, the ethnographic tradition furthermore structured the 
language used to represent a lived system of misfortune and moral authority into 
notions of religion, cults, sacrifice and worship that were palatable to European 
audiences. Though the difficulties of translation are universal to any context, such 
connotations of ceremony, adoration and separation did not marry with how Lugbara 
elders explained their own relationship to their ancestors. In the 1950s, Lugbara elders 
spoke about their ancestors in thoroughly human terms. Implicated in case of sickness, 
ancestors were spoken of by name, and on occasion referred to as ‘ba drapi ‘bori 
(‘people who have died’, emphasis mine). The theologian Dalfovo notes that the words 
that connoted ritual sacrifice—ori owi (to offer) or ori nya (to eat)—could equally be 
used to describe human activities.305 Lugbara people, Middleton observed, described 
their ancestors as exemplary humans: “Elders often quarrel among themselves like 
young men. They are men and all men have bad hearts. But the ancestors do not quarrel 
among themselves.” Or as an extension of the family: “If the dead are angry then their 
child will also be angry in his heart, as a child follows his father.”306 Such descriptions 
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point to a human conception of dead ancestors, closer to Mbiti’s notion of the “living 
dead,” or what Koptyoff terms “ancestors as elders.”307 Crucially too, ancestors usually 
worked in communion with the words and grievances of elders: this was a living system 
of authority. 
 
The linguistic aspect here is key. Lugbara speakers recognised the idea of a distinct, 
imported religion, which was connoted by the Kiswahili term dini, introduced during 
the second half of the 20th century. By the 1950s, dini referred to Islam, Christianity, 
and previously, Yakan.308 As Dalfovo noted, speakers differentiated between religion as 
an imported, imposed concept, and the ancestors, who were understood to be “an 
undistinguished part of life and an undifferentiated component of society.”309 
Unsurprisingly, importing a religious vocabulary had particular consequences in a 
landscape undergoing intense Christian evangelism. Missionaries and Lugbara converts 
were involved in parallel processes of re-constructing ancestors as discrete “religious” 
systems, labelling them kafiri (pagan), and portraying this practice as opposed to 
Christianity.310 Adherence to the ancestral system would become a means of marking 
Christians from non-Christians, which, as discussed in later chapters of this thesis, 
would acquire increased momentum following independence and war. In this way, 
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Other translations presented particular problems. For example, deploying the term 
“God” to stand for a hierarchy of divinities, denoted by Adro/Adroa, conflated complex 
hierarchies of spirits tied to different forms of affliction.311 Translations of witchcraft 
and sorcery presented further issues, which are discussed in the later part of this thesis. 
But as with ideas about religion, these translations, also adopted by Christian 
missionaries and educated Lugbara-speakers, have today produced the worlds they 
describe, importing new ideas into local epistemologies. 
 
Finally, the use of a religious vocabulary obscured alternative framings of health and 
well-being, framings that have subsequently been related to systems previously 
described as religion, elsewhere.312 Speaking of Bunyole, Uganda, Whyte poses the 
question of whether medical anthropology has increasingly come to cover issues that 
were formerly addressed by religious anthropology. For Whyte, herself a medical 
anthropologist, functional social anthropology—in its attentiveness to ceremony and 
structure—neglected to inquire into the realities of suffering and affliction.313 Indeed, on 
one occasion, Middleton reminds the reader that Lugbara people actually do get sick. 
Yet today, many remember ancestors as being implicated in healing. An elder of Araka 
explained: “If there is problem—those days it was mainly sickness—we would 
slaughter a chicken and animal, the blood would be sprinkled on those stones whilst 
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mentioning the names—if it is you, so and so, then help us, let this sickness go, we were 
asking for help.”314  
  
3.4 Cult of the Dead: Healing and Social Reproduction 
 
This section describes the ancestral systems of healing that dominated practice during 
the last decade of Protectorate rule. After providing a sketch of Lugbara spiritual 
infrastructure, the following section describes the realities of the ancestral system.  
 
Before Middleton, other Europeans had described the extent of a material landscape 
connected to ancestors. During the early years of Protectorate rule, successive outsiders 
commented on a prolific landscape of stone shrines that surrounded Lugbara 
homesteads. Based on the prevalence of ancestral shrines, McConnell, a British colonial 
administrator, concluded in the 1920’s: “From cradle to grave the lives of the tribe are 
saturated with supernatural spirits…”315 Before him, Chauncey Stigand, a chronicler of 
the peoples of the Lado Enclave, remarked of those clans living around Mt. Wati: 
“There is no clearly marked division between religious and superstitious practices; in 
fact religion is largely superstition, whilst superstition is often more or less religious.”316 
Egidio Ramponi, a Catholic missionary, described how this intimate system of shrines 
indicated a society beholden to the “wrath” of the ancestors.317 For Middleton, this 
landscape was relevant not as a religious artefact, but as a catalyst for interactions 
within the social context. 
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Ancestors collectively were known as a’bi (‘to go away’). A’bi could be both male and 
female, and were designated shrines as a collective, known as a’biva. Individually, 
ancestors were known as ori (which Middleton translates as ‘ghost’). Ancestors 
designated ori were men who had borne children, and who usually had lived exemplary 
lives. After their death, stone slabs of granite arranged into the structure of a stone 
house were erected in memory of the deceased, structures which also took the term ori. 
When misfortune brought attention to individual deaths, diviners were consulted to 
commune with the dead in the bushland, in order to domesticate the soul of the 
deceased. The ori, the most important shrines, for recently deceased ancestors, were 
kept under the main granary in the household. Shrines were also designated for elderly 
female ancestors, and external shrines were maintained for distant lineage ancestors 








Shrine name (ru) 
 
 
Alternative names Ancestral 
representative 
Form 
Paternal/ Maternal ancestors (within compound) 




Orijo amboru (big 




Internal ghost shrines 
representing recently 
deceased agnatic kin, 
placed under main 
granary, and most 
frequently implicated in 
sacrifice 
Always small granite 
slabs, placed flat on the 
ground or built as a 
house of five stones 
(four walls plus a roof), 
Difference was because 
of cultural variation. 
 
Orijo andesia (I 
refuse to give) – 













Shrines for ancestral 
collectives. Though to 
represent the souls of 
male ancestors who had 
male children. Send 
sickness directly (ori ka) 
Two flat stones. A 
special a’biva shrine is 
placed on the veranda 
of the senior wife’s hut 
Anguvua  Shrines for male 
ancestors without kin 
No actual shrine, just 
said to be there 
Tali Also called the 
angumatali 
(personality of the 
territory) 
Shrines for collective 
“personalities” of 
ancestors who have left 
male kin 
Small cocoon-like 
shrine of dried mud six 
or nine inches high, 
with a single hole, the 
door 
Abego   Shrines for a man or a 
woman who has recently 
died and who is helpless 
Flat granite stone 
Shrine for ancestors in mother’s mother’s line (within compound) 
Okuori (woman shrine)  Female-ghost shrines, 
thought to send sickness 
directly 
Placed under the eaves 
of the senior women’s 
hut. A man usually has 
shrines to his mother’s 
mother and mother’s 
sisters 
Matrilineal shrines – all designated by mother’s brother (within compound) 
Lucugo   Ghosts of mother’s 
brother 
 
Drilonzi    Ghosts of mother’s 
brother 
Physically part of 
lucugo shrine 
Adro-ori (adro =uncle)  Ghosts of mother’s 
brother 
Under eaves of man’s 
mother’s brothers hut 
Ambo  Ancestor of a man’s 
father’s mothers’ brother 
Placed in the compound 
hedge; thought to be 
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very strong and 
dangerous 
External Lineage shrines (beyond compound) 
External shrines 
beyond the lineage, 
larger ritual 
congregations 




Ghosts of distant 
ancestors; formerly of 
internal shrines 
Two flat stones and an 
upright stone 
Dede    Ghosts of great 
grandmother or 
ancestress (dede) 
Three flat stones 
A’bi (burial trees of the 
ancestors); a’bi = 
ancestor 
  
  Fig trees planted at the 
graves of important 
men and women. Some 
trees have a stone set 
under them 
External Lineage shrines (beyond compound) II: Fertility shrines 






Shrine to father of 
ancestress 
Single flat granite stone 
with asiti grass planted 
near it, surrounded by a 
miniature fence of 
ekaraka sticks 
Eralengbo (associated shrine 
tiri, aloe-lime plant) 
Shrine to father of 
ancestress 
Old grinding stone of 
granite, hole worn 
through the centre. 
Inside the cattle kraal 
Fig 1: Shrines among Lugbara clans near Ofude, as reported by Middleton in the 1950s (adapted 








Ole ro or ori ka/ 
kata 








Swellings of the 
body 
Sent by ancestors 
as collectives  
oracle Sacrifice at a’biva 
Swellings of the 
body  
Sent by ancestors 
as collectives 
oracle Sacrifice at 
anguvua 
Bad luck or 
misfortune in 
general, including 
lack of fertility of 
wives, livestock or 
crops, lack of 
success in hunting 
 
Caused when a 
man’s mother’s 
brother thinks/ 
speaks ‘bad words’ 







oracle Ritual meal shared 
by mother’s brother 
and sister’s son to 
remove the 
sickness. 
Construction of a 
lucugo shrine and 
later sacrifice at it 
The person who is 
responsible 
acknowledges he or 
she talked out of 
anger and says if 














result of the words I 
uttered let the 
misfortune go. 
Male impotence or 
menstrual 
disorders 
As above   oracle Construction and 







through ori ka (no 
invocation) 




Ancestor of man’s 
father’s mother’s 
brother brings 
sickness of its own 
accord. 





This was believed 
to be natural cause. 
oracle Sacrifices were 
made mostly a rum 
was slaughtered and 
eaten by a few close 
relatives. 
 
Sterility (of men) 
. 
 
Serious curse, can 
be any of above or 
sent by external 
ghosts through ori 
ka 
oracle Sacrifice depending 






slaughter to eat 
and prayers are 












oracle Sacrifice at fertility 
shrine beyond the 
compound 
 
Figure 2: Treatment Pathways according to Middleton, (Lugbara Religion p.41-71) 
 
Ori were thought to see the behaviours and know the thoughts of their living 
descendants. Though stones were designated to a host of ancestors, being nominally 
linked to particular sicknesses, recently-deceased ancestors were thought to be “nearer” 
to the living and thus to send sickness more frequently. In everyday life, offerings of 
food and beer were placed on the ori as a sign of respect. Failing to do so was a sign of 
neglect, and could be a source of misfortune—but usually, discussions of the activity of 
ancestors invoked specific cases of sickness. 
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Though ori could send sickness independently through ori ka (ghostly vengeance), 
sickness normally necessitated invocation by their living descendants. Technically, any 
man whose father had died could invoke the ancestors to send sickness, but typically 
elders were expected to do so. To invoke the ancestors, an elder would sit near the 
shrines and ole ro (wail to the ghosts), though it was also thought that ancestors saw the 
discontent in elders’ hearts without needing direct invocation. Elders did not publicly 
invoke the ori, a gesture which would be tantamount to atrita (curse); rather, this act 
was done in secret. Elders particularly gifted in ritual, usually the first son of the 
outgoing elder, were thought to be able to communicate most effectively with their 
ancestors. Indeed, legitimate authority to lead the family cluster was proved not just by 
an elder’s exemplary character, but by his ability to send and reverse sickness via his 
ancestors. The authority of the living was thus validated by their connection to the dead.  
 
Everyday life was structured around ru (respect), demonstrated through appreciation for 
hierarchies of seniority and patriarchy, and values of peace and propriety. This was a 
vision structured by inzita (discipline) and azi (work), which denoted responsibilities 
between senior and junior men, and between men and women. Harmony within the 
lineage was a condition measured principally by the “cool hearts,” slow words, and the 
togetherness of family members—a state marked by restraint (and so the absence of 
sickness).318 Elders invoked sickness in reaction to ezata (social sins) that violated this 
moral code, which could include quarrelling, fighting, disrespecting an elder, not 
sharing food or remittances, over-eating or a husband neglecting those under his care. 
Generally, ori were invoked against people living within the family cluster, the head 
 
318 Middleton, Lugbara of Uganda, p. 10. 
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elder being able to invoke against any male and female members. Women married into 
the cluster were thus technically subject to the authority of the elder heading their 
husband’s clan, but also remained connected to ancestors of their natal clan. Hence, an 
elder would rarely invoke against his son’s wife, since this would cross into the 
jurisdiction of another elder.319 Viewed from elders’ perspective, ole ro was understood 
as a form of social control, a reaction to the indignation borne out of moral violation.  
 
When sickness appeared, the afflicted person appealed directly to the elder for help. 
Since the ori were invoked in secret, the arrival of affliction set in motion quests to 
discover the agent responsible, as well as the human sender. Discerning the agent 
required consulting oracles. A host of oracles existed, with the acife (rubbing-stick) 
being the most common type. Persistent cases required confirmation from chicken and 
rat oracles. Usually, elders consulted an oracle-holder beyond their social horizon, a 
measure intended to achieve an objective diagnosis. During consultations, an elder 
described the case, along with the names of the dead and living who were suspect. 
Evidently this consultation was not entirely divorced form the social knowledge of the 
inquirer, since the consultant described the terms of the case and the potential agents 
responsible, which determined the verdict. Sometimes, oracular tests were performed 
multiple times until an accepted verdict was attained. Despite these entanglements, 
Lugbara elders regarded oracles as providing important evidence: codifying suspicion 
into fact.  
 
 
319 It was however legitimate to invoke against a daughter elsewhere, since bridewealth had been transferred, 
though usually this was not done.  
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After the sick person had recovered, ritual sacrifices were performed to signify the 
cleansing of the social offence. Thus the rite removed the pollution created by the social 
sin, rather than stimulated recovery. The sacrifice marked the symbolic repair of the 
offence, which was only completed by communal eating. It was further believed that 
ancestors heard the public words of the case, and rejoiced at the harmony of the 
living.320 
 
Such sacrifices had wider social implications: elders verbally reasserted the importance 
of moral behaviour, of paying bridewealth, of good marital relations, and of non-
violence. Such addresses made explicit moral knowledge that was otherwise taken for 
granted. Words and proceedings at rituals had their own sensitivities: lies could 
invalidate the ritual and be a source of misfortune in themselves, as could the incorrect 
distribution of meat.321 Significantly, rituals were not grand ceremonial affairs: 
Middleton, after attending his first sacrifice, commented, “I could not see why it was 
important to the Lugbara and what all the fuss was about.”322 The power of these events 
lay in their subtle expression of hierarchies and alliances (elders from neighbouring 
clans often attended), and in the truth of the words there spoken. Even the most 
ritualistic aspect of processes to manage affliction were shrouded in social, rather than 
religious, significance. 
 
3.5 Ritual Reality 
 
 
320 ibid. p. 93. 
321 Middleton, The Study of the Lugbara, p. 93. 
322 ibid. p. 52. 
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Middleton’s small-scale method has significant advantages in elucidating divergences 
between ritual knowledge as unquestionable truth (described in the system above), and 
empirical knowledge arising from practical experience. Crucially, whilst viewing the 
management of misfortune as a closed system provides little analytical insights into the 
present, focusing on the social and ritual realities of the system opens an exploration of 
the resonance of the system today.  
 
3.5.1: From Symptomatic to Social Aetiologies  
 
Whilst for Middleton it was possible to describe a system where particular ancestors 
were associated with particular forms of chronic sickness (Figure 2), in reality, 
ascertaining responsibility was driven by the social position of the afflicted individual. 
Lugbara elders recognised the power of their ancestors to enact sicknesses, whilst the 
social tapestry directed the diagnosis of misfortune. Indeed, elders spoke of azo entirely 
with reference to the social field surrounding the afflicted person, beginning their 
diagnosis with an analysis of the possibilities of strained social connections that could 
lead to invocation, activating sickness. Talk of sickness was saturated with 
consideration for pervading social context. This process is best elucidated by example: 
Otoro cut a goat at his senior ghost shrines on behalf of his daughter, an 
adolescent girl who was suffering from severe menstrual bleeding, a complaint 
that would usually be considered the result of invocation of curses by maternal 
kin. But her mother’s brother had visited her compound and had shown great 
affection for the girl, so that Otoro said that it could not come from that lineage. 
Okwaya told me that even so it might usually be expected that the mother’s 
brother would be called to deny any evil intent in public before other possible 
agents would be considered; but that in this case ‘Otoro does not have to 
remember the words of the territory where he gave his cattle (in bridewealth). 
Here in Araka there are many words and Olimani, our brother had spoken many 
words in his heart against Otoro.’323 
 
 
323 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 154.  
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This resolution of the menstrual bleeding of Otoro’s daughter demonstrates the ability 
of intimate social knowledge, rather than specific symptoms, to influence the diagnosis 
of illness. Usually, excessive menstrual bleeding would be associated with curses from 
maternal kin (Otoro’s wife’s father’s brothers). However, in this instance, because of 
good relations between Otoro and his wife’s uncles, as evidenced by a recent visit, the 
daughter’s sickness was interpreted with reference to prevailing conflicts among 
Araka’s elders. In this case, Olimani, an aspiring elder, was ultimately held responsible. 
The cause of azo in this case was influenced by intra-lineage power struggles. Oracles 
confirmed the multiple social discussions circulating between elders about the potential 
agents of affliction.  
 
3.5.2: Controlling Male Ambition 
 
The above case, which substituted loose understandings of ancestral aetiologies for 
contests between elders, was purposefully selected as an illustration. It is not incidental 
that power struggles informed this case, since, according to Middleton, elders often 
competed for authority through manipulating the ritual system. As he explained: 
A would-be elder therefore tried to invoke ghosts against his dependant 
frequently. That is to say, he interprets sickness that befalls members of his 
segment in that way. If he can consult the oracles he tends to put suggestions to 
them that will lead to his own invocation being given as the cause.324  
 
Here, the specificities of Araka are important. During Middleton’s observations, the 
cluster had tripled in size, and the head elder, Ondua, was nearing death (he died in 
 
324 ibid. p. 226. 
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1951 during Middleton’s fieldwork). Conflicts for lineage authority were rife, and the 
rate of ancestral invocation was abnormally high, as competitions for authority overrode 
other social conflicts. As noted earlier, the invocation of ancestors was normally a secret 
act, but during this time if an elder was prevented from consulting the oracles, he might 
openly declare that he had invoked the ancestors—which would then force that elder to 
put forward his name to the oracle operator. In response, elders whose positions were 
threatened would also claim to have invoked their ancestors. Such contests informed 
each other, producing ever more claims to invocation as the lineage came closer to 
segmentation. 
 
At the same time, however, these contests could be interpreted not as legitimate 
invocations following acts of disobedience by undisciplined juniors, but as illegitimate 
invocations arising from envy. Middleton terms these illegitimate contests “witchcraft”, 
a translation that disguises the subtle nuances of interpretation: both legitimate and 
illegitimate sickness were motivated by ole. Yet, instead of preserving the social order, 
envy-driven invocation by a non-elder was seen as an anti-social force. Both ancestral 
and witchcraft-based sicknesses manifested in general symptoms of disease known as 
oyizu (‘growing thin’).325 Accusations of “witchcraft” were rarely spoken outright, but 
instead defined through careful monitoring of a peer’s character. Ultimately, certainties 
regarding sickness were provided by the initiative and power of those who could prove 
its cause. A highly local politics of interpretation structured what constituted legitimate 
and illegitimate use of the system: rarely did accusations of witchcraft result in social 
exclusion.  
 
325 Ibid. p. 70. 
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Middleton focused on conflicts between elders, but illegitimate sickness was also 
interpreted as caused by conflicts between young men and elders, and between young 
men within family clusters, particularly when the cluster was not close to segmentation. 
In particular, sons who had worked as migrants used witchcraft allegations to assert 
their independence. In the context of an emerging cash economy, the authority of 
households challenged that of the wider family cluster. Though migration decisions 
were often mediated by elders, the politics of cash remittances was a source of tension. 
Sons sometimes opted to send their earnings back to their mothers’ brothers (i.e. outside 
the patrilineage) for safekeeping. In response, elders sought to discipline their sons 
through invoking the ori against them. When recalling the past, elders often associated 
the invocation of ancestors as a means to ensure discipline among junior men. 
Incidentally, elders explained that Middleton’s own research assistant, Inus Yukwa, was 
subject to such invocation, following his decision to work for the police in Arua. 
Viewed as abrogating his responsibilities to the lineage, an elder of Araka invoked 
sickness upon him which resulted in a broken leg. Nonetheless, in defiance of this, Inus 
continued to work as a cook in Arua, where he was introduced to Middleton. So intense 
were these conflicts that elders sometimes accused young sons of acquiring forces for 
killing outside the district, known then as elouja. Of one such son it was said: 
That Okavu is bad. He stays away for many months. Then one day he returns 
home. His heart has become bad there, perhaps he has learnt the words of elojua. 
Now he does not respect his father of his ‘father’ Ngoro. He comes to his 
father’s compound and there refuses those words ‘in the mouth of the ghost 
shrine.’ Truly then Olimani thinks ‘my son is now lost to me,’ and he said the 
words and finished; we shall see.326 
 
 
326 ibid. p. 163. 
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Simultaneously to legitimacy contests between elders, the ori were used to encourage 
young men to take responsibility for the roles in the lineage. Prior to colonial policies, it 
was unusual for a father to invoke against his own son: if married, the wife’s clan 
members, to which the clan was tied through payment of bridewealth, would accuse the 
father of ruining security in the home by bringing sickness upon it.  
 
Middleton notes how ordinary people used the ritual system as a means of ascertaining 
power. Indeed, in a later article, Middleton explores the possibilities for spiritual 
autonomy beyond the wills of competing elders.327 For young men, demonstrating that 
sickness was caused by spirit-possession rather than by ancestors offered opportunities 
for emancipation from the lineage. If women could prove they had been possessed by 
Adro, then through proving skills of divination they could achieve significant 
independent authority from the lineage. These claims would need to be validated 
through an accepted means—using the ritual system and sacrifice—but evidently, 
women and more marginalised men were able to advance particular explanations of 
sickness in order to assert their autonomy. These claims are further explored in Chapter 
Four.  
 
It is also worth noting that only ten of the thirty-five cases Middleton observed were 
linked to ancestral invocation and lineage-related struggles (though Middleton explains 
these were the most significant cases). Additionally, elders made two sacrifices at 
external and fertility shrines, in response to general anxiety about harmony in the 
lineages. Five sacrifices were made by husbands to remedy the barrenness of their 
 
327 J. Middleton, ‘Rites of sacrifice among the Lugbara’, Systèmes de pensée en Afrique noire 4 (1979), pp. 175-192. 
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wives, which allegedly stemmed from the ill-wishes of their maternal uncles. These 
‘non-structural’ rites were of less interest to Middleton, but it seems a more 
participatory politics was at stake beyond lineage competition.  
 
 3.5.3: ‘Now the ghosts have shown us’: Institutionalising Misfortune 
 
If functional anthropology was decried for substituting complexity for coherence, much 
of Lugbara Religion is nevertheless attentive to the messiness of struggles for intimacy 
in the colonial period. Araka was essentially a site where grudges between elders and 
their juniors played out, and where at the margins, ordinary people found the possibility 
for emancipation through the ancestral system. In the 1950s, explaining affliction with 
recourse to ancestors provided a shared language for living lineage members to struggle 
over responsibility, morality and legitimate leadership.  
 
Under the changes brought by colonial rule, modernity had generated discontents 
among the accepted distribution of authority and age. At its most descriptive, 
Middleton’s work reveals the texture of these debates, and how ideas of ancestors 
provided a means to script and explain social tensions in relation to misfortune. Largely, 
these debates concerned the affairs of the living, rather than the dead. The role of the 
ancestors almost exclusively manifested with reference to the words of elders. 
Throughout Middleton’s thick description, the “cult of the dead” was sustained since it 
provided a means to communicate shared values, within the hierarchical systems of 
eldership promoted by the colonial state.  
 
Crucially, whilst the onset of sickness provided an opportunity to debate social tensions, 
it was through consulting oracles that these tensions could be organised. Siegel’s insight 
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into Azande oracles is useful: “The oracle here furnishes the magic word, the copula 
that allows anything to be linked to anything else. It not merely allows it, it stimulates 
such connections. It allows it to be authoritatively said that ‘X is a witch.’”328 
Consulting oracles effectively provided an answer to close a given case, providing a 
certainty that mere discussions of living elders could not guarantee (particularly since 
elders were known to competitively sought to access ritual power). Oracles outsourced 
this confirmation to a specialist, an oracle operator beyond the social horizon, who 
could impartially confirm responsibility for sickness. Whilst Middleton’s ethnographic 
method and writing was inflected with ideas of order, the colonial setting, in tandem 
with oracles, provided a means to institutionalise elders’ views of misfortune. In 
subsequent decades, the stability of this system would experience profound change, in 
ways which anthropologists could no longer ignore: the increasing proximity of the 
state, biomedicine, churches, and trade, all radically shifting the distribution of 
authority, would together serve to deinstitutionalise explanations of misfortune.  
 
3.5.4: “We do not know the words of Adro”: When Therapy Failed  
 
Though Middleton’s observation of sacrifices illuminated cases where ancestral 
explanations resulted in bodily recovery, his descriptions exhibit the elders’ awareness 
that forces may be beyond their control. As elders pursued ancestral mechanisms, so too 
did these individuals contemplate the possibility of divine pollution that could not be 
reversed. Whilst elders held the monopoly on curing, these same individuals deeply 
questioned the limits of these systems in the face of colonial changes, worrying that 
divine pollution could affect lineages collectively. For example, of one case:  
 
328 J. Siegel, Naming the Witch. Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 2006, p. 82. 
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Ondua fears that God has sent nyoka to our territory, so that our wives will not 
bear children, nor our cattle, and we shall become few men. Our children will go 
‘to the other side’ (of Lake Albert, as labour migrants), and our land will be 
destroyed. But perhaps these are the words of our ancestors, to show us that our 
hearts are evil. Perhaps it is the work of the (government) chiefs, who eat our 
wealth in fines and tax. Now Ondua is oroo (the last surviving senior man), his 
heart is closed to die. But can a man die with trouble in his heart?329 
 
Nyoka was a curse either from ancestors collectively or from God, resulting in a state of 
generalised tragedy that could not be reversed through sacrifice, and which could result 
in the end of a lineage. Following Whyte (1997), such uncertainties were not 
externalities written out of the system or a vague existential angst, but actively 
structured pursuits of certainty.330 Elders were aware of a multiplicity of forces that 
could be implicated in affliction, but pursued those routes available to them: the words 
of their ancestors which they knew. To use Whyte’s phraseology, Middleton’s work 
presents “people as actors trying to alleviate suffering rather than as spectators applying 
cultural, ritual, or religious truths.”331 Karp, in a foreword to the 2rd Edition encapsulates 
Middleton’s work as demonstrating how Lugbara elders strove to reassert their visions 
of a moral order against modern changes: how individuals “attempt[ed] to understand 
[and act upon] their fate when that fate seems to surpass understanding.”332 
 
 Whilst chronic afflictions could be reversed with recourse to ancestors who “heard” the 
living, the actions of the divinity, Adro, were understood to manifest in forms of 
persistent suffering. In such cases, Lugbara people tried mundu aro (medicine of the 
whites), or visited ojo, female diviners, who used divine forces to manage afflictions. 
By contrast to the public nature of sacrifices, patients consulted ojo in the darkness of 
 
329 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 181. 
330 Whyte, Questioning Misfortune, p. 19. 
331 ibid. p. 20. 
332 I. Karp, Foreword to Lugbara Religion, 2nd Edition, 1960 [1987], p. iv. 
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their huts. Viewed from the perspective of the patrilineage, their practice was shrouded 
in secrecy, yet scholars have since argued that female healers provided key vantage 
points to manage traumatic changes; these claims are the subject of Chapter Six. In a 
similar way, the water of Yakan, administered by the Kakwa prophet Rembe, had 
provided therapy during mass epidemics. Since forces associated with Adro were 
beyond elders’ control, communion with this divinity required the intercession of 
particular authorities thought to have connections therein (cf. Chapter Four).333  
 
3.6 Deinstitutionalising Misfortune: Subsequent Studies 
 
Given the dearth of alternative sources on everyday life in West Nile, and subsequent 
destruction of archives in the war, Middleton’s work provides a key portrait of the past. 
For this reason, students of medical anthropology, history and theology have all had to 
rely on and extrapolate from Middleton’s findings more than they might have otherwise 
done, often drawing radical conclusions about social change. This section briefly 
summaries the key findings of multi-disciplinary studies conducted after Uganda’s 
independence. 
 
In the 1970s, under Amin’s rule, the medical anthropologist Barnes-Dean carried out an 
ethnography of healing in the vicinity of Kuluva Hospital. Barnes-Dean worked mainly 
with two female ojo and recorded their methods of healing, which were largely 
performed through the administration of herbs. From her observations, Barnes-Dean 
drew the radical conclusion that “The traditional medical system has in a sense been 
 
333 Middleton gradually refined the scope of his translation, from ‘God’ to ‘Divinity’ or ‘Divine Spirit’.  
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turned inside out by culture contact”.334 Female healers—previously on the periphery of 
healing—were now at its centre. Ancestors were now rarely mentioned in relation to 
sickness, with most cases diagnosed as enyanya (poisoning, Vurra dialect). Whilst this 
work could be indicative of the attainment of Middleton’s hypothesis regarding the 
prevalence of sorcery in relation to social change, interpreting Barnes-Dean’s data 
requires caution. This location is significant: not only did Barnes-Dean work in an area 
where healing was likely influenced by the mission hospital, but even before the 
establishment of this facility, clans in this area had less distinct systems of ancestral 
shrines than in the north. Barnes-Dean uses Middleton’s work as a baseline, yet their 
two research areas had differing historical exposure to medical and religious practices. 
Despite recognising the limitations of Barnes-Dean’s work, Allen uses her observations 
regarding enyanya as antecedent indicators of the erosion of elders’ authority which he 
experienced in Laropi in the late 1980s.335 Overall, Allen concludes that whilst elders 
did assert ancestral explanations in cases of misfortune, such explanations were 
generally superseded by more modern diagnoses in Moyo. 
 
Contrasting the simplistic portrait of change within Barnes-Dean’s work are the papers 
of a Catholic theologian and scholar, Titus Dalfovo. Drawing on songs, riddles, 
proverbs, and memories of tradition, Dalfovo presents a more complex cosmological 
system than Barnes-Dean. Dalfovo records the persistence of sacrificial rites, and 
locates fears of poisoning within a wider universe of misfortune.336 From Barnes-
 
334 V.L. Barnes-Dean, ‘Lugbara illness beliefs and social change’, Africa 56:3 (1986), pp. 334-351, p. 344. 
335 T. Allen, ‘The Violence of Healing’, Sociologus 47:2 (1997), pp. 101-128. 
336 A.T. Dalfovo, ‘Lugbara Proverbs and Ethics’, Anthropos 86:1/3 (1991), pp. 45-58. 
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Dean’s and Dalfovo’s work alone, it is clear that alongside the emergence of poisoning, 
new explanations, agents, and therapies existed following independence.  
  
By contrast to these studies, the present thesis argues that elders remain deeply 
significant in the interpretation of misfortune. Resonating with the healing concepts of 
the past, the term for well-being in Lugbarati is rua ala (literally, ‘a body which is good 
and clean’), with rua (body) deriving from ru (respect). Concepts of bodily health 
continue to be entangled with ideas of moral discipline, as Middleton showed, and 
elders continue to draw legitimacy from their ability to send and reverse sicknesses. 
Rather than responding to individual episodes of sickness, elders manage misfortunes 
that “follow” blood descendants. As evident of this moral world concealed by post-
independence studies, a 2018 study found a key reason for illness given by patients 
presenting at the psychiatric unit in Arua Regional Referral Hospital was a curse 
delivered by family members.337 As Dalfovo found, in particular circumstances words 
continue to connote sickness.  
 
Bearing testimony to the evolution, rather than dissolution, of the role of elders in 
managing misfortune are events in Araka that have transpired since Middleton’s 
fieldwork. In March 2018, I interviewed two elders of the clan, one of whom 
remembered Middleton personally. These elders explained that the ancestral shrines 
were abandoned in the early years of independence, but Araka’s elders still recognised 
the power of words driven by ole: “Everyone has ole, it is a curse. It is to control the 
 
337 L. Verginer and B.H. Juen, ‘Spiritual Explanatory Models of Mental Illness in West Nile, Uganda’, Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychiatry 50:2 (2018), pp. 233-253. 
 155 
family members, to impact morals in the family.”338 Yet in Araka, as across Maracha 
District, elders acknowledged that whilst their words retained power, their authority was 
no longer uncontested: “People behave how they want now. During those days, people 
feared elders—if you did anything wrong to them you could die, now people don’t 
respect elders.”339 
 
Whilst Araka’s elders felt connected to Middleton’s accounts, they too recognised a 
host of agents of misfortune that are beyond their control. In Araka there are specific 
reasons why elders would resonate with a historical depiction of spatial order and 
cohesive local communities. In the background of our discussion, several homesteads in 
Araka lay in ruins. After the interview, my co-worker explained that several years ago 
the cluster had been involved in violence, news of which had travelled across the 
district. The homes of one male clan member had been burnt down following an 
allegation of a novel form of witchcraft associated with individual wealth accumulation. 
The allegation had been made public after a young boy within the family died, a death 
that was attributed to his relative. Elders subsequently cursed their own son, who fled to 
Arua town. Having formerly been a prosperous member of the clan, this man was now 
said to be “collecting foodstuff from the rubbish.” That in Arua the expelled man had no 
home to eat from was a sign of his status beyond family protection. If, for Middleton, 
witchcraft was a force that could be controlled within the local politics of lineage 
segmentation, today it is no longer seen as a force that can be internally controlled. To 
begin to explore the transitions in these logics, the next chapters of this thesis explore 
 
338 FG, Araka, 13/03/2017 (OJ). 
339 Ibid. 
 156 
the importance of dini (religion), the dynamics of change peripheral to Middleton’s 




This chapter has both situated Lugbara Religion in its historic intellectual context and 
outlined its impacts on contemporary scholarship, in order to use a “whole society” 
account as a baseline for the present study. Whilst Middleton was deeply influenced by 
structural-functionalism, the nuance of his analysis still yields deep insights regarding 
the dissonance between theory and practice, the sociality of healing, and the means 
through which local struggles to explain misfortune remained encased within the 
prevailing politics of power (which, at that juncture, was control of the lineage). 
Fundamentally, in Middleton’s work, the management of misfortune is most clearly 
seen as a system of practice, rather than as a material artefact, a distinct cosmology or 
coherent set of beliefs. 
 
Though the segmentary heuristic can obscure the extent of social relations, Lugbara 
Religion reveals how familial and clan connections were of central importance in the 
resolution of misfortune. Lugbara people attributed suffering to interpersonal relations, 
which mattered because of the surveillance both of local ritual guardians and of the 
dead. Though Middleton calls this system “religion,” this was a lived, localised system. 
Moreover, the maintenance of intimate authority pivoted on the diagnosis of chronic 
sickness, a key reason why this system remained resilient, albeit transformed, under 
colonial authority.  
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Subsequent studies foregrounding Middleton’s insights have concluded that, with the 
destruction of the ancestral system, new forms of healing based on biomedicine or 
witchcraft have prevailed. Yet the present research finds that, in lieu of the ancestral 
system, words and curses continue to bring about misfortune within the clan. Since the 
return from wartime exile, the diagnostic world in which the living suffer both from the 
words of the elders and from the indignation of the dead has been reconstituted. The 
result of destructive witchcraft allegations, such as the events which befell Araka 
seventy years after Middleton’s departure, are still relevant to elders’ social control—
even if, in modernity, they also mark its limits. 
 
Before turning to the post-return context, the next chapter explores the expansion of 
explanations of affliction connected to dini through historical and ethnographic 
methods. Drawing both on mission biographies and life-histories of Lugbara Christian 
converts—who unlike Middleton’s conservative focus were preoccupied with change—
the chapter records and explores the voices of those excluded from Lugbara Religion. If 
elders attempted to impose versions of society based on hierarchy and internal respect, 
throughout the colonial period external forms of knowledge were mobilised to challenge 
the primacy of the ancestors, and in so doing, reworked the local balance of power. 
Nonetheless, the power of dini can only be understood with reference to its relationship 













Whilst the previous chapter explored everyday mechanisms for social control premised 
on ancestors, discipline and clan knowledge, this chapter explores historical 
engagements with divine forces, embodied in the term Adro and its reproduction in 
practices of possession connected to dini (religion).340 This analysis is concerned with 
the social effects of individually channelled divine power from Yakan to Charismatic 
Christianity, and explores how these expressions of spiritual power have interacted with 
clan authority. On the one hand, this chapter engages with a spiritual landscape 
characterised by palimpsest, whereby practices of possession have been harnessed by 
social groups from the late-19th century to the present. On the other, it details historical 
resistance to spirit-inspired possession when practiced—often by men—in projects seen 
as challenging solidarities and obligations within normative ideas of social peace.  
 
This approach is inspired by the approaches of African scholars of religion, including 
Okot p’Bitek and Bethwell Ogot, who urge a practice-based approach to 
 
340 For an extensive discussion of regional and temporal diversity see A.T. Dalfovo, ‘The Divinity among the Lugbara’, 
Journal of Religion in Africa 28:4 (1998), pp. 468-493. The transcendent aspect of the divinity was rendered through 
regional dialects: Adro (Ayivu), Adroa (Terego), Adrou (Vurra) and Adroga (Aringa). Middleton took Adroa as the 
Supreme God, and Adro for earthly spirits. Crazzolara, as part of Catholic efforts to indigenise the liturgy in the 
1960s, adopted the Ayivu varant, which is the reverse. Crazzolara’s selection was formed by his location in Arua, 
thus Adro/ adroa has long been accepted by Lugbara Catholics as well as Anglicans. For the sake of comprehending 
sources taken from different geographical areas, I use Adro to connote the Supreme Being, and adroa to connote 
earthly forms (unless quoting from other sources).  
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conceptualising African religious concepts.341 In the 1960s, p’Bitek lambasted European 
anthropologists and missionaries who sought to create coherence out of African 
cosmologies. Instead, p’Bitek was interested in how cosmology was lived and 
reproduced through ritual practice. In seeking definitive answers, outside investigators 
had sought to answer questions that practice did not ask, obscuring the very texture of 
what the concepts mean to those who use them in everyday life.342 Whilst the previous 
chapter explored how answers to p’Bitek’s concerns can be located in Middleton’s 
writings on ancestral forces, less attention was paid within his texts to everyday 
participation in divine power. This binary opposition—between the lived realm of man, 
and the ‘secret realm of God’—precluded an analysis of how social groups (male and 
female alike) beyond lineage elders harnessed spirit possession to make moral claims.  
 
Since returning from exile, Lugbara people no longer maintain shrines to their ancestors 
within compounds. In the early years of the post-independence state, Lugbara Christian 
converts, instructed by mission education and directives from God, undertook personal 
crusades which targeted the ori. Since then, as in many other African geographies, 
Lugbara people have internalised missionary sentiments that venerating ancestors is 
representative of ‘paganism’ or ‘traditional religion’, the opposite to dini 
(Christianity).343 As as this thesis shows, rupturing events have not served to erase the 
moral and spiritual authority of elders, yet, colonial struggles over power have deeply 
shaped ritual and religious practice to the present. 
 
341 O. p’Bitek, Religion of the Central Luo, East African Literature Bureau, 1971; B.A. Ogot, ‘The concept of jok’, 
African Studies 20:2 (1961), pp. 123-130. This approach too stands in contrast to Africanist scholars such as Mbiti, 
who have tried to find conceptual coherence between African indigenous religions and Christian theology. 
342 Mogensen, ‘The Resilience of Juok’. 
343 Behrend, ‘Resurrecting Cannibals’ 
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In relation to grassroots struggle over ritual authority, this chapter explores how clans 
have historically been involved in “limiting” practices of possession.344 To the present, 
Christian prophets who deploy theology in ways which challenge social peace may be 
deemed extremists and subject to violent exclusion. Thus the increasing freedom with 
which people can participate in divine practice is in itself an increasing source of post-
return insecurity. This chapter explores how colonial histories of Christianity, as well as 
longstanding fears of divine power, have contributed to post-war anxieties, and 
occasional, policing of possession.  
 
To locate this enquiry, this chapter first considers indigenous divine concepts, before 
exploring how these notions were implicated in Yakan, an exploration that develops in 
detail the healing dimensions of the ‘anti-government cult’ introduced in Chapter Two. 
Tracing the historical reverberations of Yakan, the chapter explores complex pre-war 
struggles over spiritually-inspired possession. Moving to the post-independence period, 
this chapter contrasts that history with self-reported cosmological realignments during 
the era of armed conflict in the 1980s, and the embrace of charismatic healing 
movements in mainline churches both in Arua town and the rural countryside following 
return. The chapter concludes with an ethnographic exploration of how these 
movements were resisted in the eviction of a male charismatic preacher near the Congo 
border.  
 
 4.2 Adro: From Abstractions to Action 
 
 
344 L. Ravalde, "Deceiving the spirit: Engaging with the Holy Spirit in Catholic Uganda." Africa: The Journal of the 
International African Institute, vol. 89 no. 1, 2019, p. 147-164, p.148 
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As Dalfovo noted, the task of recovering authentic indigenous concepts is impossible, 
given the the imprint of European translation and Christian evangelism which were 
fostering new meanings throughout period of documentation.345 In view of these 
complexities, this section attempts to best reconstruct ideas of divine forces prior to 




In the 1950s, elders explained that they “did not know the words of Adro”. Despite the 
inherent secrecies around the divinity, accounts collated during the colonial period 
consistently agree that Adro was described as having both distant and earthly 
dimensions. On the one hand, Adro was defined as a transcendent, omnipotent being, 
and a positive, life-giving force responsible both for the creation of the universe and 
procreation. In this aspect, the divinity was referred to as Adroa o’bapiri (‘God, the 
creator of man’), and said to be eri (not a person), existing in the sky, air, or wind, 
above and beyond human society.346 Lugbara theologians to date stress a belief in 
Adroa o’bapiri as evidence for indigenous religiosity which paralleled Christian 
theology (and European missionaries’ failure to incorporate this belief as a reason for 
the initial rejection of Christianity).347 Based on interviews with Catholic Catechists in 
the late 1960s, Dalfovo suggests creatorial dimensions may reflect an import of 
Christian monotheism.348  
 
 
345 Dalfovo, ‘Divinity among the Lugbara’. 
346 Middleton, Lugbara Religion. 
347 D. Cadri. The Development of Small Christian Communities in the Catholic and Among the Lugbara People of 
Uganda After the Second Vatican Council, PhD Dissertation, (Theology Department), Duquesne University, 2007. 
348 Dalfovo, ‘Divinity among the Lugbara’, p.484. It is notable that many attempts to document cosmologies 
occurred in locations which had by that period been subject to several decades of mission evangelism. 
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More consistently, Adro was regarded as the ultimate architect of misfortune, being 
associated with collective crisis, including famine and mass death at the clan or 
population level, as well as individual suffering including infertility, incurable or 
disfiguring sickness, or “bad” deaths that were sudden, tragic, or inexplicable. In this 
earthly guise, Adro existed as a multitude of anthropoid spirits inhabiting bushes, 
streams, and hills in the uninhabited wilderness. Here, Adro was referred to either as 
Adroa, the diminutive form of Adro, as Adroanzi (‘children of the divinity’), or as Adro 
onzi (‘evil aspect of the divinity’). Adroa was said to appear to people as a snake, or as 
lightning, but more commonly spoken of as appearing in disfigured human form: 
‘…like a man, and very tall and white; but his body is cut down the centre and he has 
only one eye, one ear, one arm and one leg, on which he jumps about. He is very 
terrible to see.’349 In cases where the immanent aspects of the divinity appeared to 
people or collectives, it was taken to be an evil omen, and a signifier that the person or a 
whole clan may be close to death. It was said that Adroa followed people at night, 
‘seizing’ them and afflicting sickness.350 What emerges from anthropological and 
theological descriptions pre-1950 is that Adro was used to denote states of mass 
tragedy, and adroa was used in lesser cases, to denote afflictions (beyond ancestral 
cure).  
 
Lugbara people themselves had little difficulty in reconciling divine concepts, applying 
Adro or adroa where appropriate to unfortunate circumstances. Indeed, Odama, a 
Catholic Lugbara theologian, concluded in the 1960s, “Nobody knows what the exact 
 
349 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p.254; Dalfovo, ‘Divinity among the Lugbara’, p.471. 
350 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p.255. 
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relation between God and the lower spirits is”.351 Yet in both guises Adro connoted 
crisis on a magnitude of scales: the entity was applied to circumstances beyond the 
control of ordinary people to explain mortality from epidemics, deaths from poisoning, 
and inexplicable possession—all of which became more common in Lugbaraland from 
the late 19th century. Unlike the ancestors, elders rarely made sacrifices to Adro, who it 
was thought could not hear the living, and operated independently of the will of 
ordinary people.352 In both transcendent and immanent guises, it is significant is that 
Adro was consistently articulated as dwelling conceptually and spatially outside human 
society—inhabiting the skies, the bushlands, hills or water-bodies, beyond the realm of 
homesteads and order.353 Also noteworthy is that mid-century fears of disfigured white 
spirits ‘seizing’ people in the bushland paralleled the violent colonial encounters of 
abduction. Indeed, Europeans were occasionally referred to as Adro, since like the 
divinity, white invaders came out of the bushland, taking people from their homes. 
Whilst on the one hand, as one Lugbara theologian noted, concepts of the divinity were 
powerfully symbolic of the violence of the colonial encounter, the parallel use of the 
term speaks to the experiential nature of the concept.354 Both Adro and Europeans 
inflicted suffering upon Lugbara people that they could not control.  
 
351 Cited in Dalfovo, ‘The Lugbara Concept of the Divinity’, p. 473. 
352 Dalfovo argues that the relationship between God and the ancestors is unclear. He makes that arguments that 
whilst some people were of the opinion that God lay behind the ancestors (and so ultimately, sacrifices were made 
to God, with the ancestor acting as intermediaries), other elders clearly asserted that they have only the ancestors 
in mind—arguing that food was given to the ancestors, and nothing was offered to Adro. See Dalfovo, ‘Divinity 
among the Lugbara’, p. 477. In Middleton’s work, a notable exception is made by elders in respect to their own 
mortality. Ondua, as he neared death, sacrificed a sheep to God in a solitary sacrifice, in effort to reverse his fate, 
hoping Adro would perhaps take notice. Diviners, by contrast, make sacrifices to Adro, specifically to the rivers 
where his anthromorphic aspect is said to reside. 
353 Following the years of war, terms have once again shifted. Catholics now render Almighty God as Adro, and 
Adroa now as the “small gods” that resided in trees, rivers and hills. Anglicans continue to use Mungu for God, and 
mungua (small gods) as well. Conversationally, both Anglicans and Catholics explain that affliction connected to 
adroa/mungu was associated with particular trees, streams and hills—which, if stared upon, could inflict boils, 
swellings or death. With modern development and population growth, however, this “wilderness” has been tamed, 
and the effects of adro are ascribed to the past.  
354 S. Enyabo, A Survey of Lugbara Spirit Beliefs. Ma’di-West Nile Diocese Archives, 1979. 
 165 
 
4.2.2: Intermediaries  
 
Beyond defining concepts, outsiders have focused on the relationship between ordinary 
people and the divine through studying intermediaries. As noted by Ogot and Ravalde, 
given the ambiguous powers of divinities and spirits – and their inherent unknowability, 
the interventions of human mediators are particularly important.355 Of the concept of jok 
(translated as Deity, God, spirit) among Nilotic peoples, Ogot notes that since man had 
no direct or personal relationship with God, ordinary people had to rely on mediators 
and prophets to interpret or control the divine.  
 
For Lugbara people too, interpreting Adro has long relied on turning to functionaries, 
believed to do Adro ma azini (‘the work of God’). People turned to these intermediaries 
to interpret suffering for which they have no answers or cure, and thus relied on others 
to access and interpret with the divine. Given the relationship of Adro to death, it is 
hardly surprising that these figures were considered ambiguous, or even dangerous: 
their practice involved handling power that could result either in miraculous recovery or 
death. As this thesis shows, for Lugbara people, dwelling too close to death has long 
carried the risk of being blamed for it.356 
 
In the pre-colonial period, opi-ozooni (rainmakers) distributed across wider lineages 
embodied the separation between ordinary people and the divine. Rainmakers practiced 
in secret raingroves, which ordinary people could not enter. Though secret, it was 
 
355 Ogot, ‘The concept of jok’; L. Ravalde, ‘Deceiving the spirit’ 
356 The notion of aripe, like rejoicing in death, derives from strange acts near graves, rejoicing in mourning, or 
strange phenomena that connote intra-personal accountability (See Chapters Seven through Nine for examples).  
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believed that rainmaking groves contained rain-pots wherein rainstones known as si 
(hail), thought to fall from the sky, were kept, as well as the bones of snakes, hyenas, 
and leopards and wild animals, all symbolic of the wilderness. The dangerous forces 
contained in raingroves were said to enable opi-ezu to commune with Adro, to bring 
rain, end famines or stop continuous feuds: all situations of crisis to which the living 
had no recourse. The office carried risks: according to Avua, rainmakers were 
physically beaten in persistent droughts: whilst their powers could provide solutions, as 
human beings, these men could suffer retribution if their interventions failed.357  
 
Both the violent incursions of the colonial period and the epidemics that caused mass 
death were understood as incursions of Adro. Searching for cures to prevent mass 
mortality, ordinary people accepted the authority of prophets, who were usually 
considered dangerous. In a period of crisis, the unknown objects and practices of 
outside prophets were cautiously embraced. Rembe, a Kakwa prophet, was the most 
significant: his power was thought to emanate from his connection to divine forces, 
derived from his ownership of a secret pool near the Congolese border, which contained 
a mystical being which was half-human and half-snake. Rembe was said to possess 
feminine qualities, and divined using a weke (gourd), the first of its kind in 
Lugbaraland, himself falling into a wild state of possession. Decades later, Rembe’s 
practices informed techniques of female divination, as Chapter Six details. Connections 
to the divinity were inscribed upon the practice of these functionaries, which not only 
involved secrecy, but the recycling of ambiguous objects and icons of the wilderness.358  
 
357 Avua, L. 1968 “Droughtmaking among the Lugbara”, The Uganda Journal 32 (1): 29-38 
358 Chapter Six argues that whilst diviners may have emulated Rembe’s practice, they often legitimated their 
activities on the basis of assisting the maintenance of patrilineal authority (through healing, but also through 
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Departing from available sources, scholars have paid significant attention to the 
performance and symbolism associated with rainmakers and prophets. Yet, at the 
beginning of the pre-colonial period, prophetic power was significant insofar as these 
intermediaries allowed ordinary people to participate in divine power, through imbibing 
water, experiencing possession, or accessing answers through visiting mediums. In 
periods of crisis, divine power was no longer held at a distance in intermediaries’ words 
or in snake-oracles, but practiced and normalised through everyday participation in dini. 
 
4.3 Yakan and Practicing Prophetic Knowledge (~1890-1919) 
 
 
Appearing among Lugbara populations in the late 19th century, by the early years of the 
Protectorate state, Yakan had reportedly developed into a mass religious movement in 
Maracha and Terego. In the context of mass death from epidemics, a new cadre of 
Lugbara leaders localised the prophetic powers of Rembe, in symbolic performances 
which inverted the distribution of patrilineal authority. In a time of “collective despair”, 
people turned to dangerous metaphysical powers for healing, radically re-adapting 
moral norms in the process. By 1919, Yakan water was believed to offer immunity 
against diseases and the resurrection of dead ancestors and cattle, and reportedly even 
protection from Protectorate guns. This section revisits contemporary descriptions of 
Yakan, noting the practical and phenomenological antecedents that would later 
influence Christianity in the colonial period.  
 
 
communing with the dead). The ulterior picture presented by Middleton may be somewhat exaggerated (see notes 
on his gendered schema). 
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Though the different forms of practice Yakan ushered in were inextricably linked to the 
spread of epidemic disease, as noted in Chapter Two, contemporary observers were 
preoccupied with the movement’s potential to harbour anti-government resistance.359 
This interpretation led to very real consequences: in 1919 Protectorate officials violently 
quashed Yakan, deporting its leaders and killing many adherents. Following these 
accounts, scholars have sought to explain rather than to challenge Yakan’s militancy. 
King, for example, relates militant sensibilities within Yakan to the impulses of 
returning male soldiers from the King’s African Rifles.360  
 
More recently, scholars have revisited the proposition that Yakan was an anti-colonial 
resistance cult. Re-examining testimonies collected in 1919-20, along with DC 
Weatherhead’s journals, Leopold suggests that Yakan’s militancy was over-estimated, 
with information manipulated as a means of installing sub-county chiefs loyal to the 
British.361 Whilst Leopold does not explore the ethnographic evidence to the contrary, 
he suggests that Yakan’s raison d’etre was likely related primarily to healing. Similarly, 
Vokes has reassessed the Nyabingi cult in southwest Uganda, arguing that violence was 
not the raison d’être for the colonial-era movements here either. For Vokes, the 
violence of Nyabingi was secondary to its legitimacy in redressing misfortunes.362 In 
light of Leopold’s reassessment, Vokes’s reassessment seems pertinent to understanding 
Yakan; militancy was legitimated through its success at explaining misfortune. 
 
359 Driberg’s paper was most influential in this regard. Whilst presented as an anthropological account, he collected 
his data whilst on a fact-finding mission for the colonial administration. See: J.H. Driberg. ‘Yakañ’, The Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 61 (1931), pp. 413-420. Leopold notes that Driberg was 
prone to exaggeration. It is also notable that archival sources described Yakan as ‘quiescent’. 
360 King, ‘The Yakan Cult’. 
361 Leopold, Inside West Nile. 
362 R. Vokes, Ghosts of Kanungu: Fertility, Secrecy & Exchange in the Great Lakes of Africa. James Currey: Suffolk, 
2009, p. 14. 
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Moreover, by contrast to Nyabingi, where there is indisputable evidence of violent 
resistance, in the Lugbaraland, reporting regarding the militant aspects of Yakan is 
inconsistent.  
 
Even accounts focusing on Yakan’s militant dimensions attribute its origins as a healing 
cult, a pragmatic response to outbreaks of meningitis and other epidemics that brought 
mass mortality to Lugbaraland from the late 19th century. Meningitis was known as 
ndindia, and small-pox as mua, both terms that mean ‘sickness’ or ‘sickness sent 
secretly.’363 These diseases could not be managed through the ancestral system, and so 
local leaders sought cures from elsewhere. References to curing as a means of turning to 
Yakan are replete within Middleton’s 1963 account, which elicits elders’ memories of 
participating in Yakan as young men. Elders explained that: “Men went to Kakwa to get 
the water because they were big men who wanted to help their people.”364 Elders 
recalled Rembe’s coming as linked with the resurgence of meningitis, explaining that 
just as deaths from epidemics came in the dry season, so, too, did the prophet.  
 
It is important that, prior to 1917, Yakan had comparatively few adherents. Those 
possessed by the spirit were said to roam the country like ‘ba azazaa (‘mad people’), 
and were often driven away to other places.365 Sources derive from the years of 
Protectorate rule, when the cult was revived following the resurgence of epidemic-
fuelled mortality. The qualities attached to the water evolved from curing sickness to 
offering immunity from it, ushering in new forms of religious practice. Signifying this 
 
363 Middleton, ‘The Yakan or Allah Water Cult’, p. 92. 
364 ibid. p. 88. 
365 ibid. p. 93. 
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evolution, Yakan became known as dede (grandmother), enculturated into the Lugbara 
language, and equated to the protection offered by a grandmother.366 As the protective, 
rather than reactive, dimensions of Yakan developed, membership became attached to 
the expression of ritual performances. As one eyewitness explained to Middleton: 
“They came from all [over] Maraca, and also other men. In the evening, every day, they 
danced, like a koro. The dance was called yakani tuzu, a'bi ndua (‘to dance yakan at the 
foot of the a'bi tree’)”.367 As evidence of these comparisons, one elder compared Yakan 
to Catholic practice: “Rembe put his a'bi tree here, and one at Miutini, and people 
gathered there and sacrificed, like the Catholics do when they go to hear the Fathers.”368 
Practices took on different forms across the region: among Lugbara communities in 
Congo, after drinking the water, the imbiber had to run at full speed away from the pot, 
“looking back on pain of death”.369 In Vurra, in 1920, after a serious outbreak of 
meningitis, a goat and a white calf (referred to as ‘the beasts of Yakan’) ornamented in 
the bracelets of a man who had died from meningitis, were involved in rites and chased 
into Mt Luku, symbolically chasing away disease.370 In localised ways, through Yakan, 
unique ritual expressions emerged among its adherents.  
 
 
Vokes has argued that colonial tendencies of documenting alleged cults or secret 
societies transformed practices which were “a diffuse set of informal, and in many ways 
ephemeral, exchange networks” into “bounded and coherent” structures.371 Thus, 
 
366 ibid. p. 89. 
367 ibid. p. 90.  
368 ibid. p. 92. 
369 Driberg, ‘Yakañ’, p. 417-9. 
370 Middleton, ‘The Yakan or Allah Water Cult’, p. 92. 
371 Vokes, Ghosts of Kanungu, p. 15. 
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caution must be exercised in accounts that describe Yakan in terms of a coherent tiered 
system divided into three ranks, and replicated across space in all sub-clans of north-
central Lugbaraland.  
 
That said, sources and local recollection do confirm that whilst the power of Yakan was 
initially associated with Rembe, it was quickly indigenised into a local leadership 
structure in North Lugbaraland (though not in the south, for unknown reasons).372 
Rembe’s activities had been confined to particular places near Maracha, along the 
Lugbara/Kakwa border. Yakan’s evolution relied on elders travelling to Kakwa County 
to buy the water to administer at home. This evolution is apparent in reported price 
differentials in the compound of a Kakwa dispenser, Lagoro, which Driberg visited in 
1919. Reportedly, Lagoro’s compound consisted of over 200 huts to accommodate 
overnight visitors, where Yakan water was dispensed in several tiers: people could pay 
one rupee to drink it on the spot or two rupees to take the water away, with higher costs, 
in animals, for dispensers.373 These price differentials at the source indicate the 
increasing development of local centres in Lugbaraland.374 Reportedly, Lagoro’s water 
was preferred to Rembe’s at that point, since deaths had been linked to the potency of 
the original Yakan water. According to Driberg, Lugbara adherents accused Rembe of 
poisoning the water, and launched a raid on his Kakwa tribe.375 The evidence suggests 
that whilst Lugbara people engaged with prophetic authority, they did so pragmatically, 
according to the health outcomes of imbibing the water from particular intermediators.  
 
 
372 Middleton, ‘The Yakan or Allah Water Cult’, p .86. 
373 Driberg, ‘Yakañ’, p. 416-7. 
374 King, ‘The Yakan Cult’.  
375 Driberg, ‘Yakañ’, p. 417. 
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The practice of Yakan differed radically from the hierarchies and disciplines within 
systems of leadership. It was led by younger men, based on their ability to purchase the 
water, and through consuming it, ordinary men and women could become yi’ 'ba 
Adrogua, or ‘people of spirit’.376 But crucially, the movement bought new possibilities 
for new forms of possession, as ordinary people demonstrated connection or 
inhabitation with the immanent aspects of Adro. Simultaneously, Yakan’s adherents—
male and female alike—tied shifting spiritual empowerment to the adoption of new 
moral norms. Men and women camped in the bush, danced, and had sexual intercourse 
regardless of clan affiliation (sexual relations between clan members usually being 
prohibited).377 Driberg too notes that Yakan water became linked to the resurrection of 
dead ancestors, indicative of its encroachment upon the segmentary lineage system. 
Middleton concludes that, as Yakan developed, it provided a vehicle to challenge the 
traditional form of social organisation. Ultimately, little is known about whether 
Yakan’s adherents engaged with or entirely abandoned the ancestral system, but in 
crisis, though participating in Yakan, forms of possession were linked to the embrace of 
new moral codes.  
 
Without historical records, it is not possible to ascertain whether Yakan was the only 
prophetic movement to take hold in the region.378 Acidri documents the remnants of 
other spiritual cults that were domesticated as shrines within homesteads in the manner 
of Yakan—including mua, abea, and adra—which were said to possess people 
throughout the colonial period.379 Today, forces once considered divine have been 
 
376 Middleton, ‘The Yakan or Allah Water Cult’, p. 71. 
377 ibid. p. 101. 
378 Allen, ‘Understanding Alice’. 
379 Acidri, ‘The Impact of British Colonial Policies’. 
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domesticated into the lineage order, said to offer protective qualities to clans who ‘own’ 
them, and to punish individuals who offend them. Violations result in the appearance of 
‘normal’ (rather than ‘killing’) sicknesses, which often affect the stomach, and force the 
offender to come forward to seek inter-clan reparations. A century later, powers vested 
in Yakan have been fully domesticated by elders.  
 
By the 1950s, elders who had been involved in Yakan expressed a degree of ambiguity 
as to the practice, explaining that they had been misled by the movement, and in their 
confusion, “clutched at any straw for confidence and help.”380 Despite this, elders 
maintained shrines within compounds and Rembe’s divination skills continued to 
manifest in female ojo, consulted when sickness required. The mass fervour associated 
with the movement would not recur until the arrival of Revival Christianity.381 Such 
continuities have not escaped Lugbara people themselves. A descendant of Kamure (a 
Yakan chief), living near Ofude, recalled: ‘Rembe was so miraculous he could walk on 
water like Jesus… It was a kind of religion—people were dancing—like this one of 
Pentecostal churches.’382 The comparison to Pentecostalism is not incidental, since 
these churches are today associated with wild outpourings of faith and healing, even in 
contrast to mainline Charismatic denominations. It is to this successor movement, its 
origins and its revivals, that I now turn. 
 
4.4 Participating in Christianity: From Mission to Margins, 1918-1980 
 
 
380 Middleton, ‘The Yakan or Allah Water Cult’, p. 90. 
381 C. Hoehler-Fatton, ‘Possessing Spirits, Powerful Water and Possible Continuities: Examples of Christian and 
Islamic fervour in Western Kenya prior to the East African Revival’, in K. Ward and E. Wild-Wood (eds.), The East 
African Revival: Histories and Legacies. London: Ashgate, 2011, pp. 73-88. Fountain Publishers: Kampala. 
382 I, Elder of Alipi Clan, Maracha, 7/03/2017. 
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4.4.1 Mungu and Modernity 
 
Mission Christianity, introduced in South Lugbaraland in 1918, sharply contrasted with 
the fervour of Yakan. Chapter Two introduced Christian missions as an elite force, 
which appealed primarily to a new class of people who were educated in mission 
schools and treated in mission hospitals. In this guise, urban engagement with 
Christianity throughout the colonial period provided a means to access modernity 
through education and medicine.  
 
The situation was different in the rural countryside. Despite the emphasis placed on a 
‘militant’ approach to evangelism from both the Anglican Inland Mission and the 
Catholic Comboni Fathers, given competition with each other against paganism and the 
perceived threat of Islam from the North (fears of which were stoked equally by 
Yakan), preaching the gospel encountered significant obstacles.383 With limited 
manpower and limited capacity in local language, missions faced similar challenges to 
the state administration, and provoked similar antagonisms among local people. In 
removing young men from their homes for baptism and instruction at missions, 
missionaries mirrored state patterns of recruitment for the military and for plantations, 
tensions amplified by the simultaneous backdrop of state-sanctioned hostage-taking in 
the South. That European missionaries were conflated with those violent measures is 
evident in how, even today, both Catholic and Anglican elders explain that the first 
missionaries came “with guns.”384  
 
 
383 Dobson, Daybreak in West Nile, p. 19. 
384  I, Elder, Arua, 28/12 2017 (OJ). 
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Moreover, missionaries made little effort to enculturate Christianity within pre-existing 
practices, instead opposing customary funerals and marriages that lay at the core of 
social reproduction. This opposition was most striking in the rendering of Mungu to 
represent the Christian God. In response the complexities presented by an indigenous 
divinity which was dual, both Anglican and Catholic missionaries simply sidestepped 
the engagement with local terms, using the Kiswahili term Mungu (which Muslims also 
used for Allah) in their ministry.385 Missionaries advocated against the worship of other 
gods, including divine deities and ancestors. One Catholic priest in Vurra explained, 
“When the missionaries came—they started instructing our people [that] there are no 
gods in the mountains, valleys, hills—it is this same God who created everything.”386 
Whilst identifying with Mungu did locate a Lugbara Christian within the modern world 
of mission and the state, these imported concepts gained limited traction across the 
countryside.  
 
The work of Dalfovo on Lugbara songs and proverbs is indicative of the continuing 
importance of Adro in moments of crisis. Based on a sample of 769 songs collected in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, 75 mentioned the divinity: 64 mentioning Adro, and 15 
Mungu. Songs were generally sung at funerals; of the songs that mention Adro (in either 
guise), 42 mentioned death, and the remaining 22 mentioned afflictions of some nature. 
Alternatively Mungu was referred to as an “inspiration to abandon evil, a giver of 
peace… a term of reference for human behaviour and the one answering prayers”.387 
Adro continued to be resonant in personal crisis. As Morgensen argued, in adding 
 
385 Dalfovo notes that the term may have been introduced by Swahili traders in the 19th century. 
386 I, Catholic Father, Ediofe, 18/05/2017. 
387 Dalfovo, ‘The Divinity among the Lugbara’, p. 484-485. 
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additional terms, Christian evangelists simply added complexity to ideas of divine-
forces that defied coherence.388  
 
This is not to say that Christian evangelism had no impact, but that the arrival of 
missionaries, and Mungu did not automatically displace prior concepts of Adro (or of 
ori). Vokes’ networked perspective through which divine knowledge spread through 
colonial prophetic movements is also useful to understand the means through which 
rural Lugbara people were exposed to Christianity. The most successful evangelists 
were for many years not those recruited by missions, but returning labour migrants, who 
had been exposed to Christianity in southern Uganda. Of one incident in Yole, Terego, 
in 1924, a missionary recalls: “Crowds of people gathered at Yole to hear him [the 
evangelist] preach… about the same time hundreds of people began coming to the 
mission station at Mvara.”389 Unhindered by the language barriers facing European 
missionaries, ‘sons of the soil’ could more readily inspire conversion.390  
 
In a similar way, the East African Revival – spread by Ugandan evangelists - would 
spread rapidly in Arua town, and later across the countryside. By the late 1940s, urban 
Revivalists, Balokole, meaning ‘Saved Ones’ in Luganda, or pomzifu (KiS. “the quiet 
ones”) in Arua, espoused new forms of fervent worship. Theologically, Revivalists 
emphasised salvation through the cleansing qualities of Jesus’ blood, accessible through 
the confession of sin, and giving testimony, to live a “new life in Christ”.391 According 
 
388 Mogensen, ‘The Resilience of Juok’. 
389 Dobson, Daybreak in West Nile, p. 21. 
390 Cadri, The Development of Small Christian Communities, p. 13. 
391 E. Wild-Wood, ‘Why Strive for the Gospel? The Culture of the Chosen Evangelical Revival on the Northern Congo-
Uganda Border’, in K. Ward and E. Wild-Wood (eds.), The East African Revival: Histories and Legacies. Fountain 
Publishers: Kampala, 2010.  
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to Lugbara theologians, emphasising Yesu (Jesus) as personal saviour served to 
humanise the gospel, reconciling the ideas of remoteness that continued to be attached 
to Mungu. Beyond this, Revival no doubt appealed as well since it was predicated on 
horizontal participation of Europeans and Africans as ‘brethren’, as well as the equality 
of men and women within the movement—which appealed in urban contexts where 
households had established themselves beyond the lineage. Theologian Silvanus Wani, 
a West Niler who would become Bishop of Uganda after the murder of Archbishop 
Luwum during Amin’s regime, was associated with propelling the movement in Arua.  
 
4.4.2 Possession and Moral Revival 
 
By the mid-1950s, Christian revivals thriving in town began to have greater effects in 
the countryside. In 1949, a Bagandan doctor and Revialist, Lubulwa Eliya, arrived in 
Arua.392 Eliya, in partnership with a Ma’di doctor, promoted a strain of Revival based 
on “striving”, which involved an embrace of charisma, along with a provocative style of 
preaching using trumpets and other instruments. In Baganda, Eliya had fallen out of 
favour with mainstream Revivalists, in part because his movement openly critiqued the 
laxity of the mission church. In the North, however, his style of striving was well 
received.  By contrast to elite-driven urban factions, strivers vehemently disavowed 
education and worldly wealth. Eliya himself often dressed in a sack, breaking codes 
around the usual forms of dress considered suitable for Christian Sunday worship. 
Strivers were not only committed to public evangelism, but to the denial of ambition 




held great appeal to many rural people. Today, elders of Maracha and Arua, who had 
been involved in striving, afford Eliya the status of a prophet, similar to Rembe. 
 
Scholars have attributed the success of Revival to its continuities between confession 
traditions and pre-existing customary norms around truth-telling. Yet Wild-Wood notes 
that Revival took on radically different forms within East African societies. Strivers 
exhibited “more exuberant and radical” means of expression, in forms of spirit-inspired 
possession that resembled Yakan.393 Balokole adherents filled with the Holy Spirit fell 
into a trance-like state, giving confessions whilst speaking in tongues. Revival was said 
to be “a thing that seizes a man like Yakan, so that he falls to the ground and speaks 
words of Mungu”.394 As with Yakan, participation provided a route for ordinary 
Lugbara people to access authority outside the patrilineage. Striving provided a means 
of spiritual empowerment for its adherents. Revival was often spread by women, who 
took on key roles in preaching, often validating their messages on the basis of being 
instructed by the Holy Spirit. At crusades, Revivalists connected divine 
communications, dreams and visions to healing through prayer.395  
 
If contemporary scholars have emphasised the peculiarities of possession among 
Northern Revivalists, Lugbara people themselves—who participated in or who were 
brought up in Revivalist households—emphasised the strict moral codes and discipline 
involved in the movement. On a personal level, becoming “Saved” and receiving the 
gifts of the Spirit relied on confession, and subsequently adapting codes of monogamy, 
 
393 ibid. p. 188. 
394 Middleton, ‘Lugbara Religion’, p,.264  
395 M. Lloyd, A Wedge of Light: Revival in West Nile District. Rugby, n.d. 
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accepting prohibitions on drinking and smoking, avoiding immoral places such as 
markets, adhering to bodily cleanliness and keeping a clean compound. Bruner notes 
that amidst changes in late-colonial Uganda, Revival was simultaneously a message of 
“eternal salvation”, and a means for adherents to exert control over changing family 
situations.396 Women, for example, could emphasise monogamy as homes became 
autonomous from the lineage, and migrant husbands became more mobile—allowing 
them to take another wife elsewhere. Among Lugbara Balokole too, the expression of 
possession was linked to enacting new moral ideals. For women, the insistence on 
cleanliness, fidelity, and the confession of sin provided a means for adherents to assert 
themselves as moral persons, aligning with, rather than contravening, ideas of discipline 
and respect, and of being oku ala (a good wife) at the core of Lugbara society. Though 
participating in divine power, spirit-inspired possession broadly supported wider 
notions of discipline advocated in clans.  
 
4.4.3 Disavowing Ancestors 
 
By the late years of the colonial state, Christianity was having other effects on moral 
praxis in the countryside. European missionaries equated prior practices associated with 
honouring the dead – including ancestral ‘worship’ as well as ritual dances performed at 
funerals – as “idolatrous” presenting a barrier to Christianity, modernity, and scientific 
medicine. Dobson encapsulates the Anglican view, which was characteristically 
detached from local circumstances: “Animism does not only bring fear, it also is a mill-
stone round people’s necks preventing them from making progress”.397 As with 
Catholic missions elsewhere in Uganda, Comboni missionaries were more attentive to 
 
396 J. Bruner, ‘The Testimony Must Begin in the Home’: The Life of Salvation and the Remaking of Homes in the East 
African Revival in Southern Uganda, c. 1930-1955’, Journal of Religion in Africa 44:3-4 (2014), pp. 309-332. 
397 Dobson, Daybreak in West Nile, pp. 17-8. 
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local vocabularies, attempting to document prior religious systems.398 Yet even 
Ramponi reached the conclusion that ancestors were a source of fear for ordinary 
Lugbara people. By contrast to the human names and terms through which Lugbara 
elders spoke of their ancestors, the ori were now described collectively as orindi, spirits 
of the dead, or the ‘souls of the living-dead’ who could torment the living. Constructed 
as a religious other, missionaries labelled the ori as “things of Satan,” and those who 
venerated ancestors as kafiri (Kis ‘pagan’).399 According to missionaries, as Christians, 
Lugbara people should trust in God. Yet despite the vitriol directed at pre-existing 
practices, beyond preaching the virtues of Mungu, there was little direct action against 
such practices beyond the immediate vicinity of missions (in the South) through much 
of the colonial period.400 
 
This changed as generations of Lugbara converts were educated in mission schools. 
Initially, converts were recruited to establish churches. As indicative of the success of 
these endeavours, by 1964 more than 400 Anglican churches had been established 
across West Nile, led by local clergy.401 In the Catholic tradition too, from 1921 to 1958 
many other mission stations were opened, with Lugbara Catholics taking on roles as 
catechists and lay teachers.402  
 
 
By the late colonial period, male Christian converts operationalised earlier mission 
critiques in direct attacks on ancestral shrines. From the late 1940s in the South, and 
 
398 E. Ramponi, ‘Religion and Divination of the Logbara Tribe of North-Uganda’, Anthropos 32 (1937): pp. 571-594, 
pp. 849-874. 
399 Dalfovo, ‘Lugbara Ancestors’, p. 499. 
400 Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals, p. 4. 
401 Dobson, Daybreak in West Nile, p. 45. 
402 Cadri, The Development of Small Christian Communities, p. 17. 
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from the late 1950s in the North, zealous Lugbara converts undertook radical 
evangelical projects premised on the material destruction of shrines. Interviewees for 
this research explained that clerical leaders from both denominations, Protestant 
(Anglican) and Catholic, were involved in destroying shrines. Revivalists took a leading 
role; indeed, one elder recalls the divergence between Anglican converts and Balokole: 
“For them [Anglicans], they say these traditional issues can be left [alone]. But for 
Revival, all of these things were condemned.”403 Catholic Action groups participated in 
similar efforts. Given the prevalence of the ancestral system across the countryside, the 
destruction of shrines became a site of struggle between Christian evangelists and 
village elders. Elders today, some of whom witnessed this destruction, often recounted 
this history in narratives that the coming of dini was marked by the destruction of 
shrines.  
 
Symbolically, the destruction of the ori served as a visible demonstration of the power 
of Mungu, the Christian deity. To give a sense of the power of these events, the 
following account from 1962, relayed by an Anglican church teacher and confirmed by 
other Maracha elders, is indicative. Owing to the power of the Kimeru shrine, a clan 
historically associated with rainmaking, these events are part not only of Kimeru clan 
history but also of the establishment of the Anglican church in Maracha.404  
Reverend Canon Matia Anguandia [an Anglican Revivalist from Maracha] was 
the one who destroyed the small gods. He went to destroy the shrine when he 
was a headmaster at Nyoro Primary School. He was a Lugbara from Ayivu. This 
was in 1956. He was a committed Christian of the church, but he was serving as 
the headmaster of this school. When he heard of the Kimeru people still having a 
shrine, he went to destroy it. He was the only one who had the interest and 
courage. The Kimeru clan was regarded as having particularly strong power 
 
403 I, Elder, Arua, 18/05/2016 (OJ). 
404 FG, Kimeru, 31/05/2016 (OJ); I, Pastor, Kimeru, 13/03/2017. 
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compared to other clans. They were all worshipping the supreme power of 
Kimeru, the power to control the rain and weather.  
 
Before he went he first stood and announced in church that he was going ‘to 
destroy that shrine the Kimeru people had.’ So when the Kimeru people heard 
what he had announced, they themselves said ‘our small god is more powerful 
than the god that he is serving.’ What happened, there were some bees, where 
the Chico quarry is now—there were bees in a certain cave. Those [Kimeru] 
people said that as he passes to that shrine—[at] this hill the bees will sting him 
to death. It was a threat, though even in reality those bees had strung someone to 
death. Before he went he sent information to his relatives that here he had found 
two things. The first was the bees at this quarry and the second one was the 
snake from that shrine. If the bees stung him to death, his people should not 
come and fight the Kimeru people, since he went to destroy the shrine out of his 
own will.  
 
When he destroyed that shrine, nothing happened. It empowered the church 
teacher and the Christians of Nyoro church, that their God is supreme… He 
went to preach in Miridri, after two days he went to Baria, he also stayed for 
another two days and then moved to preach within the Kimeru clan. Then he 
went to Odravu to preach. He was preaching that the power of the Almighty God 
was greater than the power of the Devil that these people had been worshipping. 
After some time, after he preached in Kimeru, a church was established in 
Kimeru.  
 
Echoing other accounts recorded during this research, this encounter demonstrates how 
specific events became theologically persuasive, both feeding into conversations of 
causality for misfortune and providing evidence to bolster Christian evangelism. 
Ordinarily, it was considered taboo for the living even to carry the ancestral stones, for 
fear of provoking sickness from offended ancestors.405 In cases where ancestral shrines 
were abandoned, furthermore, it was thought that ancestors protested this abandonment 
through ori ka or nyoka, states of sickness that befell entire clans. The failure of these 
consequences to manifest proved the power of Mungu over the ancestral spirits—now 
designated as orindi, lesser spirits. 
 
 
405 Enyabo, A Survey of Lugbara Spirit Beliefs, p. 7. 
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Recalling this history, Christian elders emphasised the triumphalism of their actions as 
converts. Yet, at the time, these efforts were considered unwelcome, interpreted by rural 
elders as threatening social stability. Even theologians report that after independence, 
dini was seen by many as a source of division. If young men who refused to share 
migrant earnings were suspected to be sorcerers, converts who targeted sites of social 
stability, were violently punished. Margaret Lloyd, the Anglican missionary, recounts 
how the leader of the Strivers in Maracha, after receiving divine instruction to destroy 
his father’s “big spirit shrines,” travelled to the countryside to do so and was 
subsequently beaten and left for dead by his family.406  
 
In view of this resistance, efforts unfolded over decades on a clan-basis. In the South, 
where mission stations were concentrated, ancestors were abandoned decades before 
they would be abandoned in the North, in Maracha and Terego. Understandably, 
converts were reluctant to undertake radical action which carried significant personal 
cost, including the risk of ostracisation from the lineage and its associated social 
securities. Even when ori were destroyed, mass conversion within clans did not result. 
Some elders simply restored the ori, others organised the burning of Christian books in 
retaliation.407 In Maracha, many elders explained that they left the ori behind only as 
late as 1980, when fleeing war.408  
 
Given the multiple functions of ancestors described in Chapter Three, this reluctance is 
understandable. Though castigated by Christians as “pagan”, ancestral sites lay at the 
 
406 Lloyd, A Wedge of Light, p. 71. 
407 Enyabo, A Survey of Lugbara Spirit Beliefs. 
408 FG, Pio, 02/03/2017 (OJ); I, Abiti, Kampala, 15/03/2016.  
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centre of social peace and cohesion, and provided elderly men with needed ritual status. 
Even today elders explained that the ori represented a’bi (grandfathers or, history). 
Unlike their educated sons, uneducated elders found little relevance in the 
advancements offered by Christian missions. It is significant too, that these events took 
place within an indigenisation of the church – a Lugbarati Bible being made available 
after independence, and within the Catholic church, from the late 1950s the term Adro 
being reintroduced into the Christian texts and songs (with Adroa for lesser divinities 
and spirits).409 
  
Prior to war, it is clear that Lugbara people participated in Christianity through an 
increasing array of social projects. Through localised Christian practices, Lugbara 
people actively debated and reformed ideas of morality, propriety and belief. Directed 
by spiritual inspiration, some projects complemented ideas of discipline connected to 
the patrilineage, whilst others directly challenged them. Whilst the personal projects of 
reform undertaken by Balokole may have been perceived as odd, by contrast to the 
destruction of shrines, these activities did not pose a threat to tualu (togetherness). In all 
– spirit inspired activities were assessed not on account of its associations with a 
particular institution (be that mission Christianity, or Revivals) – but on how this power 
was practiced in the social context. 
 




409 Similar positions were also taken in the Anglican Church under a Ma’di Bishop, Remelia Ringtho, who sought to 
better understand spirit beliefs in order to ‘screen out’ bad ideas rather than reject such notions wholesale. 
Anglican scholars set out to document the synergies between pre-existing practice and indigenous beliefs. 
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The experience of war and displacement from 1979-86 had profound effects on notions 
of divine protection. Hutchinson writes of inter-ethnic conflict in South Sudan in the 
1990s, that amidst upheaval that surpasses explanations within moral limits, “one of the 
few things people can do to retain faith in the future and in themselves is to band 
together to create moral enclaves in which they collectively reaffirm their commitment 
to God's will—however defined.”410 For Lugbara populations too, war and displacement 
were interpreted as indicative of divine causality. Within the warscape, when soldiers 
serving as agents of the state engendered abject terror in local populations, and the 
unstable economic and social circumstances of exile challenged elders’ moral authority, 
churches often provided a semblance of particular and spiritual security. In exile, too, 
Christian theologies provided a means to make sense of uncertain surroundings, and 
Christian converts often pragmatically asserted their identities as Christian to blend with 
Congolese. 
 
Missionaries, who had previously been seen as imposing foreign ideas which 
challenged local society, protected people from this violence. Missions were directly 
targeted, and missionaries killed. Amidst the horrors of war, as civilians came under 
siege from both the UNLA and rebel factions, Lugbara people often turned to missions 
for sanctuary and support. Some 10,000 West Nilers had sought refuge at the Ombaci 
Catholic Mission, hoping that the presence of international missionaries and the Red 
Cross would confer safety. On 24th June 1981, however, UNLA soldiers entered the 
mission and opened fire on the civilians, resulting in the deaths of between 50-100 
 
410 S. Hutchinson, ‘A Curse from God? Religious and political dimensions of the post-1991 rise of ethnic violence in 
South Sudan’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 39:2 (2001), pp. 307-331, p. 316. 
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people.411 The Catholic Mission in Lodonga, which lay at the front line between the 
UNLA army and rebel forces, was targeted by liberation forces with long-range 
weapons. Ediofe Mission, lying proximate to the UNLA barracks in Arua, was also 
raided: six people and one nun were killed, and rebels tortured Catholic priests.412 
Today, there is a deep collective memory amongst Lugbara people that the church 
suffered alongside them, that missionaries protected people, and even “paid for people 
to live”. Indeed, it was often clergy who led those in exile back home, their knowledge 
that return would be safe being trusted over other authorities.413  
 
For Lugbara civilians, Christian identity was also given new import. Amin’s former 
solders, who formed the main internal resistance to the UNLA, were often identified 
(accurately or not) as ‘Muslims’. Thus, to be Muslim was to risk being identified as a 
rebel, and to risk being killed by the UNLA army. One Lugbara church teacher, a 
resident of Terego who was residing in Yumbe (a majority Muslim district) during the 
war, recalled: “God has been merciful to me. Even after the war, I had been paying my 
poll tax in Aringa. If anyone knew that, the soldiers would kill you on the spot, because 
they were saying the Aringas had caused the war”.414  
 
Whilst identifying as Christian conferred a degree of safety before going into exile, in 
the same way, Christian churches provided a means for elders to remedy insecurity in 
Congo. For example, identifying as a Christian leader also proffered a means of 
 
411 ‘The 1981 Ombaci Massacre’, West Nile Web, 18 January 2018. Available at < 
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mediating with Congolese authorities. One catechist of St Joseph’s Church in Aroi 
explained how Congolese sudas (soldiers) collected market dues through him and other 
catechists. Participating in these affairs gave him a voice to protect his fellow 
Ugandans, and to prevent sudas from “mistreating people”.415Another Lugbara priest 
credited with healing abilities explained that his services were accessed by the 
Congolese.416 Through engaging with church infrastructures, people used the resources 
available to them to survive, to integrate with the population and to protect their 
families. 
 
Prior to war, mission evangelism and Revival had been cross-border enterprises: the 
AIM and Comboni Fathers had also been active in Congo, and the Striver movement 
had become established in Aru, DRC, as well. Amidst the uncertainties of exile, these 
connections provided a sense of continuity. One Catholic elder remembered how taking 
Holy Communion provided a source of stability, and given the similarities in Christian 
structures, many informants for this research explained that prayer in Congolese 
churches provided a means for ordinary people to proactively work towards return.417 
Moreover, as Pentecostal churches (which had also arrived in Arua during Amin’s rule) 
were more established in Congo, both women and men recalled experiencing and 
connecting with new forms of ecstatic worship and immanent healing. One Revival 
leader, Manoa Ofuta explains how healing gifts emerged amidst continuing insecurities:  
There was a gentleman– his brother was sick. It was during Amin’s [rebel] 
army. He got sick somewhere and was sent home. They asked me to go and pray 
for him. God used me in a different form. His relatives had to come and find out 
what sickness was binding him. That was not my motive—those were cultural 
ways. I asked the owner of the home, ‘I am a Church-man, I am a Church leader. 
 
415 I3 Elder, Aroi, 27/05 2016 (OJ). 
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I have come with my team. These people should come out of this home, so I can 
come in.’ I said ‘We are going to pray as church men—I am going to lay my 
hands on the sick man, after those prayers – if you don’t believe that this man 
will get up—do not say amen.’ I laid my hands on him. The sick man saw a 
snake running. He was shouting ‘snake, snake, snake’. He couldn’t stand but 
after those prayers—he was standing and fighting the snake. From then on he 
could stand… they had been carrying him before that, that was physical 
healing.418  
 
Another woman explained how after several weeks of attendance she channelled her 
prayers towards afflictions within her family, laying hands on her husband to reverse his 
declining health. War temporality resettled relations of patriarchy and seniority, and to 
survive, people came to depend on each other in new ways, materially and spiritually. In 
a period where medical care was difficult to access, for many Lugbara people simply 
staying alive was evidence of God’s power. One elder, Caleb Ondoma, who remained in 
Uganda throughout the war, camped on the slopes of Mt Oci:  
I didn’t go into exile … We fled to Mt. Oci … We were staying on the slopes of 
the mountains. We slept under trees. If it rained you covered yourself with 
leaves. At night we went back to Yole to get cassava from the garden. On the 
mountain, that was the most miraculous thing God did. There was no sickness, 
no malaria—much as people were in rain, the cold, being bitten by wild insects, 
there was no sickness during that period. That was God’s work. God has been 
merciful to me.419  
 
For many individuals, God’s power was made manifest in people’s ability to avoid 
disease, and remain with their families. This was not a recognition of the divine 
expressed through ceremony, but through the simple fact of staying alive. 
 
When recalling the experience of war and displacement, many elders encapsulated their 
experiences in biblical scripts of punishment and redemption. These memories indicate 
the extent to which Christian theology provided a means to comprehend the horrors of 
 
418 I, Canon Manoa Ofuta and Samuel Ondua, Mvara, 14/03/2017. 
419 I6, Elder, Abrici, 9/06/2017 (OJ). 
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war. On the one hand, elders explained violence as a punishment for their previous 
rejection of Mungu. For example:  
[We] saw exile as a punishment from God—people were taught [that] if you do 
not believe in God you will have misfortunes—and war is one of those things—
so we understood that the war was because we had not been following God, and 




People conceived exile as a punishment from God because of [their] not 
listening to God.421 
 
On the other hand, Lugbara people internalised political explanations of conflict, 
whereby West Nilers were equated with the misdeeds of Amin’s soldiers. This was 
expressed in biblical narratives of personal sin: 
People understood that Ugandans had misbehaved so God was punishing them 
through war. During Amin’s regime, the soldiers committed atrocities. Amin’s 
soldiers were doing something against God’s will.422 
 
Such explanations simultaneously drew on Old Testament ideas of divine punishment 
and a punitive, omnipotent being—Adro, the ultimate arbiter of misfortune—as well as 
curses that could kill off entire clans. For other elders, notions of salvation and survival 
in Revivalist preaching gained new significance, providing an antidote to narratives of 
divine curses and punishment. 
Many people lost their relatives and were told that God saves people. They came 
to believe that if we had believed in God earlier, maybe these things would not 
have happened—so let us believe in this God that has been brought.423 
 
Either way, the specific dynamics of war in the 1980s brought new meaning to the role 
of Christian actors and institutions in ordinary people’s lives, and so to the influence of 
the Christian theology premised on punishment or salvation. Elders consistently equated 
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war to the expression of an omnipotent being. Whilst these ideas had existed prior to 
war, when inflected through the prism of personal suffering and survival, elders 
explained that they came to a’ii (‘believe’, a term that also means ‘accept’) the dini first 
brought by missionaries.424  
 
According to interviews across Maracha, after return, in view of Christian identities 
connected to war, and the hardships of return, there was little interest in reinstituting the 
ori. The post-war years saw a significant increase in conversion to Christianity, or 
Christians opting to become Saved. Several elders explained that they accepted 
salvation, and became Saved, soon after passing back into Uganda, their safe return 
serving as evidence of God’s mercy. One leader, Canon Manoa Ofuta, confirmed: “The 
Revival moved from the margins to the core”.425 As Jones has argued with reference to 
Teso, ideas of beginning a “new life” dovetailed with people’s need to break with the 
past, and in this case, a conflict seen as “revenge” for others’ misdeeds.426 
 
4.6 Post-Return Charismatic Revivals and their Limits 
 
Since return from exile Christianity has become a major force in people’s lives, 
governing propriety and moral standards. As a simple illustration, throughout this 
research, moral homes were often identified as “god-fearing”. Presently, Christian 
practice is marked not by distinct institutional boundaries, but by complexity and 
borrowing between denominations, and revivals within them. This section outlines the 
 
424 It is also of note that Juma Oris, the leader of WNBF, the rebel group that caused insecurity in Maracha, was 
believed to be possessed by spirits, or to have control of powerful spirits. Later, Oris’ spirit (whilst he was still alive) 
was named by Joseph Kony as one of the chief spirits possessing him, issuing him orders in battle. For West Nilers, 
this legacy points to the devastating effects that male-inspired possession can have in response to militancy. 
425 I, Ofuta, Mvara, 15/03/2017. 
426 Jones, Beyond the State. 
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texture of post-return revivals, and explores cross-denominational continuities in the 
social practice of charismatic power.427   
   
Over decades of return, Revival has occupied a less prominent presence in West Nile. 
At one service in Maracha, the attendees lamented that the majority female presence did 
not encourage their husbands to join, hence the movement was dying. Diocesan leaders 
lamented that the Revival had failed to inspire leadership among younger Lugbara 
generations.  
 
In part, this is because the moral piety of Revivalism has been replaced by other 
charismatic dimensions of Anglicanism. Influenced by Pentecostalism, the importance 
of being ‘born again’ was widely propagated by a new rank of aspiring Anglican leaders 
who rose to prominence after exile—men who had often worked as labour migrants, as 
government civil servants, or in the army. Whilst still promoting strict moral virtues, 
becoming ‘born again’ does not carry the strict moral imperative to condemn social sins 
(within the church or beyond it) as advocated by Revivalists.428  
 
Selected influential Anglican leaders are credited with having healing gifts, though their 
practice is mainly confined to Arua’s urban churches. One Pastor noted the resistance of 
lay populations: “Anglicans have no holy spirit!”, and “people were saying we had 
brought another religion and maybe it is a kind of sect because God was doing 
 
427 For example, Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals, and C. Christiansen. ‘Conditional Certainty: Ugandan Charismatic 
Christians Striving for Health and Harmony’, in L. Haram and C. Yamba (eds.), Dealing with Uncertainty in 
Contemporary African Lives. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2009, pp.48-71, p. 49. 
428 Socially, Revialists continue to be distinguished by their plain speech, where any evil is condemned as the devil—
after a fight with a husband, for example, a Revival member may say ‘the devil passed through my husband 
yesterday’. Leaders explained the movement was undergoing a crisis, since its leaders were ageing.  
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wonderful things”429 Influential leaders are involved in managing affliction through 
prayer and the laying on of hands, they also disavow extremists who ascribe every case 
of illness to ‘demonic possession’, and emphasise the need to seek treatment from 
healers.430 Revivalists often considered faith healing a source of insecurity: “People 
tend to follow signs and wonders… they hear that here they are getting healers… For us 
elders in the Revival, we are outnumbered. We just pray [for them]”.431 
 
It is the Catholic Church which has undergone significant post war revival in the 
Charismatic Catholic Renewal (CCR). If healing gifts in the Anglican tradition are 
accepted insofar as they are mediated by male pastors, the CCR represents mass 
participation in spiritual gifts, and places a direct emphasis on personal gifts through 
channelling the power of the Holy Spirit. One adherent explained, “your life should be 
spirit-filled, spirit-directed, spirit everything”, and an intercessor said, “you are standing 
in the gap between people and God, you take the burden of that person, their sins, and 
you communicate between that person, the situation and God.”432 Given the Catholic 
Churches indigenisation of the liturgy, CCR members now speak of Adro.  
 
The CCR in Uganda has been extensively described by scholars, this section explores 
its localisation in Arua town and the countryside.433 The CCR represents a local 
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433 For example, Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals, and C. Christiansen. ‘Conditional Certainty: Ugandan Charismatic 
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 193 
iteration of global Christianity. Charismatic gifts among lay Catholics were accepted by 
the Vatican in 1971. The CCR reached Arua until 1984, at the time led by a prayer 
group directed by the White Fathers (Catholic Missionaries) at Christ the King Parish in 
Arua. The movement pivots around the establishment of the Bethany Centre in 2000, 
which features weekly prolific displays of mass deliverance which echo earlier 
performances of Balokole and Yakan. Today, Bethany enjoys a reach far beyond CCR 
members: its healing masses draw Catholics, non-Catholics, Anglicans, and even 
Muslims. Each week, hundreds of supplicants gather, many clutching holy water, to be 
blessed by the priests. Alongside spiritual maladies, many suffer from visible injuries or 
chronic conditions. A Catholic explained,  
When the person preaches you will see Christians being touched in various 
different ways. Some will begin shouting. Others will begin jumping. Others 
will become crying. Others will roll. When the preacher calls the name of Jesus, 
Jesus come down, Holy Spirit come down, you will see a lot of things 
happening. Individuals – some will be dancing, with noise, some rolling, some 
are very chaotic.434  
 
As with Revival, CCR encompasses a revitalization of traditional styles of worship, 
featuring indigenous instruments and vigorous prayer. Services are led by male priests, 
who for some occupy a prophetic status in the regional imagination, and often yield 
miraculous bodily healing. CCR members, and those who seek healing from the 
movement, are overwhelmingly female, though all members acknowledge the 
transformative impact of the Holy Spirit in their lives. Often decisions to join the CCR 
were predicated on experiencing change through the cleansing of physical or mental 
afflictions, or domestic disquiet which prayerful revelation revealed to be caused by 
orindi onzi, jo jok, or oleu. As with Saved Anglicans, CCR members must abide by 
 
434 I, Catholic, Arua, 15/06/2017. 
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strict moral codes regarding sexual and public behaviour. If these codes are broken, 
prayerful repentance is required. One Lugbara priest explained: “[s]in can be physical, 
can be spiritual—you need to end your past life, and begin your new life.”435 For its 
adherents, participation in the CCR is a deeply moral and spiritual endeavour. 
 
The CCR (and Anglican faith healing) is accepted in so far as healing is practiced by 
collectives, and legitimated through affiliation to established mainline churches. This 
legitimation matters, since in the last decade, charismatic movements have taken a 
frontline role in confronting social problems, particularly in confronting witchdoctors 
residing in urban communities, and latterly, witches in rural areas (Chapter Six and 
Seven). Interventions, which destroy the “shrines” of witchdoctors, or remove evil 
objects from the houses of witches, replicate the destruction of the ori in the colonial 
period. In cases of mazi—a form of killing spirit which has emerged post war—CCR 
members may decamp to rural villages, praying, revealing and burning herbs and 
objects that represent evil. In lieu of ancestoral worship as an other to Christian piety, 
witchcraft or visiting a witchdoctor has come to represent the opposite of Christian 
piety. Tacility accepting customary rites of marriage and death formerly castigate by 
pre-war converts, the emphasis on witchcraft has served as a useful explanation  of 
failures in prosperity in modern times. Yet, whilst colonial action targeted a material 
religious landscape, collective action now targets individuals suspected of malpractice. 
Yet, in particular context of localised crisis, charismatic healers are understood as 
performing important social functions by those who fear themselves affected by 
particular forms of “modern” witchcraft. 
 
435 I, Priest, Bethany, 16/05/2017. 
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To return to Ravalde’s insights, the powers and limits of deities and spirits are always 
mediated by the abilities of their human hosts.436 In view of Christian Revivals which 
explicitly sanction the inhabitaton of human bodies by spirits, the role of mediators 
becomes critical.  Just as followers of Yakan and Strivers were considered a fanatical 
movement by non-adherents (including mainline Anglicans) in the colonial period, 
tensions have emerged around practices of possession. Critiques as to uncontrolled 
possession were common parlance during this research. A command refrain heard 
throughout this research was: “Is that truly the Holy Spirit?”. Approached with novel 
forms of spirit-mediated possession, Lugbara people widely questioned whether power 
was ala (good) or onzi (bad), seeking to determine whether this power contributed to 
social health, or division. Anxieties are not assisted by translational complexities. 
Catholics take the term Orindi Ala for Holy Spirit, and though existing on the primacy 
of its cleansing, simultaneously, orindi have long been recognised as lesser spirits, 
associated with madness, and since return, with white anthropoid apparitions 
reminiscent of older adroa. Inspired by Christian theologies, these forces are associated 
with Satani, rather than potentially ambiguous aspects of Adro.  Lay Catholics 
sometimes refer to the CCR by the derogatory phrase ‘the movement of the sick’ – in 
relation to the movement’s emphasis on healing affliction, and the dubious nature of the 
spiritual powers channelled by its  adherents. 
 
In this way, individual charisma, when practiced publicly, can be subject to social 
policing, particularly in villages where healers operate from their homes, residing on 
 
436 Ravalde, ‘Deceiving the spirit’. 
 196 
ancestral land and subject to clan by-laws. In Ediofe, for example, the makeshift 
deliverance church of a female Lugbara Pentecostal preacher was destroyed, in an 
attack reportedly sanctioned by the Catholic Church.437 In one borderland clan, a self-
styled Catholic nebi (‘prophet’), named Zefa Joseph, was violently evicted on account 
of practicing his “religion”. 438 The details of the latter case are here summarised, since 
they elucidate the contours of tolerance of individual charismatic authority. 
 
Zefa received his gifts - divine messages as visions, dreams or songs - after 
experiencing a strange affliction, which he explains as a period of edezu (cleansing), 
which instructed him to evangelise against sins, including violence, drinking adultery or 
poisoning. He travelled round as an itinerant prophet, and gained a significant following 
“at home”. Zefa’s experience and evangelical tones were common to Charismatic 
Catholics (and Saved Anglicans). Additionally Zefa too took a firm stance on animal 
transfers that constitute bridewealth, or reimbursements after death, also condemning 
the worldly authority of elders:  
Our culture is somehow misleading. The sacrifices… they eat in the name of the 
deceased, or in the name of their lineage. When clans sit they slaughter animals 
in the name of praying and getting cleansing from ancestors—they will always 
mention the name of the ancestor as they say the prayers. They attempt to get 
healing from the ancestors, not from God…it is like they are imitating Jesus.439  
 
Whilst these critiques echo those of Revivalists, and replicate contemporary claims 
made by CCR priests, Zefa marshalled these contestations into grassroots confrontation. 
Zefa isolated himself from his clan, refusing to partake in collective meals, leading to 
 
437 I, Jennifer, Pentecostal Pastor, Ediofe (Arua), 29/12/2017, English/Lugbara (PN). Reportedly, one established 
Kampalan pastor was even chased from his service by town dwellers. The contours of these events are complex, 
and whilst neighbours drive violence, conflicts are often incited through church sermons. 
438 I, Zefa Joseph, Arua, 18/05/2017 (DA); I, Relative, Arua, 15/06/2017. 
439 Whilst CCR male priests advance these critiques, lay CCR members do not participate in them. All CCR members 
interviewed explained that they continued to observe customs around marriage and death related to “culture”. 
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mounting tensions over his anti-social presence. Of his practice, a clan elder explained: 
“As he was bringing a vision, it was as if he was running mad”.440 His clan members 
(which overlapped with his church congregation) asserted that his powers were onzi 
(evil), and claimed Zefa was trying to ‘anoint himself like the Pope’. Following Zefa’s 
attempts to influence the proceedings around a clan funeral, in 2009, he and his family 
were evicted from their homes by clan members, who destroyed the huts within his 
compound and threatened him with physical violence.  
 
Zefa’s relatives offered multiple explanations for his eviction. The funeral in question 
was of his nephew, his brother’s child, who had died in Kampala. Some soil had been 
returned to the clan such that the nephew could be buried at home, where burial rites, 
which reportedly included traditional dancing, ensued. According to one relative, people 
were angered that as the funerary rites were proceeding, Zefa was hosting a parallel 
prayer session at his home—a sign of disrespect, and a negation of Zefa’s kinship 
responsibilities. Another relative reported that Zefa suggested that the soil for the grave 
should be placed not in the ground, but in water, mirroring the sacrament of baptism. 
Yet another relative said that Zefa had begun to instruct his followers to use prayer, 
rather than medicine, in cases of sickness, even as his own wife seemed close to death 
(a situation which would warrant the intervention of the clan). Regardless of the truth of 
the event that precipitated violence, all explanations clearly elucidate that Zefa 
challenged fundamental tenets of peace, respect to the dead and the well-being of the 
living. Violence by his clan was thus aimed at the perceived assault on their social 
world, reflected in the practices of Zefa’s mission. Zefa’s alleged possession by the 
 
440 I, Elders, Kamaka, 19/06/2017 (DA). 
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Holy Spirit provoked anxiety enough among his clan and church, but it was the precise 
texture involved in the practice of his power that ultimately led to violence.  
 
The eviction of Zefa has historical antecedents. Whilst women have embraced radical 
forms of possession, it has rarely been marshalled in direct contravention to clan-work. 
In the colonial period, violent struggles were pursued by clan elders and their spirit-
inspired sons, who mobilised divine intervention to attack symbolic anchors of ritual 
life. In many ways Zefa’s struggles echo early post-independence rivalries played out 
by elders and their Christian sons over the moral probity of shrines. As in the past, 
Lugbara elders’ approach challenges to their lifeworlds not in terms of abject 
cosmological strife, but as closely-observed struggles between people, outcomes and 
spirit-inspired mediators. Presently, many Lugbara people are cognisant that many 
leaders, prophetic or otherwise, use power to enact suffering beyond their control—be 
these prophetic pastors, witchdoctors, self-styled healers, or other actors such as 
politicians or businessmen. Yet Zefa brought messages home, challenging social peace 
and health within his clan.441 As this thesis shows, through clans can provide support, 
these are also theatres of rigorous policing towards those who challenge tualu. 
 
 
4.7 On Boundary-Making and Cosmologies 
 
Middleton sought to accommodate this world of forces and intermediaries within his 
dualism of Lugbara thought, contrasting the world of the divine with the legible world 
of the patrilineage, and dividing persons, things and activities into “opposed, contrasted, 
 
441 The following chapter (Five) comments on CCR “Family Tree Healing” practices, which too take critiques of 
gerontocatic authority “home”. Though these practices are mainly urban, priests who had conducted them 
reported stark resistance from elders. 
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or complementary pairs” of onzi (bad) and ala (good), respectively.442 The masculine 
sphere of order, morality, elders, ancestors, evidence and control was held in continual 
tension with an external sphere of disorder connected to Adro, associated with 
unpredictability, femininity and instability.443 For reference I summarise:  
  
Onzi onyiru 
Adro, in the sky, above, outside and remote 
from men 
The world of men 
Adro, in the bushland, away from 
settlements, the place of wild animals 
The homestead and settlement, home of 
lineage members (including dead ancestors) 
Disorder Order  
Outside and lacking social control Within social control 
Individuals Social persons 
Women and femaleness Men and maleness 
Asocial, morally ignorant, mythical beings Socialized genealogical beings 
Bush and uncultivated land Settlements and cultivated fields 
Wild animals Domestic animals 
 
 Adapted from Dual Classification444 
 
In this way, writes Middleton, “Lugbara conceive of their society as a field of ordered 
relations in the dimensions of space and time, and also in a moral dimension. They see 
it as an area of order surrounded by disorder, the latter the domain of asocial and amoral 
chaos and of unpredictable power uncontrolled by members of society whether living or 
dead”.445 In essence, cosmological balance—first expressed by elders, then invested in 
the routinisation of lineage authority—was maintained through limiting dangerous 
spiritual forces beyond the control or knowledge of men. Middleton summarised: 
“[The] Lugbara would like the two spheres to be kept separate, but this never happens 
 
442 J. Middleton, ‘Some Categories of Dual Classification among the Lugbara of Uganda’, History of Religions 7:3 
(1968), pp. 187-208, p. 188. 
443 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 250. 
444 Middleton, ‘Some Categories of Dual Classification’, pp. 193-5. 
445 ibid. p. 197. 
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for very long, as their own experience of forces beyond their control tells them.”446 
Balance, then, was maintained through limiting the effects of Adro, effects made 
continually manifest through suffering. 
 
Middleton’s dualism has proved influential not only for subsequent studies of Lugbara 
illness or political history, but also to explain gendered patterns of possession across 
societies in Northern Uganda, in both everyday and extreme contexts.447  It has been 
interpreted as relating to a gendered commentary on the distribution and expression of 
divine power. These observations remain relevant, since expressions of divine power 
remain gendered: women do become possessed more frequently than men. With 
reference to the Acholi context, Finnstrom notes, observing the gendering of displays of 
emotion and possession, that, “womanhood was, more than manhood, intimately 
associated with Acholi cosmology and the local moral world.”448 For Acholi men – as 
for Lugbara men - emphasis was put on control, and demonstrating responsibility 
through restraint. Whilst Chapter Six explores the production of female possession, this 
chapter has explored the broad parameters of possession in historical and contemporary 
times, and the wider social engagements of divine praxis.  It has suggested that an 
acceptance of possession pertains not to gendered essentialisms, but to the end results of 
how specific practices of possession are applied in everyday life. 
 
 
446 Middleton, ‘Spirit Mediumship among the Lugbara’, p.222. 
447 Barnes-Dean, ‘Lugbara illness beliefs’; King, ‘The Yakan Cult’  
448 S. Finnstrom, Gendered War and Rumours of Saddam Hussein in Uganda, Anthropology and Humanism, 34(1), 
pp.61-70, p.64 
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Allen explains that Christianity has reconciled the ambiguity in divine power, 
translating forces which were perceived as onzi into social forces.449 Yet, viewing 
expressions such as Yakan – or Christianity – as stable institutions neglects to consider 
the dynamics and partial ways expressions are experienced in rural communities. It also 
ignores how the intention of individuals is subject to continual scrutinty (Chapter Seven 
and Eight). As in the period prior to war, complex Christian practices are understood 
less as abstract theology, but in their relation to their complementarity with evolving 
patrilineal securities and individual repute. With reference to Revival, and Christian 
practice throughout the colonial period, activities were welcomed in so far as they 
supported mutuality, and challenged when converts challenged the moral order of the 
patrilineage too directly. As this chapter has shown, the aspirations of Christian 
converts have been gendered in relation to the relative social power of actors to vocalise 
particular moral ideals. 
 
Post-return charismatic revivals have increased the complexity with which global 
scripts of possession are localised into the grassroots. In the rural countryside, Lugbara 
people draw on ideas of Charismatic Christianity in vibrant ways, as prophets, 
intercessors and diviners, to provide protection, and sometimes to begin entirely new 
dini. Whilst this creative tapestry of divinely-inspired leaders may provide answers to 
people’s misfortunes, spirit-inspired directives can in themselves become a source of 
insecurity. Such questions are particularly pertinent in the realm of healing or religion, 
since these practices govern life and death. For elders who remain answerable to the 
health of their clans, at times, this can involve instigating violent policing. Fears are not 
 
449 Allen, ‘Understanding Alice’. 
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solely directed along gendered lines – both women and men who exhibit charismatic 
power in anti-social ways can be sent away. 
 
Discussing Middleton’s schema with Lugbara people, divisions between good and bad 
often elicited approval. One Lugbara elder confirmed, “Yes, there are good things and 
bad things”. Another elder explained, “It is not about philosophy, but about practical 
outcome.”450 Whereas Middleton understood states of good and bad to be oppositional, 
Lugbara people ascertain these verdicts on the basis of context and outcome. My 
interlocutors rarely debated the realities of power, but on how practice affects social 
well-being and health; whether prophets, diviners or pastors contributed or undermined 
tualu - mutuality. This is less of a struggle for cosmological balance or the ordering of 
specific categories, than a pursuit of life in relation to the human mediation of power. 
 
Rather than assuming gendered essentialisms as reflecting whether power is good or 
bad, this thesis contends that an acceptance of possession—both in the past and 
present—relies on its social outcome. Reaching into the past, at particular moments of 
crisis – including mass epidemics and wartime: dangerous and distant spiritual forces 
and human authorities were consulted since they remedied situations of affliction.  
During periods of relative stability - attaining cosmological balance depends on 
assessing how power is used by individual practitioners. Historically, the exercise of 
female possession and the suppression of male power exist side by side, but are related 
to the responsibilities and outcomes of how men and women have used power in 
relation to Adro or Mungu.  
 







This chapter has explored historical expressions of possession and charisma in West 
Nile. Moving beyond attempts to define or classify divine concepts, this chapter has 
used the prism of practice to show how popular participation has long provided a means 
for “marginal” social groups to make claims regarding healing, and to rearticulate moral 
ideals of being. Whilst practices of possession, performed in Yakan, and Christian 
Revivals echo through crisis and peacetime alike, crisis ushers in radical realignments 
of practice and moral norms, periods of peacetime reflect the need to restore moral-
spiritual balance through regulating the individual practice of power. Charismatic 
claims are limited and policied, according to their effects on tualu.  
 
Thus this chapter has argued that the social acceptance of possession is dependent not 
necessarily upon its gendering, but upon how the outcome of individual practice is 
assessed by observers, collectives, and crucially, relatives. Thus, in contravening 
particular norms—including rites of marriage and death, or in encouraging practices 
that promote ill-health—self-styled prophets and healers may be subject to evictions, if 
their practice occurs within the jurisdication of the clan.  
 
Continuing the exploration of suffering, cosmology, and repair in the present day, the 
next chapter now turns to the reconstitution of clan-based explanations for misfortune. 
Considering how elders have reconstituted their authority following return, adds further 
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Chapter Five 
E’yo that “follows”: the lingering world of moral affliction 
 
We still derive a lot from our social support systems which include our family and 
extended family, we wouldn’t want to harm anything that would be contrary to 
that… At the end of the day, if there is a problem, when you die—even with 
modern treatment—you will still be buried by your own people. When you are 
sick, you aren’t looked after by the government, you are looked after by your own 
people who come with those strong cultural values… it has tried to build some 




5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the evolution of explanations of misfortune befalling families and 
clans, and the role elders play in this process. If previous chapters provided historical 
and spiritual context for such acts, this analysis outlines changing contours of discipline 
and obligation that Lugbara elders offer in relation to sickness and misfortune in the 
present day. As suggested by the above quote offered by an Aruan doctor, care—
including end-of-life care—is often provided by relatives, not by the government. 
Whilst this doctor reifies such conditions as static “cultural values” common to a public 
health approach, this research shows how Lugbara elders have advanced specific 
explanations for and responses to misfortune since the return from exile.  
 
Explanations of elders revolve around tracing e’yo (words, or deeds), or failures of azi 
(work), as defined by normative clan visions of action and responsibility. In this realm, 
sickness follows a person because of who they are, and their relations to the living and 
 
451 I, Doctor, ARRH, 18/06/2017. 
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the dead. To use Meinert’s words, the effects of disturbances “haunt” relatives, 
irrespective of distance.452  
 
Previously, Chapter Three described how in the 1950s, individual afflictions were 
usually attributed to ancestral wrath, activated by the indignation of their elderly 
guardians. In the late colonial period, such efforts to manage affliction served 
simultaneously to heal social wounds engendered by offences, as well as to enforce 
disciplinary codes and affirm social hierarchies. Owing to the demands of the time, 
sickness was often related to the neglect of youthful male migrants. Subsequent studies 
have suggested that modern changes have eroded these internal mechanisms, and the 
explanatory power of clan elders regarding sickness.453  
 
Yet I argue that, on the contrary, clan elders—often accompanied by their sons who 
have taken bureaucratised titles as ‘clan leaders’— continue to be much invested in 
tracing and resolving misfortune. As Chapter Two illuminated, clan healing was a lived 
system of practice, whereby social events were debated in cases of sickness, and 
verdicts institutionalised through oracular consultation. This chapter argues that since 
the ancestral system was less about religious practices, and centrally about re-ordering 
and disciplining human relations, particular words and senior figures have continued to 
prove resilient both in the generation and resolution of misfortune.  
 
 
452 L. Meinert, ‘Haunted Families after the War in Uganda: Doubt as Polyvalent Critique’, Ethnos 85:4 (2020), pp. 
595-611, p. 595.  
453 Barnes-Dean, ‘Lugbara illness beliefs’. 
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Evolving explanations of misfortune point to the continuing importance of family and 
clan in ensuring fortune through rights, resources and care in the countryside. In 
addition to the regulation of conduct, these curses enforce social and economic 
obligations, such as encouraging financial transfers at marriage and death—reinforcing 
the normative boundaries of clan-based social fabrics that are increasingly challenged 
by modern changes and generational rifts. Yet at the same time as many Lugbara people 
assert the primacy of these structures, the realities of what Baines and Gauvin term the 
“bankruptcies of lineages and sub-clans” are continually made apparent.454  
 
This chapter begins by interrogating the notions that sickness may “follow” individuals, 
families and clans, describing a kind of shadow lineage of misfortune trailing the living 
members. Second, it goes on to describe three concepts applied to suffering: cursing, 
unpaid lineage transfers, and retributive acquisitions. Whilst many elders explained 
sickness as relating to particular social visions, this chapter finally explores how the 
idiom of “deciphering” such afflictions is currently in deep crisis.455 Amid increasing 
social fragmentation, and the limited social and financial investments of male clan 
members in tracing even critical afflictions, many cases remain left unattended. Within 
the fragilities of this system, other options are sought. 
 
5.2 Evolving Idioms: Misfortunes that “Follow” 
 
In cases of persistent affliction, many Lugbara explain that misfortune is “following” 
those individuals who suffer. Whilst Lugbara people accept that suffering can be caused 
 
454 E. Baines and L.R. Gauvin, ‘Motherhood and Social Repair after War and Displacement in Northern Uganda’, 
Journal of Refugee Studies 27:2 (2014), pp. 282–300, p. 291. 
455 Das, Affliction, p. 11. 
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by viruses, parasites, or infectious diseases, suffering can also be caused by words or 
curses brought about by one’s own actions, or even by antecedent actions of living or 
dead family members that “follow” the living and necessitate cleansing. A useful 
analogy to understand transformations in misfortune comes in Meinert and Grøn’s 
conceptualisation of “contagious kinship connections,” where “diseases and other 
phenomena can be transmitted either with or without physical contact, but are often 
implied in a social bond or connections”.456 Whilst relatives can provide health, 
security, and protection as care-givers and financial providers, social bonds can also 
breed misfortune.  
 
The logics and consequences of misfortune described here stem largely from family 
members connected through blood, descent or marriage, and are “sticky,” in that they 
are understood to remain with people throughout their lives. As Meinert and Grøn note, 
unlike friendship or business connections, blood ties cannot be abandoned or “cut 
completely,” and indeed the neglect that would constitute this severing could be a 
source of misfortune in itself.457 The transmission of sickness is thus independent of 
space between individuals: elders interviewed for this research described settlements 
demanding that implicated individuals return “home” from the USA, Europe or even 
just Kampala to address issues. Whilst proximity can engender misfortune, the cases 
described here involve the violation of social bonds rather than dangerous encounters or 
touches. Importantly, to attend to suffering involves interrogating one’s own actions and 
 
456 Meinert and Grøn, ‘It Runs in the Family’, pp. 581-2. 
457 ibid. p. 582. 
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moral position regarding marriages, deaths and inheritance—rather than physical 
contact.458  
 
As families today extend across space, so, too, do ideas about sickness extend through 
time. Since misfortunes can also follow generations, contagious relations remain 
significant beyond the lifespan of any individual or living generation. Accepting that 
suffering can “follow” families often necessitates an opening up of the intimacies of 
familial heritage: pertinent events could reside months or years in the past, or could 
arise from the misconduct of kin, false allegations, eviction of wives, unpaid funerary 
debts, or marriage dues residing several generations back in lineage history. Thus 
violations of past and present provide resources that serve as critical events to generate 
present misfortunes. “Haunting” of living family members persists until the event is 
brought out into the open and resolved before a ritual congregation.459 
 
In such cases of sickness, past histories of obligation or acts subject to examination can 
involve either descendants of one lineage or inter-lineage histories of marriage. Repair 
thus necessitates an open-ended “tracing” of the past, grounded in connections, but 
much evolved from the closed system Middleton described in the 1950s. If at that time 
ancestors were afforded the ability to affect and reverse sickness, and most cases 
concerned social violations or disputes among the living, today Lugbara people view 
suffering through an expanded social landscape of possible sources—particularly 
though histories of marriage, which through the transfer of bridewealth engenders 
obligations between different clans. Misfortune can be generated by unfulfilled 
 
458 Cases of poisoning also follow inheritance. Whilst attacks are said to result from eating, abilities to poison are 
said to be inherited in the lineage (cf. Chapter Nine). 
459 Meinert and Grøn, ‘It Runs in the Family’, p. 4. 
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obligations of the living, but also in relation to the past. The souls of one’s ancestors do 
remain significant in that their discontent continues to be understood in relation to 
mystical sickness, which flows through blood ties, affecting living generations. In such 
cases, misfortune affects not just an individual, but “follows” family members, or 
members of entire clans. The gradual accumulation of misfortunes contributes to 
awareness of “something being not quite right.”460  
 
Whilst among Lugbara populations particular ideas about spirits and witchcraft have 
now been codified by the Christian church, forms of sickness discussed here continue to 
be described by a human vocabulary, often using the names of the relatives involved. 
Evading the imprint of Christian translations, sickness in this realm is not referred to as 
emanating from orindi (spirits) or witchcraft. Issues are often referred to as e’yo (words) 
“spoken against us,” or alternatively from unpaid obligations, e.g., “this sickness results 
from bridewealth.” The vocabulary comes from suru, and sickness is explicitly spoken 
of with reference to the unique relationship—the disturbed relation or rite—of each 
case. Certainly, the incidence of critical events—particularly unpaid dues and undone 
funerary rites—is indelibly entangled in circumstances of war and economic hardship 
that makes fulfilling these obligations difficult. But afflictions that “follow” emanate 
from the way in which external events have imprinted themselves upon human 
obligations between families: misfortune both describes, and is described by, reference 
to intimate relations.  
  
 
460 Das, Affliction, p. 1. 
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In the cases I documented, the forms of suffering under enquiry included: persistent or 
continuous affliction that evaded medical treatment, reproductive disorders, and 
generalised misfortunes. Das’s description of categories of affliction that flow through 
the everyday—becoming absorbed into daily life, whilst marking it with a sense of 
“foreboding”—well encapsulates how this sense manifested among my interlocutors.461 
At times, conditions can become critical, and on occasion, deaths could be attributed to 
underlying problems.  
 
For Lugbara people, suffering itself is often relational, involving the patterning of these 
events across groups of relations: within homes, families, or across entire clans. 
Individual cases of affliction were less significant than collective patterns: elders speak 
of individual affliction within the framework of collectives, namely, that “misfortunes 
are befalling us” (emphasis mine). At their core, states of affliction have a relative 
dimension: this sense of collective suffering accounts for the omission of these ideas 
from previous studies that have focused on individual patient pathways.462 Powerful 
underlying anxieties and unease are gradually confirmed or neglected as cases of 
misfortune accrue, or fail to manifest, in particular families.  
 
This distribution of sickness is not considered random; rather it directs an enquiry into 
the appropriate level of the past. In cases where families suffer (specifically women and 
children), the answer may lie in marriage settlements. Where entire clans suffer 
misfortune, then funerary rites or other events of the past may be implicated. Curses, for 
 
461 ibid. p. 19. 
462 For example, Barnes-Dean, ‘Lugbara illness beliefs’. 
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example, can affect clans across generations, flowing through the lineage until brought 
out and resolved. Though clans retain a monopoly on managing most sicknesses that 
“follow”, ideas of family haunting are borrowed from an array of specialists, and 
respond to real and perceived changes in both the distribution of affliction, and ways of 
explaining it within an increasingly plural diagnostic context.  
 
5.2.1 Patterns of Affliction  
 
Ideas about sickness following blood descent have been deeply influenced by observed 
patterns of sickness and mortality, following the return from exile. Many informants 
recounted that, in the two decades following return, new patterns of death emerged, 
wherein family members perished one by one. Whilst little is known about HIV/AIDS 
prevalence among Lugbara populations, Allen notes the overrepresentation of southern 
Ugandan within surveys of national prevalence, with 15 or 21 sentinel sites used up to 
the mid-1990s being located in the south and central regions of the country.463 Yet given 
national trends, it is likely that patterns of mortality clustered around families were 
caused by AIDS. One survey, led by Makerere scholars across the North in Arua, Soroti 
and Lira, reported high rates of AIDS-mortality among Lugbara respondents. Recorded 
mortality was significantly higher in Arua than in the other study sites: Arua (26.9%), 
whilst (9.7%) in Soroti or 12.9%) in Lira.464 This high prevalence was linked by 
scholars both to the commercial boom that flourished during relative peace post-war, as 
well as to the marriage of women to soldiers. The survey reported AIDS mortality was 
 
463 T. Allen, ‘AIDS and evidence: interrogating [corrected] some Ugandan myths’, Journal of Biosocial Science 38:1 
(2006), pp. 7-28, p. 9.  
464 N. Ayiga, et al., ‘Causes, patterns, differentials and consequences of AIDS mortality in Northern Uganda’, The 
Continuing African HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 1999, pp. 139-154, p. 146.  
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highest in “unstable marriages”, where the couple cohabited but were not formally 
married, and where bridewealth had not been transferred.465 Death was thus interpreted 
in contexts were normative social relations were unfulfilled, presented simultaneously 
as a medical and moral crisis. 
 
In the present research, interviewees remembered that HIV/AIDS was recognised in 
Arua District beginning in the late 1980s. One former Community Health worker turned 
Anglican pastor, who worked at the first testing clinic set up by an American doctor, 
explained that these understandings emerged as testing was introduced in the district.466 
Knowledge of HIV/AIDS does not match the arrival of the disease in the district, but 
rather the beginning of biomedical understandings of disease.467 Prior to this moment—
and throughout the 1990s, before ARVs became available—the interviewee reported 
that these deaths, now presumed to be from AIDS, were previously attributed to 
witchcraft, as well as to curses and unpaid bridewealth that were said to follow families: 
When HIV/AIDS started in West Nile, the population didn’t know anything 
about it. They looked at it as witchcraft, being bewitched—that is how they 
looked at it. Even when they were tested, and told that they have the virus, they 
never believed and they still continued to look for ways of healing, because it 
was a new thing, and they never believed it. For those who believed it, they were 
traumatised. They didn’t want to be identified as people who had this problem. 
Because the beginning of HIV, it is changing its way—in the beginning it would 
only take about 6 months for somebody to die… They resorted to traditional sort 
of things—if they will see, for example, your mother’s dowry was not paid, that 
is why the uncles are talking—they will also go to the witchdoctor, who would 
tell them a different story. They looked it as a curse, more especially from their 
uncles, their unpaid debts. It caused them a lot of things, they attributed it to 
other things.468 
 
465 ibid. p. 145. 
466 I, Anglican Pastor/CHW, Ediofe, 14/06/2017. 
467 In a similar way, a 1991 survey in Moyo reported that 90% of respondents knew of HIV/AIDS, which when 
compared to Allen’s report that HIV/AIDS remained low even by the mid-1980s, suggest that a rapid uptake of 
public health messaging was slow to arrive in the West Nile region. 
468 I, Anglican Pastor/ CHW, Ediofe, 14/06 2017. In a similar way, during the present research, when Hepatitis-B 
testing arrived in the region, suffering related to imbalanced relations shifted in relation to a positive diagnosis of 
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In other contexts, anthropologists and public health scholars have linked the dramatic 
death increase from AIDS to a rise in perceptions of witchcraft, or to shifting ideas of 
occult forces. In Chiawa, Zambia, Yamba explains that witchcraft—and witch-
finding—provided a means for rural Africans to comprehend increasing death rates. He 
argues that efforts to explain excess mortality within families threw “cosmologies in 
turmoil”, culminating in killings by a witchfinder.469 Explanations mediated by local 
institutions can take on surprising forms: Behrend too links the rise of “cannibalism”, 
and efforts to purge witches associated with its practice, to the rise of Charismatic 
Catholic lay movements, whose activities bore new resonance amidst economic decline, 
state corruptions and mass death. She elucidates the dialectic relationship between the 
sense of panic from death and the production of explanation: “when the death rate is 
rising, this shifting of responsibility and guilt to the interior of communities increases 
discord, hatred and fear, sometimes to an unbearable extent.”470 In essence, the 
anthropological evidence suggests that across African contexts, people search for 
meaning in suffering through idioms of responsibility, idioms that have often 
transformed in relation to mass mortality from AIDS. 
 
Among Lugbara populations, these tragedies have been linked to the production of new 
explanations under the guise of “spirit[s] which follow families” (Cf. Chapter Seven), 
but simultaneously, familial suffering has also been linked to the reassertion of older 
 
Hepatitis-B. As indicative of shifts to public health medicine, Hepatitis-B was understood through the prism of 
HIV/AIDS, and was said to be “worse than HIV”. 
469 C.B. Yamba, ‘Cosmologies in turmoil: witchfinding and AIDS in Chiawa, Xambia’, Africa 67:2 (1997), pp. 200-223, 
p. 200. 
470 H. Behrend. ‘The Rise of Occult Powers, AIDS and the Roman Catholic Church in Western Uganda’, Journal of 
Religion in Africa 37:1 (2007), pp. 41-58, p. 46. 
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ideas of curses. Cheney argues that AIDS has had particular effects on understandings 
of kinship and the significance of “blood as a bodily substance of everyday 
significance”.471 In this way, experiences of the late 1980s have affected understandings 
of contagion and family connections well into the present day. Since clan elders remain 
arbiters of explaining suffering and death, it is perhaps not surprising that explanations 
connected to curses and bridewealth regarding the extinction of clans pre-war—rather 
than witchcraft or poisoning, a charge of which many elders are reluctant to speak 
openly without evidence—began to be asserted in relation to deaths. Allen makes more 
direct links: in Moyo, he suggests that the same village councils who had earlier been 
involved in mediating debates about bridewealth, and sanctioning the eviction of 
women accused of poisoning, were involved in HIV/AIDS interventions. Perhaps 
because of this, inyinya was used interchangeably to describe deaths from AIDS and 
poisoning in the 1990s. Sanctioning the activities of councils which had been involved 
in the exclusion of women, and in reinforcing conservative norms, served to invigorate 
local institutions and understandings of affliction in unexpected ways.472 In a similar 
way, Lugbara elders, in seeking to explain tragedies, leant on an established vocabulary 
of explanation. 
 
At burials, if deaths are believed to be caused by AIDS, this would not be publicly 
revealed. Death from the disease continues to carry social stigma, in part because of the 
manner in which transmission is explained through government, NGO and church-led 
 
471 K. Cheney. ‘’Blood Always Finds a Way Home’: AIDS Orphanhood and the Transformation of Kinship, Fosterage, 
and Children’s Circulation Strategies in Uganda’, in Childhood, Youth and Migration (Children’s Well-Being: 
Indicators and Research book series, CHIR volume 12). Switzerland: Springer International: pp. 245-259, p. 
245. 
472 Allen, ‘AIDS and evidence’. 
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public health campaigns. During the period of this research, contracting HIV was 
continually tied to non-monogamous sexual behaviours, with campaigns warning of the 
dangers of intimate relations, and encouraging tests even within marriage. Yet, since 
2003 anti-retroviral therapies have been cheaply and widely available from NGOs and 
clinics.473 As the aforementioned informant put it, “In the beginning it would only take 
about 6 months for somebody to die. But I am surprised that today people are staying 
with it, because many of those who were tested positive in the 1990’s are still alive 
today.”474 As ARVs became available, as across Uganda, in West Nile people stopped 
dying from AIDS in such dramatic numbers.475 Yet, post-war changing patterns of 
mortality continue to shape understandings of contagion. During the present research, 
deaths from a host of known biomedical conditions, including AIDS, malaria, hepatitis 
B and brucellosis, continue to be discussed in terms of something following the living. 
Explanation developed in relation to mass mortality in the 1990s retain relevance in 
explain sickness among the living (and in some cases, deaths).  
 
5.2.2 Linking Family to Affliction  
Other actors have participated in ideas of contagion flowing between extended family 
relations. On the one hand, searching through “family histories” directly parallels 
clinical and psychiatric practice. One mental health practitioner explained how when 
patients are admitted to Arua’s sole psychiatric facility, patient histories are taken that 
go back many generations. Many of those admitted, he noted, return home to search 
 
473 S.R. Whyte, Second Changes: Surviving AIDS in Uganda. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2014. 
474 I, Obanya James, Anglican Pastor/CHW, Ediofe, 14/06/2017, English. 
475 As indicative of the power of this life-saving medicine, during the 2016 election, one Maracha resident told me 
that people voted for Museveni believing he would personally supply the region with ‘life-saving ARVs’. Should he 
not be elected, residents were worried the supply of medicines would stop.  
 218 
through family histories for curses and other sources of trouble: “[Patients] will really 
dig, they will dig and dig.”476 Yet whilst doctors and nurses adopted this mode of 
questioning in reference to histories of family mental illness or “stressors” linked to 
family breakdown, this doctor suggested that “75% of the patients we admit will 
attribute the cause of their problems to some traditional problems… ‘this is happening 
to my child, my father, my brother, because of a break in traditional norms’, which 
often included unpaid bridewealth or avuti, problems during funerary rites or curses”. 
Accordingly, this doctor suggested that even if medications were offered, most patients 
returned home to manage their illness.477  
  
Other actors too have advanced explanations of inter-generational misfortune. Christian 
actors often explain misfortune with reference to fragmented family units, and lack of 
adherence to obligations within the nuclear family structure. Accordingly, many 
Christian actors have adopted family-based approaches to therapy, emphasising 
connections between broken relationships and suffering. Given the emphasis on the 
nuclear family and the primacy of the family unit, many clergy identify familial 
fragmentation as the root of misfortune. One renowned Anglican healer, Kefaloli, noted 
that if people came to him with suffering, he would dig through their family history. He 
explained:  
What I have discovered is [that] listening is a therapy. People talk about their 
experiences. You begin to realise—can this be demonic? Did you go for 
treatment? Do you get bad dreams? Can you give me your life background—
some are orphans, others want to go to school but are constrained financially, 
broken relationships are a key thing, it affects the whole family, mother 
abandoned the children, one of them passes on—they’ll need healing.478 
 
 
476 I, Medical Doctor at ARRH, 18/06/17 
477 ibid.; see also Verginer and Juen, ‘Spiritual Explanatory Models’. 
478 I, Reverend Kefaloli, Ambiriambati Church (Arua), 16/06/2017. 
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Other actors make more even direct links between family ties and the inheritance of 
spiritual contagion. Charismatic Catholics assert that orindi (spirits) can linger in 
lineages, and that younger generations can suffer from the behaviour of their dead 
ancestors. In recent years, priests have offered specific therapies to target negative 
influences hidden in the “Family Tree” (described later in this chapter). Sessions 
involve extended families coming together to retell intimate histories, mimicking forms 
of collective discussion within clans, and using prayerful revelation to uncover acts that 
lie beyond the memory of those present. Ironically, these therapies often critique the 
tenets of normative clan processes, for example equating bridewealth payments to 
extortion and greed, as well as attacking the ritual authority of elders, declaiming curses 
as “satanic behaviour.” Overall, this therapy only reinforces ideas that the intimate 
familial past could be a reservoir of potential “roots” for misfortune. As one CCR priest 
at the Bethany Centre explained, “as grandchildren we are going through certain 
misfortunes, which are in our history… younger generations are “standing on” the acts 
and deeds of the great-grandparents.”479 According to this line of enquiry, misfortune is 
inherited “in the blood.” Though the process rescripts the agents and forms of 
reparations involved, this process represents a local innovation of global CCR practice, 
even as it mirrors clan traditions of tracing and resolving misfortune.  
 
Crucially, however, clan elders remain the prime agents for cleaning sicknesses that 
follow: since they are the arbiters of intimate histories in which explanation resides. 
This chapter now examines the explanations attributed to misfortune, and places them in 
the context of changing notions of custom and political-economic conditions. 
 
479 I, Father, Bethany, 16/05/2017. 
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5.3 Sources of Misfortune 
 
5.3.1 Generating Misfortune: Cursing 
 
When elders spoke of “issues” related to misfortune, they often used the term e’yo, 
which stands for ‘word’, but also ‘deed’ or ‘action’. If Lugbara people continue to turn 
to elders to explain their suffering, it is in part because they live in a social world where 
words themselves govern prospects for well-being. Like kinship relations, which hold 
the potential for both health and misfortune, so too can words, used in particular 
contexts, denote dual states of fortune and misfortune. This opposition finds its clearest 
expression in the outcomes of blessings and curses.480 According to the Lugbara 
theologian Obetia, “The two go together. A curse is the direct opposite of a blessing, 
having the same source and purpose: the promotion of right order for the good of all”.481 
Whilst blessings at critical life events are believed to promote rota (prosperity), curses 
can denote sickness and wider suffering.482 Curses are said to come from God, 
legitimate when their utterance follows mistreatment, violence or social violations—
acts that threaten mutuality, support and peace. In the colonial period, curses followed 
significant events such as feuds or non-payment of bridewealth, invoking a state of 
persistent pollution (nyoka) affecting an entire clan, and requiring collective rites to 
cleanse the territory.483 My interlocutors emphasised the primacy of curses as governing 
everyday behaviour. As with Finnström’s discussion of cursing in the Acholi context, 
 
480 Blessings are connoted by dri tiza, or asi ndrizafeza, literally, ‘to give good heart’. 
481 J. Obetia, Worship and Christian Identity in Uganda: a study of the contextualization of worship in the Anglican, 
Roman Catholic and Independent Churches in the West Nile and Kampala areas of Uganda. PhD Thesis, School of 
Theology & Religious Studies, University of Leeds, 2008. pp. 91-2. 
482 Curses are known as atrita in Ayivu/Terego, and katri in Maracha.  
483 Obetia, Worship and Christian Identity in Uganda, p. 106.  
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curses function to preserve a collective moral order, at moments when normative ideas 
of respect, care and propriety are threatened by individual misbehaviour.484  
 
Theoretically, the power to curse is vested in any individual who has been wrongly 
mistreated. One elder summarised: “Sicknesses are repercussions for mistreatment; if 
you are mistreated with no cause there is always a repercussion.”485 But curses are 
usually understood to follow violations of care or material support within a family unit, 
or violations of peace and internal security within a clan. In the context of a household, 
a curse may be placed upon a husband who fails to provide for his wife or children, who 
abandons the home, or who wrongly sends a wife away from a marriage. Curses can be 
uttered in everyday life, or take the form of direct protestation. In cases of neglect, 
children may curse their father, claiming: “You are the head of the family, the man, but 
you don’t like the girls in the family. These girls will curse—‘In future you should not 
like any girl, you should treat them the same way you have been mistreating us.’”486 
Similarly, if abandoned by her husband, a woman can decry: “In case you marry 
another woman, you should treat them the same way you have treated me.” Spoken 
outright, these phrases refer to future prosperity, stating that poor treatment will come 
back to haunt its instigator. Curses follow failures to uphold normative responsibilities 
of care and support.  
 
Within this framework, the power of cursing is vested in the vulnerable as well as the 
powerful: Obetia explains that the curses of women and minors have power precisely 
 
484 Finnström, ‘Wars of the Past and Present’, p. 208 
485 FG, Elders, Tara, 11/10/20126 (OJ). 
486 I, Elder, Aroi, 28/10/2017 (OJ). 
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because of their marginal position.487 Curses of this nature can manifest as any 
continuous form of suffering, or afflictions including general weakness, sores, swelling, 
leprosy or madness. Yet the enactment of everyday curses—even in response to 
neglect—is shrouded in ambiguity. Whether or not a curse is enacted depends on the 
emotions and intentions of its utterer: someone with a “good heart” – or who identifies 
as a Saved Christian – is said to utter “good words”. Depending on the personalities 
discussed, the same mistreatment may or may not result in misfortune. Further 
ambiguity in this dynamic is found in Christian theology, whose evangelists condemn 
cursing. Instead, this theology holds, Christians should practice forgiveness, or “turn the 
other cheek” without seeking material redress for mistreatment. 
 
Though the ability of anyone to curse is widely acknowledged, particular significance is 
afforded to curses uttered by elderly men. Elders in Ayivu and Maracha explained that 
ritual curses, which are unambiguously understood to cause sickness, became more 
frequent in the early years of independence. Prior to this period, curses were used in 
extra-familial matters, such as feuds or non-payment of bridewealth, but in the 1960s, 
elders recalibrated their moral authority in relation to internal affairs.488 Cursing was a 
punishment for “wrong acts” in which the offending individual (usually a junior son) 
had been warned, but had chosen to ignore the words and direction of his elders. For 
Lugbara elders, the increasing enactment of ritual curses from the 1960s on reflected 
very real fears that the social fabric was threatened by neglect and anti-social 
behaviours, as young men garnered increasing freedom from traditional lineage 
responsibilities. Around this time, Dalfovo reported Lugbara people explained sickness 
 
487 Obetia, Worship and Christian Identity in Uganda, p. 106. 
488 As discussed in the introduction, curses can also be effected beyond the lineage. Their use in novel political 
contexts represents the extension of intimate worlds outwards.  
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as bati (sickness ‘from the mouth’). Elders continued to direct sickness towards labour 
migrants who returned home for a sacrificial meal, where elders stressed the importance 
of “not forgetting those at home.”489 
 
Today, whilst informal utterance or “pain in the hearts” of elders can be related to a 
curse, curses usually require a ritual sitting in which elders gather and the implicated 
individual sits “under the sun”: surrounded by a quorum of elders from across relevant 
clans.490 Curses are spoken bluntly, and contain a strong futurate element: [If truly you 
have done this], oli ma nda mi (‘the wind will follow you’) or “you should not make the 
sun to burn them”.491 Curses of this sort can result in death or madness, the logic being 
that the offender is forced to retreat from communal life. Another elder illuminated this 
dimension by noting: “With the curse, you are not really living, you are dead. You are 
not a person.”492  
 
As Whyte notes, the effects of curses are shrouded in uncertainty.493 Today, again, 
many elders accept that curses lack their former power, and the consequences take great 
time to manifest. Yet in exceptional circumstances, ritual curses continue. During this 
research I witnessed and recorded curses being delivered in cases of suspected adultery, 
land-grabbing and witchcraft. In all these cases warnings had been previously offered, 
and few alternative measures were available. Curses are sometimes referred to as rudu 
(prayers), and delivered in contexts where guilt or innocence is suspected but cannot be 
 
489 Dalfovo, ‘Lugbara Ancestors’, p. 499. 
490 FG, Araka, 13/03/2017 (OJ). 
491 I, Woman, Druyer, 12/05/2016; Adultery Case, Maracha, March 2017. 
492 I, Tara, Elder, 13/10/2016 (OJ). 
493 Whyte, Questioning Misfortune, p. 172. 
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proved through evidence.494 In cases of witchcraft, community suspicions of a suspect 
are often overwhelming, but clan members acknowledge there is little material proof 
that can be directed to the local state. Similar issues of “concrete proof” arise in cases of 
adultery, where communities may have been surveying and discussing activities of the 
women involved (male adultery not being considered an offence), but the offending 
couple have not been “caught in the act.” The curse thus functions as an ordeal: whether 
an elder’s words manifest in sickness becomes proof of guilt: if indeed the accused is 
guilty, it is thought they will run mad or even die. If they are not guilty, then the test 
rebounds on the accuser, which can be either an individual or a clan.  
 
Similarly, the enactment of curses today is often contested, with Christian evangelists 
condemning their use. Indeed, while rozu was once widely translated as “curse,” some 
Christian leaders translated the term as “to bewitch”.495 This shift in language is 
important, as it removes the morally normalizing nature of cursing integral to elders’ 
conceptions, instead moving the act to the immoral realm of witchcraft, where sickness 
is activated arbitrarily, or from envy and individualism. This inscription accounts as 
well for the shift to regarding sickness as ba ti (sickness ‘from the mouth’), indicative of 
the Christian imprint on local translations and on the use of Lugbarati terms: what were 
once simply words are now curses.  
 
The following account from a land dispute in Terego elucidates how these contestations 
structure the enactment of ritual curses. The land of the first speaker, Isrome, had been 
 
494 Rudu was formerly the name of a fertility shrine (certainly for clans of Maracha), indicating its power over social 
reproduction. 
495 I, Aruan, 20/04/2016. 
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“grabbed” by a neighbouring family, who had been granted the plot for safety during 
the war.496 It was widely accepted that Isrome’s land had been encroached upon, 
following formal rulings and sittings of elders and government courts over a period of 
more than a decade. Yet Isrome continued to be threatened by the occupying party. 
After a sitting convened by both parties in the presence of local government officials 
failed to provide a resolution, Isrome, a church teacher, voiced using a curse as an 
option, since all other routes had failed. As the two parties were different sub-clans of a 
wider clan, this curse would be convened ritually, by an elder with overall authority for 
both lineages. This was met by contestation:  
ISROME: There is nothing I can say now because I'm on target to be killed by 
the people who want to grab my land. [Isrome then opens a Bible and reads 
Numbers 27: 5-11. After he finishes reading the passage, he resumes speaking]. 
If my land is not given to me now let them wait for curse; I’ll call my elders to 
come and curse. 
 
LCIII: The church people don’t talk about curse, if you take curse to work 
within a clan, there will be death here. I would suggest this land should remain 
for Isrome. 
 
Police woman: I'm requesting you, Isrome, not to use curse as a solution. This 
meeting started with prayers; let’s end in a way we started, in good faith. I will 
not come again for another meeting over this land; if you want violence, go 
ahead, if you need peace, let’s find it. I'm requesting the OC to advise in this 
matter, much as it’s not a police case.497 
 
Isrome here appeals to an overall ritual elder to deliver a curse, legitimating the practice 
through referencing the Bible, yet he is countered by the sub-county LCIII acting as a 
witness, who distances himself from the curse. Importantly, however, in rejecting the 
action neither party denies the power of the curse, instead rejecting it on moral grounds 
precisely because these curses can confer death. With Christian discourse providing a 
 
496 I, Elder, Terego, 02/06/2017 (OJ). 
497 Land dispute, Terego, June 2017. 
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stage for the curse to be debated between these two parties, it is clear that these 
utterances retain their power—even if, in this case, no curse was ultimately delivered. 
As with the ancestral explanation, notions of cursing are positioned in ever-evolving 
debates over propriety and the relationship between human power and sickness. 
Christians tie the performance of these words to the moral status of their utterer. 
 
Curses are believed to follow members of a lineage beyond the implicated individual, 
flowing through successive generations until living clan members collectively right the 
wrongs of the past. In this way, living members of a lineage are bound to the actions of 
their dead relatives, with curses tied to patterns of suffering and even premature deaths 
that affect both women and men. In such cases, elders must sit and trace through 
histories of their lineage to pinpoint the source of misfortune in the present. Misfortunes 
will continue until the parties come together to eat, and speak words to put the issue to 
rest. When such reparations are made, suturing the social fabric of the present is 
instigated by remembering the past. 
 
Curses are also found in sifting through histories of obligation, identifying potential 
sources of violation: often, the mistreatment of women, specifically their eviction from 
the clan. In one Maracha clan, following a spate of collective misfortunes and the 
suicide of a husband, elders sat multiple times before uncovering the wrongful eviction 
of a woman, Nyapio, who had married into the clan many generations beforehand. 
Wrongfully evicted, Nyapio died in the wilderness—and on account of her 
mistreatment, her people cursed the members of Luge, since the obligations to protect a 
woman who had married into the clan had been violated. Nyapio’s great-grandchildren 
were suffering for these actions. In this case, the delegation organised funerary rights 
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and payments to be made to the living maternal uncles: “The real ones are dead, [but] 
the lineage of uncles still remains”.498 Following Jeater’s observation in the context of 
Zimbabwean retributive spirits, “the claim is, in effect, a claim for the lineage, not the 
individual, to be reimbursed”.499 By making amends for the past, this Lugbara clan 
repaired the social wounds with living members of Nyapio’s lineage.  
 
5.3.2 Clan Transfers and Debts 
 
Beyond considering internal disciplinary procedures, elders were also preoccupied with 
affliction born out of unpaid transfers and debts, from marriages (contemporary or 
historic), deaths or fines—in short, tracing misfortune from inter-clan obligations. As 
one young professional in Arua explained, “We have inherited debts… but as brothers 
and sons we are going to pay—otherwise it will affect my children.”500 Crucially, clans 
are involved not just in remedying misfortunes wrought by misbehaviour, but by the 
failure of members to effect obligated transfers at marriages and deaths. Such 
obligations bind entire clans together, and so relatives across suru can suffer from their 
absence of fulfillment. In this way, misfortune provides an occasion for elders to debate 
not just internal histories but external ones, including histories of unfulfilled agreements 
between sub-clans.  
Normative conceptions of Lugbara society rest on the fulfilment of particular 
obligations. As discussed briefly in Chapter Two, the most central transfer is ali 
(bridewealth), transferred from the husband’s people to the wife’s people after marriage. 
Since bridewealth represents the transfer of a woman’s reproductive rights to the 
 
498 I, Male Catholic, Arua, 28/03/2017. 
499 Jeater and Mashinge Jr., ‘Can’t pay, won’t pay’, p. 269. 
500 I, Male Catholic, Arua, 28/03/2017. 
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husband’s clan, cases wherein a married woman fails to conceive, experiences a 
difficult delivery, or suffers more generally in marriage are all interpreted as signs of 
uncles’ discontent at outstanding payments. Misfortune here thus effects the 
reproductive life of the clan. As one elder explained: “The miraculous thing is that you 
will not die: you will be very thin, but that curse cannot kill you.”501 In cases where ali 
is unpaid, sickness is said to result from the onata (grumbling), rather than curses, of the 
wife’s maternal uncles. This group of men is spoken of collectively as adro/adropi, 
invoking connection with the divinity and their power with regards to sickness.502 Since 
it is these men who “eat the ali” in the transfer, their words have particular power in 
contesting its absence.503 In this instance, the mechanism of sickness is rarely translated 
as ‘curse’, but rather ‘grumbling,’ signifying the moral legitimacy of the claim. Indeed, 
even the most devout Christians interviewed on this matter affirmed the importance of 
bridewealth.  
Though bridewealth is defended as “traditional,” appearing even in Lugbara origin 
myths, its requirements have transformed according to changing times. Though one bull 
as the price of bridewealth has remained constant (ali literally means “bull of 
seduction”), other costs have fluctuated according to government policies and economic 
pressures. In precolonial times, wealth was expressed in animals: one elder recalled that 
in pre-colonial times the bridewealth transfers of his great-grandfather had been levied 
 
501 I, Elder, Aroi, 14/05/2016 (OJ). 
502 In a similar vein, misfortunes are said to accrue to children who grow up with their maternal uncles (with their 
mother’s people), rather than their paternal relatives. My co-worker explained: “In such cases, things don’t happen 
in a normal way, they normally say ‘It is the curse of the maternal uncles’ adro ti - You have grown from their place, 
eaten their food, there is an expectation” (fieldnotes, June 2016). There is a sense that children have grown out of 
place according to the patrilineage, and that the improper investment of resources has generated misfortune. 
503 Any improper procedure connected to transfer of bridewealth can result in sickness. Today, if clansmen cannot 
attend the eating of the ali, uncooked meat is often ferried to them over long distances. One assistant commented 
that “meat” would be the most controversial topic to research in Arua.  
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at twelve cows, twelve goats, and 300 arrows, a sign of great prestige.504 During the 
early colonial period, rising costs and rinderpest outbreaks undoubtedly made such 
levels difficult to sustain, reportedly resulting in inter-clan feuds. Such revolts were 
quashed by Protectorate officials through fines: acting on visions of law and order, 
transfers were capped at three cows, two goats, and six cents.505 These restrictions 
seemed to have little impact, however, as one elder explained that it was common for 
ten cows to be given in the late colonial period.506 
 
War and post-independence upheavals presented further barriers. Many elders explained 
that they lost animals during their flights into exile or at the hands of the Congolese 
authorities, animals that were never regained. Others explained that “people just 
married” away from the clan, without formalising the union in the conventional 
sense.507 Recognising the difficulties presented by these experiences, following the 
return from exile it became commonplace to transfer animals more slowly, over longer 
timeframes. A popular contemporaryLugbara saying encapsulates this change: “even a 
poor man can marry”, an inversion of the older proverb, “a person without cattle 
remains unmarried”.508  
 
Whilst bridewealth is legitimated on the basis of social peace and the reproductive 
health of the clan, animals remain an important source of wealth, and inter-clan 
 
504 I6, Elder, Abrici, 09/06/2017 (OJ). 
505 These restrictions probably pertained as well to the desires of officials to protect their own taxation plans, since 
many labour migrants spent returning cash on bridewealth contributions. 
506 I2, woman, Abrici, 25/09/2016 (OJ); I2, Leader, Maracha, 26/09/2016. Confirmed also by Middleton’s field notes. 
507 FG, Terego Elders, 08/06/2016 (OJ). Additionally, I recorded two instances where forced marriages were 
arranged by boys’ fathers, since their cattle were threatened by war. 
508 Dalfovo, ‘Lugbara Proverbs and Ethics’, p.47. 
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transfers are an important means of sustaining rural communities.509 Since return, the 
number of animals required for ali has continued to rise, and is the subject of often-
tense negotiations during aje (the act of negotiating and paying bridewealth) between 
the male relatives of the husband and wife. Settlements today include heads of cattle, 
goats, and chickens, as well as money to recoup school fees and the loss of labour for 
the wife’s clan.510 An additional sum of cash, remarkably called ‘malaria’, is often 
added to recoup the costs a girl’s family has spent on her healthcare.511 One Maracha 
clan offered this brazen explanation as to misfortune’s relation to unpaid dues: “The 
words people utter cause that sickness. Their complaining—each time your daughter is 
taken and nothing is given for her. Yet you laboured to bring her up—all this talk can 
make her sick, generally people will not be feeling happy; they will be grumbling.”512 
Since it costs money to raise a girl, to recoup these expenses, clans negotiate 
increasingly high rates of bridewealth.  
 
Given their import to the reproductive life of clans, bridewealth transfers are 
particularly sensitive matters, as are unpaid transfers at female deaths, known as avuta. 
Conventionally this takes the form of one cow, which is transferred from the clan of the 
husband to the clan of the wife after her death, to compensate for the loss of their 
daughter. This transfer, which has remained constant throughout the 20th century, 
 
509 Contrary to the stance of much recent policy literature drawing attention to the links between bridewealth, the 
commoditisation of women, and abuse, for example: G. Hague, R.K. Thiara, and A. Turner, ‘Brideprice and its links 
to domestic violence and poverty in Uganda: A participatory action research study’, Women’s Studies International 
Forum 34:6 (2011), pp. 550-561. 
510 N.B. Gormley, Mission and development: imagined spaces for women, PhD Thesis, Department of Geography, 
University of Edinburgh, 1998, p. 155. 
511 ibid. 
512 FG, Nyarire, 20/06 2016 (OJ/AC). The words spoken at here were considered blunt; rarely are processes couched 
in such overtly transactional terms. 
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effectively symbolises harmony between clans at death. The following example of a 
young man from Ayivu illustrates the practice:  
In my lineage, my father has failed to settle in marriage. My mother has given 
birth to six of us, but they separated in the 1978 liberation war. Since then he got 
married, but he can’t stay well. I was raised by my father, my mother got 
married again. She comes from Congo side, my father comes from Uganda 
side—the war contributed so much. When they separated, my mother got 
married to another person, they had one person but that person died…  
 
Traditionally, when they don’t clear certain [transfers]—when I marry here and 
when she dies and I don’t pay, I don’t give a token of appreciation in the form of 
cows—I think my father hasn’t done something similar like that on their side. 
Avuta has to be paid. This issue has not come up, we are going to pay the 
avuta—my father isn’t able—but as brothers and sons we are going to pay, 
otherwise it will affect my children… we have inherited debts.513 
 
In this instance, having inherited the debts of their parents, men within a sub-clan had 
rallied to raise animals to settle those debts, and to restore good relations between clans. 
In this example, affluent members of the clan had taken it upon themselves to raise the 
avuta to remedy the past. In so doing, it is important to note that clansmen act not just to 
remedy the past but also to halt the progression of suffering which they believe will 
affect future generations. Also recorded in debts of this kind were historic fines levied 
on men for committing violence or neglecting their wives: on such occasions, if 
bridewealth has been paid, a woman may appeal to her relatives for a sitting. At such a 
sitting, the wife’s elders levy fines on the husband depending on the level of 
mistreatment. If they remain unpaid, elders explain that these debts can follow the 
living, bringing sickness and death. Though these situations can present elders (and 
invested junior clansmen) with significant costs, enacting such settlements was 
explained as a means of pursuing inter-communal reconciliation, putting right the social 
wounds of the past to remedy suffering in the present.  
 
513 I, Male Catholic, Arua, 29/03/2017. 
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Today, the consequences of elders’ words arise not just from internal discipline, but also 
from the absence of settlements at marriage and death. These transfers effectively 
solidify inter-clan relations and fortify marital productivity. As elders increasingly 
lament the dissolution of collective life, however, misfortune provides an occasion to 
reinforce critical obligations and attend to the future prosperity of a lineage. At a time 
when junior men may elope and marry away from their elders, misfortune provides 
elders the chance to assert the need to formalise marriage. On other occasions, though, 
elders are forced to confront complex inter-clan histories—such as locating curses 
resulting from mistreatment, thus resolving crisis through suturing frayed social 
relations.  
5.3.3 Retributive Acquisitions  
 
A third cluster of explanations arises when individuals are said to acquire spiritual 
forces or powers in order to punish those who have offended them. These forces took 
the names adra, mua, yakani, or abea, and their operation follows a similar retributive 
logic to curses in that their sickness serves to force the offender to seek forgiveness.514 
Offences commonly include theft, violence or adultery. For example: 
When you go to steal someone’s things without permission, they get you, you 
will be punished by adra.515 
This boy, he slept with a girl from a clan near Congo, but didn’t pay. The clan 
were waiting patiently for him to pay. This clan near Congo was having mua—if 
you wrong them, they send mua—it comes and attacks you, beats you, strangles 
you, something comes and has sex with you in the night.516 
 
 
514 A clear distinction is made between this family of forces and those which could be considered as witchcraft. 
Affliction stemming from this family of retributive forces is thought to follow offences, whereas in cases of 
witchcraft, there is little such intention.  
515 FG, Nyarire, 29/06/2016 (OJ/AO). 
516 I2, woman, Abrici, 27/09/2016 (OJ). 
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These terms denote a family of forces associated either with particular clans (yakani and 
adra), or are thought to be purchased from clans, usually in Congo (mua and abea). 
Acquisitions are distinct, but follow similar retributive logics. As one elder explained: 
“If I attack someone who has adra—it will be adra that attacks me, not yakani.”517 Adra 
is associated with clans in Arua and Maracha, mua and abea with clans in Congo or 
near the Congo border, and yakani with clans in Terego.518 According to Middleton, 
these forces bear the historical legacies of colonial healing movements, which gradually 
become dissociated from their respective prophets and localized into the landscape 
(such origins being evident in the term yakani). But crucially, these forces affect entire 
lineages since they are said to pass down the lineage from the original owner to their 
relatives, who become new hosts. It is thought that if these forces are not appeased, they 
can even take the life of their current owner (and subsequently remain in the lineage). In 
the context of affliction, then, retributive acquisitions require cleansing for perceived 
offenses, or when a clan member has acquired these forces and subsequently fails to 
‘appease’ it. Of a case where it was believed mua had been brought in to the clan, elders 
explained: “That thing will start killing her immediate family. When it kills her 
children, her immediate brothers and sisters, then it will move to kill the whole of [the 
clan] if it is not resolved.”519 
Remedying the effects of these forces requires clan cooperation: since these forces 
affect entire families, reparations are thus collective, with clan members seeking 
forgiveness from the owner of the power. The gravity of the offence determines the 
reparations, which is determined by the owner, but usually includes animals (cow, sheep 
 
517 I, Elders, Lujje, 18/02/2017 (OJ). 
518 During this research, some elders conflated with mua with mazi, since both are acquired in Congo.  
519 I, Elders, Lujje Clan, 18/02/2017 (OJ). 
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or goat) plus money. As one elder explained, “That thing will automatically leave you 
when the elders are happy; they will say ‘we have come here, now we are going home, 
let this thing leave you. It is their own thing; it will listen to them.”520 Since these are 
inter-clan negotiations, there is the potential for extortion. In the cases I observed, elders 
were reluctant to table these settlements, owing to the expense of the transfers involved. 
Decisions to articulate the presence of particular forces were calculated with available 
resources in mind. 
 
5.4 Accessing Repair: An Idiom in Crisis? 
 
The above categories of explanation tie sickness to repercussions emanating from 
violations of discipline and obligation. Indeed, elders who have a privileged place in 
determining connections between past deeds and present misfortune often described 
explanations in terms that replicated ideas of order within the structural-functionalist 
view of anthropology—where the invocation of sickness served to reaffirm a moral 
order grounded in social responsibility. Explanations of sickness serve to draw 
increasingly mobile family members back “home” to address obligations. Sickness 
provides a moment to affirm normative visions of moral personhood, and the words, 
acts and duties that mark healthy relationships within and between suru.521 Following 
Knighton, these events hold a “social memory”, and despite being in “rude health”, lie 
at the heart of Lugbara being.522  
 
 
520 FG, Elders, Irivu, 31/05/2016 (OJ/AO). 
521 In a similar vein, so do clan by-laws act as symbols to retrench moral ideas at the point of their disappearance.  
522 Knighton, ‘Globalizing Trends’. 
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Yet, even where those who suffer are aware of outstanding debts, the past cannot 
always be remedied: owing to the high cost of repair, to struggles for knowledge in 
complex inter-clan relations, as well as to the deep imprint of social fragmentation in 
tracing misfortune. Before concluding this chapter, I attend to wider observations as to 
the realities of misfortunes across Maracha and Terego. 
 
Repairing misfortune relies on the transfer of resources such as transfers of bridewealth, 
avuta and fines, all part of village economics. To resolve cases, it is said ba suru ri ovu 
ki ni ayiko si ku (‘the clan should be given meat to eat’), or that ba li anyapa ba suru ri 
pi ni (‘animals should be slaughtered for the clan’).523 Issues are formally settled only 
when animals are ritually slaughtered, collectively consumed, and words are said that 
lay the issue to rest. Echoing the sacrificial rites described first by Middleton and later 
by Dalfovo, these events affirm social hierarchies between men, and are an opportunity 
to affirm clan visions of social peace. If divisions of work are not followed, and meat is 
not apportioned correctly, this too can be a source of misfortune. Naturally, economic 
constraints deeply effect possibilities for repair, as enacting redress is costly. 
Reparations indicative of forgiveness rely on material contributions—specifically the 
transfer of animals—that mark the solidification of social bonds, yet acquiring these 
animals is often difficult in an increasingly monetised economy. Whilst bridewealth 
may be raised by a husband alone if he is wealthy enough, raising animals in other cases 
usually relies on collective efforts, as well as on donations from other male relatives. 
Additionally, elders require fees to sit, or payment of their transport costs to do so. 
Though transfers are defended according to symbolic and social explanations, the costs 
 
523 (Saved) Christian Lugbara may say: e’yo di le di anyapa ari ni (‘this issue now requires spilling animal blood’), 
emphasising the sacrificial nature of clan processes. 
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of remedying the past are often sidelined when it is struggle enough for many to subsist 
in the present. 
 
In essence, this idiom of repair relies on structural cohesion and communication: on 
“coming together” to address the causes of sickness. Misfortune moves across families 
irrespective of distance; both the separation between family members and the erosion of 
clan solidarities present continual problems in addressing sickness. Thus from the 
perspective of those who are suffering, who are actively seeking to trace, and so repair, 
social wounds in relation to bodily or familial health, clan processes of healing were 
regarded as obsolete. Indeed, younger generations or town dwellers increasingly eschew 
clan affiliation, finding obligations such as marriage and funerary contributions 
onerous—yet crises of health and well-being are occasions to lament the dissolution of 
the same structures often have disregarded in daily life. For example, one young man 
explained, “Elders only reveal these things [the cause of sickness] at funerals,” and one 
woman echoed that, “Our culture is difficult; they [elders] will not point it [the cause of 
misfortune] out until someone dies.”524 These admissions highlight not only the deep 
hold of the “cultural” idiom of explanation, but also the perceived severity that many 
attribute to failing to address sicknesses that follow.  
 
Feuchtwang notes that the transmission of ancestral memory relies on family 
commitment to cultivating sensibilities through the imparting of particular narrative 
tropes of memory between generations.525 Discerning the explanation for suffering 
 
524 I, Male Catholic, Arua, 28/03/2017; I, CCR, Vurra, 27/03/2017. 
525 Feuchtwang, ‘Haunting Memory’ 
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relies on relatives and family members coming together to sift through recent and 
distant histories. Whilst discussions may proceed among members of the immediate 
household, who may ponder the cause of misfortune, initiating repair necessitates 
formal sittings, where the “issue” is brought out in the public realm. On an 
administrative basis, this requires the willing participation of clansmen. Since these 
meetings are now less regular in Lugbara society, the process of tracing misfortune now 
often unfolds over many months or years. This longer duration is not merely an issue of 
coming together, but rather of the incompleteness of the historical record needed to 
trace misfortune. The transmission of history relies on events being passed down from 
elders to sons: formerly, elders explained, they would “sit by the fire” to relay oral 
history to their sons, through songs and stories.526 Yet today, little attention is paid to 
such processes. 
 
Nowadays, and particularly after exile, many elders—who were themselves labour 
migrants—have not received a complete record of clan settlements or curses that form 
the basis of intimate moral knowledge. Within any clan, few elders are regarded as 
having detailed historical knowledge. During this research, one Terego clan set aside 
time to reconstruct this knowledge, versions of events which were to be documented in 
a ‘handbook’—yet discussions during meetings of the past were deeply contested. Clan 
members themselves regularly question the partisan nature of elders’ knowledge. There 
are deep parallels between this system and efforts to reinforce customary land 
boundaries through drawing on traditional wisdom.527 Since in the management of 
 
526 Obetia, Worship and Christian Identity in Uganda, p. 111. 
527 C. Leonardi and M. Santschi, Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern Uganda: Boundary disputes and 
land governance. London: Rift Valley Institute (Contested Borderlands series), 2016. 
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sickness too, historical memory determines the distribution of resources, much is at 
state. In lieu of oracular confirmation, assessing the validity of information is a human 
enterprise. Scepticism of human-mediated power extends to the verdicts and words of 
elders.  
 
The realities of repair depend greatly on the exact distribution of elders authority, and 
the attention of particular figures within a clan. In one Maracha clan, for instance, men 
actively sat and debated issues: throughout my fieldwork this clan intentionally sought 
to redress the suffering of its members, negotiating and making payments on deaths 
“following the lineage,” or paying bridewealth for chronically-ill clan daughters. Elders 
were supported by married sons, who returned home often and kept up with clan 
events—one particular elder who assisted in this research had served as a political 
organiser and a former LCIII aspirant; alongside his political affiliations, he was 
increasingly petitioned to address problems by his seniors. Yet in one Terego clan, the 
situation was different. Though elders there expressed fears regarding misfortune, since 
only one of three elders resided within the ancestral home, and the married sons worked 
as teachers and civil servants in Arua, it was more difficult to attend to the past. Thus 
whilst members were troubled by the lingering effects of a historical debt from 
mistreatment of a woman who married into the clan—an event taking place almost a 
century earlier, but that elders and married men had formally identified—throughout the 
entire period of this fieldwork, the issue was yet to be formally “tabled” in a sitting. 
Since this clan was also involved in ongoing land disputes, these more pressing events, 
which often bore their own connection to misfortune, took up most of their time. 
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Repair is furthermore constrained by customary restraints on who can speak about 
misfortune: a strict politics of voice governs who can bring or speak about issues 
publicly. Attending to critical events is almost exclusively a male realm, though on 
occasion elderly women (paternal and maternal aunties) who have witnessed the past 
may be invited to contribute memories out of necessity. Those without authority to 
speak live with the consequences of these worlds: it is often difficult for them, and for 
women in particular, to raise matters formally. Whilst any given person may begin to 
sense that “something is not right,” a disjuncture often remains between those who 
suffer and those who can begin to alleviate their problems.528 Whyte terms this “the 
innocent model of suffering,” whereby the suffering of women and children is 
proportioned differently to men. Women suffer as wives married to men, or because of 
the unpaid dues of male relatives. Yet women lack structural power to challenge their 
lack of voice in matters of custom.  
 
In cases of bridewealth, for example, the possibility of misfortune, as well as the 
process of enacting settlements, resides within a complex field of familial sentiments 
and sensitivities. One elder of Arua described a situation where his daughter was 
suffering on account of “grumbling” by uncles over unpaid bridewealth: 
It is true you as a parent have no problem, but [to] your clan brothers who have 
an eye for eating, such things can cause problems. But it is you, the father of the 
girl who will see it [sickness] for yourself. The animals you want to eat you 
cannot go and take by force, but you see your daughter suffering. This wealth is 
meant to be paid by [her] husband who is not part of the family—so are we 
going to let our daughter die? We must sit as brothers and pray, ‘if she is 
suffering because of the words I said, then I invoke my words.’ [Getting well] 
relies on the forgiving heart of my brother. Otherwise, when she dies he will 
also feel the pain.529 
 
528 Meinert, ‘Haunted Families’, p.595 
529 Interview, Elder, Ediofe, 24/11/2016.  
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Since it is the husband’s responsibility to raise animals, a father could do little to 
instigate settlements. This situation is further compounded by an increasingly 
fragmented social context: for women who conceive children outside of formal clan 
marriage, the potential consequences of not paying bridewealth present a lingering 
worry. Yet it is up to their men to formalise the marriage before the clan. In many such 
cases, good relations are absent; in others, husbands may have departed from informal 
marriages, and have little interest in returning to pay dowry. Herein lies a critical issue: 
the fragmented realities of family life can not only perpetuate notions of sickness, but 
make its redress increasingly complicated. The social fragmentation that generates 
misfortune also prevents its redress. 
 
5.5 Borrowing Frameworks: A note on Alternative Options 
 
In some cases of pressing misfortune, sufferers act unilaterally. These were considered 
to be recent innovations by many, but I here describe alternative directions in relation to 
the tracing of misfortune. Excluded from collective discussions, individuals may try 
prayer, trans-night worship, religious counsel or consultation of a diviner-healer. With 
the exception of the final realm (discussed in the following chapter), many of these 
measures were only palliative, and the sense of underlying difficulty remained.530 In 
other cases, younger generations formed new coalitions, such as families simply coming 
together by themselves. Of one case of persistent misfortunes within a family, one sub-
county chief explained how his family united without elders: “We said, if elders are 
 
530 In divination settings, several women interviewed during this research rejected witchcraft as an explanation, on 
account of the knowledge that her bridewealth payments were outstanding: see Chapter Six. 
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causing a stumbling block—let us see what we can do as a family.”531 In this case, 
brothers and sisters gathered among themselves to trace misfortune.  
 
In other cases, young men took action. In one village near Arua, young men had come 
together to form their own conclusions about sickness. Lacking historical knowledge of 
transfers, these men were preoccupied with the changing freedoms of women and 
emergent forms of sickness—specifically, linking azo with evolving sexual relations, 
and the possibility of male sickness arising from women’s extra-marital sex. In Druyer, 
a group of married men (who retained the title “youth”) explained that a new sickness, 
enima, which manifested as shock, blackouts, and paralysis, resulted from the sexual 
behaviours of married women. The leader of the group, who had himself suffered from 
this affliction, explained that enima “…could affect her husband or her children, and is 
specifically activated if a woman commits adultery outside the home, returns, and cooks 
food for her husband. To resolve it, the woman has to bring a chicken.”532 If the 
adulterous woman remained in the home, a ritual known as ndu aduma must be 
performed, whereby her relatives must return the bull given them to them as 
bridewealth (ali). If the woman produces a child, her relatives donate a further cow (an 
equivalent payment for a woman leaving and marrying another man). In one sense, this 
sickness could be read as a clan earning back cows they had transferred as bridewealth, 
but Druyer’s young men explained that their concern about the increasing rate of enima 
was great enough that they had formed a committee to educate women about the 
consequences of their sexual activities.533 These emergent explanations link observed 
 
531 I, Aruan, 30/04/2016. 
532 FG, Druyer, Arua, 18/05/2016. 
533 FG, Druyer, 18/05/2016 (OJ); I, Assistant Leader, Biliafe, 2/06/2017  
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moral changes (or the perceptions thereof) to invert obligations associated with 
suffering. The social context drove explanations for suffering in new ways, which 
avoided deep interrogations of the past.  
 
Finally, other sufferers in search of repair seek the intervention of Christian leaders, 
through the aforementioned Family Tree. These sittings echo those of elders, but are 
often driven by younger generations, who prepare themselves for a sitting both through 
prayer and through historical research into their origins, often over periods of greater 
than a year. One Aruan Catholic, Agnes, suggests the directions these enquiries take 
based on her own example: “My great-grandfather—they [the priests] start pressing: 
what were they known for? The good and the bad attributes: did they offer 
sacrifices?”534 In their reading of the past, charismatic actors imbue family histories 
with particular moral dimensions, which echo crusades against “idol worship” of the 
colonial period. Certain ancestors become subject to particular scrutiny, namely elders 
who practiced “sacrifices.” As one CCR member, Natalia, explained: “The ancestors—
what they did in the past goes on affecting the next generation, [and the] next 
generation. If this is not dealt with in prayers, there is no hope… The ancestors—they 
first picked that god which is not the real God to worship and listen to.”535 Natalia 
furthermore contrasted the results of the Family Tree among Lugbara and Alur 
communities, explaining that the causes of misfortune were specific to different 
families, according to differences in social structures. Paying heed to the extensive 
 
534 I, CCR Member, Arua, 28/03/2017. 
535 I, CCR, Nsyambia, 27/03/2017   
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nature of elders’ mediations of ancestral healing, Natalia explained that, for Lugbara 
people, “our ancestors were the government.”536  
 
Charismatic actors are preoccupied with “spiritual strongholds,” effectively redefining 
family histories into a new language of spiritual restraints, often premised on individual 
sins. Repair in this context shifts the focus away from material reparations to 
neutralising spiritual agents through prayer and repentance for the acts of one’s 
relatives.537 Whilst the Family Tree and lineage-tracing both agree on the fundamental 
“polluting” effects of past killing, adultery and violence, their interpretation of elders 
and payments is an important area of divergence. For example, Father Simon extended 
the vocabulary of shrine-worship to discuss bridewealth:  
Traditionally, when a girl gets married in some cultures you will see a cow, 
goats are brought and are supposed to be slaughtered. The blood is put at the 
door, cows are slaughtered and the blood is cooked somewhere before the meat 
is cooked in a specific place. That is what we call idols. Those are spirits that 
our parents have got in touch with. When you please those spirits in that way 
you will be successful, [but] if you don’t please them, there will be misfortune. 
People are deeply rooted in it.538  
 
For many, however, this linguistic conversion of bridewealth into spirits was 
unconvincing. As the next chapter shows, many women turn to diviner-healers to 
produce evidence to approach elders regarding outstanding debt, rather than reject these 
customs. Natalia herself explained that though the Family Tree revealed unpaid 




537 I, Father, Bethany, 16/05/2017. 
538 ibid. 
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Turning to elders or to the Church both provide a means of acting on the disturbances of 
the past, and a mechanism to interrogate internal histories. Both therapies react as well 
to a perceived sense of crisis within extended families, and both approaches reinforce 
local anxieties that the living can suffer because of the dead. Misfortune reifies these 
connections, which elders claim endure despite the physical distance between their 
urban and rural relations. When elders turn to history, just as when Charismatic priests 
direct families to consider their family tree, the past is reinvented through the moral 
messaging of the present. Hence elders emphasise animal transfers as the cornerstones 
of social peace (even if today they remain increasingly unpaid), and priests stress the 
pollution from the performance of past “idol worship.” The past is read with how people 
perceive moral probity in the present: it is in part because of these interventions that 





In the 1950s, Lugbara people lived in the conscious submission to their ancestors, 
guided in their will by the worlds of watchful elders’. Mutuality, or tualu was attained 
through the hierahcial structure of the clan, reified against a disciplinary colonial state, 
whose laws lacked the socially contingent judgement of clan elders. War marked the 
end of a long assault – fuelled by Christianity, colonisation and modernity, on the 
material sites where the ori resided. Since return, Lugbara people have lost the term to 
describe their ancestors. The ori has been subsumed into a Christian language of 
worship – the ori’ba, group protected by shrines, has become the orijo (church). For 
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younger generations, practices of venerating ancestors through shrines are indicative of 
a historical past, rather than a lived present. 
 
Yet, as with other linguistic transitions, a shift in publicly articulated moralities 
contrasts to the deep meaning that the Lugbara ancestors continue to have, as 
experienced through the phenomenological effects of their discontent, which flow 
through generations, influencing the living. Debts are remembered by the name of 
relatives – indicating the intimacies and uniqueness of these “haunting memories” 
which account for their persistence. Despite the declining emphasis placed on the 
cultural transmission of intimate memory during everyday life, in moments of suffering, 
the lingering discontent of wronged dead male – and female – relatives continues to 
demand reparations between living parties. To use Igreja’s words, cosmological ideals 
reflect “non-linear” temporalities which do not reflect ideas within transitional justice of 
a “past of violence and a present for justice and closure”.539  
  
Thus, contrary to previous studies, I argue that clans hold an enduring position both in 
interpreting chronic and fatal suffering, and in enacting redress. Elders, in tandem with 
interested sons, remain the social and moral centre of suru, and retain key roles in 
interpreting affliction among families and households. This chapter has shown how 
clans have collectively attempted to redefine explanations for misfortune following the 
return from exile, and second, how these explanations become increasingly contested 
due to social changes that not only offer competing opportunities to define and manage 
 
539 V. Igreja, ‘Multiple Temporalities in Indigenous Justice and Healing Practices in Mozambique’, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 6 (2012), pp. 404-422, p. 408. 
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affliction, but fray the physical and social cohesion of clan boundaries as well. Though 
according to local idiom contagious influences follow bloodlines irrespective of 
distance, in reality, social fragmentation and insecurities were deeply inscribed upon 
processes of repair. Often, debts hauting individuals remain ideational, and cannot be 
fulfilled because of material constraints.  
 
Increasingly, other explanations are recruited to account for the roots of misfortune. 
These explanations may draw on the moral behaviour of the present, or on religious 
technologies to reveal previously hidden spiritual strongholds. This development 
unsettles notions that tie misfortune to the moral fabric: in selecting different therapists 
to mine the past for misfortune, Lugbara people opt to re-define not just the agent of 
sickness—the words of relatives, material debts, or spirits—but how to repair the social 
fabric of the present as well. Since the management of affliction continues to be imbued 
with social outcomes—such as the proper means of marrying, living together, and 
burying the dead—misfortune continues to be a terrain where claims to moral authority 
are actively negotiated. Mediating misfortune with recourse to either clan or church 
involves encoding personal histories in particular ways. No matter whether elders 
emphasise words or the dead as sources of broken moral order, or whether charismatic 
priests emphasise “spiritual disturbances” caused by individual sins, identifying 
material or spiritual disruptions provides critical opportunities to affirm or critique the 
primacy of lineage relations—and with it, seniority and power.  
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Having examined traditional, patriarchal mechanisms for the identification of suffering, 
the next chapter now turns to the domain of divination, exploring how women, as 















Having explored contemporary Lugbara practices of clan health-seeking, this chapter 
now elucidates the importance of female agency in discerning and acting upon 
misfortune, through revisiting the forms of explanation embodied in female divination. 
Whilst the previous chapter described evolving ideas of misfortune in conjunction with 
clan elders, a space of predominantly male knowledge and action, this chapter details 
the attempts of female healers and sufferers to address misfortune. It is specifically 
interested in the social role of explanation for those who consult diviner-healers: 
therapy-seekers who are, overwhelmingly, women. 
Chapter Three introduced gendered ascriptions in healing expressions. Whilst the forms 
of clan healing described in this chapter remain subject to a politics of restraint, 
premised on ‘slow words’ that embody ideals of leadership and order, the energy, 
rhythm, and pace of exuberant possession, revelation, and prayerful healing in the 
compound of diviner-healers provided a stark contrast. This chapter seeks to understand 
these expressions within the structures and constraints of women’s social worlds. 
The first part of this chapter engages with the work of diviner-healers in historic and 
contemporary contexts. The chapter begins by reviewing the existing evidence that the 
work of female diviners lay in opposition to the moral realm of elders and ancestors.540 
Building on the analysis in Chapter Three, this chapter then engages with how, through 
 
540 D.M. Casale, ‘Women, Power, and Change in Lugbara (Uganda) Cosmology: A Reinterpretation’, Anthropos 77 
(1982): 385–396; Barnes-Dean, ‘Lugbara illness beliefs’. 
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localising powers of Christian spirits, diviner-healers have transformed their roles to 
become what Redding terms “social healers”541. This enquiry culminates in an 
exploration of two contemporary diviner-healers: Vivian Ambe, an Anglican 
“prophetess,” and Ezaru Mary, a Catholic “woman who prays.” 
The second part of the chapter engages with the content of divinatory revelation. 
Engaging with process rather than outcome, the analysis positions women who consult 
diviner-healers as “not passive believers but sceptical agents with reflexive awareness 
of their own actions”.542 Considering but moving beyond questions of “faith and belief”, 
it then explores how divinatory verdicts are interwoven into the familial and clan 
structures of therapy-seekers, providing a means for women to critique familial neglect 
within the limits of the moral world defined by husbands and elders.543 Challenging 
contextual scholarship that previously emphasised the asocial or transformative impact 
of female healing, this research thus argues that divination in fact reproduces the 
normative expectation of kinship relations: it is only through becoming a diviner-healer 
that women can transform their relative position in local society. Nonetheless, the 
process of tracing misfortune provides a means of acting within the restraints of 
women’s social worlds. 
Since the changing vocabulary of healing is central to the debates presented in this 
chapter, a brief note on terms is necessary. In the colonial period, female healers took 
the term ojo, which in Lugbarati denotes ‘healer,’ and has been applied to specialists 
practicing herbal or clinical work (i.e. any practice unrelated to lineage histories). 
 
541 S. Redding, ‘Women as Diviners and as Christian Converts in Rural South Africa, c.1880-1963’, Journal of African 
History 57:3 (2016) pp. 367-389.  
542 H. MacDonald, ‘Believing sceptically: Rethinking health-seeking behaviours in central India’, in S. Levine (ed.), 
Medicine and the Politics of Knowledge, Cape town; HSRC Press, 2012, pp. 101-117, p. 102. 
543 Victor and Porter, ‘Dirty things’.  
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Middleton translated this term as ‘diviner’. The term ‘medium’ could equally be 
applied, since ojo communicated with the divinity and associated spirits, as could the 
term ‘healer,’ since therapists explicitly dealt with afflictions in physical and mental 
health. Barnes-Dean translated odzo (the regional variation) as ‘herbalist,’ yet this 
translation related to a locally-specific portrait of female divinatory work. Following the 
return from war, Christian actors have translated ojo as ‘witchdoctor’. Ojo is now 
associated with healers who may be onzi (evil). Accordingly, female healers have 
distanced themselves from the term, using instead ‘prophetess’ or simply ‘Christian.’ 
The ambiguity is pervasive: those informants I interviewed who had consulted diviners 
had difficulty encapsulating their practice in a single word, referring to the specialists in 
this chapter as ‘people who can see things,’ ‘women who reveal the causes of drilonzi 
(misfortune),’ or simply oku mungu ziza (‘elderly woman who prays’). For those who 
trust in them, female healers are understood as divine mediums who can reveal the 
causes of suffering, and potentially reverse it.544 Given this emphasis on revelation 
alongside bodily healing, this chapter thus uses the term ‘diviner-healer.’  
 
6.2: Diviner-Healers in Historic Context: Ambiguous and Adaptive 
Healers  
 
Alongside clans, female diviner-healers have long played a role in interpreting and 
managing affliction among Lugbara populations. By the 1950s, female diviners known 
as ojo or ojou operated throughout rural Lugbaraland, their practices drawing on 
traditions of prophetic healing, possession, and revelation first exhibited by the prophet 
 
544 Critics continue to use the term ojo in relation female diviner-healers to question the individualistic healing 
powers of female healers. 
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Rembe. Indeed, the name ojo was derived from kamiojo, a “gladiolus-like” bulb found 
in the wild bushland, which was added to Yakan water and to which Lugbara people 
attributed hallucinatory effects.545 Diviners were thought to be conduits for divine 
knowledge, able to mediate with Adro, and as such have access to words which elders 
“did not know”. Their services were sought in cases of suffering where oracles or 
European medicine had failed either to reveal the source of the issue or bring 
recovery.546 
 
Historically, divination was an explicitly female pursuit. Skills of divination were said 
to be inherited down the female line, from a diviner to her eldest daughter. This 
transmission was evidenced after a woman was “seized by the spirit,” or “possessed by 
God” in the bushland.547 During this encounter, which typically occurred during 
adolescence, a young girl would wander round naked for several days in a trance-like 
state. After long tutelage from another diviner, a diviner would begin practicing from 
her hut, known as adrojo, where a shrine was constructed and a sheep was sacrificed by 
another female diviner elected as sponsor.548  
 
 
545 The ojo bulb has long held mystical and ambiguous properties, being associated with healing as well as sorcery. 
See J. Middleton, ‘Secrecy in Lugbara Religion’, History of Religions 12:4 (1973), pp. 299-316, p. 306.  
546 Middleton encapsulates these afflictions as “sorcery”, a problematic term since it has no direct referent in 
Lugbarati. See Chapter Seven for a discussion. 
547 Elsewhere, Middleton describes how a woman could become a diviner if she legitimated her sickness via the 
ancestral shrines. In a 1979 article, Middleton noted that for a given women who is sick: “she has a choice of 
showing that the sickness comes from the ancestors of her husband (a sign of her disobedience to him), her own 
ancestors (a sign of their protection of her against her husband) or a spirit who singles her out and thereby gives her 
a new identity or personality… [or] By being possessed by a spirit and coming under its protection, she can validate 
whatever decision she makes and can establish her independence.” It is difficult to understand how women could 
manipulate the ritual system, since in Middleton’s wider analysis its operation is used entirely by men, but this 
description is indicative of female agency within the patriarchal system, which was also exercised in their role of 
diviners. Cf. Middleton, ‘Rites of sacrifice among the Lugbara’, p. 190. 
548 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 249.  
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Ojo worked in darkness and secrecy, consulting on an individual basis. Exact practices 
differed: some ojo practiced through becoming possessed and “speaking to the spirits,” 
subsequently offering food “sacrifices” at bodies of water.549 Other diviners engaged in 
pseudo-medicinal forms of curing, which involved sucking out objects from the sick 
person’s body, drawing out “objects which they first secrete in their mouths or in twists 
of grass, and in which is captured the power of the sickness.”550 Such objects included 
parts of snake bodies, bones, worms or caterpillars, pieces of bird bone or beak, fungi, 
ants, pieces of quartz, or even obsidian, which embodied “ambiguity, the wild, or divine 
power”.551 It is unclear whether specialists performed different services, or whether 
healers blended multiple practices, but by the late colonial period, when healers were 
legitimated by evidence of divine possession, it is clear that ojo exhibited what 
Ventevogel, et al. call an “entrepreneurial spirit,” blending healing traditions with older 
prophetic forms of possession.552  
 
What united these practices was, according to Middleton, the “uncanny and dangerous” 
perceptions of ojo. Diviners’ practices embodied the near opposite of patrilineal 
sacrifices, where words and rites were publicly performed before a wider congregation. 
Women also played little role in patrilineal rituals, performing only minimal tasks of 
preparing porridge and beer offered to ancestors, it being taboo for women to prepare 
the sacrificial meat. These observations were derived from Middleton’s dualist concepts 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, which relied on essentialist divisions between the sexes. Thus 
 
549 Middleton, ‘Rites of sacrifice among the Lugbara’. 
550 Middleton, ‘Spirit Possession among the Lugbara’. 
551 Middleton, ‘Secrecy in Lugbara Religion’, pp. 306-7. 
552 P. Ventevogel, et al., ‘Change and continuity in Burundian divinatory healing’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 
12:1 (2018): pp. 22-43. 
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Middleton associates women with Adro, the wild, and with a lack of control, 
summarising one elder’s claim that “[w]omen are evil… They bring trouble to men, 
they do not know the words of the ancestors. Women are the things of Adro [God of the 
grassland].”553 Middleton notes that women were said to be “lacking an orindi (soul),” 
and thus social responsibility of men.554 Departing from his dualism, Middleton 
explains that ojo were feared on account of the uncontrollable forces perceived as 
vested in women. For Middleton, this unpredictability was transposed onto divinatory 
healing: which embodied the ambiguity of secrets and that of womanhood. 
  
Casale revisits the gendered dimensions of Middleton’s dualism between good and 
bad—a division not only specific to the Lugbara context, but common to distinctions 
between nature and culture prevalent in anthropology at the time—arguing against such 
a rigid, oppositional emplacement of the sexes.555 Retracing the detail within Lugbara 
Religion, and building on the work of feminist scholars, she argues for a model of 
gender mutuality: an acknowledgement of the potential for women to act as conduits for 
ordinary people to manage change. Within this revisioning, Casale notes that women 
were perceived as both threatening but vital to male survival, in part because of their 
ability to harness both constructive and destructive healing forces. In the colonial 
context, women’s association with sorcery and divination embodied the extremes of this 
potential: as sorcerers, women were suspected of preparing poisons derived from 
snakes, agents unknown to men that caused suffering and death. And yet as diviners, 
women were equally capable of channelling forces to manage these attacks, in addition 
 
553 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 248. 
554 Middleton ‘Some Categories of Dual Classification’, p. 194.  
555 Casale, ‘Women, Power, and Change’. 
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to employing new forms of possession to restore individual health. Thus, reviewing 
these positions, it seems that neither women (nor divine possession) were inherently 
onzi. Casale points to the interpretation of power related to its use: for health or 
healing.556  
 
Underplayed by both Middleton and Casale, however, were the links between the work 
of diviners and the performance of lineage rites. In some aspects of their role—
particularly their ability to commune with dead ancestors —the work of female diviners 
was integral to male elders’ pursuit of moral order through ritual. For example, diviners 
were consulted to speak with recently-deceased ancestors, whose souls were thought to 
linger in the bushland after death, in order to domesticate their souls as ori in the 
homestead. When misfortunes aroused the memory of the deceased, elders who asked 
“where are our fathers and our father’s brothers?” consulted diviners to ‘speak’ with 
those relatives, constructing ori to bring ancestors into communion with the living.557 In 
this way ojo played an integral role in facilitating the continuity of the patrilineage.558 
Such work reveals a more nuanced and adaptive dimension of divinatory work, which 
was integral to restoring lineage order at routinised moments of disorder, including 
death.  
 
By the 1970s, according to Barnes-Dean, female ojo had moved to the centre of healing 
practice. Barnes-Dean explained that ojo were primarily concerned with the 
management of enyata (poisoning) by various means, as well as attending to physical 
 
556 Notably too, several interviewees rejected the notion that women were onzi. This was a designation grounded in 
social behaviours. 
557 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 250. 
558 Casale, ‘Women, Power, and Change’. 
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afflictions including skin lesions, boils, diarrhoea, headaches, and swellings, as well as 
ofu (leprosy). Though the legitimacy of diviners still stemmed from their connection to 
Adro, their practice now relied almost entirely on the administration of herbs gathered 
in the bush.559 As discussed above, it is likely that Barnes-Deans’ work was heavily 
influenced by her proximity to Kuluva Hospital—given the entrepreneurial practice of 
individual healing, it is not unsurprising that therapists in her purview mimicked the 
dispensation of drugs at the hospital.  
 
In 1979, an Anglican missionary described the work of female diviners in different 
terms.560 Documenting healing practitioners around Ayivu, Enyabo described how 
diviners were possessed in the conventional way by Adro, or by free, named spirits. He 
gives the example of a diviner, Andru, who was possessed by a spirit called ‘Yindu,’ 
whom she addressed as opi asia (the other lord). Around Ayivu, diviners were 
understood to contact souls (a rite known as orindi ti sizu), and to address cases of 
possession from adroa (divine spirits) residing in rivers, trees and hills—cases which 
required ‘chasing out’ these spirits and solitary sacrifices in the bushland or in bodies of 
water, as well as freeing orindi onzi (evil spirits), which possessed people with 
increased frequency. On occasion ojo were called upon to contact neglected ancestors: 
ojo were able to speak to and receive replies from dead relatives who had been 
neglected, determining the sacrificial offering needed to restore balance. For a male 
ancestor, an offering of a goat, sheep or cow, and for a female, offerings of crops. 
Following these sacrifices, elders would gather to speak on issues and feast to ‘beat’ 
 
559 The importance of this divine connection is evidenced in the fact that ojo did not possess any herbal treatment 
to which “lay” or ordinary Lugbara people did not have access. 
560 Enyabo, A Survey of Lugbara Spirit Beliefs.  
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away trouble, while a small portion was offered to the diviner as a “fee.” In this role, 
ojo performed important social roles, and were reportedly respected by the communities 
they served.  
 
From these accounts, we can summarise that the practices of ojo represent an eclectic 
mix of historical prophetic knowledge and inspiration drawn variously from clinical, 
herbal, and prayerful techniques. Divination was never a static tradition: rather, it has 
exhibited great diversity at the level of individual practitioners who have assimilated 
“change and continuity” in their practice.561 Practices of divinatory-healing evolved 
against increased access to mundu aro (European medicine), as well as through 
incorporating older traditions of herbal medicine and female possession. As healers, ojo 
mediated the space created by the gradual erosion of ancestral healing, at times 
supporting the maintenance of patrilineal authority through contacting ancestors, and at 
other times offering novel explanations for suffering—but always adapting their 
practice to the requirements of the contemporary situation. The evolution of diviners’ 
practice was simultaneously a “supply and demand issue”.562 As perceptions of the 
forces at work in the colonial period changed, Lugbara people sought out the verdicts of 
specialists who could manage the effects of those forces.  
 
6.3: Christianity and Commercialisation 
 
A focus on indigeneity precluded the links between Christianity and female 
empowerment unfolding throughout the colonial period, most notable in Revival 
 
561 Ventevogel, et al., ‘Change and continuity’. 
562 Allen, ‘Understanding Alice’, p. 387. 
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(described in Chapter Four). Since the return from war, female divinatory practice is 
entangled with scripts and symbols of healing borrowed from Anglican or Catholic 
traditions. Female diviner-healers assert their abilities as “gifts” from Mungu or Adro 
and their revelations as enabled by the Holy Spirit.  
After the return from war, female healers began to openly link their practice with 
Christianity. Writing from Moyo in the 1980s, Allen noted that ojo in the traditional 
sense were now virtually absent, with female healers—now identifying as ajwaki (pl., a 
term borrowed from Acholi speakers)—claiming possession from non-kin spirits or 
multiple spirits.563 Diviners asserted the moral probity of their practice by claiming their 
communication with spirits was mediated through the Christian God, whilst others 
compared their spirits to “angels.” Personally identifying as devout Christians served to 
iron out any ambiguities in the sources of diviners’ power, aligning their work with 
forces of good rather than evil.564  
Important changes have occurred since the 1980s. Diviner-healers face increasing 
competition from healing ministries. The rise of the CCR has been significant: given its 
association with bodily healing, spiritual healing centres offer weekly deliverance 
services headed by a Catholic priest, where congregations (sometimes hundreds strong) 
are ministered to, and subsequently delivered en masse by teams of intercessors, who 
move throughout the assembled body. Public services (within mainline denominations) 
are not only free of cost, but are accepted, in that power is publicly ministered. The 
CCR has, furthermore, widened the parameters for possibilities of individual encounters 
with orindi ala (the Holy Spirit). The acceptance of healing gifts for CCR adherents 
 
563 Allen and Storm, ‘Quests for therapy in northern Uganda’. 
564 ibid. 
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presents a parallel to divinatory work, but is also a source of competition. After intense 
periods of prayer, confession and completion of a ‘Life in the Spirit’ seminar, adherents 
are afforded “gifts” from the Holy Spirit, which may include intercession or the ability 
to pray for those who are sick. One adherent described how these gifts allow ordinary 
people to stand “between God” and people’s suffering. This encounter with the Holy 
Spirit resonates powerfully with the former possession of ojo in the bushland; through 
this route, possession by the Holy Spirit is today structured and, to an extent, accepted. 
Whilst the CCR typically encourages these gifts to be deployed in collective cleansing 
or during public crusades, increasingly women have taken up their own practice from 
their homes. At the margins, the distinction between intercessor and diviner-healer is 
often just a matter of emphasis, as the experiences of Ezaru Mary described below 
reveal.  
6.3.1: Witchdoctors: Moral Panic and Modern Crusades  
 
If Christianity ironed out ambiguities in diviners’ positions as unverified mediators of 
dangerous powers, in a contemporary commercial context, Christian associations have 
raised new questions over diviners’ moral probity. Today, diviner-healers’ individual 
practice stands in tension with the acceptance of gifts that come through collective 
expression of Christian worship, such as the CCR. But more specifically, local 
perceptions of female healers who are understood to possess exceptional gifts have been 
affected by the recent, substantive condemnation of witchdoctors. Since the mid-2000s, 
Lugbara religious leaders have continually denounced visitations to witchdoctors as the 
 260 
antithesis of being Christian.565 It has created new anxieties about the dangers of harm 
when visiting specialists whose power-sources are unknown.  
 
This critique stems in part from a newly-emergent, increasingly commercialised field of 
healing that has arisen in the last decade. Since the opening up of West Nile after the 
cessation of the LRA bush war, specialists from Congo, Southern Uganda and Kenya—
who cannot be verified by local recommendations—have settled in Arua and its 
surrounds, as well as along the Congo border.566 On billboards, banners on homes, and 
leaflets, these practitioners advertise cures for physical and mental afflictions, 
relationship problems, or male impotency. Whilst the number of outsiders publicly 
engaging in healing has increased, Christian condemnation of “witchdoctors” has 
certainly raised their profile, creating a “moral panic” around the effects of their 
unverified services.567 Pastors equate witchdoctors to “devil-workers” whose services 
may afford their consultants immense, miraculous healing, or punish unfaithful 
relationship partners—but these services come at a high cost, with individuals 
consulting evil “idols” including snakes and shrines, rather than channelling godly 
forces. Now a local personification of devil work, witchdoctors are often associated 
with sexual immorality, with rumours abounding that they have sex with female 
consultants. Other Christian pastors deploy a secular critique, painting witchdoctors as 
tricksters who extort from the desperate, charging excessive fees and exploiting 
people’s fears. Christian leaders explain that witchdoctors’ diagnoses promote divisions 
within families: “[They say] this problem is because your wife is doing this, your 
 
565 Arua Diocese Bulletin No. 130, May/June 2013.  
566 I2, LCI, Oleba, 19/10/2016. 
567 E. Goode and N. Ben-Yehuda, ‘Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction’, Annual Review of 
Sociology 20 (1994), pp. 149-171. 
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husband is doing this—parading lies.”568 Witchdoctors are described as rupturing 
communal peace, and as such have become scapegoats upon which to blame many 
modern ills.  
Since the mid-2000s, the “moral panic” surrounding these occult practitioners has been 
brought to life by collective actions to destroy “shrines” located in their premises, and 
on occasion, expelling them altogether. These events create public evidence of the evil 
that they describe, echoing the destruction of ancestral shrines in the early years of 
independence. They usually follow collective disasters, including frequent road deaths 
or inexplicable fires in Arua town and its periphery. In 2007, some zealous Anglican 
leaders had destroyed the “shrines” of two separate witchdoctors operating in Abrici, 
along the Arua-Kampala road. A pastor of Onzivu Church, who had been involved in a 
crusade, explained:  
[In] their shrines they cover the room with red cloth. When you enter the room 
you can’t see anything. They make the shrine, most of the shrines look alike. 
They make something like a granary—when you enter a shrine you throw 500. 
When you enter you find these 500 coins, a big amount—which explains how 
many people come here. And then they put things like a dead snake, dead 
chameleon, dead lizards to scare people… I found there was no evil power, he 
was conning people.569  
 
After this pastor accused the witchdoctor of extortion, these raids produced extensive 
paraphernalia that served as symbols of evil, such as snakes, bones, and wild animals—
all emblems formerly associated with Adro. Since this event, local government and 
public health officials have led even more raids. In a later event in 2016, reportedly 
hundreds of witchdoctors were evicted from Oli, an urban zone in Arua, after a spate of 
 
568 I, Captain Aleni, Onzivu, 10/06/2017. 
569 ibid. Interestingly, whilst this pastor “outed” the witchdoctor through demonstrating his lack of power, 
populations in the area feared that road deaths were the result of objects lingering in the ground post-eviction. 
Fears of witchdoctors revolve around ideas of extortion, but also from very real anxieties about what these 
individuals are capable of. 
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mysterious fires swept through the neighbourhood. These crusades have an instrumental 
value, in that government intervention here created a spectacle that effectively 
distracted press attention from the mishandling of relief aid. Other MPs have garnered 
support from championing evictions, which are seen as dealing with the root cause of 
urban residents’ disquiet. But these evictions also make fears about witchdoctors real. 
Urban events affect perceptions of security in rural trading centres: reportedly, many of 
those evicted in 2016 fled to nearby trading centres, where many were subsequently 
evicted again. Such news also travels over the radio shows hosted by Anglican and 
Catholic denominations.  
 
Of particular note is the flexibility as to who constitutes a witchdoctor. Though the label 
was first used in relation to foreign practitioners, the term can now be associated with 
any spiritual, herbal, or pseudo-medical healer who demonstrates inexplicable healing 
prowess. Critiques and accusations of witchcraft often target men—particularly those 
who practice techniques involving “sucking” objects out of bodies (resembling colonial-
era divination), or those who “cut” the skin in the “traditional” way. Female healers can 
also be subject to condemnation within the church, or in their homes, as evident in the 
testimonies of diviner-healers below. 
 
 These debates not only create personal insecurities for those who exhibit healing gifts, 
but affect the market for healing as well. Just as in the past, partaking in sacrifices was 
considered un-Christian, today going to a witchdoctor is seen as seeking quick solutions 
from unverified sources instead of “trusting in God.” Indeed, testimonies of being ‘born 
again’ (such as Zaitun’s below) regularly explain how turning to God involved turning 
away from witchdoctors. Outsourcing one’s past and succumbing to the temptations of 
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a witchdoctor provides an easier testimony, after all, than publicly attesting to personal 
sins. MacDonald describes how sufferers approach a plural landscape of therapy with 
what she terms a “hybrid eclectic scepticism.” This consciousness, she argues, judges 
healing practice not according to “the decline of a ‘traditional’ worldview and its 
arbitrary replacement by another, the ‘modern’ complex”, but rather according to an 
evaluation of changing conditions, and the individual reputations of healers.570 Since my 
Lugbara interlocutors constantly evaluated decisions as to healing on the basis of 
changing information, diviner-healers must market themselves accordingly, and 
distance themselves from scepticism generated by the church.  
 
As is clear, today divination is deeply entangled with Christian theology, practice and 
symbols. Illustrating this entanglement in more detail are the accounts of two female 
diviner-healers, Vivian Ambe and Ezaru Mary, as well as the reaction to an emergent 
form of healing, contemporary witchdoctors. 
 
6.3.2: Vivian Ambe: Anglican Prophetess 
 
Vivian Ambe is a self-styled Kakwa prophetess who works from her compound in 
Ewata, 4km from Arua town.571 She is a former accountant with an NGO, influenced by 
Pentecostal practice from her time in South Sudan, as well as from watching the 
Nigerian evangelist T.B. Joshua on the television in her home. Vivian’s grandparents 
were regional Revival leaders, and she identifies as Anglican, regularly attending 
Onzivu Church. Her healing practice exhibits all of these influences. Vivian’s healing 
 
570 MacDonald, ‘Believing sceptically’, p. 102. 
571 Ewata hosts diverse settlers and languages. During Protectorate rule the land was gifted to loyal Ma’di and Alur 
chiefs. Now, the original owners have sold their plots and many families rent.  
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gifts began to manifest after she returned from South Sudan in the wake of the 2013 
war. She heads a household after her husband remarried in South Sudan.  
 
According to Vivian, she received her healing gifts through devotion, fasting and 
prayers, as well as through tutelage with another urban diviner-healer, Mama Faith. “I 
just admired [Him] and wanted to hear God’s voice”, she explained. After cohabiting 
with Mama Faith, Vivian began to hear God’s “auditorial” voice on a regular basis. 
These commands instructed her to undertake a daily prayer routine, as well as to set up 
her own altar on her husband’s plot. In 2015, following divine instruction, she laid 
hands on the “festering wound” of a female consultant, which she explains was caused 
by “wizardry.” Subsequently Vivian gained a reputation for interceding in a case of 
mysterious fires that swept a neighbouring family in Ewata: her prayers featured visions 
that revealed the cause of misfortune to be outstanding payments surrounding the death 
of a woman who had married into the family. After settlements were made, the fires 
stopped.  
 
Vivian’s practice is driven by divine revelations, but in individual cases, she lays hands 
on the head or affected body part of the consultant, using Christian paraphernalia as 
healing devices. Vivian explains this repertoire:  
In the prayers, if the Holy Spirit leads me to use the Holy Water we use it. If not, 
we only pray. It can cover any situation depending on the guidance of the Holy 
Spirit… Holy Water acts as a point of contact between you and the person you 
have offended. [In] Ezekiel 36:25 onwards, [during] that time it was God who 
used the water to heal the Israelites. Salt is for cleansing, the same as water (2 
Kings 2:19-25). If you go to hospital they put you on drip which is water, [and] 
when you are baptised they use water. It speaks a lot about water.572 
  
 
572 I, Vivian, Ewata, 22/06/2017. 
 265 
Vivian’s services appeal to elite and professional women, though her close followers 
were drawn from women involved in petty trade or service work within her local 
environs. Vivian divines publicly during ‘services’ at her home. Falling into a trance, 
she lays hands on her consultants, “speaking” to the harmful spirit in Arabic, English, 
Lugbara, Kakwa or Alur, depending on its origin. Her consultants subsequently fall 
down, shaking, barking like dogs, slithering like snakes or screaming and crying. When 
asked to explain these influences, Vivian reproduced localised Pentecostal scripts of 
affliction: of demons, free spirits, or jo jok (witchcraft). In individual cases, her 
diagnoses are often more culturally or socially attuned to the familial relations of the 
consultant.  
 
6.3.3: Ezaru Mary: Catholic-inspired healing 
 
Quite different explanations for healing gifts were offered by a second woman, Ezaru 
Mary, a Catholic-inspired diviner-healer who practices in Vurra. Following violence in 
her marriage, Mary returned to her ancestral home. Her arrival at home coincided with 
the spreading of a mysterious sickness, which caused her clan members to fall ill. Given 
the timing of these afflictions with Mary’s return, rumours began to spread that she was 
bewitching her relatives, and moves were made to evict her. Yet as the eviction attempts 
were mounting, a strange sickness descended upon Mary. Returning to her hut, Mary 
testifies that she passed away and lay dead for three days. She explains: “This was a 
period of purification, it did not require any earthly intervention.”573 All who tried to 
enter her hut were prevented from entering by God, in what would otherwise have been 
 
573 I, Ezaru, Vurra, 22/05/2017, Lugbara (DA). 
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a gross violation of familial responsibility.574 During this period of cleansing or 
purification, she recalls receiving visions and images:  
I felt a spirit descending on me in a cold way, it was tied to a rosary. I was rescued 
from the hands of evil. I was able to see Mary mother of Jesus, that cloth that was 
wrapped around Mary mother of Jesus [she points to a Way of the Cross poster] was 
wrapped around her. I was running. I was ahead of Mary mother of Jesus, who was 
lighter than me. I ran and ran until I found myself back home, in my home. This was 
a dream; I was running in a dream back to my physical body, which was here in the 
house. At some point I woke up, there was coldness in the house. I started to pray, 
but without the rosary. I was able to get a revelation of all the causes of death, all 
the causes of death right from my own family, my children, my parents, my 
grandparents. I was able to get all the traditions of the other cultures, I began to 
know them. I started asking ‘Is it the devil or the Holy Spirit using me?’ But 
because of Mary, I realised it was the Holy Spirit, not the devil.575  
 
After coming back to life, Mary revealed these visions to her clan members. Their 
attitudes toward her remained ambiguous, but after Mary began to pray for her relatives, 
and sickness stopped affecting them, she was allowed to remain in her natal home. Like 
Vivian, today Mary practices from her hut in that natal home, which is adorned with 
posters of the Catholic bishop. She too uses salt and water: “The water together with the 
salt, you apply it and recite a prayer, mainly asking God to bless the water and the salt 
to remove the evil powers in people that manifest through sickness. When that water 
and salt is blessed, it is sent to the world to heal people. It is simple.”576 Mary regularly 
prays with her local CCR branch, and takes a role in collective purges against mazi, a 
new form of witchcraft (Chapter Seven).577  
 
These divine encounters have their specificities, as do different denominational scripts. 
Vivian emphasises the protective qualities of Jesus’ blood, and drives out demons “in 
Jesus name,” often crying ‘efu!’ (‘Get out!’). Her instructions, moreover, are received in 
 
574 The point being that if her body had been found, she would have been taken for burial . 
575 I, Ezaru, Vurra, 22/05/2017, (DA). 
576 ibid. 
577 Diviners as individuals rarely confront mazi, but rather as part of collectives. 
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visions or dreams where she hears “God’s auditorial voice.” Mary, however, 
emphasises that her powers come from Jesus, but her revelations are mediated through 
“Mother Mary.” Both women espouse the Holy Spirit as the agent of cleansing, which 
drives out “evil spirit[s]” and “witchcraft” in a spiritual fight that represents the battle 
between powers of good and evil. Similarly, both women stress the importance of faith 
and devotion of individuals in healing encounters: though their consultants are mainly 
drawn from across Christian denominations, some come from Islam as well. 
Furthermore, both healers continually defended their own position, denying personal 
power whilst presenting themselves as conduits for divine work.578 As Mary explained: 
“For me, it is a spiritual gift and it is also a fight. I get a number of satanic things. I will 
go and remove the physical things and burn them with fire. There is nothing like I have 
gone underwater or I am a witchdoctor, for me it is the Cross… it is costless.” Both 
diviner-healers explain that their practice is driven by levels of “sin” in local 
populations, which manifests in envy, witchcraft and curses. Their gifts are afforded by 
God as a means to combat these sentiments. As such, in addition to their healing 
practice, diviner-healers regularly become involved with communal quests against 
witchcraft, a positioning that protects their status as aligned with social peace.  
 
As is clear, whilst contemporary diviner-healers do align themselves with Christianity, 
the moral ambiguity around individual practice presents an unstable space of practice. 
In order to protect their reputation and their trade, these women must exhibit their 
loyalty not only to Christian values, but also to wider ideas of social peace.  
 
 
578 P. Gifford, Christianity, Development and Modernity in Africa. London: Hurst & Company, 2015.  
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6.4: “I got my healing at Vivian’s place”: Three Journeys 
 
Many consultants who visited diviner-healers explained that the decision was made 
after “medically, treatment had failed.”579 Sufferers sought relief for a range of 
conditions ranging from physical afflictions, mental disquiet and spiritual hauntings, to 
domestic disputes and employment issues. Today, diviner-healers are never associated 
with managing illness believed to be induced by enyata poisoning, nor with the 
management of HIV/AIDS or Hepatitis-B. In such cases, it is said that “prayers don’t 
work,” since poisons are “ingested” and “real,” and viruses are carried in the blood.580 
To maintain their reputation, diviner-healers do not associate themselves with death or 
“critical” cases, but with chronic suffering or misfortune. 
 
Those interviewed in this research were women who continued to visit diviner-healers. 
They did so on account of the “relief” that they experienced as pain faded, mobility was 
restored or domestic fates changed. Whilst people often testified publicly as to the 
completeness of their healing, in most cases, this self-reported success was not a 
specific, one-time event, but relied on continual prayer and return visits to the diviner-
healer’s compound over a period of weeks or months. Diviner-healers attributed this 
process-based healing both to a consultant’s faith and to the qualities of their social ties: 
“Sometimes people are thrown down [by the Spirit] because they are bad, sometimes it 
is because people are doing bad things to them,” Vivian explained. She added that 
sometimes the faithful provided more enticing targets for the “devil’s work” or jealous 
 
579 I, Vivian’s congregation, Ewata, 22/06/2017 (PN). 
580 I, Reverend, Maracha, 02/05/2017. Only once did a consultant testify that Vivian had healed her Hepatitis-B 
infection, in a claim that Vivian herself quickly quieted. Cases of enyata are managed exclusively by male herbalists. 
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associates.581 Whilst diviner-healers (and consultants) emphasised the role of faith and 
belief in divinatory healing, the following cases illuminates the process of kinship 
structures surrounding each case. Focusing on journeys rather than testimonies, and on 
events beyond the diviner-healer’s compound, these cases reveal how divinatory 
verdicts intersect with wider social, economic and legal structures.  
 
6.4.1: Nancy: Lingering Funerary Debts 
 
Nancy relayed these details over several months, during which time she frequently 
prayed with Vivian. A Saved Anglican, Nancy explained that she had experienced many 
misfortunes over recent years. After marrying a Lugbara man in the mid-1990s, she had 
suffered problems after the difficult birth of her second son, after which intimacy with 
her husband became too painful. She sought diagnoses from clinics in Arua and Kuluva, 
but was given little explanation. Eventually her husband left the home and remarried in 
Nebbi. During her own struggles, Nancy’s firstborn son was also suffering from 
learning difficulties after a tragic fall in the home, and her father died in a mysterious 
motorcycle accident. Though she had earned qualifications to undergraduate level, 
Nancy struggled to find employment and had lost several jobs. After these repeated 
misfortunes, she began to explore the causes for her suffering. 
After seeking counsel from her elders, Nancy came to believe that the underlying issue 
arose from the funeral of her mother. Her mother had died from an ectopic pregnancy, 
but was buried at her maternal home in Maracha rather than at her husband’s place. 
Nancy’s father’s people had refused to pay avuta, in part because her father’s mother 
 
581 I, Vivian, Ewata, 23/12/2017 (PN). 
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was a Revival Christian, who vehemently disavowed such customs. The death was 
sudden, and the burial ended in violence between the two families, which necessitated 
police intervention. As the firstborn child, Nancy believed herself to be in line to 
receive misfortunes from the failed funerary rites. Though Nancy’s elders were aware of 
the situation, they were reluctant to speak up. Nancy instead took a goat to her elders in 
an effort to reverse the situation, and also gave a significant contribution towards the 
purchase of a cow that could be used for cleansing. Despite this, the issue was not 
formerly tabled. 
Following these events, Nancy began to seek more direct intervention. She began to 
seek counsel from priests in Arua, as well as sporadically attend the weekly healing 
ministry at Ambiriambati. Though these services lifted her spirits, Nancy explained that 
her “heart [still] pained.” In early 2017, however, Nancy visited Vivian. After prayers 
and consultations, Vivian entertained the possibility that Nancy had been bewitched by 
her ex-husband’s new wife, yet Nancy was unconvinced. After extensive prayer, Vivian 
revealed that Nancy needed to deal with the reparations around her mother’s death. 
Nancy began to pray with Vivian repeatedly, explaining that being a woman, “it was 
very hard for me to enact the cultural things.” Nancy explained that Vivian’s prayers 
were directed “that someone will hear from my dad’s side and will take this thing 
forward, so that I can be released from it.”  
During this same time, Nancy re-engaged with Kuluva Hospital. She found a diagnosis 
for her pain, which resulted from incorrect stitching and consequent problems after 
childbirth. This diagnosis, too, she attributed to Vivian’s prayers. After finding 
employment with an international NGO, Nancy offered Vivian a tithe of 10% of her 
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salary. In our last meeting, Nancy was hoping to buy a plot of her own to assuage the 
economic insecurity she had experienced since leaving her husband. Moving away due 
to her new employment, Nancy gradually lost contact with Vivian. Though the “root” of 
the problem remained unsolved, in a renewed position of economic stability, Nancy was 
able to move on with her life. 
6.4.2: Zaitun: Unpaid Bridewealth 
 
The second case was narrated in Lugbara by Zaitun, a tailor in Arua, who after being 
healed became a pious follower of Vivian. Zaitun was raised as a Catholic, but had 
converted to Islam after marrying her husband. After being healed, she re-converted to 
the Christian faith, worshipping twice weekly at Vivian’s place.582  
 
Zaitun explained: “Here [at Vivian’s place] is where I got my healing, and here is where 
I remain.” She started to feel sick in 1997, with pain beginning in her leg, as if an object 
had pierced her. After two to three months, the pain had spread to her back and was so 
intense she could not carry a baby on her back. She took tablets and was given 
injections, but nothing changed: “If I [took] tablets or drugs, I felt more ill than before,” 
she recalled. On the advice of her mother-in-law, Zaitun visited a specialist whom she 
described as an ojo (witchdoctor), who started removing objects—batteries, keys, 
broken bottles, metals, and wires—from her body (replicating the treatment of colonial 
female diviners). Subsequently, Zaitun did experience relief, but fell ill again.In the 
intermittent years, Zaitun explains that she delivered twelve children. She continued to 
 
582 I, Zaitun, Ewata, 07/02/2017 (PN). 
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visit different ojo around Arua: “I took so many herbs, roots, leaves, some fruits—all 
kinds of things. Still I had no healing.” Eventually she became bedridden, unable to 
bend, carry luggage, or cook. She had previously worked as a tailor, but was now 
unable to do this work either: “Because of this sickness I became very fat. People 
thought it was good health. I was always feeling like there was gas in me. I was always 
tired, I couldn’t move. I could not walk half a mile.” In 2016, her neighbour, after 
witnessing her suffering, told her about Vivian’s prayers.  
 
Vivian prayed over Zaitun, and began to receive visions as to the cause of her affliction: 
“That [misfortunes] had happened behind me, with my grandparents. The vision was the 
bridewealth that was given for me, it was not enough. Some of the animals which were 
given died and they were supposed to be repaid. One of the animals died, [and] the ali, 
which was meant to be eaten by my husband’s clan, was not given.” Zaitun told her 
husband, who agreed to repay the bull and the cow that had died. After these transfers 
had been made and the ali eaten by her people, Zaitun explained, “My people even 
confessed that it is true they had been complaining, their words were causing the 
sickness.”  
 
Zaitun continues to pray with Vivian, and accompanied her on a pilgrimage in 2017, 
where she was able to walk for several days. Of her experience and her belief, she 
concludes:  
It is your faith. The prayers can only work with your faith. If you do not forgive 
those who have offended you, however much we pray for you, you will not get 
healed. If there is also a vision about you, if you have something to do with your 
maternal uncles or you have been cursed, if you do not do that forgiveness, it 
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will not work for you. It may or may not require eating [i.e. a formal sitting with 
elders].”583 
 
For Zaitun, Vivian’s prayers worked in tandem with the enactment of cultural 
settlements. In contrast to Nancy, the attentiveness of her husband and relatives resulted 
in a perceived successful outcome.  
 
6.4.3: Sharon: Witchcraft and Vengeance 
 
Sharon narrated her experience in English and Lugbara from her business premises in 
Awindiri.584 She explained that her misfortune began when she was growing up, in 
Koboko. Her father had died, and she grew up with her mother’s people. Sharon’s 
mother had worked for the Arua government and on projects with German NGO 
workers, and had amassed considerable personal wealth. Before her abrupt death over a 
decade ago, Sharon’s mother had bought a commercial plot in Koboko, and had begun 
to cohabit with a new man from Ayivu. At the funeral, however, a fight over the unpaid 
bridewealth broke out, after which Sharon’s mother’s relatives took the animals by 
force. Amidst this disruption, there was no effort to ascertain inheritance rights for the 
building, which Sharon’s stepfather then claimed. Sharon’s maternal grandfather, a 
respected elder, warned that “Since [my daughter] has children, one day they will come 
and follow these things themselves.” Despite this warning, the stepfather began to rent 
the building himself. It is significant that the stepfather was known as a “notorious” 
man, who reportedly consulted witchdoctors.  
 
583 I, Zaitun, Ewata, 07/02/2017 (PN). 
584 I, Sharon, Ewata, 19/02/2017 (OJ). 
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Indeed, in mid-2015 Sharon and her siblings petitioned for a sitting with her stepfather, 
in which joint ownership could be discussed. Subsequently, the stepfather opened a case 
at Koboko police station, claiming that “My wife’s children are trying to kill me” (an 
alleged diversionary tactic so that he could continue to use the buildings). The police 
instructed that the matter should be settled at home with elders. In the intervening years, 
three formal sittings were held, yet no resolution was found. Sharon and her siblings 
decided to abandon the case, but local government officers within the family urged 
them to continue. As of January 2017, Sharon was awaiting a letter from Arua 
magistrates.  
From 2015-17, though, misfortunes had begun to befall Sharon. Sharon believed that 
these events accrued to her because she was her mother’s firstborn, and so would stand 
to inherit the largest portion of the estate. In one mysterious accident, she was knocked 
off a bike, breaking her leg—and by her account, though no one had told him of the 
accident, her stepfather was reportedly celebrating at home with soda. He was rumoured 
to have suggested to his relatives: “Why are you crying? This is just the beginning!” 
After returning home, more misfortunes occurred. Fires began in her home, and on one 
occasion, a box containing the court documents caught alight. The family began to pray, 
and invited a female Anglican reverend to intercede for them as well.585  
Some weeks after these events, Sharon and six of her family members were called to 
court, and on a complaint lodged by the stepfather, arrested for trespassing onto his 
property. Later, the case was thrown out, and Sharon returned to her home in Arua. 
Lamenting the continued costs of attending court, she explained: “I lost my husband 
 
585 ObservationsPrayerful intervention, mysterious fires, February 2017, Ewata. 
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five years ago—I am the only one paying school fees for the children. It is a struggle.” 
But she was even more troubled by the continuing threats from her stepfather. After 
returning home, fires started again: as she recalled, “Other things started burning, until 
the whole house burnt down. [As] much as we involved many people to come and pray, 
Vivian, the other Christians in our church—things kept on burning. That is how we got 
to know this was about the ongoing struggle for my mother’s storage house.” Along 
with secular investigations by family members, Vivian’s revelation confirmed the 
stepfather’s involvement in the crimes. 
At this point Sharon’s elders took greater interest. A sitting was hosted in Koboko, 
where elders fasted and prayed over the issue. Within these prayers, a curse was issued: 
“If it is really true that our daughter Sharon’s mother’s fingers were put in this structure 
[i.e. constructed the building], let him [the stepfather/culprit] come openly and confess, 
or let it be.” Another curse enjoined: “If is it true that it was this man doing these things, 
then these things should also go back to him. His things should also start burning.” 
At Vivian’s compound, much excitement circulated about the cessation of the fires, yet 
Sharon’s trauma continued. Mysterious strangers visited her compound, offering gifts to 
Sharon’s children, and sending mysterious messages via phone. Word spread that her 
stepfather was talking openly, that “for the sake of that house he will kill someone.” 
Sharon explained that there would be repercussions for his use of the court against his 
family, as well as for him sending the fires (because of the curse), yet these effects 
would take time to manifest. She explained that the police could do nothing, “since no 
one has seen him [the stepfather] directly lighting the fire.” Some weeks after she 
narrated this story to me, Sharon left Arua.  
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6.5 From Peripheral Healing Practice to the Generation of Moral 
Knowledge 
 
In the Lugbara context, scholars have primarily associated female divination with the 
management of secrets and asocial afflictions. This trend echoes the focus in much 
anthropological literature on the secrecy and “magic” of divination, whereby techniques 
serve to “reveal the unseen, articulate[s] the unheard”.586 For this reason, scholars have 
argued that sufferers deliberately consult diviner-healers beyond the immediate social 
horizon. MacDonald notes that culturally or geographically distant healers are often 
regarded as offering more credible answers, or stronger prayers.587 Stroeken, moreover, 
has argued that Sukuma therapy-seekers deliberately visit diviners beyond their locality, 
believing that distance between themselves and the diviners allows the “truth of the 
matter to be revealed”.588 
 
For Lugbara women, however, the opposite is often true: quests for answers took place 
within the places where those seekers lived or worked. Whilst on the one hand these 
decisions were taken pragmatically against resource constraints, decisions were also 
taken on the basis that the source of diviner-healers’ insights could be validated, as 
could the strength of their healing powers. Indeed, for Lugbara women, distance 
actually bred suspicion. One Anglican consultant who was “healed” at Vivian’s place 
voiced suspicion as to Ezaru Mary’s power, recalling, “There was one [diviner] in 
 
586 M. Winkelman and P.M. Peek, ‘Introduction: Divination and Healing Processes’, in M. Winkelman and P.M. Peek 
(eds.), Divination and Healing: Potent Visions. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004, pp. 3-25, p. 15.  
587 MacDonald, ‘Believing sceptically’. 
588 K. Stroeken, ‘In Search of the Real: The Healing Contingency of Sukuma Divination’, in M. Winkelman and P.M. 
Peek (eds.), Divination and Healing: Potent Visions. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004, pp. 29-54, p. 31.  
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Vurra, I heard that she had witch-powers and they chased [her] away.” Indeed, 
divination is often practiced within the neighbourhood. This of course means that 
diviner-healers are imbricated in the social field of their consultants, and often have 
prior knowledge of cases based on rumours or gossip that travel through villages and 
church communities. The encounter is never entirely anonymous.589 Rather than reveal 
the unknown, divination can thus serve to order pre-existing possibilities for affliction 
or misfortune: as such, this process provides a parallel to how elders collectively comb 
through family histories, assessing personalities and the likelihood of historic contagion. 
That said, unlike encounters with elders, diviner-healers’ abilities were regarded as fact 
since they were validated by their connection to the divine.  
 
In some cases, however, seekers assessed their divinatory verdicts with scepticism, 
rejecting explanations of witchcraft or possession that were detached from the 
circumstances of their specific social bonds. For example, prior to consulting Vivian, 
Nancy was troubled by the events of her mother’s funerary rites, and the misfortunes 
which were accruing to her as the firstborn child. Nancy was born-again, and highly 
conversant regarding ideas of evil spirits. Yet when it came to her own case, she resisted 
Vivian’s suggestion that her misfortunes could have resulted from witchcraft from her 
husband’s new wife. Opting for witchcraft as an explanation would have been 
preferential, since prayer alone is believed to work in such cases (animal payments to 
elders not being required). But rather than seeking independent answers, Nancy, Sharon 
and Zaitun were instead searching for confirmation of their pre-existing concerns. In 
 
589 Even in more distant cases, knowledge of misfortune spreads far beyond local limits. I was told of aspects of 
Sharon’s case from members of Onzivu’s church community, as well as from relatives in Maracha—the reputation 
of her stepfather was widely known. 
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contrast to the forms of divination Stroeken described, for Lugbara women divination 
worked most effectively when it served to formalise possibilities already known by the 
consultants (and probably also by the diviner-healer). Consultants proactively 
participated in their diagnoses, to the point of rejecting explanations that did not 
resonate with their own knowledge of what could cause suffering  
 
For those who prayed with them, diviner-healers’ credibility was located in the changes 
experienced following their prayers. These changes did not necessarily involve 
miraculous instances of bodily restoration, though diviner-healers did cite these 
examples. As one woman recounted: “I am thanking God for Vivian and all of those 
who pray with her. She has been to pray in my home. Before her, no one would pray in 
my home. I used to buy food alone for the home—now my husband buys food. Last 
Sunday he woke up at 5am and said, ‘Are you going to church?’ Vivian has the key to 
life!”590 In this situation, simple reconciliation within a marital relationship was 
evidence of Vivian’s power. In the cases discussed above, focussing on processes rather 
than outcomes reveals that divination rarely served to fully eliminate a sufferer’s sense 
of misfortune. Rather, within the wider structures of clan and law within which women 
exist, divination proffered a script to evidence—and so begin to address—mistreatment 
or injustice. Of thirty recorded cases in this research, nine verdicts revealed that clan 
reparations were necessary (Appendix D). In this sense, divination can be seen to 
operate within the patriarchal settlement framework of clan transfers. In the same way 
that diviners were used to contact ancestors in the early years of independence, their 
services have since adapted to women’s exclusion, and the increasing material demands 
 
590 I, Trader, Ewata, 27/01/2017 (PN). 
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of this framework following return. Following Peek, the power of divination lies in its 
ability to investigate and transmute the wider social context, where “a culture's most 
cherished values are adapted to the real world of continual flux.”591 Rather than 
enacting radical change, as Casale suggested, divination remains strongly linked to the 
familial and clan structures within which individuals are imbricated.  
 
As noted above, choices to consult a diviner-healer may be pragmatic due to resource 
constraints, but other dimensions inform these choices as well: namely, the politics of 
voice that govern the resolution of misfortune. Divination reinforces the position of the 
marginal within clan frameworks, a restrictive politics of which women are cogently 
aware. Women seek divination not only because it is free, but because it provides 
answers that may serve as an entry point to a moral system from which they are 
excluded. As described in the previous chapter, women suffer uniquely as wives or as 
daughters: in their quests for healing, many women sought not to radically change 
kinship structures, but to bring attention to their own position within them. On account 
of this imbrication, accessing divinatory services yielded mixed outcomes, depending 
on the individual woman’s position regarding relatives, finances, and the willingness of 
others to enact wider repair. Whilst diviner-healers enabled women to draw attention to 
their own neglect, the transformative effect of this critique depended greatly upon the 
attentiveness of the familial institutions surrounding them.  
 
The different fates of Nancy and Zaitun are instructive. In both cases, Vivian revealed 
that the misfortune stemmed from failure to complete customary sanctions: avuta and 
 
591 M. Winkelman and P.M. Peek, ‘Introduction’, p. 7. 
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ali, respectively. In Zaitun’s case, her husband was receptive to the divinatory 
revelation, and mobilised animals to instigate a formal sitting. Accordingly, Zaitun was 
able to use the diagnosis to transform her state of sickness. In Nancy’s case, however, 
raising cultural payments was more difficult, and her elders were reluctant to table the 
issue (despite her donations to them). Thus Nancy proceeded with prayer, and when her 
fortunes changed, attributed this change to Vivian’s intervention. Yet should this change 
in the future, it is likely that Nancy would again turn to the unpaid debts around her 
mother’s death as an unsolved root cause. As argued above, enacting reparations 
reproduces normative aspects of a moral order based on kinship. Similarly, in Sharon’s 
case, given the inattention of the law to the lack of evidence surrounding witchcraft, and 
the powerlessness of her family to confront a wealthy stepfather, little could be done.  
 
When Lugbara women sought the causes of affliction, they purposefully selected 
healers who could mediate within local moral worlds—approaches that stand in stark 
contrast to pastors of charismatic Christianity, who, as observed in Pentecostal 
communities elsewhere, often encourage their followers to “break with the past.”592 As 
noted in Chapter Five, for example, tracing family misfortunes can lead to a verdict that 
radically challenges the moral standing of elders, by critiquing bridewealth and funerary 
payments. Yet diviner-healers are attentive to such frameworks, and to the implications 
of lingering debts. Whilst diviner-healers borrow from and perform different aspects of 
Charismatic Christianity, revelation remains highly culturally attuned. Moreover, 
diviner-healers’ therapies often contained a strong punitive element. As Heald noted in 
 
592 B. Meyer, ‘‘Make a Complete Break with the Past.’ Memory and Post-Colonial Modernity in Ghanaian 
Pentecostalist Discourse’, Journal of Religion in Africa 28:3 (1998), pp. 316-349, p. 318. 
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Gisu communities in Uganda, divination retains a strong focus on individual 
vengeance.593 For example, in Sharon’s case, where she believed her life to be at risk, 
prayer offered a means to manage the situation in lieu of governmental or elders’ 
prohibitions. The tenor of Vivian’s prayers mirrored the logic of the elders’ cursing, as 
she instructed the “fire to be returned to its sender.” Sometimes, after her prayers, she 
explained: “He [the stepfather] is now bedridden. His body is burning.”594 The 
retributive logics of suffering for one’s own actions thus echo elders’ traditions of 
verbal justice through the rudu curse. Whilst Vivian celebrated this result, Sharon 
continued to bear the effects of her stepfather’s witchcraft. Neither her elders’ curses 
nor Vivian’s prayers offered sufficient protection.  
 
6.6 The Violence of Home-Life 
 
In the case studies presented above, the women involved retained connections to their 
relatives and possessed relative wealth through employment in town. Yet many women 
who accessed diviner-healers did not enjoy such securities. In a further eight of the 
thirty recorded cases, misfortunes stemmed from problems in homes: quarrels with 
husbands, violence or the breakdown of marriages. In these cases, therapy-seekers 
sought not to redress cultural obligations but to stabilise their domestic lives. Again, 
context here is key, as compared to past generations home units have become 
increasingly autonomous, particularly in cases where couples rent away from their natal 
clans—indeed, the majority of women interviewed in diviners compounds fell into this 
 
593 S. Heald, ‘Divinatory Failure: the religious and social role of Gisu diviners’, Africa 61:3 (Diviners, Seers and 
Prophets in Eastern Africa) (1991), pp. 299-317. 
594 I, Vivian, Ewata, 07/02/2017 (PN). 
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category. Homes are sites riven by gender politics: labour is divided between men and 
women, with respect demonstrated through women’s serving men, and the separation of 
eating practices and foods. One consultant of Vivian’s explained that she did not 
directly look into her husband’s eyes, instead bowing as she spoke to him. Whilst there 
is obvious variation depending on the personalities within homes, the increasing 
autonomy of household spaces creates new vulnerabilities. On a case-by-case basis, 
women—particularly women recently married or married away from clans—are often 
subject to the protection and provision afforded by their husbands, with little influence 
over distribution of their household’s resources.  
According to custom, clan relatives invest intensive labour into making both material 
provisions and moral assurances for new homes. Visits by relatives and vetting 
processes are finalised by the transfer of bridewealth. Despite the erosion of clan 
involvement in marriages, powerful moral templates pervade how women and men 
should relate to each other, as well as how homes should function on a daily basis: 
homes are to be non-violent spaces, where respect (ru) is demonstrated. Conventionally, 
in cases where a husband excessively mistreats or abandons his wife, he may be subject 
to discipline from his clan brothers and elders. This intervention is intended to restore 
peaceful relations, in order to prevent the wife petitioning her relatives in her natal 
home. For example, in one Terego clan in 2016, a young male clansman was called 
before his clan and caned after publicly beating his wife. The recent introduction of clan 
by-laws means that in some cases men can be subject to fines or caned for 
indiscriminate violence. Yet the enforcement of this intervention depends on the 
investment of the clan, and provides little security for married couples who live away 
from ancestral lands, or who have eloped without the transfer of bridewealth. 
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NGO workers interviewed during this research, working with human rights frameworks, 
expressed concern at high rates of domestic violence in Arua.595 Elders and local 
government alike blame this rise on increasing rates of alcoholism and spousal 
abandonment, and in response to these cases, Arua District officials drafted an 
ordinance in 2016 that sought to regulate times for drinking, to punish perpetrators of 
gender-based violence, and to ban the illegal sale of waragi (local gin) sachets. Despite 
this attention, according to the representatives of one of the few NGOS engaged in the 
field, much violence goes unreported even to LCIs, with even fewer cases being heard 
in courts.596 In part, this is because involving government in family disputes (rather than 
clan members) is thought to manifest in a state of sickness known as aruba, which 
requires cultural cleansing.  
In Lugbara society many actors—from clan elders to Christian pastors—promoted 
visions of tualu based on hierachies within homeshome. Often these interventions 
served to encourage peace at the expense of acknowledging mistreatment—a point 
illustrated by Porter’s analysis of post-rape interventions in Acholiland.597 Here, 
maintaining social harmony often served to silence the claims of individual women who 
had been raped during war or by their partners. In one intervention in Aroi, Arua, 
covered by the local press, a resident appealed to her fellow villagers: “Convince your 
husband, pull him towards yourself with good deeds, no one will change your husband 
apart from you, solve your issues with him in the bedroom and once he senses that you 
 
595 I, Juliet Logose, HRC, 04/02/2016; I, SNV Programme Manager, Arua, 05/05/2016. 
596 I, Uganda Law Society, Arua, 04/05/2016. 
597 H. Porter, After Rape: Violence, Justice and Social Harmony in Uganda (The International African Library). 
Cambridge UP, 2016. 
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are unfazed by his acts, he will change.”598 Both Christian and secular cultural 
sensibilities promote a vision of heteronormativity in which the onus for peace and 
stability is placed on women. Vivian, too, explained the need for her female consultants 
to take care of their hygiene in order to keep hold of their husbands. Often the behaviour 
of women is blamed for the breakdown of social structures—in cases of elopement, for 
example, women who frequent markets are often blamed for promoting immorality. In 
each of these situations, women must cope with often difficult marital situations, with 
little recourse to other actors.  
Diviner-healers emphasised this relational aspect of being in explaining their practice: 
women visited them, and experienced possession since they were “weaker” than men, 
had more “forgiving hearts than men”, or were more ready to “submit to the spirit”.599 
Incidentally, returning to Middleton’s schema—diviners explained their practice not as 
pertaining not to essentialist ways of being, but because of the relational situations in 
which their female consultants’ lives were enmeshed. In a similar way, anthropologists 
have sought to explain female possession cults as historical and contemporary responses 
to patriarchal oppression and male dominance in public life. Female possession has 
been explained as response to subordination, or creative resistance to patriarchal values, 
mediated through historically accepted expressions.600  
 
598 C. Aluma, ‘Residents attribute increased domestic violence to alcoholism, night discos’, West Nile Web (Analysis), 
10 December 2019. Available at < https://www.westnileweb.com/news-a-analysis/arua/residents-attribute-
increased-domestic-violence-to-alcoholism-night-discos>.  
599 I, Mary, Vurra, 22/05/2017 (DA); I, Vivian, Ewata, 23/12/2017 (PN). 
600 For example, J. Boddy, ‘Spirit Possession Revisited: Beyond Instrumentality’, Annual Review of Anthropology 23 
(1994), pp. 407-343; E. Bourguignon, ‘Suffering and Healing, Subordination and Power: Women and Possession 
Trace’, Ethos, 32:4 (2004), pp. 557-574. Incidentally, elders often blamed male possession on the consumption of 
mairungi (khat), alcohol or other drugs, where the abrogation of responsibility is a choice. I have written about this 
in a forthcoming article with Anguyo and Odda.  
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Evidence of this coping pervaded conversation at Vivian’s compound, and frequently 
fed into the content of divinatory verdicts. One woman, Grace, explained,  
My husband wanted to strangle me and would continue until saliva was coming 
out of my mouth. He only stopped when one of the nearby neighbours came and 
rescued me after my mother-in-law suggested I should leave the home. I wanted 
a sitting with my elderly relatives, but my husband had not requested a sitting.601  
 
In this case, Vivian explained that Grace’s husband was possessed by orindi onzi, the 
spirit of a dead person possessing him, inspiring him with uncontrollable anger and 
intent to kill his wife. Grace did not approach her husband, but after prayer with Vivian, 
the violence stopped. Possession provided a means to explain violence, outsourcing 
responsibility of the husband to a spiritual agent. Accordingly, through prayer, Grace 
could address this agent, and work towards peace when few other options were 
forthcoming. In multiple other cases, prayer addressed the need for “peace at home,” 
providing a means for women proactively to address domestic disquiet.  
 
Notably, coping strategies were present not just through prayer, but by the continued 
association of women with diviner-healers and healing communities. Diviner-healers 
often formed deep and extended relationships with their consultants, and Vivian’s and 
Mary’s own experiences of overcoming marital issues, highlighted continually in the 
sermons that accompanied weekly deliverance masses, offered inspiration to their 
visitors. Moreover, diviner-healers’ compounds provided a place where women could 
cathartically discuss their own problems (the provision of food was an additional 
incentive to visit). Yet time within the compound still remained within the purview of 
watchful husbands, with some of Vivian’s followers confiding that their husbands had 
 
601 I, Trader, Arua, 21/01/2017 (PN). 
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contested the time they spent at her place. In mid-2017, Vivian explained she had to 
curtail her increasingly lengthy healing ministries, since husbands were complaining 
their wives had no time to perform cooking and household work. 
Both in the home, then, and in the clan, divinatory verdicts often served to reinforce a 
moral status quo that privileged the position of men. It is of note that both Mary and 
Vivian headed female households after separating from their husbands, occupying a 
position within local society that continues to be ambiguous. This position differentiated 
these women from the majority of other Charismatic Christians—including CCR 
intercessors who extol prayerful revelation—who reside in monogamous partnerships as 
a prerequisite for joining the movement. In Mary’s case, tangible insecurities arose 
when her return to her natal home coincided with the onset of mysterious sicknesses, 
and her clan sought to evict her. As noted, however, Mary’s gifts allowed her to reside 
with her clan, subverting suspicion of her own involvement with witchcraft, and as her 
reputation spread, she was invited to treat sicknesses across the District, receiving both 
hospitality and prestige. Mary spoke about the “envy” of people in her village, since 
despite being divorced and without status, she received many visitors who travelled to 
her home by car and motorbike. Vivian, too, after separating from her husband in South 
Sudan, lived with economic independence. Both women offered their services for free, 
but as an appreciation, satisfied consultants gave both women financial contributions. 
Since Vivian had afforded healing, many of her consultants feared that her 
interventions, if unrewarded, could turn against them. Indeed, developing gifts of 
divination provided economic security to women living in ambiguous social positions. 
In earlier eras too, diviners were often divorced or barren women, yet their powers of 
divination made them invaluable resources to the community.  
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Finally, the potential leverage that could emerge from healing gifts was evident in the 
number of Vivian’s consultants who themselves, later, laid claim to healing powers. 
Just as Vivian began her career through praying with another Anglican prophet, Mama 
Faith, those whom Vivian healed also received visions and heard voices, instructing 
them as to their own power. One of Vivian’s close followers, Opinia, explained: “When 
I came I was prayed for [and] I got healed but there was a revelation that God wanted to 
use me more greatly than just healing me, and that I needed to open my heart to God… 
God started using me until I am now preparing to initiate an altar in my own home.”602 
Vivian tolerated these gifts, but also expressed frustration on more than one occasion—
it was likely that Opinia would eventually take consultants away from her.603 Yet for 
Vivian to contest Opinia’s revelation would be to undermine the veracity of her own 
account, a position that Vivian could not realistically adopt. Echoing the past, the 
modern diviner-healer’s practice remains responsive to changing currents of public 
opinion: should another healer prove more powerful, their local status could quickly 
diminish. 
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has detailed the pasts and presents of Lugbara female divinatory healing. 
Prior accounts of female healing (e.g. Middleton) were structured by essentialist 
binaries between women and nature, but also neglected wider forms of female 
 
602 I, Vivian Ambe’s Disciples, Ewata, 20/02/2017 (PN). 
603 These revelations, which had befallen several women followers, differed from that of one man, Bosco. He lived 
with his maternal relatives adjacent to Vivian’s home, but took his gifts in a different direction: “I don’t take my 
children to hospital when they are sick but I pray for them, I use water, I use salt,” he said. Interview, Bosco, Chief, 
12/04/2017 (PN). 
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empowerment connected to Christian currents. Christianity served to legitimate the 
ambiguous position of divine healers. Yet, as Christian-inspired healers within an 
unstable terrain, this alignment has produced new ambiguities in an increasingly 
commercialised healing landscape. Engaging with these currents has transformed the 
work of diviner-healers, who now no longer treat cases of poisoning, or critical cases, 
but instead channel prayers and the Holy Spirit to reveal the causes of problems, in 
relation to chronic suffering. 
Overwhelmingly, diviner-healers are consulted by women. This chapter placed 
divinatory revelations and healing within the wider life course of women, which in the 
context of suffering, remains affected by the entrenchment of patriarchal clan structures 
since return. Though women’s suffering often stems from unpaid cultural debts and 
dues, women have little means to reverse this problem. Even so, as the diviner-healer’s 
compound is a site of ecstatic energy, this chapter has shown how women pragmatically 
reject or apply verdicts as a means of confronting and repairing frayed domestic 
relations. This chapter has moved beyond the “magic” of divination, considering 
revelation within not only the immediate context of the diviner-healer’s consultation, 
but the wider social position of women who are often already cognisant as to why 
affliction occurs.  
Chapters Five and Six have described evolution in clan-based and divinatory healing: 
clans and diviner-healers alike are invested in the ordering of social knowledge, as a 
means of explaining chronic suffering. Whilst previous analyses have suggested that 
specific types of conditions necessitate different interventions (clans managing ancestral 
sicknesses, and diviners managing witchcraft and sorcery), these chapters have shown 
that decisions to consult clans or diviner-healers is heavily influenced by access, which 
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is often in turn informed by gender. Whilst much transformed by Christianity and 
societal changes, clans and diviner-healers remain legitimate options in managing 





Part III: Death, Bereavement and Explaining Crisis  
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Chapter Seven 
Contesting Sacrifices: Subjective Realities and 




The previous chapters have explored how efforts to explain and act upon chronic 
sickness have aimed at reinforcing normative ideals of Lugbara society. The final three 
chapters of this thesis explore how efforts to explain sudden deaths, often with recourse 
to the same institutional landscape of healing, engender explanations that may erode 
clan and social protections for individuals. Since return, these explanations have 
increasingly been translated through the umbrella term witchcraft, though the term 
belongs to a non-European vocabulary whose development these chapters trace as well. 
Whilst scholars continue to describe these notions in terms of “belief,” I here seek to 
account for the production of ideas, in conjunction with crisis.604  
 
Since returning from exile, the fears of and responses to witchcraft have transformed.. 
Amid reconstruction, new forms of witchcraft have provided idioms to explain unequal 
prosperity. On the one hand, Lugbara link war to metaphysical shifts: people widely 
recognised that new forms of witchcraft “followed” populations back from exile in 
Congo, where experiences of exile facilitated new opportunities to buy witchcraft on the 
market.605 On the other hand, older fears of poisoning continue to exist, but are 
managed in new ways, through improvising pseudo-legal structures to evict suspects. 
During this research, state officials were concerned about an alarming rate of increase in 
evictions, wherein local ontologies came into conflict with protections afforded by 
 
604 R. Solomon, ‘Witch-killings and the Law in Uganda’, Journal of Law and Religion 35:2 (2020), pp. 270-296.  
605 As with the sicknesses connected to suru, mazi is said to “follow” families.  
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human rights and state law.606 The following chapters explore the dynamics behind 
witchcraft claims, considering the evolution in their logics, as well as the institutions of 
healing and law involved in anti-witchcraft action. 
 
As Turner (1964) noted long ago, dynamics of affliction and suffering are too often 
side-lined in analysis of witchcraft.607 Whilst, as in other contexts, Lugbara speakers use 
witchcraft in creative ways to describe power and change in public discourse, 
accusations against individuals that lead to evictions always follow sudden, successive 
“bad” deaths within families and sub-clans. Whilst much has changed following return, 
among rural populations deaths are managed at home, and elders and family members 
retain moral responsibility both in instigating funerary rights and in ascertaining 
responsibility for deaths. Sudden deaths evaded explanation via the logics predefined in 
this thesis. Instead, tragedies are explained through witchcraft or poisoning. Today, both 
prosperous and marginal members of a community may be accused of having a “hand in 
death”. 
 
A primary goal of this chapter is to detail new fears of witchcraft “conversions” that 
allegedly bring individual family members into new wealth via the sacrifice of their 
loved ones, practices known locally as mazi.608 In the region, analysts have highlighted 
evolving forms of witchcraft related to consumption.609 This chapter focuses on the 
specific local practices that facilitate shifts in witchcraft discourse, and transform ideas 
into anti-witchcraft action among Lugbara populations. At the outset, I explore the 
 
606 I, LCIII, Nyadri, 18/02/2017. 
607 V.W. Turner, ‘Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy versus Dynamics’, Africa 34:4 (1964), pp. 314-325. 
608 A. Apter, ‘Matrilineal motives: kinship, witchcraft, and repatriation among Congolese refugees’, Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute 18:1 (2012), pp. 22-44, p. 23. 
609 Allen, ‘Vigilantes, Witches and Vampires’; Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals. 
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shifting discursive terrain of witchcraft, before charting the landscape of metaphysical 
evidence mediated by healing practitioners and local authorities, evidence that 
establishes the presence of a “diabolical” threat within families. This chapter thus 
distinguishes between discourse and action: between ideas about witchcraft and their 
mobilisation in evicting suspects. Tracing the development of allegations, this chapter 
explores how evidence is mobilised by specific groups, and contested by others, amid 
contemporary social struggles. The analysis emphasises the uncertainties that prevail 
over an accusation which to many social groups is inconceivable, and which has no 
basis in lineage histories (often associated with forms of poisoning). Overall, I present 
the concept of witchcraft as a struggle to define health and healing mediated by 
complex interactions of social power and local politics.  
 
7.2 Evolving Ideas about Witchcraft 
 
The events described in this chapter and Chapter Eight were often referred to as 
witchcraft. As scholars have noted, the term presents particular challenges, invoking a 
particular European experience.610 Yet the widespread use of the term by West Nilers 
necessitates attention. Since the colonial period, Lugbarati and English vocabularies 
have commingled, with ideas of witchcraft defined by European missionaries and taken 
up by Lugbara people educated in Christian schools. Bearing the imprint of a Christian 
inflection that has divided forces along broad lines of good and evil, with witchcraft 
signifying suffering driven by the evil, immoral intent of malicious individuals.  
 
 
610 M. Crick, ‘Anthropologists’ witchcraft: Symbolically defined or analytically undone?’ Journal of the 
Anthropological Society of Oxford 10:3 (1979), pp. 139-146; P. Geschiere, The Modernity of Witchcraft. 
Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1995. 
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In reality, the Lugbarati terms that denote witchcraft depend greatly on the moral 
authority of the speaker. Witchcraft is singularly able to communicate moral judgement 
in relation to the exercise of power. For example, a charismatic priest may define curses 
as witchcraft (translating rozu as ‘bewitch’), to destabilise elders’ moral claims as to 
social reproduction as individualistic and harmful. Similarly, the curing prayers of a 
diviner could be labelled as bewitching, reflecting the speaker’s perception of a healer’s 
moral probity. Generally, my interlocutors distinguished between restorative spiritual 
practices on the one hand, such as the moral invocation of sickness via elders’ cursing 
or the cleansing of affliction via godly means (by church people or diviner-healers), and 
‘witchcraft’ on the other, namely, the immoral use of different powers to cause suffering 
by individuals. Whilst the former retained collective qualities, witchcraft arose from 
malignant individualism, greed or hatred, and was intended to destroy life. 
 
Precisely because witchcraft carries different connotations, different groups 
instrumentalise it to emphasise their chosen points about society. Publicly, urban elites 
and district-level officials often deploy the term as a means of decrying the 
“backwardness” of the “village,” and the lack of understanding (or education) of rural 
populations, who challenge the law through witchcraft. Of the evictions described 
within these chapters, the Maracha LCV, Lawrence Abriga, lambasted his rural 
constituents, asking: “Why do you behave like pagans and illiterate people?” Affording 
his voters some credibility, he continued: “Avoid taking the law in your hands and 
allegations of linking every death to witchcraft; [this] stems from grudges and land 
wrangles which must stop.”611 As a Lugbara leader, Abriga recognises the links 
 
611 G. Angupale, ‘Campaign against witchcraft ‘perception’ launched’, West Nile Web, 28 February 2019. Available at 
< >.  
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between crisis and accusation. Yet he dismisses the truth of witchcraft, suggesting 
instead that fears of witchcraft are recruited to advance villagers’ competition over land, 
which is increasingly scarce in Maracha. For Abriga, the solution was a series of 
district-wide “sensitisation” campaigns in 2019 that intended to eradicate “witchcraft 
perceptions.” As Rutherford has noted, for all commentators on the subject, knowledge 
of witches is tied to the pursuit of authority.612  
 
Witchcraft is not just a term used by a distanced, English-speaking elite, but also by 
villagers who fear the effects of nefarious forces. My interlocutors used the term 
precisely because of its global resonance: unlike other words, ‘witchcraft’ is singularly 
able to communicate the scale of misfortune befalling them. Of the evictions here 
detailed, one elder of Maracha District decried: “What about this war on witchcraft, it is 
worse than this war with guns.”613 This elder invoked parallels between witchcraft 
evictions and the South Sudanese civil war, so that I would understand the scale of the 
events. His claim, moreover, is also a comment on West Nile’s marginality: unlike 
refugees fleeing the “war with guns” who received humanitarian aid, the war on 
witchcraft in Maracha was largely ignored (despite its leading to killing within local 
ontologies of harm). Unlike Abriga, this elder drew attention to the facts of witchcraft 
as he understood them: his is a war based not on false allegations or irrationalities, but 
on the misdeeds of people within his sub-county. Hence, witchcraft is a term imbued 
with struggles between classes, and can be used to acknowledge or critique different 
conceptions of reality within Lugbara society.  
 
 
612 B. Rutherford, ‘To Find an African Witch: Anthropology, Modernity, and Witch-Finding in North-West Zimbabwe’, 
Critique of Anthropology 19:1 (1999), pp. 89-109, p. 92. 
613 Comment, Elder, Field notes 03/2017. 
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Discussions in English sit ill at ease with the host of terms expressed in Lugbarati (and 
in neighbouring languages) that are now incorporated into everyday speech, terms that 
could refer to witchcraft. Whilst many scholars simply opt to use English translations, 
others urge a disaggregation of occult concepts.614 My interlocutors distinguished 
between different types of occult forces, their impacts, and their temporalities. These 
terms evade discrete classification, yet my interlocutors widely distinguished between 
old and new types of witchcraft.  
 
7.2.1 Old Witchcrafts 
 
In the colonial era, forces termed ‘witchcraft’ were related to the sentiment of ole. 
Witchcraft was ambiguous, since ole could relate to socially-reconstituting sickness 
invoked by elders, or illegitimate sickness motivated by individualistic envy.615 In 
Lugbarati, the male witch was known as oleu, and was often a competitive elder who 
envied power and resources. Defining witchcraft relied on social competitions between 
elders. Less ambiguity was afforded to malicious women who were thought to poison 
through food or through placing substances on doorways. Whilst an oleu could be 
reintegrated, female poisoners were either killed or sent back to their natal homes. 
These differing fates stemmed in part from their outcomes—whilst the envy of the oleu 




614 G. ter Haar and S. Ellis, ‘The Occult Does Not Exist: A Response to Terence Ranger’, Africa 79:3 (2009), pp. 399-
412; H. West, Ethnographic Sorcery. 
615 J. Middleton, ‘The Concept of ‘Bewitching’ in Lugbara’, Africa 25:3 (1955), pp. 252-260.  
616 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 248. 
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Whilst in the context of the social field the oleu was a human who possessed an anti-
social disposition, being spiteful or (by contrast) overly friendly, the term was also 
attached to manifestations of evil. Lugbara people admitted that while they did not 
know the words or deeds that constituted witchcraft, particular signs connoted the 
presence of these forces. Witches were identified by their anti-social behaviours—night-
walking, vomiting blood, defecating on doorsteps, or destroying shrines—but their 
presence was also linked to more ethereal signifiers: by a light moving across distant 
fields, or by sightings of leopards, snakes, or wild-cats, animals into which the oleu 
could shape-shift and which then manifested to their victims in dreams.617 Alternatively, 
oleu were said to bewitch with their evil-eyes, or to have lights glowing from their 
wrists or anus. Representations of inversion were assigned to distant social groups: 
witches from Logo or Keliko groups, called kule or kole, who lived to the west of 
Congolese Lugbara populations, were said to be white in colour, and to walk upside 
down. Strangers moving through the territory were also suspected to be oleu, who 
afflicted their victims by spitting on them during the daytime.618 Since the intentions of 
these groups were not known, they could potentially be witches.619 By the late colonial 
period, the relative fixity engendered by the restriction of movement within a closed 
district further fed into fears about outsiders: witchcraft applied to broad classes of 
insiders and outsiders alike. 
 
As a psychic act, witchcraft was particularly adaptable to the specific mobilities 
generated by the colonial economy: witchcraft could work without the intimacies of 
 
617 Middleton, ‘The Concept of ‘Bewitching’’, pp. 255-6. 
618 ibid. p. 256. 
619 ibid. p. 259. 
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eating or touching, long attributed to sorcery, and so could be attached to anonymous 
strangers, as well as family members who left ancestral lands. As Sanders notes, 
patterns of movement have long transformed idioms of witchcraft.620 Whilst the 
separations of the colonial era generated fears of outsiders bolstered by the Lugbara 
concept of the oleu, flows of migrant labour were also connected to the appearance of 
new forms of witchcraft, designated by new vocabularies. Returning migrants were 
associated with the acquisition of elouja, derived from the Alur term lowjok (magician). 
Elders feared that juniors, freed from the disciplinary powers of the lineage, might 
purchase elouja on the open market either in the South or in Congo. On his deathbed, 
Middleton’s chief elderly informant instructed that young men formerly under his care 
“should not go to Congo and get evil things.”621 Along with labour migration “over the 
water,” itinerant traders from Congo who frequented Arua’s markets were feared as 
possessing elouja, understood as a power that could be acquired, but also that operated 
through knowledge of “words” learnt outside.622 As noted, these fears were generated 
by the separation of groups following the demarcation of colonial borders—but prior to 
that, oracle poisons (used by elders in poison ordeals) as well as herbs had been 
collected from Congolese forests. In its association with places where ordinary people 
did not pass, elouja was thus an expression of the differential experiences of modernity, 
and the fears of those who remained geographically fixed, subject to the movement 
restriction in a closed district. Not only did elouja describe forms of magic brought in 
from outside expressed in a foreign vocabulary, but the notion marked a shift in 
attribution of intent as well. Whilst the oleu acted out of envy, migrants associated with 
 
620 T. Sanders, ‘Territorial and magical migrations in Tanzania, ‘ in R. van Dijk, D. Foeken and M. de Bruijn (eds.), 
Mobile Africa: Changing patterns of movement in Africa and beyond. Leiden: Brill, 2001. pp. 27-46 
621 Middleton, Lugbara Religion, p. 183. 
622 ibid. p. 184. 
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elouja possessed relative wealth and acted out of disregard for ties of kinship and social 
bonds. As Middleton recognised, “elouja is a symbol of all that is unusual and uncanny, 
and is a response to social change.”623 Fears of elouja were indicative of the impact of 
modernity—and money—viewed through the prism of frayed social connections.  
 
Following the colonial period, the terms evolved. Oleu is today translated as ‘wizard,’ 
and still represented the exercise of anti-social, masculine power, associated with 
shining lights, shape-shifting, and manifestions of attacking visions. Wizardry was 
consistently explained as a traumatic, haunting experience in which the victim could be 
“strangled,” but rarely was it considered lethal. In any case, elders explained that such 
occurrences were less common, since wizards were “chased” away by prayer.624 More 
commonly, oleu became an accusation levelled at mourners who seemed unduly joyful: 
in this context it was not translated as ‘witch,’ but indicated inappropriate displays of 
grief and general anti-social tendencies. The term elouja is no longer recognised, but jo 
jok or joki joki is a form of psychic power associated with Alur people. Jo jok is still 
understood as an imported concept, associated primarily with Alur populations in Arua 
town, Alur women married into Lugbara homes, and to outsiders and migrants. Whilst 
the term arose outside the Lugbara social body, it has now been localised into it: after 
witnessing an incidence of strangling in Maracha, my co-worker expressed surprise that 
“this thing is here now.”625 In such instances people usually turn to churches or diviner-
healers, though on occasion elders are involved in sending away individuals directly 
 
623 ibid. p. 247. 
624 I, Elder, Abrici, 6/01/2018 (OJ); I, CCR, Vurra, 13/04/2017 (Z). 
625 Co-worker commentary, 07/2016. 
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associated with older signifiers of witchcraft (night terrors, strangling, or defecating in 
victims’ homes). 
 
Whilst fears about witchcraft took shape within a changing colonial context, as 
described in Chapter Three, elders suppressed these accusations with recourse to the 
ancestral system. The actions of an oleu in causing chronic sickness were understood as 
one possibility among many. Elouja, too, was entertained as a possibility in cases of 
sickness, but there is no evidence for mass anti-witchcraft action against returning 
migrants (or strangers). This could stem in part from shifting colonial legislation: the 
1912 Witchcraft Ordinance was largely intended to suppress both the accusations and 
the activities of witch-finders, featuring penalties both for witchdoctors as well as 
parties who accused others.626 But in the context of everyday clan proceedings, overt 
allegations against individuals were deeply taboo. Elders may have been troubled by the 
indiscipline of their juniors, but were undoubtedly reluctant to expel junior men on 
whose remittances they depended to pay taxes (and so to maintain health in the lineage). 
As such, elouja was usually discussed with scepticism. No mention of the term appears 
in research into healing and affliction in the early decades of independence. Barnes-
Dean went as far as to say that witchcraft had disappeared from Lugbaraland by the 
early 1970s, replaced instead by claims of poisoning.627  
 
 
626 R. Abrahams, ‘A Modern Witch-Hunt among the Lango of Uganda’, Cambridge Journal of Anthropology 10:1 
(1985), pp. 32-44. As Chapter Nine shows, the application of this act is ambiguous. The state intervened in claims of 
poisoning in particular ways, whilst missions engaged in cleansing of witchcraft.  
627 V.L. Barnes-Dean, Illness Beliefs and Social Change: A Study of the Lugbara of Northwest Uganda. PhD 
Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1978. 
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Following the return from exile, anti-witchcraft action, pivoting on both new and old 
concepts, has not disappeared but transformed. As highlighted by diachronic 
ethnographers in the wider region, the experiences of post-independence hardships 
precipitated an increase in the potential violence of these anti-witchcraft eviction.628  
 
7.2.2 New Witchcrafts 
 
Lugbara people widely acknowledge that, since returning from exile, new forms of 
witchcraft can simply be bought on the market, with today’s alleged purchasers 
identified not as oleu, but as having dri onzi (‘dirty hands’). Echoing earlier fears of 
elouja, the acquisition of new witchcrafts is connected not to envy, but to individual 
desires for vengeance or consumption. Detached from the social context, new 
witchcrafts can be bought by anyone, used to destroy relationships and bewitch 
enemies, but are most commonly used for individual advancement at the expense of 
family members. For ordinary Lugbara people, these new understandings of witchcraft 
help to explain the rise of a “mysterious cabal” of elite persons including cross-border 
traders, politicians, musicians, construction workers and increasingly anyone who 
prospers without an educational background.629 These acquisitions, which could be 
powers or charms, are simply referred to as something that is onzi (bad). Alternatively, 
indicating their imposition into Lugbara society, these forces are rendered in foreign 
vocabularies: mazi (from Congo), mayembe (from Southern Uganda), tonga tonga (also 
from Congo), and juju (from Nigeria) are often used to explain the acquisition of wealth 
 
628 Allen, ‘The Violence of Healing’; M. Douglas, ‘Sorcery Charges Unleashed: The Lele Revisited, 1987’, Africa 69:2 
(1999), pp. 177-193. 
629 L. Victor, ‘Those who go underwater: Indignation, sentiment, and ethical immanence in northern Uganda’, 
Anthropological Theory 19:3 (2010), pp. 385-411. 
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or political power. These terms are used imprecisely, since ordinary people are by 
definition barred from accessing them on account of their cost. 
 
In this modern nexus of witchcraft, mazi has become particularly prominent, and the 
dynamics through which it works most fully articulated. The term mazi is most probably 
derived from the Kiswahili or Lingala term maji (water), bearing reference to its origin 
of mazi in Congo.630 Mazi is understood as a deadly force, acquired yi etia (‘under the 
water’), which converts the blood of family members to money, wealth and status for its 
“owner.” Mazi is spoken of as an orindi onzi, an evil spirit, acquired by the wealthy 
from witchdoctors who facilitate underwater exchanges, in which the acquirer selects 
the names of close family members, often from within the nuclear unit, to be sacrificed. 
Mazi is understood to result in killing, whereby individual accumulation relies on 
“witchcraft conversions” that exchange “blood” to money. After being “taken by mazi,” 
victims are thought to be resurrected to “work” for their owner, either tilling their fields 
or working in “underwater factories”, generating their riches. Deals made with mazi are 
thought to be binding: if the purchased spirits are not appeased, the life of the owner 
will be taken instead.631 As I detail below, the clarity with which such dynamics are 
described varies greatly across religious and social groups. Particular healers have the 
ability to reveal facets of mazi hidden from the ordinary population (as do survivors). 
Broadly, mazi is widely accepted as a modern terror. It has become a catch-all phrase to 
denote the sacrifices that fuel modern consumption, and as such may be applied to 
explain the success of anyone who prospers without explanation. Mazi, too, has a 
specific temporality: elders often say these spirits “followed us back from exile.” 
 
630 Another suggested derivation was from work (azi) in Lugbarati. Ideas of water and work have long been 
entangled; for example, colonial migration was referred to as going ‘over the water’ (ma mu yi).  
631 Reflection, co-worker, 05/2017. 
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7.3 Witchcraft’s Modernity 
 
As Lugbara groups recognise witchcraft’s increasing marketisation in modern times, so 
too have anthropologists insisted on reading the evolution of African witchcraft 
discourse in tandem with discourses of modernity, specifically, the inequalities and 
exclusions ushered in by capitalist market economies.632 Calling attention to the 
recycled imaginaries of vampires, zombie workers and familial sacrifices, scholars have 
understood witchcraft not as a belief that resides within the social structure, but as a 
response to regional and global processes of accumulation. Witches have been theorised 
not as “traditional” enemies, but as “modernity’s prototypical malcontents,” or “icons of 
modernity”. For those excluded from prosperity, witchcraft provides a means to critique 
consumption and inequalities, and the damage that capitalist economies are perceived to 
inflict on everyday life, family ties and social connections.  
 
Analysts have warned against reproducing “modernity” as a universal condition, urging 
instead the emplacement of fears of modern development in particular places.633 
Notions of sacrifice reverberate through West Nile’s history, which throughout the 
colonial period involved the exploiting the bodies and labour of local populations, first 
in the slave trade and later in migration, to “work for” others. As Shaw notes, witchcraft 
serves as a vehicle to express histories of oppression in the present.634 Whilst building 
 
632 See, for example, Jean and John Comaroff, ‘Introduction’, in Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (eds.), 
Modernity and its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
pp. xi-xxxvii, p. xxix. See also Geschiere, The Modernity of Witchcraft. 
633 T. Sanders, ‘Reconsidering Witchcraft: Postcolonial Africa and Analytic (Un)Certainties’, American Anthropologist 
105:2 (2003), pp. 338-352. 
634 R. Shaw, ‘The production of witchcraft/ witchcraft as production: memory, modernity and the slave trade in 
Sierra Leone’, American Ethnologist 24:4 (1997), pp. 856-876. 
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on historical patterns of exploitation, the sacrifices within mazi represent a vernacular 
way to express how post-war development is perceived to have disproportionately 
benefitted local insiders, whilst excluding the majority of the population. Discursively, 
mazi provides a means to critique regional inequalities: for rural populations, Arua town 
has acquired a reputation as a place divorced from village morality, a place where 
nefarious forces can be bought on the market.  
 
Yet there is more to the story than regional inequalities between town and village. The 
proximity of Arua District to international borders, and the nature of capitalist 
production over those borders, has appeared in specific ways within witchcraft 
discourse. The dominance of illegal smuggling as the engine for these developments is 
significant: not only does the clandestine movement of goods produce value in invisible 
and unstable ways, but the dynamics of this operation are inherently secret.635 
Following the return from exile, since the accumulation of profit depended on traders’ 
subterfuge, and rural populations witnessed the flows of commodities along panya 
roads without explanation (including the unexplained prosperity of relatives), it is 
unsurprising that ideas of mazi quickly adapted to supplement the logics of illegal 
supply chains. Rural mazi discourse mirrored these covert transactions: mazi spirits 
were bought from magical specialists in Congo, just as gold from traders was 
exchanged for cash and other goods; mazi shops were suddenly stocked in the morning, 
 
635 Anxieties about trade and the occult are not entirely new. The magendo trade during Amin’s regime was linked 
to rumours of body snatching by faceless intruders known as kulia batu, who were thought to use heads to raise 
buildings. Kulia batu were thought to come from Congo, or to be white people who exchanged bodies for money 
through regional or trans-African business networks. “This is when these issues of sacrifice started. These kuela 
batu would find you, grab you and take you away. If you resisted, they cut off your head, regardless of you being a 
person. Those people who overpowered you, they took you and you were never seen again.” Interview, Anglican 
Elder, Abrici, 11/05/2016. 
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just as illicit deliveries from across the border commonly arrived under the cover of 
night to refresh merchants’ supplies the next day.636 Illegal activity thus created a space 
for rumours of the occult to flourish. Beyond the discursive parallels, the first 
accusation of mazi was levelled at one of Arua’s prominent tycoons in the early 1990s: 
as detailed in the next section, despite death threats from his clan members, this trader 
did not reveal his involvement in illicit trading, maintaining the separation between the 
world of trade and the world of mazi. The disjuncture in truth-claims between insiders 
and outsiders persists: one former trader, who strongly refuted the trade, claimed that: 
Mazi—it is not true. These accusations are everywhere, but they come up 
because people don’t understand about smuggling. In Arua here, the richest 
people have shops in town, but they are making so much money. It is all to do 
with smuggling, food stuffs, oil—they keep it in the village. So they are in town 
looking for contacts, and after making that contact, they will supply that person 
with bulk supplies. These rich people—the ones that have developed Arua—
they are supplying all these people who sell small things here. You see them 
going round town in closed vehicles, distributing. But in the village, people 
don’t understand these things, so they accuse them of mazi.637  
 
Those who knew of the trade professed the innocence of the tycoons, unlike accusers, 
who found mazi a more plausible explanation. Mazi provides a means to critique 
economic exclusion, and feeds off of inherent secrecies in post-war development. But to 
equate mazi as a mirror to economic development precludes a focus on the institutions 
that have shaped this development, and how rumours (which surround many of Arua’s 
wealthy traders, hoteliers and businessmen) do or do not translate into accusations.  
 
Post-war modernity has affected the imaginaries of witchcraft in other ways. Mazi has 
taken shape amid the increasing role of Christian actors in offering spiritual protection, 
 
636 Specific rumours were recounted to me about the owners of bus companies and other investments, but I have 
not recounted these to protect anonymity of those involved. 
637 Conversation, male trader, Field notes, 06/2017. 
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bolstering a new, zealous leadership across denominations (cf. Chapter Four). The faith 
of many Christian leaders today has been formed not through mission education, but 
through exposure to different ideas in diverse geographies, including Pentecostalism in 
Southern Uganda, or during exile in Congo. In contrast to their predecessors who were 
interested primarily in condemning ancestor worship, contemporary pastors have 
focused their social condemnations on witchcraft and witchdoctors. My interlocutors 
suggested that ideas of “going underwater” in fact originated from Christian evangelists. 
As Mary, one elderly lady who spent seven years in Congo (returning around 1987) 
astutely explained, “When I came back from Congo, things in Arua were similar. 
[Though] there were now people prophesising against witchcraft and going under the 
water.”638 Ideas of sacrifice thus provide a metaphor for West Nile’s economic history, 
whilst simultaneously bearing the hallmarks of Christian legacies of disavowal. 
Exchanging people for wealth represented an extreme example of anti-Christian 
activity, which once took the form of elders’ sacrificial rites, and which now was 
attributed to a modern, immoral elite.  
 
After exile, with a new generation of male leaders at the helm, Christian churches began 
to apply themselves to explaining the problems of modernity. Extractive witches 
provided an answer to explain the economic malaise experienced by the majority of the 
population—a significant expansion of misfortune away from direct sickness and 
towards broader concerns for well-being and economic development. Even for those 
whom the ‘prosperity gospel’ teachings have seemed unrealistic, following orthodox 
 
638 I, Woman, Abrici, 09/05/2016 (OJ). 
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theology Christian evangelists regularly disavow excessive wealth and greed, preaching 
instead the sharing of wealth through legitimate channels including offertory.  
 
Crucially, these ideas have been propagated over new public media, breaking former 
taboos on speaking about the subject. In the late 1980s, the Arua Catholic Diocese 
printed the names of accused witches in a weekly newspaper that was distributed in its 
services.639 Today, descriptions of witchcraft regularly resonate over the airwaves of 
local radio shows, with the two most popular stations being funded by the Anglican and 
Catholic dioceses. Rural homesteads regularly tune into Lugbara- and English-language 
shows that both report on witchcraft cases from a factual basis as well as make satirical 
comment on local events. Songs of local musicians also address issues of witchcraft: 
one popular song on the radio dissuades people from killing their family members, and 
another artist, King Weeda, has used the airwaves to rebut accusations of ‘going 
underwater’ levelled against him. Print media, too, bring stories of sacrifices from 
Kampala, and on occasion report on events across West Nile. One Ayivu suspect, 
Samuel Ocatre, explained that he had been hounded by journalists, with his case (and 
his name) published in the Red Pepper paper in 2014.640 Bookshops in Arua town sell 
sensationally-titled books that cover changing demonologies and instructions on 
‘Healing the Family,’ as well as testimonies of reformed pastors who have broken with 
devilish underwater ties before turning to Christ. Since return, the exposure to ideas of 
malevolence has shifted profoundly. As Bonhomme observes regarding the circulation 
 
639 T. Allen, ‘A Flight from Refuge: The Return of Refugees from Southern Sudan in Northwest Uganda in the late 
1980s’, in T. Allen (ed.), In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight & Homecoming in Northeast Africa. London: James 
Currey, 1996. pp. 220-261. 
640 Allegation, June 2016, Arua. 
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of occult rumours in Gabon, not only do media outlets localise distant events, but “they 
also contribute to the social perception of the phenomenon.”641  
  
At the regional level, these changes are significant, making public new ideas which 
were formerly governed by a strict politics of speech. Yet as La Fontaine notes, there is 
a critical difference between a belief in witchcraft and taking action against malevolent 
forces.642 As observed in this research, the messy politics of anti-witchcraft action 
resists correlation to a broad analytic such as “modernity”, or changing media 
currents.643 Within the field of action, a witch is a relative on whom many depend on for 
resources, and anti-witchcraft action was consistently contained within the family unit. 
Understanding evictions necessitates an engagement with how shifting ideas become 
plausible within specific familial contexts: with the logics that produce the witch. 
 
7.4 Evolution of the Field of Action 
 
To understand the diversity of local perspectives on anti-witchcraft action, it is essential 
to consider how what Neihaus terms “subjective realities”—whereby symbolic 
formulations become “clothed with an aura of factuality”—are produced in relation to 
suffering, and how these ideas are taken forward within a local political field.644 
Behrend, too, urges attention to the forms of evidence mediating between discourse and 
 
641 J. Bonhomme, ‘The dangers of anonymity: Witchcraft, rumor, and modernity in Africa’, Journal of Ethnographic 
Theory 2:2 (2012), pp. 205-233, p. 209. It is not that any occult rumour is accepted as truth. In fact, my Lugbara 
friends often rejected or questioned sensational media reports.  
642 J. La Fontaine, ‘Witchcraft in Bugisu’, in J. Middleton and E.H. Winter (eds.), Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa. 
London: Routledge, 1963. pp. 187-220, p. 198. 
643 Sanders, ‘Reconsidering Witchcraft’. 
644 I. Neihaus, ‘Witches and Zombies of the South African Lowveld: Discourse, Accusations and Subjective Reality’, 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 11:2 (2005), pp. 191-210; See also Geertz, 1973: 90, cited in Neihaus, 
p. 203. 
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realities, asking how specific forms of proof codify and reproduce fears of the occult.645 
These two interventions thus begin to bridge the gap between discourse and the field of 
action. Following in these footsteps, this section details the phases of the development 
of suspicions prior to accusations, as well as the scepticism and questioning around the 
production of evidence. Specifically, I now trace the therapies and technologies through 
which villagers tied notions of power acquired ‘under the water’ to episodes of local 
suffering.  
 
7.4.1: The First Allegation of Mazi 
 
The first accusation of mazi occurred in Arua town in the early 1990s. As the first 
reported case of a new witchcraft, these events mark the first moment that fears were 
translated into the contact of social action. The sequencing of the case is now part of 
Arua’s history, constituting a “subjective reality” of its own making. To traders, the 
accused, a man named Ondua, is known as one of Arua’s tycoons, a self-made man 
from humble beginnings who profited during exile. His family members, however, 
alleged that his wealth was acquired yi etia, from ‘under the water.’ After a spate of 
successive deaths within Ondua’s extended family, his brothers levelled death threats at 
him, claiming the deaths resulted from Ondua’s sacrifices to mazi. In response, Ondua 
convened a quorum of Ayivu’s most prominent elders, who ritually cursed him through 
a rudu prayer: “If truly you did this you will die within two weeks”. After he survived 
this death sentence, however, Ondua’s relatives continued to threaten his life. The case 
culminated when he fled to a local Anglican church, stripping out of his clothing and 
cursing himself before God: “God, I am as good as useless: if truly I have sacrificed 
 
645 Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals. 
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people, [then] take my life, the time to take my life is now.”646 Ondua’s nakedness 
during his self-cursing added a powerful cosmological and symbolic dimension to the 
act.647 As Abonga et al., explain, naked bodies carry the potential to “create an effect of 
shame through a performance of extreme frustration”.648 In Arua, such an exposure is 
usually attributed to marginalised persons, often elderly women, who use their nudity as 
a last resort to curse family members who have rendered them powerless through an 
abrogation of support.649 Ondua inverted this process, placing himself at the mercy of 
his relatives and neighbours, and bringing shame to those who accused him.650  
 
The gravity of this performance diminished the violence against Ondua. An Aruan 
woman familiar with the case explained: “People didn’t believe him—but despite this, 
[they] thought that God was stronger than his evil. If he was living, this was God’s 
will.”651 Though he was able to remain on his ancestral land, his economic ties with his 
extended family have been severed, and Aruans continue to fear him and his family. 
One young man described Ondua’s children as “wrong elements in society, because it’s 
believed they sacrifice people for wealth.”652 Hinting at his changed reputation, Ondua 
himself conceded to me after the interview that “Since you are here, people will say you 
are the new cause of my wealth.”653 
 
 
646 Accused, 16/06/2016 (PN). 
647 F. Abonga, et al., ‘Naked Bodies and Collective Action: Repertoires of Protest in Uganda’s Militarised, 
Authoritarian Regime’, Civil Wars 22:2-3 (2020), pp. 198-223. 
648 ibid, p. 201. 
649 This is a form of protest which has been exhibited in numerous Ugandan contexts, recognised as such by my 
interlocutors. For example, in 2017, a naked protest from a collective of women in Kasese brought alarm during a 
focus group with Lugbara elders, who explained such events as one of the worst forms of curses. 
650 In cursing himself, Ondua explicitly referenced the allegation levelled against him—unlike elders, who offered 
their curse without reference to the terms of the offence. 
651 Arua Resident, Field notes, 07/2016. 
652 ibid. 
653 First Allegation of Mazi, Arua, 06/2016. 
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Accounts of conflict often differ between the accusers and the accused. The above 
narrative highlights both the injustice of the accusation and the complexities of 
containing a modern threat. Left unanswered is how, and why, Ondua’s relatives 
launched allegations that not only resulted in violence, but ran counter to their own 
economic interests. Whilst Ondua maintained that his relatives acted out of envy—these 
events were by no means a “leveller”—economic ties between him and his extended 
family were severed.654 Subsequently Ondua explained that many of those who accused 
him have “run mad” or have passed away, outcomes which he attributes to the effects of 
the rudu curse, in light of their false allegations against him. The eviction held grave 
consequences, both for Ondua and for those who sought to evict him—impacting not 
just their own health but the long-term health of the clan. 
 
7.4.2 Observing Inequitable Accumulation 
 
In the field of accusation, economic differences between young men did contribute to a 
sense of suspicion. Reflecting on the increasing autonomy of the household as a unit of 
accumulation across the countryside, in the subclans where accusations unfolded, 
neighbouring clan members commented on the suspicious origins of the prosperity of 
their brothers. In this way, accusations of witchcraft among Lugbara populations follow 
a trend observed elsewhere in Africa, wherein the decline of collective collaboration 
creates a space for allegations of witchcraft between households.655 Without necessarily 
being privy to the dynamics of accumulation, relatives speculated on increases in 
others’ wealth. Those accused were all men who had prospered to varying degrees, but 
 
654 F. Golooba-Mootebi, ‘Witchcraft, Social Cohesion and Participation in a South African Village’, Development and 
Change 36:5 (2005), pp. 937-958. 
655 See ibid. and Neihaus, ‘Witches and Zombies’. 
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who often had larger houses, larger vehicles or more significant business holdings than 
their peers. Importantly, those accused had received little formal education, which is 
recognised as a legitimate, moral route to prosperity. Without formal education, these 
accused men shared the same disadvantages of others who struggled, raising the 
question: why, then, did they prosper? In contrast to the first case of mazi, here those 
accused increasingly had prospered through means which could be explained with 
recourse to legitimate productivity: tobacco, large-scale agriculture or local trade.  
 
Two examples serve to illustrate the point. First, one man, Samuel, accused in 2010 in 
an Ayivu village whose economy was centred on tobacco, explained that quiet 
allegations surfaced as he prospered in tobacco-growing over the course of a decade. 
Having established his position as a middle-man, Samuel began selling his neighbours’ 
crops to buyers in Arua.656 Tobacco is a difficult and tedious crop to grow, taking a full 
year of intensive work before the crop can be sold, and Samuel’s own brothers struggled 
to make money from cash-cropping. As Samuel’s fortunes grew and he acquired a shop 
and a farm, allegations began to spread.657 Second, another informant, David, explained 
that in the late 1990s, he began to trade cars between Uganda and South Sudan. His 
mobility provoked suspicion, particularly since he returned to his ancestral villages in 
vehicles that he would then sell in Sudan. Vehicles are both a coveted possession and a 
sign of status—that a family member would return with one would provoke much 
comment. Yet David was accused of witchcraft only after his business failed, when war 
in South Sudan made his business impossible. His relatives offered various 
 
656 I, Accused, 13/06/2016 (PN). 
657 I, Elder and Accused, 01/06/2016 (OJ). 
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explanations: after several deaths in his clan, they claimed that he was using mazi to 
recoup his lost gains.  
 
Oftentimes, suspicions of mazi spread as rumours among those fixed in place, at home 
in the village. In the absence of those accused—typically mobile young men—relatives 
could only speculate on the source of their wealth. Indeed, many businessmen are 
cogently aware of the risks of their prosperity. To deflect such allegations, many 
explained that they paid or contributed school fees, bridewealth or healthcare support to 
their relatives. After a successful business deal, one suspect businessman slaughtered a 
cow, dividing the meat equally between villagers. Yet as suspicions mounted, these 
gestures, rather than demonstrating generosity, were interpreted as manipulative actions 
to deter attention from his evil-doing—as Middleton noted, the witch could be either 
anti-social or overly friendly.658 Giving gifts and alms in this case served to foment pre-
existing suspicions: rather than exonerate the accused, participating in reciprocity 
among kin actually contributed to their guilt.  
 
Since the 2000s, allegations of mazi have sped through surrounding rural villages. 
Accusations have now moved beyond trade, affecting men at lower echelons of Lugbara 
society, including those who have profited from (highly visible) agricultural production, 
as well as healers. Allegations have also spread as volumes of illicit cross-border trade 
have diminished, under the increasing regulation of the Uganda Revenue Authorities.659 
Simple attributions to the secret engines of regional modernity, therefore, have limited 
 
658 Middleton, ‘The Concept of ‘Bewitching’ in Lugbara’. 
659 Titeca, ‘Tycoons and contraband’. 
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explanatory value in explaining the evolving spatiality of accusations into the 
countryside. Whilst inter-household commentaries on wealth produced a field of 
jealousy, disbelief, and fears of witchcraft in some cases, in other cases, those accused 
possessed no wealth at all. 
 
7.4.3: Metaphysical Evidence 
 
At times, suspicions of unease arising from economic inequalities were confirmed by 
metaphysical phenomena: by occult visions and sightings which were interpreted as 
indicating imminent danger. In one village, visions of white people were rumoured to 
emerge from certain streams. In another, a body of water turned blood-red, and in 
another case, 100-strong flocks of sheep were reportedly sighted on the road at night.660 
In other cases, snakes appeared.661 Rumours of these sightings circulated in homes in 
the area, creating a sense of panic that evil was at large. These visions evoke the terror 
generated by the appearance of white spirits, which during the colonial period was 
interpreted as an omen of death. Whilst previously anthropoid apparitions were thought 
to be immanent manifestations of divinity, these concepts were now attributed to 
mazi.662 New concepts are made legible through conjuring and reworking old ideas of 
Adro: sightings believed to predict future deaths, which may befall specific clans.  
 
In other cases, individuals’ dreams and visions were interpreted as portents of tragedy. 
Such visions may involve a conjuring of the suspect; indeed, wizards have long been 
thought to appear in visions or dreams, or to appear in the hut of the victim. Lugbara 
 
660 FG, Aree, 02/11/2016 (OJ). 
661 I, Security, Etoko, 9/11/2016 (OJ). 
662 Sheep were similarly sacrificed by diviners in difficult cases of affliction, and were rarely used in ancestral 
sacrifices. 
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people have long recognised the power of dreams to convey malevolent future events. 
Often, elderly women are associated with dreams that predict the future, but messages 
can appear to anyone. One herbalist accused of witchcraft, Peter, recounted a painful 
rumour spread around his village that he had acquired mazi, after his niece relayed the 
contents of a dream which showed Peter holding a coffin in his house, signalling that he 
had pulled a body out of the grave.663 Many of his clan believed that this was evidence 
of mazi: that the body would be resurrected. Peter explained that these visions ignited 
communal suspicions, though he believed his niece had been “bribed” by envious 
relatives.  
 
Another young man, Ronnie, experienced a dream that signalled his being “taken by 
mazi.”664 He explained: “In a dream I saw a coffin: I was going to die, I would be buried 
in the coffin, because those people who have the mazi have not given up—they are still 
trying to affect me.” Not every vision or dream is accepted by the wider community. 
Whilst this dream served as a confirmation for Ronnie himself, who endeavoured to 
bring up “the issue of mazi” in clan meetings, his elders dismissed his hauntings on 
account of his “history of being mad” due to his mairungi-eating. A more sympathetic 
hearing was provided by his local Anglican church, who offered credence to his visions, 
and whose pastors organised prayers in his compound. Soon afterwards, Ronnie’s 
family members began seeing wild foxes and other visions, and suffering misfortunes: 
his father had a boda boda (motorbike taxi) accident and his brother was the victim of 
theft. Within his family, unusual visions and events precipitated the consciousness that 
 
663 I, Accused, Maracha, 9/03/2017 (OJ). 
664 I, Man, Etoko, 14/12/2017 (OJ). 
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they were under attack. As noted above, visions or sightings can ignite suspicions, but 
they can also be rejected on the basis of the social status of those who experience them.  
 
In a context where it is taboo to know too much about witchcraft, survivors are a 
particularly valid source of testimony. Some young men who had been treated by 
herbalists recounted vivid accounts of “being taken.” A young trader named Wilfred, 
for instance, who worked at a trading centre near the border, has been the victim of 
several witchcraft attacks, elevating him to the status of ‘occult expert’ within his 
immediate environs:  
[They] will bring back the whole body and put your spirit back in you—you will 
come back to life and you will work for them doing any kind of work for them, 
not necessarily evil, you might become a slave, doing digging, so [you are] still 
there for them, visible to them but not to your people. [They] won’t keep you in 
the same area you were working before. Your relative might see you, but you 
might not recognise the relative. In most cases you will not be normal like the 
way you were before. You can become abnormal, can become deaf, can be 
dumb, [you] can be anything. These stories about mazi are rampant, we do not 
know whether you are taken underwater, or how you are taken, if that they first 
make you to die and then they come at night and exhume your body or you just 
start running, you can even disappear into water, even very shallow water.665 
 
Wilfred’s account offers a key detail as to why young men in his trading centre were 
being attacked: to be resurrected and involuntarily employed. Wilfred was an animated 
narrator, and though he explained that he was reluctant to speak about these events 
“openly,” he freely shared his experiences with his peers (and during this interview).  
 
7.4.4 Healing Interventions 
 
Many Christian actors, diviner-healers, and herbalists have participated in treating those 
who claim possession by mazi spirits. Some therapists have engaged directly in 
 
665 I, Victims, Ovujo, 15/06/2016. 
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revealing the involvement of a close family member in these events. Of his experience 
in treating cases, one herbalist in Terego explained:  
[For] mazi, things which come underwater, [healing] takes longer. For mazi, the 
person inflicted will always be violent, will always want to use force and run to 
a nearby body of water. After you have caught them, lay them down, cover them 
in a blanket, and cover the whole body and the head. Herbs from a broken pot 
are also covered, placed in a direction where the wind will blow so the person 
can inhale the herbs. As this is happening, it is likely the person will say the 
name of the person who is using mazi on them.666 
 
In a similar way, diviner-healers’ prayers often revealed individuals within localities 
who had gone underwater. As with the therapies discussed in the previous chapter, since 
diviner-healers often serve home clans or close communities, such revelations often 
serve to codify pre-existing knowledge, but knowledge backed in these cases by the 
authority of the Holy Spirit. One diviner-healer explained that she would not reveal the 
name publicly, but testimonies from communities suggested otherwise. Others sought 
cleansing at charismatic healing centres, where prayers induced a possession state 
where the afflicted person would scream the name of the accused. Healers draw on 
different ritual traditions, but often these interventions are orientated towards extracting 
the name of the human agent behind witchcraft. As with the veracity of dreams and 
visions, whether these experiences are considered credible rests both on the reputation 
of a healer and the social position of the sufferer. That these fears travel as rumours 
around homesteads, which actively debate their veracity, only increases their 
contingency.  
 
In recent years, groups of Christians, often led by the CCR, move “home-to-home” to 
cleanse witchcraft. Indeed, without suggesting a definitive causal explanation, from the 
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2000s on evictions have spread first throughout Ayivu and then Maracha as Charismatic 
Christianity (and the CCR in particular) have become established. Behrend, for 
example, has documented how anti-witchcraft action spearheaded by a lay movement of 
Charismatic Christians served to reproduce fears of a cannibalistic form of witchcraft in 
western Uganda. Modern “crusades” brought out evidence in a “dramatic discourse of 
discovery”, which successfully produced scapegoats for communal fears of a novel 
threat.667 In Maracha District, CCR members adopted similar forms of ritual action as 
Behrend described: invitations for groups to “cleanse” neighbourhoods were generally 
mediated by elders, and though they were explained as “managing disunity” among 
village members, often these crusades were intended to manage difficult accusations in 
a non-violent way, or in situations where elders were compromised. 
 
In one case, elders invited a charismatic group to pray following suspicions of an 
herbalist’s (named Peter) acquisition of mazi. Communal tensions rose after the death of 
a woman in 2016, followed by outbreaks of possession among young men in the clan, 
who had started “running mad,” shouting the name of the suspect and running to bodies 
of water (this being particularly concerning since such episodes are usually ascribed to 
women). Clan elders had permitted Peter to operate within the village, so their own 
authority to intervene was compromised.668 CCR members from across the district 
camped in the village and prayed for three days, moving from “home to home,” praying 
and cleansing each homestead. Items such as bottles, human hair, tree roots, sewing 
 
667 H. Behrend, ‘Witchcraft, Evidence and the Localisation of the Roman Catholic Church in Western Uganda’, in R. 
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Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2006. pp. 43-60, p. 44.  
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needles and ojo bulbs were extracted from almost every homestead, including from the 
homes of elders. These objects were removed, doused in holy water or salt, and burnt.  
 
As with the lay Charismatic members Behrend described, CCR members were greatly 
concerned with the production of evidence. One CCR member explained: “The level of 
sin is so overwhelming. If someone here is able to say ‘you have this, there is evidence’ 
[then] this is happening.”669 One female member, who has been involved in many 
crusades to combat the nefarious powers of businessmen in her area, explained how 
seemingly benign herbs could indicate the presence of evil: “At night those things turn 
into evil spirits like mazi spirits in the image of white people, but their fingernails are 
not the normal ones—they are extremely slender, very long. I have seen them—
sometimes as they pray some of the spirits go out. Come out of a person as they shake 
you.”670 Others described how in cases of mazi white spirits were seen emerging from 
rivers, echoing the collective forms of terror described above. In any case, in the context 
of these crusaders, the removal of objects or sighting of spirits are all evidence that 
codified these fears.  
 
That said, in the two cases observed during this research, whilst these crusades did 
contribute to the recognition of local fears, they were ill-equipped to actually deal with 
the presence of a witch. Indeed, the evidence thereof, produced by predominantly 
Christian women, met an ambiguous reaction. Village men questioned the evidence 
obtained by Holy Spirit-filled Charismatics, with one elder insisting that many of the 
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herbs that had been burnt as witchcraft objects had in fact been bought for healing. Most 
of all, people resisted the escalation of an effort to ascertain individual responsibility 
into a collective purge. In situations where collective suspicions were directed towards 
an individual, the question became, why were clan members exposed as sinful en 
masse? 
 
In Peter’s case, he fled the village during the CCR crusade, absenting himself from 
cleansing. Some days later, eighteen adolescent girls who had partaken in the crusade 
fell into a state of possession after prayers at their high school, and began calling out 
Peter’s name. Openly bringing out the name of a suspect by an individual is deeply 
taboo—yet in the possession-state, an individual is understood to be directed by the 
Holy Spirit, transcending that individual’s full capacity and providing a medium for this 
critical information, and allowing them to break from the normal politics of speaking. 
These actions were concerning, since they vocalised pre-existing rumours that had been 
circulating about Peter. In an interview, the Headteacher of the school explained that the 
possession states confirmed that “people of this kind, doing things, want to get money 
by the blood of people.”671 In response, the Headteacher invited an Anglican prayer 
group to intercede, to seek to neutralise the accusations. Interesting to note here is that 
these actors chose to take a private approach to individual accountability: as the 
Reverend leading the prayers conceded, “It is true that there must be somebody behind 
this, but we don’t deal with such a person—we just pray.”672 Whilst this approach was 
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considered by elders to be less defamatory, and lauded as neutralising evil forces, 
ultimately it did not absolve Peter from suspicion.  
 
Thus, observations about inequality were transformed into accusations when mediated 
through diverse traditions of healing. Whereas rumours about accumulation promoted 
suspicion, therapies and metaphysical signs were produced as a sources of evidence, 
which were increasingly interpreted as indicating the malevolence of particular 
individuals. Of similar episodes of possession in Acholiland, Victor has argued that 
possession outbreaks are representative of individual agency, in that subjects “refuse to 
be pathologised”.673 In a similar way, spirit possessions, dreams and visions provided a 
means for women, young men and schoolchildren to communicate their fears, in 
contexts where levying an accusation in plain speech could be subject to punishment 
from elders. Accumulations of signs affirmed perceptions of responsibility among 
particular social groups. Rather than explain deaths through biomedical explanations, 
more marginalised groups could express their anxieties through technologies of therapy. 
In so doing, they drew on older imaginaries of witchcraft and spiritual possession to 
legitimate a modern threat: as noted above, shared prior symbols legitimated the novelty 
of mazi.  
 
Overall, rather than producing a coherent consensus, these interventions localised a 
sense of mazi among particular social groups: among relatives of victims, friends of 
survivors or participants in religious crusades. This spread, granted, met its own 
resistance—often from elders promoting formal sittings to bring out claims, or from the 
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family members of the accused. But key to observe here is that the incoherence of 
evidence production directly created a sense of unease. Following Das and Kleinman’s 
observations on the origins of communal violence: “the rumours (…) unsettle the 
context to an extent that the perpetrators can begin to feel that they were the intended 
victims”.674 Forms of evidence gradually produce the witch as an external threat, 
sowing the seeds of tension and uncertainty.  
 
7.4.5 Funerary Rites as Cathartic Release 
 
In the context of growing suspicions, sudden deaths, often patterned among family 
members, facilitated the transition from lingering uncertainties to public accusations 
against individuals. One resident summarised this sentiment among rural clans: 
“Because of those deaths people were very hostile. It is not OK for there to be two 
deaths in one week.”675 Intimate tragedies confirmed local fears that evil forces were at 
work, and fuelled by a context of collective bereavement, young men and relatives of 
the deceased mobilised subjective realities, bringing claims out into the open.  
 
Crucially, what distinguished “good” deaths from deaths from mazi (as well as from 
deaths from poisoning) are the circumstances surrounding the moment of death. Prior to 
their death, particular signs were said to appear that someone is being taken to the 
underworld. For example, it was said a sacrificed corpse may “sweat,” remaining warm, 
though lifeless, indicating that “organs were still working.”676 Presumably this evidence 
was derived immediately after death, when rigor mortis had not yet set in, by those 
 
674 Das and Kleinman, ‘Introduction’, p. 17. 
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676 I, Victim, Oleba, 17/10/2016. 
 323 
family members who washed and prepared the body for a funeral (most likely women, 
to whom this responsibility falls). In other cases, it was said that numbers appeared on 
the arms of the deceased, signs that the “underworld is taking you.” In cases where the 
deceased were adult men, the name of the mazi suspect was brought out when the dying 
cried out, “Why are you chasing me? Why are you taking me?” One young man 
explained that “Before the underworld takes you, you can see the image of the person 
who is trying to take you.” In other cases still, the deceased “ran mad,” running 
uncontrollably to water prior to death, and sometimes drowning as a result.677 These 
behaviours have become common currency, interpreted as signs of imminent death, that 
“mazi is following you, you will die and work with them.”678  
 
In other cases, allegations of mazi followed particular patterns of death within the same 
home; the timing of these allegations consistently followed these deaths. David, a cross-
border trader, explained: 
Allegations started that I was being a bad person in the community, and as I no 
longer had money, that I was sacrificing children to make money. The first child 
was taken to hospital; without a diagnosis he was taken to a traditional healer 
but he later died. The second child died of meningitis, and so did the third. [All] 
the children died within three weeks of each other. The allegations started to 
come up after the death of the second child. All of the children were in the same 
home, my brother’s home. The deaths were a week apart.679 
 
In David’s case, patterns of mortality were important drivers of allegations, as the 
deaths of children tend to surpass any idiomatic explanation of misfortune discussed in 
Chapter Five. Though the death of one child, generally after a longer sickness, may be 
cause for elders to assert the need for husbands to transfer bridewealth (alongside 
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miscarriages or other failures to conceive), this explanation does not account for sudden 
deaths. In cases where elders attributed children’s deaths to historic curses following the 
lineage, those deaths unfolded over a period of years. Within the idiom, this attribution 
affords the individual a chance to repent either for their own sins or for the actions of 
their ancestors that precipitated the curse. In the context of sudden, repeated deaths, 
however, no such explanations exist.  
 
 
Today, funerary rites are presided over by Christian priests, but are performed at home, 
rather than in a church, and are handled by clans. As in the past, strict roles govern 
responsibilities at these events: the washing of the body, the digging of the grave, and 
the preparation of food. Beyond this ritual division of tasks (further detailed below), 
what is striking is the effort to ascertain individual responsibility following deaths. At 
the public funeral, attended by a broad suite of extended relatives and friends, those 
related to the deceased formally account for his or her treatment prior to death. What is 
most striking are the contemporary efforts to prove that the deceased was cared for. 
Public funerals, which proceed the burial, involve close family members (from the 
nuclear family, elders and invested relatives) and others connected to the deceased 
standing before the coffin and explaining the process of death. At these accountings, 
family members show that obligations were met and the deceased received adequate 
care - provided at home or in hospitals, their underlying medical conditions, and the 
engagement with other healers. Such interrogation provides a means of assuring 
mourners of the deceased’s proper social relations and responsibilities during life.680  
 
680 T. Vaittinen, et al. ‘Care as everyday peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding 7:2 (2019), pp. 194-209. Vaittenen et al. 
encourage a mundane focus on care as a lens to view everyday realities of peace.  
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Testimonies I observed often took several hours, but the sentiment is clear: relatives 
confirm that death was not the result of action by an individual. This process preserves 
the external reputation of the clan, and prevents any connotations of responsibility, or 
“having a hand in death.” 
 
Following this public burial, after distant relatives have left, clan members sit together 
to comb through more specific circumstances of the death in an “evaluation.” In “good 
deaths,” for which there was a clear explanation, or the deceased was elderly, such 
discussions may simply reflect on the funeral proceedings, or outstanding clan dues in 
relation to the deceased. But in “bad deaths,” such as those that occurred suddenly, 
these discussions may descend into allegations. In such meetings, the normal politics of 
speech (dominated by elders) may be reversed: Whilst elders may offer explanations of 
curses, or unpaid lineage transfers past or present, younger generations increasingly put 
forward explanations of witchcraft. It is these explanations that young men (and 
women) can access—through observation, rumour or encounters that produce evidence 
of ill-doing. IAs one young man argued: “If this person would not hesitate to kill my 
son, would I just stay here and keep quiet?”681 Finally, in cases of successive deaths, 
where subsequent meetings were sites of ever more vociferous claims to account for 
deaths, violent apprehensions against the suspect could result.  
 
7.4.6 Resisting Responses 
 
Attempts to evict suspected witches occurred in the context of bereavement and 
injustice, where communities marshalled claims for individual accountability. In this 
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context, elders’ insistence on “slow words,” and the meetings they scheduled to address 
the issue, were perceived as inadequate by factions of the community who both 
mourned their relatives and perceived themselves to be under threat. Brothers of the 
deceased or young male relatives often formed allegiances with other young male clan 
members to violently express their claims. After allegations were made public, 
collectives often pressed not for evidentiary confirmation but for the removal of the 
suspect.  
 
Prior to a death, elders were reluctant to table cases based merely on communal 
suspicions. Some elders expressed scepticism as to the veracity of claims of mazi. One 
elder of Aroi, for example, recalled,  
When I first heard of mazi in Aroi, for me I interpreted it as a lie, that people 
were tarnishing the image of other people because of jealousy. When we heard 
of it, I went with the church people. We had a serious mass. We  entered into the 
stream. We wanted to see what mazi looks like. We never saw anything. But 
people said they saw the mazi entering the water. They took off. For us we ran, 
we were making noise, we were crying, but we didn’t see it.682 
 
Despite not seeing evidence of mazi, this elder nevertheless joined in the ensuing 
panic—but the instance was a cleansing, rather than an eviction. Despite this 
participation, this elder openly refuted the citing of spirits made by other community 
members.  
 
In other cases, elders expressed their concerns that accusations sprang not from 
witchcraft, but from the jealousy of peers. In this context, elders were concerned with 
risks of defamation or “blackmail,” that is, spoiling the name of an innocent clan 
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member (namely, an individual who often provided material support to elders, as well 
as their own relatives). Elders also grappled with the consequences of false allegations 
that weaponised witchcraft as explanation. Evicting an innocent member of the clan 
could in itself become a source of misfortune that followed the lineage. Making a claim 
against an individual is tantamount to cursing them, which, to be reversed, requires a 
sitting (to cleanse sickness). Typically elders respond to witchcraft accusations through 
tracing ancestral connections, histories of clans, and intermarriages. Indeed, the poison 
cases discussed in the next chapter are often managed in this way. Yet the forms of 
proof brought out for mazi are ahistorical—resting (as noted above) on wealth 
accumulation, visions, spirits or dreams. These forms of evidence depart from the 
intimate familial knowledge with which elders usually deal. Inherently, claims of this 
nature are uncertain, with no definitive means of proving the truth. As one elder 
explained: “Using oracles to get culprits was better—now there are so many false 
accusations.”683 In lieu of an historical basis, and sceptical of the evidence, elders are 
reluctant to bring out issues that bring shame to their clans.  
 
Even so, in some cases, curses continue to be used.684 Samuel, an accused man 
explained: “They [the accusers] wanted to beat me because I could not a give a good 
statement—could not confess to something I had not done.” A confession could have 
assuaged violence, but those accused instead defended their innocence by providing 
accounts of their newfound wealth. In one case, the accused produced legitimate 
evidence from local banks of his loans and repayments, whilst in another the suspect 
confessed to illegally siphoning off petrol from a nearby Chinese quarry. These 
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explanations did not, however, satisfy their accusers or relatives, who were trying to 
allocate responsibility for death. Since the accusers were contesting suffering and death, 
claims had moved beyond the context of economic explanation. Moreover, sometimes 
collectives did not wait for the effects of the curse to manifest, mounting further 
attempts to evict the accused. After one sitting, Samuel testified that “My shop was 
destroyed—broken and looted—looters drank the beer, and took my wares to Kasese to 
sell in a different trading centre, even the things that I got from a bad source, they even 
took them and sold them.”685 Another accused man recalled, “The youth descended on 
me… [they] told me that things have transpired and I am the cause of the deaths in the 
family. I went back in the morning for the burial; people were still talking. Elders were 
trying to respond that the allegations were false.”686 Other suspects were attacked by 
gangs of young men, and in one case I documented, violence prevented elders from 
sitting.  
 
It is significant, however, that though clans living on the Congolese border reported 
cases of mazi, these cases followed a different trajectory. Whilst since 2010, many clans 
across Maracha and Arua have condemned mazi (and poisoning) by banishment of 
300km in clan by-laws, such laws are often unenforced. Yet those villages lying directly 
on the border had taken a more proactive approach to enforcing clan laws. In part, this 
was because of perceptions of heightened risks of theft, body-snatching and witchcraft 
from Congolese citizens crossing the border, as well as Ugandan collaborators who 
facilitated these transfers. Clans have taken a particularly punitive response by 
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improvising security wings, local units that often involve village LCIs as well as 
married men and youths. These wings have been active in removing suspected thieves 
from Congo, as well as punishing Ugandans from neighbouring villages for theft. 
Suspects of mazi have been dealt with severely: in one clan in 2013, for example, a man 
who was caught sacrificing a sheep in darkness at the river was publicly caned as a 
“warning” for him to desist from “practicing evil.”687 Though these organised responses 
were outliers, this approach was able to address cases that did not include sudden or 
malicious deaths—and so avoid the heightened context of grief which could lead to 
violence. Furthermore, these security wings harnessed the power of youth in policing, 
who therefore worked with, rather than against, clan authority.  
 
Perhaps reflecting their historical non-participation in witchcraft cases, state authorities 
kept their distance from allegations of mazi. Samuel, explained that he did report his 
case to police after fleeing to Arua, but the cost of their transport and allowances for the 
investigation was too great. As he recounted, “When policemen go to the village, there 
is no-one there and they cannot make arrests.” When they were present, however, state 
officials often disparaged communal opinion regarding mazi with reference to clinical 
explanations, attributing deaths to medical causes such as meningitis and hepatitis-B. 
One LCIII explained: “There are some illnesses that can put things in your mind like 
‘so-and-so is trying to kill you’, yet it is a different sickness.”688 In one case in Oleba, 
an official blamed the delays in taking a child sick with hepatitis-B to hospital: “If they 
had brought him earlier, [he] could have been healed, all long-term sicknesses.”689 Not 
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only did the verdict in this case rest upon a different rationale— clinical medicine—than 
the claims of villagers, but this official effectively blamed the child’s parents for his 
death. Drawing on biomedical rationales propagates very different ideas of 
accountability; in providing alternative explanations regarding capital or biomedicine, 
elders and state officials echoed the frustrations of the accused. For example, one 
evictee explained: 
This man died of gout and high blood pressure. He was known to have had an 
ulcer, but was not getting treatment, instead [he was] sitting at home. He was 
eventually admitted and died in hospital. Doctors said what he died of was 
known. Yet the community said [to me], ‘You have sacrificed this man to get 
money.’690  
 
During interviews, officials often provided similar testimonies to the accused who also 
omitted mention of name-calling, possession, and running to water by their relatives 
who had died. The issue is clear: in situations where people fear mazi, elders and state 
officials dismiss the subjective realities of their relatives who fear themselves subject to 
underwater powers. 
 
7.5: Social Schisms in Anti-Witchcraft Action  
 
Within the paradigm of functional anthropology, anti-witchcraft action was theorised in 
relation to the maintenance of social structure. Accusations were a conservative 
regulator, a means of articulating and responding to tensions, and so reproduced the 
contours of local societies. This theoretical approach was married to a contemporary 
colonial context in which—despite debates surrounding the acts—oracles codified 
social suspicions into fact, and the violence of witch-hunting remained suppressed by 
law. In cases of mazi, my interlocutors were deeply divided as to how to deal with 
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suspects. The cases discussed here did not always result in eviction: oftentimes 
suspicions simply diffused, with a lingering suspicion that the accusations could again 
arise in the context of further suffering.  
 
Moreover, as the subsequent witchcraft-as-modernity analytic recognises—in part a 
reaction to the inherent reductionism within the functionalist paradigm—locales do not 
simply reproduce ideas of suffering. But neither too do locales simply absorb new 
concepts wholesale. Witchcraft appears as a response as societies adapt and 
accommodate to penetrating global logics. In light of the complexities of witch-finding 
presented above, neither theoretical approach properly captures the unfolding 
contestations over forms of evidence, nor how different groups struggle to persuade and 
comprehend realities. A major gulf remains between discourses in the public sphere and 
the realities of the field of action. New realities are brought to life through the 
reification of recognised symbols and signs of danger. Older registers of healing unite 
new conversations about wealth, accumulation, and the potential conflict between 
individuals and their social connections. Through different mediums—dreams, 
possession, ritual therapies and public discussions—Lugbara people actively debate if 
and how wealth interfaces with their local environment. As Sanders notes, witchcraft’s 
being within modernity and its being about modernity are not the same thing.691  
 
Modernity is not experienced homogenously across space: instead, access to knowledge 
and power is governed by local social divisions. These social divisions lay at the heart 
of the explanatory power of the functional paradigm—wherein witchcraft maintained 
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the social structure, but was discussed in ways so static that it belied the very struggles 
that disrupted those local power structures in the ritual field. Just as any society is 
characterised by restrictions on knowledge and speech, modernity here has resulted in 
profound divergences in experience within communities. These fractures appear visibly 
in patterns of suffering and access to care—in who lives and who dies—and 
consequently, in struggles to explain misfortune, which are today shaped by a politics of 
power. As I have shown, this politics is inherent in the construction of explanations for 
witchcraft.  
 
Examining witch-finding in post-independence Zimbabwe, Rutherford draws attention 
to the disparity between anthropological theorising and the complexity of local realities. 
For him, these theoretical lenses disguise the “politics of witchcraft,” which involves an 
unfolding articulation of social identities and power relations within a given locale.692 
He brings attention to the extensive webs of power and multiple social projects within 
any locality involved in “finding, seeing and constituting African witches”.693 As in his 
case, the politics of the events in Lugbara families extend far beyond the locale in which 
they are enacted. Returning to the disavowal of Lawrence Abriga, the LCV mentioned 
at the start of this chapter, the state dismissal of these claims fuels the quests for 
evidence described within, quests wherein communities are forced to reify their fears. 
As the next chapter explores, the reactions of the state also contain their own politics, 
which are not easily collapsed into a simple refutation of witchcraft.  
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Like Rutherford, Auslander has described the complex reality of modern witch-finding, 
which he encapsulates as the attempts of collectives to redraw a “novel symbolic 
topography.”694 Rather than representing the enactments of modernity, witch-hunts are 
on his view a collision of symbolic repertoires of healing and sickness refracted through 
actors of state bureaucracy, schools, missions, and clinical medicine. Key here is how 
different symbolic repertoires are mediated by local schisms in society: attempts to 
expel a suspect rest on diverging conceptual frameworks across generations, genders, 
religious actors and relatives of the dead, as well as those managing funerary rites. In 
making claims as to the presence of mazi, each actor asserts individual expressions of 
belief, faith, and knowledge. The multi-vocal nature of subjective realities—expressed 
through spirits, dreams, herbal medicine and clinical medicine—are indicative of the 
multiple registers of reality within any given case or collective. Yet as death demands 
the determination of responsibility, such struggles provide a moment for forms of 
knowledge to become unsettled. On occasion, diviner-healers, who usually operate in 
private, are invited to occupy a public role in revealing guilt, redefining notions of sin. 
In moments of crisis, outbursts of possession usually ascribed to women become 
attached to young men. Unsettling notions of gendered control, crisis ushers in an 
alternate politics of voice, and of speaking the truth of events. What is to be proved, 
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During my fieldwork, as suspicions of mazi transitioned to accusations, a deeper subject 
of debate became not just transgression but the indiscipline of young men. In the later 
phrases of accusation, a clear schism between elders and their juniors emerged. Young 
men, typically sceptical about such revelations, mobilised their claims in collective 
action. Whereas witchcraft has long been a means for elders to critique their juniors, by 
calling for mazi to be managed, young men confronted their elders openly with 
allegations, reversing prior hierarchies of speech. In times of panic, elders emphasise 
the importance of their wisdom, of the “slow words” that form their judgements, of 
waiting for curses to manifest and of protecting the reputation of the accused. These 
conflicts echo wider social critiques, wherein elders often lament the “idleness” of the 
youth, chastising them for theft and for mairungi-eating: “The youth just want to use 
drugs, [be] idle, don’t want to work… some of these thefts, people learn them from 
[their] peer group.”695 In one case, for instance, a meeting about mazi was turned on its 
head when elders asked a group of young men why they had accused the suspect. 
Rather than confirm who had spread the rumours, the young men explained that since 
they had been under the influence of alcohol and cannabis, they had not been in their 
“right senses.” Elders read these events as problematic not merely because of the 
possibility of witchcraft, but because of the underlying disorder in which the 
accusations emerged. In cases that turn to violence, moreover, young men reject this 
slower-paced decision-making, refusing to wait for customary outcomes of guilt.  
 
The violence of young men should not be interpreted necessarily a rejection of 
authority—rather, it could equally be a call for protection from normative clan 
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structures. Without stereotyping all youth, since the motivations of young men differed 
according to their perceived vulnerability to mazi (as well as other circumstances), one 
jua kali (Kiswahili, informal labour) youth group explained that they wanted elders to 
intervene to protect them. In other words, their resistance was instigated precisely 
because they felt unprotected. In several cases, bearing testament to this exclusion, 
young men organised meetings in the format of their elders to discuss these issues, co-
opting structures of seniority for their own ends. 
 
These struggles matter, given that the field of power surrounding evidence is central not 
only to constructing the witch, but to protecting the accused. In three cases where the 
accused were interviewed, these suspects had simply fled to other places, often seeking 
safety in Arua town, where property rights ensure a greater degree of security. Upon 
arriving in their new places, men were saved in local churches, which gave their 
neighbours confidence in their commitment to change.696 But as their new neighbours 
moreover did not bear the grudges of those at home, it was this newfound distance that 
fostered peace: the limitations of their new networks enabled these men to protect 
themselves. Granted, each of these three men reported deep psychological trauma from 
the experience of being rejected by their kin, explaining their isolation. As Samuel 
explained, “Automatically weakness and anger is there. But since they are there and I 
am here what can I do with that anger? Suicide cannot help you. But what can I do? I 
just stay here. I just pray.”697 Samuel’s shop, vandalised in the raid following the elders’ 
sitting, remains in ruins by the roadside, and has not been reclaimed.  
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7.6 Conclusion  
 
Ideas of witchcraft and of psychic harm have evolved greatly in Lugbara populations. 
Ambiguous fears centred on the context-specific notion of ole have solidified as fears of 
proximate occult markets, where bad spirits or substances can simply be bought. This 
chapter has situated this evolution against the unfolding developmental context of 
return, and the increasing illustration and condemnation of witchcraft within the public 
domain. As in other places, witchcraft has become associated with new forms of 
individual consumption.  
 
Within the field of accusation, simple analytics such as modernity, tradition, certainty 
and uncertainty are disrupted. In the face of a novel threat, implausible to many Lugbara 
people, significant explanatory work must be done by sufferers, healers and relatives of 
the deceased to confirm a threat (and a suspect). Producing evidence often requires 
invoking long-standing traditional signifiers of death, including dreams and sightings of 
white spirits, as well as trusted revelatory therapists. The interpretation of this evidence 
is highly personal, resting on the social status of the individual, as well as broader social 
struggles between the rich and poor, women and men, and elders and young men. 
Defining witchcraft is heavily imbricated in a local field of power politics. Through 
gradual contestations, rumours, suspicions and fears come into alignment to define the 
witch—but brought into contestation with sceptical elders, the fate of the accused is 
often uncertain.  
 
Having covered this ground, the following chapter discusses accusations of poisoning 
(enyata), focusing on the role of the state in processing disputes. Treating mazi and 
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enyata as separate analytical categories is not to deny the continuities between similar 
events. Indeed, approaches to managing mazi have taken shape against longer histories 
of managing poisoning. Yet, the two notions contain different histories at the border. 
Whilst mazi in reality rests on previous fears of malevolence, it is regarded as novel. 
Poisoning, however, has long been a nefarious feature of life at the border. For these 
reasons, specialists whose evidence may carry weight for post-exile generations who 
fear mazi, are often excluded from the management of enyata. Critically, in poisoning 














Poisonous Encounters: Between Words of 
Community and State 
 
There is no issue that angers people like poisoning.  
 Elder, Maracha District698  
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the politics of intervention surrounding evictions, often of entire 
families, following allegations of enyata (poisoning). Whilst the previous chapter 
explored contestations around evidence for a novel threat, this chapter explores longer 
histories of dealing with an older one. In view of this archive of experience, this chapter 
explores how collectives attempt to translate poisoning, claims based on e’yo ada 
(communal truths) into evidentiary forms and standards perceived to be legible to the 
state – ekizibiti (Kiswahili. evidence). The chapter considers how this fraught exercise 
of translation reproduces understandings of local governance and state-power. 
 
Poisoning has a long history in Lugbaraland; Barnes-Dean notes that poisoning was 
conceptualised as a “true” Lugbara illness.699 Echoing this reflection, interlocutors for 
this research explained that enyata “has always been here in our culture”.700 Bearing 
thus an intimate history in this area, poisoning maps onto a wider moral geography of 
danger: particular clans, places, and markets are associated with the threat. Managing 
the threat relies on tracing marriage relations, as well as connections to notorious 
markets or places. Accusations of poisoning remain deeply taboo, but since its 
 
698 I, Elders, Worubo, 03/03/2017 (OJ). 
699 Barnes-Dean, Illness Beliefs and Social Change, p. 19. 
700 Reflection, Co-worker, September 2016. 
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management draws on histories of moral knowledge that “follow” individuals (as do 
lineage debts) in specific contexts, there are more coherent calls to evict suspects than in 
the cases described previously. Eviction continue to follow successive deaths, but rely 
on a different evidence trail than mazi. Whilst the previous chapter focused on popular 
action amongst social groups, this analysis focuses on how elders aim to control 
violence, whilst making claims heard by the state. 
 
This is not to say that fears of poison constitute a natural facet of identity, as early 
colonial analysts documenting “belief” in Lugbaraland supposed. Leonardi artfully 
demonstrates the longer historical constitution of fears of poisoning emerging from 
flows of foreign knowledge, and their localisation into health crises along the Ugandan-
South Sudanese border.701 As this analysis details, poison has a history dating to the 
precolonial period in Lugbaraland. That said, terms and idioms of poisoning are not 
static; rather, as with fears of witchcraft, they have evolved over time. A host of 
Lugbara terms today are directly translated as ‘poison’; though these terms refer to acts 
that in essence involve ‘magic’, this family of terms is united by a simultaneous 
connection to any physical agent, food, or toxic substance applied through intimate 
gestures and encounters.  
 
Though poison agents are thought to have become more numerous in modern times 
(including chemicals, fertilisers and alcohols), unlike mazi, Lugbara people emphasise 
the physicality of enyata rather than its psychic, spiritual dimensions. Accordingly, the 
 
701 C. Leonardi, ‘The Poison in the Ink: Poison Cases and the Moral Economy of Knowledge in 1930s Equatoria, 
Sudan’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 1:1 (2007), pp. 34-56. 
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landscape of spiritual therapists such as charismatic healers and diviner-healers are not 
considered legitimate authorities in the diagnosis or treatment of poison. Consistently, 
prayer is generally understood to be ineffective against poison: as I was told, “For 
poisoners you can’t pray; you have eaten that thing.”702 Instead, herbalists are invited to 
manage afflictions, and clan authorities often use state-like procedures to evict suspects.  
 
Scholars have noted the state-like dynamics involved in poisoning evictions.703 Across 
the Ugandan-South Sudanese borderlands, removals that were once achieved through 
violence or even killing now proceed through the format of state meetings, the 
production of ballot-boxes or the passing of by-laws. Given this expression of its visible 
emblems, Allen and Reid argue that these emergent mechanisms are representative of a 
bottom-up enthusiasm for democracy.704 Yet I and others have argued that so-called 
elections may be more representative of evolved or customary decision-making 
structures, in that collective voting proffers immunity to individual accusers.705 
Evictions are thus sites where the rights of the majority who believe themselves to be 
affected by poison are preserved at the expense of the rights of the accused. The present 
study goes beyond an analysis of the mere form of evictions; rather, it explores wider 
discourses of fear and anticipation over state intervention, evidence production and 
commentaries on state scientific capacity. The level of analysis shifts beyond a 
consideration for local processes viewed in a vacuum to consider the wider institutional 
 
702 FC, Elders, Ovujo, 30/05/2016 (OJ). 
703 E. Storer, R. O’Byrne, and K. Reid, ‘Poisoning at the periphery: Allocating responsibility across the Uganda/South 
Sudan borderlands’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 2:2-3 (2017), pp. 180-196; T. Allen and K. Reid, ‘Justice at 
the margins: Witches, poisoners and social accountability in northern Uganda’ Medical Anthropology 34:2 (2015), 
pp. 106-123. 
704 Allen and Reid, ‘Justice at the margins’. 
705 Storer et al., ‘Poisoning at the periphery’. 
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connections across space. Evictions took place not only with reference to fears of 
poisoning, but within a field of anticipation and anxiety about repercussions from the 
state.706 I explore the anxieties of those officials on the frontline, contrasted with the 
sentiments of communities in the midst of panic.  
 
In what follows, I first explore three spheres of tradition—the intimate, the medicinal, 
and the judicial—that have constructed the materiality and criminality of poisoning. I 
then describe specific eviction strategies, drawing attention to the different forms of 
state intervention and interpretation from villagers. Finally, I expand this case analysis 
to encompass concerns from other cases, such as officials and collectives in Maracha 
and Arua Districts. I conclude by discussing the impact of critical moments where 
communal desires are challenged by sub-county authorities.  
 
8.2: Intimate Histories 
 
The previous chapter explored how mobilities and differential access to foreign 
specialists introduced dangerous forms of witchcraft into families, wherein secret deals 
made at a distance brought death into homes. Poisoning, however, relies on proximity 
and intimacy for its effect: on shared meals, touches, or greetings that invert everyday 
behaviours. Indeed, the very word enyata or enyanya—the term that corresponds to a 
general term for poison in Lugbarati—derives from enya (food). On a daily basis, the 
collective sharing of food among enyati, a flexible term that denotes any commensal 
 
706 The national Witchcraft Act dictates that “[a]ny person who directly or indirectly threatens another with death 
by witchcraft or by any other supernatural means commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment 
for life”. This includes the use of substances intended to cause harm through “sorcery”. Technically, then, both 
witches and poisoners could be tried in court, but I never heard of any petition involving this law in Arua or 
Maracha. Instead it was cases of mob justice (against poisoners) that were brought before a jury. 
 343 
unit including a household, age-set, or wider community, establishes solidarity between 
those whose intentions are known. Collective eating serves as a basic performance both 
of trust in daily relations, and of togetherness in ceremonial relations. Whilst the sharing 
of food holds subtle but powerful potential to affirm togetherness, in the presence of a 
poisoner this fundamental gesture holds danger: “death” could be put into one’s food. 
Poisoners are said to secretly contaminate food, or “trick” their victim into eating after 
declaring that they themselves are full. The poisoner ensnares the victim within a web 
of social norms: it is impossible to refuse the offer of food, since this rejection is 
effectively an accusation of poisoning. It is said that “we eat poison because of 
shyness.”707  
 
Throughout the twentieth century, poisoning has retained a connection to female 
propensities. In the 1920s, co-wives were said to poison the food of their husbands or 
co-wives, acting out on envy instigated by their maltreatment.708 Such women were not 
known as oleu, a more ambiguous term applied to male witches, but as ba’enyanya beri 
(literally ‘women who poison’), emphasising the materiality of their acts. Given their 
access to food, women were said to place snake-resin in the food of their co-wives or 
husbands. Female suspects could be violently killed, and though Middleton explains 
this violence had diminished by the 1950s, elders today still recalled expulsions of 
female suspects throughout Protectorate rule. Among Lugbara and Ma’di populations in 
exile in Sudan, purges against suspected poisoners continued; after return, Allen has 
documented the violent killing of suspected female sorceresses in Laropi, among 
 
707 Barnes-Dean, Illness Beliefs and Social Change, p. 133. 
708 McConnell, ‘Notes on the Lugwari tribe’.  
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neighbouring Ma’di groups. In one particularly gruesome case, multiple women were 
tortured following the death of a child, who had reportedly been given poisonous food 
at a funeral.709 For Allen, in the 1980s, accusations of inyinya (the Ma’di translation) 
had become localised, and provided a means of “…talking about social relations, and 
rumours about who was poisoning whom underlined tensions which existed within and 
between homes.”710 Fears about poisoning were widespread, and in the context of 
suffering among families, carried the potential for extreme violence. Amidst the 
contemporary context of food insecurity and mortality, Allen’s interlocutors continued 
to pay attention to intimacies, and the dangers domestic relations and gestures could 
bring. Despite the immediate epistemic uncertainties post-return, historical reputations 
of poisoning and suspicions activities remained under observation. 
Such histories remain important, since Lugbara people explain that poisoning is 
inherited down the female line, and historical associations continue to “follow” women 
to the present. In one case in 2011, in a Maracha village on the border, a young man 
with bloodied hands was discovered burying a decapitated snake. Though caught red-
handed, suspicion was directed towards his mother, a woman named Ole. The 
community alleged that the son was doing the violent work of his mother, or at the very 
least that that she had taught her evil techniques to him. Ole was violently evicted, and 
the case prompted a further cleansing of four newlywed women in surrounding villages, 
who were sent back to their natal homes. Subsequently, clans in the area passed a by-
 
709 Allen, ‘The Violence of Healing’. 
710 Allen, A Study of Social Change, p. 447. 
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law that women should not be married into a clan without a vetting process to check 
that their background was ala (clean).  
Allegations of poisoning are linked to the moral ambiguities about the intents of women 
who are brought into the husband’s lineage from outside. Since the early colonial 
period, clan processes to vet and verify the moral status of women have been eroded, 
potentially generating suspicion as to a new wife’s character. Today, as bridewealth is 
often unpaid—as discussed in previous chapters—many women retain uncertain 
relations with their clansmen. The by-laws discussed above make plain concerns about 
what women may bring into the home, translating fears into pseudo-legal language. 
Following the discovery of the abovementioned snake, these issues became a matter not 
merely of moral discontent, but of public safety. Whereas Allen asserts the unknown 
potential of women in relation to accusation, during my fieldwork it was evident that the 
past follows particular women married into new homes, regardless of vetting. In the 
case referenced above, the mother’s name—Ole—revealed that she was related to 
poisoners. It is not so much the unknown potential of new wives that is a problem, but 
the realisation that a suspected poisoner has been brought into a clan. Intimate 
knowledge of the past, traveling between clans, creates lingering fears, activated after 
the discovery of evidence or by direct suffering.  
In contrast to previous accounts, however, fieldwork for this research revealed that in 
contemporary Lugbaraland, those accused of poisoning were not just women, but men 
as well. Nor did those accused consistently poison solely through food. Though it was 
sometimes alleged that men learnt techniques from their wives or mothers, to 
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understand these allegations it is important to understand wider fears about intimacies—
and evidence—that have increasingly been tied to forms of poisoning.  
Though fears about food-based poisons endure, by the 1970s the term enyata was used 
more widely to encompass other threats. Barnes-Dean, for instance, documented 
multiple forms of enyata: adraka was a form of poison thrown onto the body or left on 
a path that caused general malaise; eseseva, which caused roughness of the skin, was 
caused when someone stepped on the victim’s shadow; and wolo, which caused 
vomiting, was said to have been acquired from the Alur tribe.711 Today, poison can be 
placed in fields or on doorsteps, resulting in wounds. The terms ba yi or enata refer to a 
poisonous substance being applied by the suspect through touching or greeting. These 
attacks are not confined to the field of immediate social relations, and can be committed 
by any proximate aggressors because of envy. Poison is a category that has gradually 
expanded to encompass fears of proximities more broadly; at its greatest scale, any 
unverified connection can harbour malevolence.  
 
Just as witchcraft from foreigners has long been feared (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), Lugbara people too anticipate the potential of strangers to enact poisoning. 
Trading centres that host migrants are sites of new fears, and young men who eat at 
hotels fear that encounters with outsiders could lead to poisoning. Stories of cracking 
plates or disintegrating glass bottles have become currency that indicate poisonous 
attacks from outsiders. Fears of poisoning are no longer constrained by social 
 
711 McConnell, ‘Notes on the Lugwari tribe’. 
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connections, and changing patterns of consumption have mapped onto fears of new 
forms of poisoning.  
Changing fears of intimacy have furthermore unfolded against anxieties about the 
increasing number of modern poison agents. Elders explained that, in the past, the most 
potent poison was extracted from the heads of snakes. For example, an elder recalled an 
eviction from (he estimates) 1952, where a suspect had confessed her mode of 
preparation: 
When I was born there was someone in this clan, a woman who was known to 
be a poisoner. She trapped these big snakes. She prepared beans and pasted 
them. If you know this snake lives under this big tree. You put the beans there. 
That snake will come out and at first the smell of that food will be nice, later on 
it will die. They cut off the head, the tail, and put it to rot in a container. When it 
rots, that juice which comes, she uses for poison. There was a day she was 
arrested, that was her confession. The woman was arrested by the suru. They 
sent her away from here. She was sent away. I don’t know if she was still alive. 
That same woman killed my elder brother.712  
 
This description is revealing, not only since it meticulously documents the means 
through which poisons are believed to be prepared, but also because it has endured over 
decades in the elder’s memory. Delivered as a confession, this testimony has particular 
authority. Though snake resin is noted as a potent poison, today Lugbara people 
recognise that other poisons can simply be bought on the market without specialist 
preparation. Any number of toxic substances, including industrial chemicals, fertiliser 
and hair dye are recognised as potential poisons. A Teregian herbalist explained:  
Mazi came to be known during exile. People got exposure to it during exile. 
There people were doing business, and they met others who have a business 
selling mazi. So people bought the mazi from them with money, and they 
brought it back here. Others acquired it from Sudan—they are all powerful 
there. People get poison from within. You could say that poisoning is within the 
 
712 I, Elder, Aroi, 10/04/2017 (OJ). 
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Lugbara culture. It was being sold at Agora market some years ago, sold openly. 
My friend lives near there, he told me openly.713 
 
As briefly noted in the previous chapter, this account contrasts the origins of poisons 
versus those of mazi. Whilst both occult discourses echo fears about markets, elders 
differentiated between foreign poisons and internal ones: poison, crucially, can be 
acquired nearby. Important to this context is that related public discourses equate the 
return from exile to other substances, which are considered poisonous insofar as they 
produce anti-social effects.  
 
Concerns about the poisonous effects of alcohol and mairungi were regular features of 
national and local concern: “These days people die and we relate it to poison because 
they drink sachets. Those sachets are poisonous: it is not that there is an intent to kill a 
person, the drink itself is poisonous.” It was rumoured that Indian traders were 
poisoning alcohol sachets as “revenge for Amin”, in retaliation for their expulsion 
during his rule.714 It is not that these ideas directly suggest acts of intentional poisoning, 
but that such accusations are located in a wider economy wherein modernity is 
understood to mediate access to powerful substances with anti-social effects.  
 
As is clear, since the colonial period, fears of poisoning—though retaining their 
connection to intimacy—have expanded in multiple directions. Yet key questions 
remain: how, for example, have these notions become evidenced? And why do certain 
populations still use these terms? To better understand these trajectories, I now turn to 
medical and juridical histories. 
 
713 I, Herbalist, Biliafe, 9/01/2017 (OJ). 
714 Commentary, Co-worker April 2017. 
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8.3: Medicinal Histories 
 
As noted above, whilst fears of poisoning have spread to encompass new kinds of 
encounters and continue to feature mystical dimensions, such attacks—unlike local 
understandings of witchcraft—consistently emphasise the involvement of a physical 
agent. As one elderly man explained, distinguishing between mazi (‘devil spirit’) and 
poison, “[If] it is only the devil spirit, mention the name of Jesus—that spirit can leave 
you. But when you have eaten that poison, however much you pray it is not possible; 
[if] you have eaten it has gone to your blood, to your heart.”715 Across Lugbaraland, 
different groups articulated clear therapy maps: prayers do not work, and instead, an 
herbalist must be consulted.  
 
Evolving alongside fears of poisoning, however, are techniques of administering 
antidotes. In the colonial period, the practice of herbal medicine could be pursued by 
either male or female ojo. McConnell explains that “somewhat wild-looking” medicine 
men dominated approaches to healing in the 1920s: “At the onset of sickness they are 
called in, or, if they know of it, may go without being called. They make their living by 
this, and may really have some medical secrets.”716 Throughout the colonial period, 
male and female ojo attended to a range of sicknesses through forms of divination 
accompanied by the administration of herbs. In the 1970s, Barnes-Dean articulated 
herbal therapies in more detail, noting that even in the vicinity of Kuluva Hospital, 
cases of enyata, alongside a host of other afflictions, were directed towards female 
herbalists (rather than to the hospital). This is perhaps surprising given that the 
 
715 I, Reverend, Koyi, 02/05/2017. 
716 McConnell, ‘Notes on the Lugwari tribe’, p. 464. 
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herbalists’ fees were higher than the hospital’s. According to Barnes-Dean, women 
collected remedies from the bush and attended to poisoning using a combination of 
herbs. Additionally, these ojo attended to lesions, boils, diarrhoea, swellings and 
worms, as well as gonorrhoea, measles and syphilis. Whilst Barnes-Dean attributes 
healing techniques in part to divine inheritance, her analysis suggests that therapy was 
primarily driven here by the application of herbs. In contrast to the healers mentioned 
by Middleton (though not by McConnell), healing had adopted clinical practices. In 
exile in South Sudan, Harrell-Bond suggested that the presence of Lugbara herbalists 
increased fears of poisoning allegations. 
 
Since the return from exile, herbal therapies have continued to evolve. I interviewed 
five herbalists, all men, who had learnt their trade either from their relatives or from 
Congolese specialists. Strikingly, each of these practitioners explained that they did not 
manage “spiritual” issues, nor relationship issues. Accordingly, these men do not go by 
the title ojo, but by aro nyaku vurife (‘administering medicine from the soil’). Though 
herbs are often gathered from Congo, practitioners emphasised the clinical qualities of 
their practice: where available, treatment was packaged in biomedical containers, or in 
plastic bags in powdered form.717 Some therapists explained that drugs should be taken 
at regular intervals or in specific quantities over period of weeks, and one Maracha 
practitioner had built a ward in his ancestral compound to accommodate inpatients, even 
administering treatment through IV drips.718  
 
 
717 I, Herbalist, Oluffe, 27/11/2016. 
718 I, Herbalist, Kijomoro, 15/03/2017. 
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Herbalists legitimated themselves through mimicking clinical procedure in other ways 
as well. In their practice, men were often supported by local government, with herbalists 
keeping hold of certificates from the sub-county or letters of validation from their LC. 
The treatment repertoire of herbalists varied, but often included ulcers, wounds, eye 
problems, snake bites and leprosy. Selected therapists intervened in cases of sexual 
weakness (abili), madness (orindi onzi), and mazi. These conditions are treated through 
different herbal concoctions which are ingested in a tea, rubbed onto wounds, or inhaled 
in a vapour through the nose. Herbal medicine is more popular in the countryside than 
in town, but if poisoning is suspected, Aruans too will travel to a nearby herbalist.  
Herbalists retain a monopoly on treating poisoning cases, where poison has been 
ingested, stepped on or applied to the body. Often herbs are ingested, and induce 
vomiting in the victim, a reaction that provides evidence of the presence of a toxic 
agent. The same process was described in relation to treating snake bites: as one 
informant recounted, “There is an herb, you smash it and give the patient to drink. If the 
venom has reached the chest, you vomit; if you don’t vomit, it’s a problem.”719 For 
cases of paralysis, herbs continue to be “cut into the blood.” One therapist explains: 
First give the person some herbs to drink—to separate the blood, the bad blood 
from the good blood. When that is done I start using a razor blade to cut the 
paralysed part: when you cut that, you see the dirty blood coming out, it can be 
as black as this dress, then when it comes out, I rub some herbs on that cut. I do 
not cut it very wide, just small cuts. [The] patient says it is painful, but you do 
not cut much and since you are in pain as a sick person, you don’t care about the 
pain of the razor blade, it is like an injection. I cut the patient once and rub herbs 
twice over two days. It’s not a big cut like the native Lugbaras used to do. They 





720 I, Herbalist, Maracha, 27/11/2016 (OJ). 
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This description is revealing in that it reiterates local understandings of poison to reside 
“in the blood.” Also key to note is that this herbalist defends his approach as being 
modern compared to the “big cuts” of previous days, which are condemned by public 
health experts today.  
 
As well as explaining their new techniques, herbalists also noted that their successful 
management of poisoning directly influences their reputation. One herbalist practicing 
near the Congolese border estimated he received ten suspected cases of poisoning per 
week, his practice promoted through the testimonies of ‘survivors.’ On occasion, 
treatments are publicly administered in the victim’s compound or in another public 
place. One recovered patient explains: 
[The] herbalist came, [and] shaved the back of my head. Put it all over my head 
which started burning, black smoke coming from the whole of my head. I started 
to feel better. It happened in public outside—people knew about my sickness at 
that point so it didn’t matter that it was in public.”721 
 
Though the exact biochemistry of this reaction is unclear, and the interventions of 
herbalists do not elicit personal responsibility for sickness, these therapies nevertheless 
promote evidence of a physical agent in the blood. Physical ailments require physical 
remedies: interventions, which have a long history, reproduce material discourses in 
relation to enyata. 
 
8.4: Judicial Histories 
 
Individual attempts to survive poisoning necessarily intersect with collective responses 
to managing suspected poisoners. Tracing these judicial traditions—which have 
 
721 I, Victims, Maracha, 15/06/2016. 
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involved both individual ordeals and the participation of the state—explains why today, 
the reintegration or absolution of poisoning suspects through prayer or salvation is 
vehemently rejected. One elder remarked, “These people who confess in church will get 
a bigger beating.”722 Of one suspect who became saved in church, after presenting a 
plastic cavera of poison during a service, the elder commented: “They want to 
camouflage themselves in God, since people here trust much in God. But in fact, they 
are doing some sort of magical practice that is not godly. They are doing business, using 
the name of God.”723 Similarly, “hiding” in the church is taken as evidence of guilt, just 
as when the wealthy who have acquired mazi give over-generously to people at home. 
Importantly, Lugbara people do not perceive poisoning as immoral but as criminal, as 
an act of attempted murder. For collectives who fear poisoning, poisoners place 
themselves beyond any ethic of care or correction which dwells within the suru. As with 
cases of killing beyond kinship, it is believed that individuals should be processed by 
the state, relevant precisely because its long arms extend beyond the limits of clan ties 
and familial justice.  
 
From the colonial period on, state interventions in the field of poisoning emphasised the 
materiality of the crime. As in other colonial contexts, British colonial administrators 
were bound by a penal code that aimed not to prevent witchcraft, but to limit 
accusations. The Witchcraft Ordinance of 1912 (amended in 1921) largely aimed to 
suppress accusations of witchcraft, as well as activities of "witchdoctors" and "witch-
 
722 I2, LCI, Ovujo, 30/10/16 
723 I, Herbalist, Biliafe, 09/1/2017 (OJ). 
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finders".Yet whilst the evidence suggests that administrators dismissed witchcraft 
superstition, activities in response to poisoning treated crimes as material realities.  
 
Prior to the advent of British rule, poisoning cases were managed through ordeals: tests 
convened by elders and the relatives of the victim. McConnell notes the use of 
respiratory poisons previously used in battle to try suspects, who were usually 
women.724 Elders administered poison ordeals, and if the suspect vomited, they would 
be presumed innocent. In this way, particular poisons had judicial uses, playing a role in 
divination and investigation.725 But because such ordeals often ended in death, they 
were outlawed by the Protectorate (the response being a shift to chicken oracles).726 In 
the colonial context, the inability to try poisoners in local courts accounts in part for the 
increasing violence of resolution: classifying a case as poison, rather than witchcraft, 
provided a route to manage tensions. 
 
That said, the colonial state did directly intervene to confirm the “real criminality” of 
these cases.727 A 1921 Report by the Acting Provincial Commissioner of Northern 
Province described an “epidemic of murders” in Maracha and Terego Counties.728 
According to the report, these murders were caused by women poisoning beer. Since the 
beer was brewed in secrecy, the Protectorate administration were cognisant of the literal 
dangers that these activities could bring to health (later passing legislation to reform 
 
724 McConnell, ‘Notes on the Lugwari tribe’, p. 450. 
725 Leonardi, ‘Poison in the Ink’, p. 40.  
726 McConnell, ‘Notes on the Lugwari tribe’, p. 462. 
727 Leonardi, ‘Poison in the Ink‘ p. 35. 
728 Report No. 869. Subject: Report on Tour in West Nile P.C., N.P. December 1920, to the Chief Secretary of 
Government in Entebbe, from the Acting Provincial Commissioner, Northern Province; the report notes “what one 
might describe as an epidemic of murders”.  
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them).729 In recording these claims, the Provincial Commissioner not only uses the word 
“murder,” but accepts local explanations for the deaths as fact. Moreover, the issue was 
discussed publicly in well-attended Barazas (local forums) in Arua, Maracha, Offude, 
Terego and Vurra, and the women found responsible served “heavy sentences.”730 The 
report concludes that should these sentences fail to serve as a deterrent, subsequent 
offenders would meet even longer sentences. In the report, the management of these 
murders is detailed after a short assessment of the ‘Allah Water Cult,’ an indication of 
their significance (given the scope of Yakan). In sentencing these women, Protectorate 
officials confirmed the explanations for killing circulating in the community.  
 
Later dispatches suggest the administration’s continuing concern. In 1922, the Acting 
Chief Secretary of the Protectorate was so troubled by poisoning cases in Northern 
Uganda (specifically West Nile) that he requested the Provincial Commissioner for 
Northern Province to obtain information from D.C. Weatherhead as to the native 
methods of poisoning preparation.731 Weatherhead discovered that four main types were 
used among Lugwari, Ma’di, Alur and Kakwa areas. Two of the four types were secret, 
with no-one admitting to knowledge of their preparation other than to suggest that they 
were made from snakes, frogs, chameleons and the glands of leopards.732 The other two 
types were concocted from the seeds and sap of a certain tree (these were the poisons 
formerly used in ordeals).733 Samples of the latter two types were extracted and sent to 
Entebbe for testing, where one of them proved toxic.  
 
 
729 Report of the Spirituous Liquor Committee, 26th January 1963, Archival Source 
730 Report No. 869. 
731 ‘Acting Chief Secretary to PCNP 30.5.22 Native Affairs 7371’, cited in Allen, A Study of Social Change, p. 378.  
732 ibid. 
733 ‘DC, West Nile to PCNP, 13/5/22’, cited in Allen, A Study of Social Change, p. 378. 
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As discussed below, in the present, state participation in collecting physical evidence 
served to vindicate local fears about poisoning. Multiple anthropologists have explained 
that their own hesitancy on encountering poisonous substances has reinforced notions of 
their potency and prevalence.734 Surely, then, the process of inquiring into and 
collecting poisons had similar impacts in the early years of British rule: since the 
colonial administration appeared to take accusations of poisoning seriously, this no 
doubt confirmed local fears.735 Writing of parallel events in Kajo Keji South Sudan, in 
the 1930s, Leonardi writes that “In struggling to differentiate actual criminal substances 
from ‘superstition,’ colonial officials were also unwittingly touching on very real local 
debates about the attractions of material substances and the dubious and gendered 
morality of the specialised knowledge that developed or deployed them.”736 In Kajo 
Keji, whilst fears about poisoning emanated from a context of suffering, sickness, and 
change, the involvement of chiefs and missionaries precipitated a panic that led to mass 
accusations, confirming the veracity of particular occult fears. 
 
This participation accounts as well for why Lugbara populations increasingly used the 
term ‘poisoning’ to express anxieties about interpersonal grievances. Explaining local 
events as poisoning meant there were specific fora in which cases could be resolved. 
Allen suggests that in the colonial period Ma’di communities emphasised poisoning 
over any suggestion of magic in order to seek redress in local government courts. By the 
1980s, Allen notes that ‘poison’ was used interchangeably with its Ma’di translation of 
inyinya, and claims that it regularly appeared in local fora to refer both to toxic 
 
734 Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid; Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals. 
735 Allen, A Study of Social Change, p. 398. 
736 Leonardi, ’Poison in the Ink’, p. 35. 
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chemicals and more magical techniques. Similarly, in Lugbaraland, by the 1970s, the 
term ‘poison’ was used for terms both magical and material. Despite local 
understandings traversing the material/magical, particular aspects of poisoning claims 
have been taken seriously: though other aspects of witchcraft have been dismissed, 
poisoning cases could be heard in court, and punished at a time when other local 
methods were overwhelmed. 
 
Though traditionally clans dealt with cases of poisoning, elders in Maracha insisted that 
under Amin’s government, a “strong state” actively punished poisoners. Though it is 
difficult to make definitive connections, these new interventions could have been 
fuelled by new anti-witchcraft legislation. The Witchcraft Act of 1967 was very 
different from the colonial ordinance, placing emphasis on “repute” (reputation) as valid 
evidence for intention. The act also outlined stricter punishments for those practising 
witchcraft, including an exclusion order which prohibited the individual from entering 
or remaining in the area of offence for up to ten years. This shift also facilitated more 
draconian local responses: under Obote and Amin, elders explained that new ordeals 
were devised to try those accused. “You could take anything dirty from the deceased 
person—you wash clothes, that water is put with meat, it is cooked and everyone eats. 
Whoever had a hand in that death, they just die. If someone was caught red-handed with 
a snake, they could be forced to eat it raw.”737 Ordeals are important, since they serve as 
proof of truth: if the suspect is evicted, it is based on fact.  
 
 
737 I, Elders, Maracha, 03/05/2017. 
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Since return, elders have become cognisant of the effects of false allegations. If 
wrongfully evicted, misfortunes follow those who evict. Since independence, sanctions 
were devised to combat false accusations, in a ritual process called nguku soma. 
Speaking out against a poisoner, should the accusation prove false, could bring sickness 
to the accuser which could pass through to their children and extended family. Thus to 
reverse this state of sickness, animals must be transferred from accuser to accused. 
Today, elders still try those who falsely accuse others of poisoning, with the expense of 
paying for this formal sitting providing a strong deterrent to profligate accusers. Indeed, 
clans were involved in intra-clan settlements to forgive past evictions of women, which 
continued to cause misfortune in the present.  
 
In contrast to pre-war times, elders lamented that the state no longer protects 
them.Though the 1967 Witchcraft Act remains law, in interviews conducted for this 
research, communities claimed that the state protects those who poison rather than those 
who suffer from it. This is demonstrated through the refusal of police and state 
authorities to sanction the eviction of suspects. As one member of the Maracha District 
police relayed: “We tell them the law does not work like that, we are all citizens of 
Uganda, what about human rights?”738 Ordeals have become less popular, and are rarely 
used. But elders remain under pressure to expel suspected poisoners – who are often 
men who have right to land. As an exploration of the following cases of evictions 
revealed, the line between state and community is increasingly blurred in poisoning 
evictions.  
 





The two cases described here unfolded in February 2017, among clans in Maracha.  
 
8.5.1 Case A: The Threat and Security of the State 
The first eviction was set in motion after a young man, Peter, was knocked down and 
killed on the road. This traffic accident was understood to be drilonzi, a term that 
connotes bad luck or a surprise event directed by human malice. Prior to his death, Peter 
had eaten potatoes prepared in the home of another villager, Simon; as noted above, 
death following the shared consumption of food is a common signifier of enyata. As 
sudden road accidents are often associated with poisoning in West Nile, this sequencing 
of events precipitated a search for accountability beyond the immediate physical cause 
of death. This particular accident was unusual furthermore because, as an onlooker 
explained, “There was no way he could have died—there was not any bleeding.”739  
 
This was not the first death in the village. Several weeks earlier, the suicide of a young 
man was connected by community members to malicious intent. Before these deaths, 
the village had suffered many unexpected deaths, with the LC counting 14 deaths over a 
period of a decade. Each death was associated with one particular aku (home), of which 
Simon was a member. This family had isolated themselves from village affairs, but so 
had many other homes struggling with the demands of work. On occasion, family 
members had been rude to other villagers. Suspicions as to their involvement in 
poisoning were grave. These fears relied not merely on recognition of social neglect, but 
 
739 I, LCI, Maracha, 17/02/2017 (OJ). 
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on tracing behaviour in the lineage of Simon’s mother: as with other cases, it was 
thought that poisoning techniques had been inherited via the female line, and brought 
into the home through marriage. Just as a mother can teach her children correct moral 
behaviour, villagers reckoned, she could also teach them bad deeds—and since her 
husband had not sent her away, it was thought that he, too, was complicit, perhaps using 
his wife as a “fence” to hide his own evil intent. Though Simon’s mother had ascended 
as a women’s leader within the Catholic Church, villagers interpreted this not as 
evidence of moral virtue but as a diversion from her bad deeds. The family had been 
protected from accusations since Simon’s father was one of two remaining elderly men 
in the village, and certain performances of deference were expected from junior 
villages. Moreover, though intense suspicion and “quiet” rumours had arisen, there had 
been no explicit evidence of poisoning, such as eating, beforehand. The events of 
Peter’s death provided a clear trail of evidence, releasing a crescendo of anger that had 
accumulated following the deaths of so many clan members, deaths which had rendered 
villagers powerless.740 
 
After Peter’s funeral, the clan members sat for an evaluation. Following a suspicious 
death, these meetings between relatives (after other visitors have left) can be tense. In 
this case, allegations were openly directed toward Simon and his family, linking them to 
other deaths. That evening, young men of the clan, plus the village LC and remaining 
elder, rushed to the family homes. The group was led by young men who shouted 
“Something dangerous has come” and “We don’t want poison here.” There were no 
dissenting voices; the villagers were united in their will to destroy the home and evict 
 
740 I, Evicted Family, 17/02/2017 (OJ/AC). 
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the family. After Simon was openly accused in the home, he responded only by saying, 
“If God knows, he will punish me accordingly.”741 The crowd had little intention of 
outsourcing punishment; young men, apparently commanded by the LC and elder, 
grabbed hoes from neighbouring compounds and began to destroy the roof of the house, 
also throwing bricks and stones at the accused family. The family—twelve members in 
total—ran from the village to the home of their maternal uncles. This home was only 
several kilometres away, but it was beyond the jurisdiction of the angry crowd. This 
eviction also sparked subsequent evictions of the daughters of the family married 
elsewhere: of these events I was told, “They [other clans] are gathering all the 
rubbish.”742 
 
Simon himself fled to the District police station with his wife, forcing an official 
response. The police moved from the sub-county headquarters to the village to find the 
group demolishing houses, and in a form of response that has now become common 
across Uganda, dispersed the crowd using tear gas. Simon sheltered for the night in the 
police station, but before joining the rest of his family, he wrote down the names of 
those who had been involved in the demolition, including the LC himself. Defending 
himself, he explained to the police (as he would later explain to me) that the eviction 





742 Commentary, Research Assistant 02/2019. 
743 I, Evicted Family, 17/02/2017 (OJ/AC). 
 362 
Three men and three women on this list were arrested the following day at the main 
market in the district. When the home community learnt of what had happened, these 
arrests were perceived to be an injustice. An exasperated LC told me: “The police are 
the ones protecting bad people. They keep on saying that people should not take the law 
into their own hands and kill people—but these people are killing people. The police are 
promoting this evil work.” 744 Members of the village hid away from home during the 
day, and youths posted themselves by the road to watch for the police, should they 
return.  
 
To force the release of their fellow villagers, a group stormed the District police station 
in Nyadri town some days later. Their protest was ignored, and the District Police 
Commander (DPC) refused to address them, but passed on a message that “Nothing 
about poisoning is written in the law book.”745 The DPC instructed that he would send a 
message back to the village with the course of action to be followed. This message 
would never arrive, and in the interim, the clan members united to raise the 1.6M 
(450US$) shillings needed to bail the six detained villagers out.  
 
With the villagers released, and the report from the DPC that signalled the sub-county 
would not be involved in the allegations, it would seem that the state had failed the 
people of Nyadri. But despite the disengagement of officials, villagers continued to 
demand the attention of the sub-county, and the following week continued their 
investigation. They searched a hut, the roof of which had held firm during the 
 
744 I, LCI, Maracha, 17/02/2017 (OJ). 
745 IM, DPC, Nyadri, 26/05/2016. 
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demolition, and tested for poison. Two bottles of chemicals and a large ojo—the bulb 
formerly used by herbalists—were found hidden within. One elder explained, “Those 
things were tied. We feared to open it [the bottles] but some people picked [up] the[ir] 
courage and opened it. We took just a tiny drop of the liquid and put it on six 
grasshoppers. They died instantly.”746 A list of more than 100 names was also found 
with the chemicals. Of those listed, seven had already died. This discovery definitively 
confirmed the suspicions that the family had aro onzi, or poison.747  
 
The sub-county was petitioned to collect the evidence. Drama ensued when the Officer 
in Charge (OC) went to collect the poison on his bike. Immediately after collecting it, 
the engine of his bike choked, and despite his efforts, it would not re-start. The village 
looked on as the OC was eventually forced to push his bike back to the sub-county HQ. 
A message reached the village that after delivering the poison the engine started again, 
without any intervention from a mechanic. People were overcome with laughter as they 
relayed these events to me.748 It was a triumph that vindicated the struggles within the 
village: the power of the poison had defeated the police. There was a palpable sense that 
the villagers had proven their case—would the state now take interest? 
 
At the sub-county HQ, there was much confusion.749 When I visited the sub-county, the 
LCIII retrieved the poison from the bottom of a cabinet in his office, and brought it into 
the room where we had been speaking and placed it on the floor. The OC of the station 
was present, but refused to touch the poison. Eventually the LCIII unwrapped the 
 
746 I, LCI, Maracha, 12/02/2017 (OJ). 
747 ibid. 
748 Informal discussion, village youths, Maracha village, 02/2017 (OJ). 
749 Visit to Sub-County, meeting with Officer in Charge and LCIII, 02/2017. 
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poison-containing vessels from the paper. He retrieved a large onion bulb (ojo) and two 
bottles of liquid, one red and one yellow. For a moment we all looked at the poison. My 
research assistant recoiled. At some point, the LCIII removed the lid of one of the 
bottles, whereupon a noxious smell filled the room and the OC left the room. “But is 
this really poison?” the LCIII asked. He explained that it is difficult to discern since the 
villagers recovered the poison from the house themselves, when they should have left it 
for the police to find. The OC then produced the list of names; throughout this 
encounter the officials’ anxiety over touching these objects was clear. The LCIII 
replaced the top on the bottle, and shaking his head, he placed it back in the office. 
Afterwards, I saw him rush outside to wash his hands with soap. When we spoke 
afterwards, he addressed me with what seemed like a question, “But even if there is 
evidence, as was brought here—that person could be using it to treat themselves 
herbally, or treating their crops. Many of our people grow mairungi; you need specific 
chemicals to grow that. Can we really kill each other?”750 At the sub-county HQ, 
profound fear of the poison was accompanied by unease over how to proceed. 
 
Even though state officials disavowed the production of the two bottles as evidence, 
they still participated in the spectacle of collection that, in their eyes, legitimised the 
claim of the community, vindicating local fears of poison. The exercise undoubtedly 
mirrored extractions of the colonial state. Though state officials seemed to be acting out 
of fear, and tried to maintain distance even when the agent was presented to their office, 
these trepidations went unseen by villagers, who perceived that the poison had been 
swiftly sequestered away by the police. 
 
750 I, LCIII, Nyadri, 18/02/2017. 
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No news ever reached the village as to the testing of the poisons, generating subsequent 
confusion as to why the district would not confirm the substances as poisonous, since 
evidence had been produced. There was anger in the village and intense questioning as 
to why, after all their efforts, such information was withheld.751 Nine months later, 
when I revisited the clan, the suspects had not returned—moreover, people had stopped 
dying unexpectedly, so there was little interest in revisiting the past. Though during 
moments of panic the state had simultaneously provided both a threat and guarantee, the 
affair had now been folded into the rhythm of everyday life. The state faded into the 
background.  
 
8.5.2 Case B: LCI under threat 
 
The second case took a different form, with greater efforts to document and judicialise 
the eviction. Two women within one village (clan), had died in quick succession, after 
being greeted and ‘tapped on the shoulder’ by a certain man. This type of poisoning 
(known as enata or ba yi), is more magical. Ba yi is sometimes explained as involving 
the application of a substance, but there were never attempts to produce poison.752 This 
suspect had also targeted the LCI, allegedly greeting him and his wife with suspicious 
words and a lingering greeting. After falling sick, the couple visited a local herbalist for 
treatment, to whom today they credit their survival. This attack made the LCI 
determined to act, as his allegiance lay with other victims in the community. 
 
 
751 I, Elders, Maracha, 03/03/2017. 
752 LCI, Alivu, 16/03/2017 (OJ). 
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Along with village elders, the LCI convened an “insecurity meeting” to discuss case 
B.753 The main action points on the agenda were simple: to determine 1) how people 
had died, and 2) who had caused their deaths. These questions may give the appearance 
of an open investigation, but reading the minutes of the meeting, it was evident these 
proceedings meant to codify pre-existing notions of guilt. Ninety people gathered—
including the LC, a parish chief, elders and youth groups—with names recorded on an 
attendance register. The formal setting of the meeting seemed to provide a space for 
people to speak openly about their experiences, and a further five women came forward 
with allegations of misconduct. After the suspect greeted them suspiciously as well, 
they also proceeded to local herbalists where they were treated. In total, the suspect 
“had attempted to kill” nine people, of whom seven survived and two died. After people 
presented their experiences, the accused was given a chance to confess. He replied that 
“It is true that I have been playing with these women and greeting them in this way. But 
I did not know it would lead to sickness or death.”754 I was told that the suspect was not 
stable in his home, and had lived away in places notorious for witchcraft. Though his 
confession did not appertain to the specific deaths, it was seen to confirm his 
involvement. After these proceedings, those present were given the chance to vote 
publicly by raising their hands.  
 
These proceedings look like what scholars have called “hybrid” or “best-fit”: evidence 
of an emergent indigenous architecture. It is important not to overstate this aspect of the 
proceedings, however—when I mentioned that voting appeared democratic, the LCI 
 
753 Taken from Meeting Notes, Village B, February 2017, the meeting was recorded in Lugbara. 
754 LCI, Alivu, 16/03/2017 (OJ). 
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was confused. This architecture was devised largely in fear of the state, as well as fear 
of sickness should an allegation prove false (as described above). By voting as 
collectives, the identities of individual accusers were protected; this apparatus is 
designed to exclude the accused in a manner that protects the majority.  
 
Following this meeting, the suspect was marched out of the village to the border with 
the next parish, in compliance with by-laws written by the village council and stamped 
by the sub-county. Similar proceedings had been initiated when thieves were caught 
red-handed: they were marched around the limits of the village, often accompanied by 
drumming and cries of their names and crimes. In most cases, these parades were 
organised at least in part by a village LC. In Case B, when the suspect began to shout at 
those who were force-marching him, young people responded by hurling stones. His 
properties were not destroyed, and his son was allowed to stay (albeit under close 
surveillance). 
 
Speaking soon after this event, the LCI was enthusiastic. He believed he had handled 
the proceedings well, resulting in no killing or destruction. Because of his intervention, 
he explained, “We did not take the law into our own hands.” Moreover, safety and 
health had been restored to the village. Meeting the LCI some few weeks later, 
however, his manner had changed and he spoke quickly and nervously. He was worried 
that the violence of the eviction might reach the police. Outside village limits, perhaps 
the state could side with the evictee. He hesitated and explained his strategy: “If he 
comes back, we will use force to get rid of him. If he comes with the right government 
officials and the police, we will sit and show the minutes of the meeting and we will ask 
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them: “Is what this man is doing the right thing?”755 His explanation was fragile, and he 
was evidently worried about sanctioning the eviction: though the suspect had survived, 
the community had in fact taken the law into their own hands. With the suspect evicted, 
it was now the spectre of state punishment, rather than the fear of witchcraft, that 
lingered over the village, and over the LCI in particular. During collective panic, the 
community acted autonomously, but the potential threat of the state was subsequently 
imagined in its absence.  
  
 
8.6: The splitting of the state 
 
These cases bear the specificities of differing contexts of affliction, as well as the 
attentiveness of local authorities as to the threat of poison. Yet all cases share a concern 
for managing the threat of poisoning, as well as fears of repercussion from the state. As 
noted in case B, the imprint of the state is reflected in local processing structures, where 
the bureaucratic procedures of the state are mimicked at the local level as a means of 
controlling local emotions in an ordered fashion. Due to exposure to local government, 
and because emblems of the state have power, idealised images of order-making such as 
agendas, meetings, taking minutes and writing laws are increasingly an option. Beyond 
the form of these evictions, these events involved particular patterns of state 
engagement.  
 
The above cases involved local authorities—embedded officials (LCI and parish chiefs) 
from the sub-country to the district level. Dealing with these evictions, particularly for 
 
755 I, LCI, Alivu, 16/03/2017 (OJ). 
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those officials hailing from the area they served, was difficult: councillors feared 
poisoning, but they also feared the state. In this gap between local witchcraft 
epistemologies and state law, officials from LCI- LCIII (village to sub-county) levels 
offered ambiguous statements that could not implicate them directly on either side. A 
common practice seemed to be to neither confirm nor deny events, and to remain 
ontologically between the state and local experience. An LCIII explained: 
I’m realising rampant evictions of the suspected sorcerers in the communities. 
We should all open out to address the problem before any death case has been 
reported in connection with that. The eviction is a big case of insecurity in this 
sub-county. And also witchcraft is becoming another big source of insecurity… 
so far we have five cases which have arisen this year, in two months… This 
issue of evicting people thought to be poisoners, around ten years ago it has 
been there, even twenty years ago it has been there—but this time it has become 
so common.756 
 
The LCIII acknowledged the problems of evictions alongside the problem of 
witchcraft—but where does he himself stand? Speaking of the aforementioned cases, he 
continued:  
There was this case of Village C, people say they caught him practising 
witchcraft, and jumping across a grave at night. A child died. In Case B 
someone had a hand in the death of a woman. The confession was accepted. It 
was peaceful. In Case A, I would term that ‘accident’ but our Lugbara people, 
when someone dies, they look for the cause. This leads them to destruction. 
Some of these cases, it is poisoning, and there is a case, but in others, I would 
see it a bit differently.757 
 
Interestingly, the cases that the LCIII suggests are “real” are those lacking the physical 
agent of poison. At the sub-county level, those cases which were the least “scientific” 
within an empirical, rationalist framework were more persuasive than those where 
physical evidence had been produced.  
 
 
756 I, LCIII, Nyadri, 18/02/2017. 
757 ibid. 
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At the sub-county level, officials were versed in idioms of witchcraft, but could keep 
their distance from it through ambiguous comments. Yet those officials embedded in 
communities were subject to intense pressure to manage the problem. They feared being 
singled out as responsible for organising an eviction, but also feared being associated 
with violence. As one LCI claimed, “If LCs support a suspect, the community will say 
he is conniving with them.”758 Similarly, a parish chief recounted that 
As a parish chief I also face the same challenges [as an LC and an elder] because 
I live in the community. There are things that are really bad in the community 
that we all know are bad. But because the community looks up to me, and I have 
an administrative role—if I tell them not to do something because it contravenes 
the government law, they say it is me who is supporting evil in the 
community.”759 
 
The “spectre” of state punishment remained, but so too did the threat of poison.760 
Embedded officials were caught between the collective will of their villagers and the 
personal allocation of responsibility from the state. That same parish chief explained his 
predicament:  
Telling rumours to the police will give the police the chance to be alert in areas 
where there may be a problem. But there are cases where you report with 
evidence and nothing happens. When you are the eye of the government you are 
expected to report to the police in a silent way so the police can decide what to 
do.761 
 
Here the chief alludes to the fact that as a member of the state he should alert the 
security personnel about unfolding events (without the knowledge of his community), 
but if he did, he would be forced to give details of the local community that would place 
him at odds with its members. LCI and parish chiefs continually imbricated themselves 
 
758 I, LCI, Alivu, 16/03/2017 (OJ). 
759 I, Parish Chief, Maracha, 28/02/2017 (OJ). 
760 B. Aretxaga, ‘Maddening States’, Annual Review of Anthropology 32 (2003), pp. 393-410, p. 395. 
761 I, Parish Chief, Maracha, 28/02/2017 (OJ). 
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in this sphere of rumour rather than that of fact. Embedded officials generally avoided 
seeking intervention of higher state authorities.  
 
Though in case B local officials did associate themselves with proceedings, speaking to 
LCIs and parish chiefs across Maracha District who had been involved in similar 
proceedings, I observed a reluctance to accept responsibility. Case B clearly elucidates 
the shifting temporalities of these anxieties for the LCI involved. More commonly, 
officials tried to distance themselves personally from local actions, blaming or 
implicating other officials. LCIs explained that parish chiefs had been the primary force 
behind evictions, and vice versa. Indeed, far from appearing as a unified force, officials 
at different levels maintained a careful distance from evictions. For the LCIII, this 
became apparent in a meeting he convened for LCIs across the sub-county. He 
explained that the meeting was necessary because of the “secrecy” of the LCI below 
him. The LCIII explained: 
As an LCIII it is very hard to deal with this. You tell the community ‘don’t do 
this’ and yet they do their own things. We move in the community, but often 
they do their things secretly. When we get the information they are planning 
‘a,b,c,d’ we go and disorganise them. For them, they will be acting secretly. It 
will be only when they are doing the action that it comes out.762 
 
Interestingly, the LCI with whom I spoke believed the meeting would proffer advice on 
how to manage suspected poisoners, or at least to mitigate the threat of poisoning.763 
Speaking to attendees of the meeting, his message was profoundly unclear: was he 
condemning the act of poisoning? Or the act of evicting?  
 
 
762 I, LCIII, Nyadri, 18/02/2017. 
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Both at the sub-county and in local communities, for those serving the state at different 
levels, these evictions were a thorny issue. Rather than take credit for these local 
solutions, however, officials tried to pass blame to others nearby. These reactions are 
interesting in light of recent analysis from elsewhere, which suggests that the 
management of witchcraft proffers an important opportunity for local elites to entrench 
their power base.764 Whilst this could be true for the case of the Bishop described in the 
following chapters, this abstracted perspective, however, neglects both the trepidation 
officials hold towards witchcraft, as well as their deep anxieties about retribution by the 
state.  
 
If in these cases the reactions of embedded officials were ambiguous, then the actual 
interventions of higher authorities were absent. The MP for Maracha East refused to be 
involved: a technocrat who spends more time in parliament than in his constituency, he 
explained his total reluctance to become embroiled in “mysterious” affairs, opting, 
rather, to leave them to those on the ground.765 The activities of the police, moreover, 
happened on an arbitrary basis. In case B, their authority was present as an idea—the 
threat of sanctions that did not arrive. In case A, their interventions were highly 
contradictory, discrediting community actions and intervening against public will.  
 
At each of these levels, state practices were either poorly articulated or nonaligned. 
Nonetheless state power was invoked by officials who, in the midst of local panic, 
continually assessed their connection to law. Even though embedded officials 
 
764 Allen, ‘Vigilantes, Witches, and Vampires’. 
765 I, Maracha East MP, Arua, 20/06/2017. 
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sanctioned procedures to manage poisoning suspects knowing such proceedings 
contravened the law, the capacity of the state to enforce the law remained ever-present 
in their calculations. Though officials did not sever their ties with communities, they 
certainly endeavoured to distance themselves from events within them. What thus 
emerged was a shifting mosaic of state authority where representatives moved between 
local epistemologies and law, a mosaic whose portrait of the state was fractured at best. 
 
8.7: Evidence and Imaginations of State Power: Perspectives from 
Below 
 
Across these cases the state manifested as anything but unified, but what was striking 
was how collectives in the midst of local crisis continued to explain their plight in terms 
of evidence, imagining the state as coherent and rational. Countless times, villagers 
explained that the “governmenti always asks for evidence which isn’t there” or 
“governmenti works on evidence.” These statements echo observations elsewhere that 
the “bluntness” of state law makes it ill-equipped to deal with crimes that are, in 
essence, malleable and invisible. For example, Geschiere, based on analysis in 
Cameroon, concludes that the “basic problem for any legislative intervention in the field 
of witchcraft is what might be called its ‘circular’ character. Unequivocal terminology 
and clear-cut definitions are supposed to be crucial for any law-making.”766 In Maracha, 
communities recognised this issue— undeterred, people set about producing evidence to 
make their claims heard. In case A, this involved producing a physical poison agent, and 
in case B, efforts were made to formally codify social fact. In each case, local 
communities sought to translate local notions of wrongdoing into the evidentiary 
 
766 P. Geschiere, ‘Witchcraft and the Limits of the Law’, in Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (eds.), Law and 
Disorder in the Postcolony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008, pp. 219-241, p. 223. 
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standards of the state. In essence, communities were performing the terms of the 1967 
Witchcraft Act, producing evidence either of repute or of physical substances required 
to cause harm. 
 
When action was not forthcoming, people exclaimed “there is no evidence”—meaning 
that there was no legal, visible evidence that the state could use. There was, however, a 
wealth of evidence based on social facts and inheritance. In each case, the evidence that 
suspects were doing evil work was profound, and had often been compiled over decades 
of observing family histories, or tracking the migrations of suspects. Particular signs 
had also been collated around death. The below description was offered by an 
interlocutor, following the death of her relative, who was thought to have been poisoned 
through water: 
The body started to disintegrate, they took him to hospital—on the way he 
started to die—strange saliva was coming out of his mouth, and when people 
touched his skin it started to come off onto their skin, so they couldn’t touch 
him. Then his bottom half started coming off, his legs, arms, private parts were 
alone. [His] body was disintegrating. Did not reach hospital. Body was in a bad 
way and couldn’t be touched, so had to bury him very quickly.767 
 
And in another case, community members describe how they had disaggregated a 
verdict of poisoning from suicide:  
Elder: For the first one, it was not sickness, he committed suicide. He was 
looking for rope. His grandmother said ‘No, don’t take the rope of my goat, if 
you want to commit suicide go somewhere else.’ … He came to the real home, 
he tried to get the rope of the sheep. He failed. He knew when his brother was 
there he would stop him doing it. He gave his brother 1000 shillings to go and 
booze. He said he would follow the brother to the trading centre later. Then from 
there he removed his shirt, he crossed the valley, there were some animals 
grazing. He removed the rope, he tied on a certain eucalyptus tree. Not very 
high, his feet were on the ground. A certain woman raised the alarm. He was 
already dead when the brother came. There was foam coming from his mouth, 
 
767 Account of friend, shared 09/2017. 
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but his feet were on the ground… When the policeman cut him down, there 
wasn’t a mark on the neck. 
 
Researcher: So he hadn’t died from the hanging? 
 
Elder: It may be because of poison. When you strangle yourself there should be 
marks on the neck yet there was nothing. So he hadn’t died that way… Perhaps 
he had eaten poison that had made him do it… At the funeral there were about 
5-6 policemen there, they had checked the dead body. They were surprised 
because they checked his neck [but] there was nothing. They wanted us to take 
him for postmortem. But we said no, it was a waste of money. We should spend 
the money on the funeral instead. So we didn’t do it, we had the funeral.768 
 
The strong conviction that wrongdoing has occurred thus yields a chain of causation 
that links the suspect to an individual death, or even mass deaths. Yet the police—and 
by extension, the state—cannot act. One would expect a disavowal of the state, but in 
fact, the incompatibilities of these evidences seemed to provide an alibi for state 
inaction. In these circumstances, people defended the inaction of the state, uttering 
statements such as “the police can’t act on rumours”, or something similar. The result is 
a complex delineation between the community in the social world where rumour 
abounds, and the role of the state—which is expected to act on visibilities and 
materialities—relying on forms of evidence that communities cannot produce. Such 
hierarchies of knowledge were developed to explain official inaction, affirming the 
distance of the state. Local collectives imagined the possibilities of state intervention to 
provide order in bureaucratic, rational and legal forms, but constructed their worlds in 
opposition to that order. The community was invoked as an inferior world of rumour, 
yet palpable aspirations for state intervention persisted. 
 
 
768 I2, Worubu, 03/05/2017 (OJ/AC). 
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Perhaps the most acute longing for state intervention came in the desire for autopsies. 
Here the modern, scientific potential of the state was articulated as a distant certainty 
that could provide an ultimate settlement and vindication of community struggles. In 
cases of poisoning, death is invariably sudden and traumatic: “The dead body goes bad 
quickly. It swells and it might explode.”769 Again, communities often assume the 
presence of poisoning through a sudden or violent death. But a post-mortem by the state 
was regarded as better than those examinations and observations made in the village. 
On separate occasions I was told:  
What is disconcerting [is that] even if the body is taken for post mortem, it is 
never disclosed. Maybe they don’t know what the poison is, or they can’t see it 
because it is magical.”770 
 
The government people know that if they disclose a verdict that a death was 
from poisoning, it will cause violence in these communities. So they refuse to 
disclose [it] even if it they know it is from poisoning.771 
 
As described in Chapter Seven, it is considered a fundamental right for those who knew 
the deceased to know the cause of death, and funerals serve as a culturally-sanctioned 
process to publicly relay this knowledge. It is important that those present are satisfied 
with these testimonies. Outsourcing calls for this autopsy, for the body to be cut open 
and the poison revealed, speaks to an absolute desire for confirmation from the state. 
Though during this research I never learned of any cases in any context where a formal 
autopsy was conducted, there was never any doubt that the state, if willing, could 
provide this ultimate form of evidence.  
 
 
769 I, Elder, Aroi, 28/12/2017 (OJ). 
770 I2, Worubu, 03/05/2017 (OJ/AC). 
771 Commentary, Co-worker, 01/2017. 
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Sometimes, local events were compared to high-profile political deaths where 
prominent officials were allegedly poisoned by the government (which then refused to 
disclose any results). Rumours I was told suggested that plates (tableware) in the 
statehouse were believed to have been poisoned, or that poison was dissolved into the 
food, or even that bottles of poisoned water in the statehouse were served to critics of 
Museveni’s regime. These stories demonstrated the power of the distant state not only 
to kill its opponents, but to withhold information of those deaths, and to keep its citizens 
in a prolonged state of uncertainty. I also heard stories of local state agents being 
poisoned whilst on the campaign trail. In such cases the causes of death were always 
kept secret. I was told furthermore that since such things happened in Kampala, the 
government would never care to intervene in a village setting. The state was understood 
as having power over access to bodily knowledge. 
 
Again, however, despite being absent—and despite failing to perform any kind of 
supportive role towards affected communities—the possibility that the state could 
provide certainty remained present across different local iterations of resolution. After 
several months researching this topic, I asked one of my co-workers what he perceived 
to be the most appropriate solution to evictions. Though he acknowledged the difficulty, 
he told me: 
I think the state should make a law against poisoning in order to deal with such 
offenders. The state always asks for evidence which is never there. I think the 
victims are enough as witness to poisoning challenges they face in their 
communities. Also, [as] the upper state doesn’t live within the community, I 
think taking the words of the lower government officials like LC I, II and III is 
sufficient enough as evidence for the state to charge poisoners with murder.772 
 
 
772 Commentary, Co-worker, 06/2017. 
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Despite all we had seen in our research together, for him the solution was still a national 
law to prohibit poisoning. The intervention of the state was still on the horizon, and 




The gravity of poisoning cases as criminal acts makes evictions an important site where 
experiences of authority and protection can be studied. Though social leaders 
throughout history have sought to control rumour and anger, and restore order following 
‘bad’ deaths caused by forms of witchcraft, in contemporary West Nile, adding the 
gloss of state bureaucracy adds additional meaning to local proceedings. As discussed 
above, the precise strategies for identifying and evicting poisoners vary according to 
local dynamics; anti-witchcraft action will always evade large-scale analysis and 
equation to macro-concepts such as legitimacy, conformity and institutionalisation.  
 
Throughout this enquiry, the resonance of the state was ever-present, and the position of 
its embedded officials proved surprisingly complex. For them, dealing with poisoners 
invoked a situation of epistemic uncertainty between fears of the threat of poisoning as 
played out in their lived experience, and fears of repercussions from sanctioning 
punishments that contravened state law. Between these competing views of the world, 
anxious officials endeavoured to protect their own positions, whilst simultaneously 
addressing local emergencies. Their actions took place in a space populated by fears and 
imaginings of ramifications of future consequences, balanced against desperate calls 
from below to end death in the immediate present. What emerged is thus a shifting 
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landscape of state authority, whereby ‘law’ as a regulatory device was continually re-
negotiated in light of local circumstances. 
 
That said, the involvement of the police, and the distant state who are not ‘of the soil,’ 
occupy different conceptions within the local mind. It is these more distanced figures 
who were conceived as the ‘government’ in everyday talk, whose inattention is 
generative more of bewilderment than falling into simple discourses of ‘failure’ or 
‘success.’ Though the government prevents communities from solving their own 
problems, there are parallel sentiments that the government could provide answers, 
order and calm. In each case, however, the state appears as a powerful possibility for 
intervention. 
 
In this ambiguous space—populated by affectations, rumours about order, potential 
autopsies and assertions of evidence—the state is conceived of as a unified entity 
capable of definitive action even though it appears and functions as anything but. 
Residents fall back on a priori narratives of vulnerability and neglect, internalising 
doubts as to their moral worlds before the state. Just as what constitutes evidence of 
poisoning is difficult to formally articulate yet still believed known by communities, the 
evidence base for effective state intervention remains elusive. But this uncertainty, 
instead of leading people to discount or discredit the state, can be seen as productive of 







Politicising the Past: A Tale of Two Bishops 
 
 
“Drandua, people wanted to assassinate him, but he never brought soldiers to 
protect him. He protected people. This one [Odoki] is like a politician. He is like 
a politican, he is not a shepherd, he is a ruler. This one is not a shepherd. He is 
not. If you are a shepherd, you do not allow your flock to interface with you—you 
close them out with the support of the police. How many Christians go to you? 
Only police can visit! And over the past 40 years people have been accessing their 
bishop. During the war people took shelter in the church. That is where—that 
Ombaci massacre, people had to take refuge in the church, others took residence 
in the Bishop’s residence. Now people are running away from the church, because 
there is fire burning in the church. The army are now in the church, plain clothes 
security operatives—you get them at the pulpit. A sacred place and these are 




Previous chapters have shown how notions of witchcraft provide a means to 
comprehend and address loss within the framework of the clan. This chapter explores 
how, through inciting claims of witchcraft, a Catholic elite politicised the death of 
Bishop Emeritus Frederick Drandua, inciting violence from mourners and residents of 
the town of Ediofe against Bishop Sabino Ocan Odoki, the reigning bishop of Arua 
Catholic Diocese, on September 21, 2016.774 
Whilst previous chapters have dealt largely with cases of individual misfortune or 
transgression, to round out the analysis of this thesis and offer useful avenues for further 
 
773 I, Catholic Father, Edifoe, 25/12/2017. 
774 Several elders who served as advisors for this research insisted this case was highly relevant to the research. 
Given the sensitive political nature of these events, all identifying details have been removed, and no references are 
made to interviews contained within the bibliography. I additionally interviewed an arrested ‘rioter’ who shared 
their experiences, but no mention is made of these details to preserve their anonymity. Attempts to interview 
Odoki were unsuccessful during the research period. I did, however, interview Catholic priests on both sides of the 
divide (their comments have been anonymised).  
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research, this chapter widens the scope to explore how clan ideas of responsibility can 
become politicised and result in collective violence. This politicisation can only be 
understood in relation to conflict-filled pasts, and the role of the Catholic Church in 
affording protection to ordinary civilians. Drandua’s death and the unfolding riot served 
as what Argenti and Schramm term a “triggering event”, resuscitating memories of war 
and reawakening consciousness of the past.775 Through funerary rites for his mourners, 
and through violence for the rioters, Drandua’s death provided a moment to address 
West Nile’s history of conflict in culturally resonant forms. When police disrupted these 
rites, reportedly under orders of Bishop Odoki, violent clashes unfolded.  
This chapter first describes the riot, then moves backwards and forwards in time to 
explore the texture of local claims. Discontent regarding Odoki was linked to the priests 
who challenged his managerial style of administration. Acting as conduits to the laity, 
these priests aired individual grievances that sullied Odoki’s reputation, who was 
portrayed as having the anti-social, individualistic tendencies of witches (described in 
Chapter Seven). This created doubts over the bishop’s moral authority and precipitated 
public outpourings against him following Drandua’s death, ultimately coalescing as 
allegations of witchcraft.  
 
Following this scene-setting, I detail how different groups of priests and elites 
participated in inciting ill-repute, as well as the disjuncture between official discussions 
of diocesan changes and the witchcraft claims made on the ground. This account seeks 
as well to provide a counter-narrative of the riot to the version advanced in national 
 
775 N. Argenti and K. Schramm, ‘Introduction: Remembering Violence’, in N. Argenti and K. Schramm (eds.), 
Remembering Violence: Anthropological Perspectives on Intergenerational Transmission. Brooklyn, NY: Berghahn 
Books, 2010, pp. 1-39, p. 11. 
 383 
media, which described events as “chaos” or a “war”—this crisis narrative caricatured 
protestors with colonial tropes of “inherent violence” and irrationality, which served to 
silence both the contestation of moral authority and memories of a traumatic past.776 
The chapter concludes with an anthropological reflection on transitions in expressions 
of loss, and a note on the violence of healing—connecting the events of this uprising to 
the evictions of previous chapters.  
 
9.2 The Ediofe Uprising 
 
The seeds of the uprising were planted in the events following Drandua’s passing on 
September 1, 2016.777 As Drandua’s body was brought to Arua, business in town came 
to a standstill, with thousands following the casket in a street procession to the 
Cathedral. Held at Ediofe Sacred Heart Cathedral on September 7, Drandua’s funeral 
was a deeply emotional event, attended by thousands of mourners from West Nile and 
beyond. The descriptions that follow come from multiple sources, first and foremost my 
own direct witness of the events during my fieldwork. I also make use of the 
widespread coverage in national media and local radio to flesh out this story and bring 
further context, as well as conversations and interviews with participants in the riot and 
in the clerical matters that surrounded it. These sources together provide a rounded 
portrait of this tumultuous event whilst preserving the anonymity of those involved. 
 
 
776 Daily Monitor, ‘Bishop Drandua’s sister injured in cathedral scuffle’, 26 September 2016, Twitter post available at 
< https://twitter.com/dailymonitor/status/780456844116500481>; The Observer, ‘Gunfire at Ediofe cathedral, 
Christians attack bishop’s home’, 22 September 2016, available at <https://observer.ug/news-headlines/46594-
gunfire-at-ediofe-cathedral-as-christians-attack-bishop-s-home>.  
777 It is worth noting that there was also disagreement in the national press about the cause of death. Whilst the 
Daily Monitor reported diabetes as the cause, other sources named oesophageal cancer. 
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Catholic tradition dictates that as a former bishop, Drandua was to be buried within the 
Cathedral grounds. Following the funeral mass, a large group of predominantly Catholic 
mourners kept vigil by his body in Ediofe. This vigil marked an extension of normal 
clan burial practices, whereby visiting relatives may remain at the grave for days or 
even weeks after the death of a relative. Even after the death of an ordinary citizen, it is 
unthinkable to remove graveside mourners, who must be fed and accommodated as long 
as they remain, and who leave of their own accord.778 Given Drandua’s prominence, 
people might well remain for several months—indeed, several weeks later, the group of 
mourners, largely comprised of young men, showed no signs of relinquishing their 
watch. 
 
The presence of the “boys” at the gravesite was supported by Drandua’s burial 
committee, a group comprised of prominent Catholics and urban elites, who explained 
that the mourners were involved in ongoing work to prepare the gravesite. Yet certain 
members of the Arua Diocese, who were perceived as representing the interests of 
Bishop Odoki, objected to the gathering.779 One Catholic sister explained over the radio 
that the mourners had turned the cathedral into a “disco”, playing music and demanding 
financial contributions for food whilst they “guarded” the grave.780 According to 
Diocesan spokespeople, both this antisocial drinking and the alleged extortion were not 
only disrespecting the dead, but disrupting ongoing renovations to Sacred Heart 
Cathedral. 
 
778 These practices can carry a certain amount of tension, since mourners must be fed by relatives at home. But 
people’s right to remain is accepted, and it is considered a ‘curse’ to ask them to retreat home.  
779 Daily Monitor, ‘Arua Diocese Crisis: 16 suspects taken to court’, 22 September 2016, Twitter post available at < 
https://twitter.com/DailyMonitor/status/779142251725271040>.  
780 Radio Pacis talk show, broadcast October 7, 2017. 
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Accordingly, on September 21, two weeks after the funeral, the police were called to 
forcibly remove the mourners. The police arrived during the night, whereupon the 
mourning party resisted the eviction. One of Drandua’s relatives later explained, “We 
were sleeping in the Cathedral [and] praying divine mercy and rosary, but when the 
police came, they beat up people mercilessly accusing the youths of causing chaos in 
the church”.781 The mourners were soon joined by other residents, since, anticipating 
this attempt, a sub-group of mourners had stationed themselves at the church bell. Upon 
the arrival of the police at the gravesite, someone rang the bell. As one Ediofe resident 
explained, “This bell is never rung. This was a cry to war. It can be heard hundreds of 
miles away.”782 Though this claim may overestimate the bell’s reach, since it was rung 
in the middle of the night, at a time not designated for mass, it did in fact awake people 
in Ediofe and neighbouring villages. Many rushed out of their houses and, willingly or 
unwillingly, became caught up in the uprising. Confronted by police, some protestors 
destroyed a temporary prayer structure outside the main cathedral, whilst others 
smashed parish offices and burned documents. Another group attempted to advance 
upon Bishop Odoki’s residence, which lay behind the Cathedral, and remove him, but 
were prevented from entering by his military guard.783 
 
Throughout the night of September 21, police responded to protestors with force. As in 
the police response to opposition rallies during the 2016 election, tear gas was fired 
repeatedly throughout the night. The police were joined by military forces, who began 
 
781 Daily Monitor, ‘Bishop Drandua’s sister’. 
782 Discussion, Ediofe resident, 09/2016 
783 R. Ariaka, ‘Arua RDC Asks Official to Resign Over Ediofe Riot’, Uganda Radio Network, 13 October 2016. Available 
at < https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/rdc-asks-arua-acao-to-resign-over-ediofe-riot->.  
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moving through homes in Ediofe, arresting dozens of people and transporting them to 
the central police station. National Police spokesperson Kaewsi would claim these were 
the ringleaders, but several of those arrested protested their innocence. They had simply 
been caught in the fray, and had not instigated violence. 
 
By 8am the next morning (22nd September), the blasts of teargas and rubber bullets had 
died down, and the scene was relatively quiet. The police and army now occupied the 
parts of the road near the Cathedral, and residents coalesced on the banks of the road 
below. More military back-up arrived throughout the day, with the Ugandan National 
Police Chief Kayihura reportedly arriving in Arua. As the police and military presence 
increased, many Ediofe residents, now joined by other Aruans and relatives of Drandua, 
formed a blockade on Ediofe Road. Aruans believed the the police had also blocked 
other groups of relatives from joining the campaign at roadblocks in the countryside. In 
town, a stand-off ensued, with shops shut down and police blocking the crowd from 
approaching the bishop’s residence and the Cathedral. Reportedly, the new bishop 
remained barricaded in his home, and did not come out to address the crowd. As the 
crowd of protestors continued to swell, protestors waved signs displaying phrases such 
as ‘Get Odoki out of Arua’, ‘We want peace’ and ‘Odoki is a wizard’. After some 
hours, some people in the crowd began to throw small stones in the direction of the 
Cathedral; their revolt lasted several hours. 
 
Though national papers referred to the event as “chaos”, this obscured the fact that 
many did not partake in violence. During the nightly confrontations, many locals hid in 
their homes. During the standoff, many others simply watched, lamenting the heavy-
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handed tactics of the police, the ‘wildness’ of the youth, the bishop, the priests, and 
even the Vatican for appointing a bishop who did not love his people. Opinion was split 
between decrying the “politics of the church” and the police, with particular concern 
over a woman who was struck in the back by a stray police bullet: “If this woman dies, 
who will be held accountable? Will it be the police, will it be the Bishop?”784 decried 
one resident. At one point an army general passed through the crowd, chastising the 
protestors and screaming, “Why are you behaving this way, you are Ugandans, why are 
you behaving like this?”785 Drawing on stereotypical ideas of the violence of West 
Nilers, some onlookers from Kampala concluded that “Lugbara fear nothing but 
rain.”786  
 
After several hours, the crowd dispersed in the face of police blockades. In the 
following days, police passed through Ediofe villages, continuing to round up the 
purported ringleaders. Several people reported brutal injuries from beatings with sticks 
or bullet wounds from security forces. In the following days, stories of police brutality, 
theft and intimidation circulated in area communities, circulations confined largely to 
Ediofe’s homesteads given that the army maintained its presence at the Cathedral (and 
would for many months to come).  
 
On September 24, twenty-three people who had been rounded up during the riot were 
charged with malicious damage to property, criminal trespass and reportedly, 
 
784 Conversation with onlooker, 22/09/2016. 
785 Observations from morning of 22/09/2016. 
786 Observations from morning of 22/09/2016. 
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“disturbing the peace of the dead”.787 The then-DPC of Arua publicly explained: “They 
will be tried because we don’t want unlawful situations.”788 The internal affairs 
minister, Mario Obiga Kania, travelled to Arua as well, ruling out negotiations with the 
bishop and instead condemning the attackers. Many Christian leaders too condemned 
the riot, decrying thatchurch issues should not be resolved through violence. In the eyes 
of the law, those who instigated violence would be charged and punished, but in view of 
the heavy-handed treatment by security forces, old trauma created new traumas for 
many residents of Ediofe.  
 
In general, Ediofe residents fear the police. Thus, in exploring the dynamics of the riot, 
it is essential to consider what was at stake within the life-worlds of Drandua’s 
mourners: what could only be reconciled with violence that brought the risk of 
punishment by the law. To understand this, I now place this riot in a longer historical 
context, and describe the tensions precipitated by the perceived contrasts in the rule of 
two bishops.  
 
9.3: Reviving the Past 
 
Both Drandua’s death and the subsequent riot served as a “triggering event” that 
stimulated Lugbara people in Ediofe and beyond to discuss the events of the past. These 
memories reflect certain truths of the war, and the personal role Drandua played in 
 
787 R. Ariaka, ‘Ediofe Rioters Face Charges,’ Uganda Radio Network, 22 September 2016. Available at   
<https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/23-ediofe-rioters-taken-to-court-as-igp-kale-kayihura-visits-
arua-to-meet-aggrieved-parties>. 
788 R. Ariaka, ‘Ediofe Rioters Face Charges,’ Uganda Radio Network, 22 September 2016 
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offering civilians protection, but these conflict-based pasts were selectively recreated 
and reappraised in view of the perceived ‘corruption’ and strife within the diocese.789  
 
As noted in Chapter Four, during the decades of war, many Anglican and Catholic 
leaders sought to protect ordinary people. In part, this reflects the dynamics of war, 
whereby Christian missions, where civilians had taken shelter, were targeted. The 
massacre at Ombaci Mission, where 100 people were reportedly killed, is emblematic 
both of the horrors of Obote’s army and the protection the church afforded. Fathers and 
priests protected civilians from the UNLA army, placing themselves in between soldiers 
and civilians, as well as dug graves for the dead. Ombaci is thus powerfully symbolic of 
how religious leaders advocated for and suffered alongside Lugbara people.  
 
In the aftermath of Drandua’s death, Lugbara people recounted how religious leaders 
had played a central role in calling “liberation” forces to account, at a time when West 
Nile was politically isolated from Uganda. In one tribute by Dr Acemah, a prominent 
Lugbara intellectual remembered the advocacy of Bishop Tarantino, a white Catholic 
Father and Drandua’s predecessor: “I recall a stormy meeting Bishop Tarantino held 
with former president Milton Obote (RIP) at which the bishop roundly condemned 
UNLA for atrocities and gross human rights violations the army committed in West 
Nile.”790 When politicians and the state were discriminating against West Nilers 
because of their association with Amin, church leaders were protesting their suffering 
 
789 Argenti and Schramm, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 
790 Daily Monitor, ‘Tribute to Bishop Emeritus’, 11 September 2016. Available at < 
https://twitter.com/dailymonitor/status/774847615603183616>  
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under Obote II. Following Verdery, “it is easier to rewrite history with dead people than 
with other kinds of symbols that are speechless”.791 
 
After the war ended in 1986, Drandua was appointed the first African Bishop, a 
powerful symbol amid post-war reconstruction efforts. For ordinary people, his 
appointment served as recognition of his service during the war. After his death, many 
elders shared personal accounts of how Drandua remained in Arua whilst others had 
fled into exile, how he offered money to soldiers to prevent them torturing civilians, and 
how he sheltered civilians in Ediofe Mission.792 Throughout the 1990s, as rebel activity 
continued along the DRC and South Sudan borders, Drandua is said to have publicly 
urged rebel factions to hand over their arms, reconcile and work towards peace.793 One 
elder recalled that Drandua confronted Oyite-Ojok, the notoriously violent Chief of 
Staff in the UNLA army, saying “If you continue to kill people, you kill me too as the 
Bishop.”794 Another elder, exiled to Congo during the early years of Museveni’s rule, 
recalled that Drandua visited him and read Lugbara proverbs to bolster his strength to 
endure exile. These stories have had collective power, serving to mythologise Drandua 
as a regional hero. After his death, the collective consciousness around the war was 
transmitted to younger generations, bolstering a sense of shared identity between urban 
residents and mourners. As Feuchtwang notes, the “relations of intimacy” which feature 
in stories of the past, make memories more “vivid” than distanced political histories.795 
 
791 K. Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies. New York: Columbia UP, 2000, p. 29. 
792 Comment, Elder, Ediofe, 01/2017 
793 Ijoy, ‘Dissertation’ ; p. 60; Gormley, Mission and development, p. 90. 
794 Comment, Elder, Arua, 11/2016 
795 Feuchtwang, ‘Haunting Memory’, p. 259. 
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Following the return from exile, the Catholic Diocese, with Drandua at its helm, served 
as a channel for international aid for reconstruction. Lugbara people today credit this 
work to Drandua personally, who is associated with countless development schemes. 
Whereas his predecessor, Bishop Tarantino, had led a centralised mission, overseeing 
all activities from confirmations to tax returns, as Drandua enculturated his new 
administration, he spearheaded a “self-reliant church.”796 In the years following return, 
funds that Rome had withdrawn were replaced by flows of relief aid from foreign 
donors. In Gifford’s phrase, the Catholic Diocese was “NGO-ised”, acting as a central 
node from which these funds promoted development across Arua District.797 The 
Catholic mission became a major provider of a suite of development interventions, 
administered through a ‘Socio-economic Development Commission’ that oversaw 
agricultural, health, sanitation and environmental projects. Drandua aided both the 
opening of Centenary Bank and the construction of Radio Pacis, the Catholic radio 
station; so extensive was his developmental legacy that in 1996 a group of priests 
produced a memorandum accusing Drandua of prioritising socio-economic 
development over spiritual duties.798 But for ordinary people, witnesses of a 
transformation from a war-ravaged diocese to a functioning one, these initiatives were a 
powerful symbol of what benefits a bishop could levy in support of his people.799  
 
 
796 The retirement of Bishop Tarantino meant the decline of external funds. 
797 Gifford, Christianity, Development, and Modernity, p. 23. 
798 Lazarus, I. (2003). A Biography of Rt Rev. Frederick Drandua Bishop of Arua 1943-2003, BA of Education, 
Kyambogo University, p. 59; Gormley, Mission and development, p. 106. 
799 In this, the experience of West Nilers echoes the more recent experience of bishops in the Acholi Conflict. See H. 
Alava and J.S. Sssentongo, ‘Religious (de)politicisation in Uganda’s 2016 elections’, Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, 10(4), (2016) pp.677-692.  
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Kassimir writes that the Catholic Church has positioned itself as the “moral conscience 
of the Ugandan nation”.800 Rather than subscribe to arguments that normatively ascribe 
religious institutions as powerful social actors, however, Kassimir argues it is essential 
to trace the precise dynamics and institutions that inform churches’ civil role within the 
public sphere—particularly in regional contexts. Based on an analysis of the colonial 
period, scholars have distinguished between the Ugandan Catholic Church as an 
advocate for the masses, often in opposition to the ruling party, and its Anglican 
counterpart, which was orientated more towards educating an elite class.801 West Nile’s 
early colonial history indicates similar inflections: the Protectorate administration 
invited English-speaking Anglican missionaries, whereas the Italian Comboni Mission 
faced initial resistance and came of their own accord. Yet these historical differences 
should not be overstated, as both missions were deeply invested in grassroots 
engagement, as well as the provision of education and health.802 Both missions operated 
furthermore through rigid hierarchies, which necessarily involved the recruitment of lay 
Christians in administrative roles to spread the faith.803  
 
For West Nilers, the experience of war served to level, then ease, tensions between 
denominations. Alva notes too that the subsequent dismantling of multi-party politics 
under the NRM government has dismantled post-independence political connections the 
church once enjoyed.804 Today, both Anglican and Catholic bishops are seen as 
 
800 R. Kassimir, ‘The social power of religious organization and civil society: The Catholic Church in Uganda’, 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 36:2 (1998), pp. 54-83, p. 57.  
801 See C. Summers, ‘Catholic Action and Ugandan Radicalism: Political Activism in Buganda, 1930-1950’, Journal of 
Religion in Africa 39: Fasc. 1 (2009), pp. 60-90. 
802 K. Ward, ‘The role of the Anglican and Catholic Churches in Uganda in public discourse on homosexuality and 
ethics’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 9:1 (2015), pp. 127-144, p. 129. 
803 The Anglican structure was ‘Africanised’ prior to the Catholic Diocese, and an African Bishop appointed. 
804 Alava and Sssentongo, ‘Religious (de)politicisation in Uganda’s 2016 elections’.  
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figureheads for all Lugbara people and West Nilers. Bishops serve as powerful 
figureheads for West Nilers—because of their role during the war, their participation in 
spiritual and material reconstruction, and lobbying for West Nile’s interests in the 
political sphere. Indeed, in the aftermath of the riot, Catholics, Anglicans and Muslims 
alike mourned and memorialised Drandua.  
 
West Nilers are less interested in the denominational affiliations of their leaders, than on 
their personal contributions.Religious leaders are expected to lobby to reverse the 
marginal developmental position of the sub-region; as one elder put it, “Only those 
bishops who support the opposition are sharp”.805 For example, Joel Obetia, a former 
Anglican bishop who spoke at Drandua’s funeral, chastised the failure of government to 
provide cancer services, a call that was met with cheering from mourners. Five months 
earlier, the breakdown of Uganda’s only radiotherapy machine at Mulago Hospital had 
made national news: “Why don’t we suspend the purchase of cars for MPs and instead 
buy cancer [treatment] machines that can save lives?” Obetia asked.806 At the 
installation of another Anglican bishop, the incumbent advocated for the need to bring 
power to Arua.807 Nowadays, as political affiliations have shifted towards the ruling 
party (with NRM MPs elected across the district), the need for a bishop to advocate for 
people’s political rights is regarded as more important than ever. These expectations 
were formed in part because of the popular understandings of Drandua’s service—but 
the conflict in Arua Diocese too reflects wider histories of regional leadership. 
 
805 Comment, Elder, Arua, November 2016 
806 F.W. Okello, ‘Uganda: Bishop Faults Government on Cancer Machine, MPs Car Scheme’, The Monitor, 8 
September 2016, available at <https://allafrica.com/stories/201609080405.html>. 
807 Observations, Appointment of Anglican Bishop, Mvara, May 2017 
 394 
 
9.4 Mobilising Division 
 
From the moment of Bishop Sabino Odoki’s installation in December 2010, rumours 
about his selection process spread. Though unproven, many explained that Odoki was 
appointed only after sealed Vatican correspondence was opened and leaked by a 
competitive Lugbara aspirant, correspondence naming Lugbara priests regarded as more 
appropriate successors to Drandua. As such, Rome was said to overhaul normal 
processes of selection, appointing instead another Northerner (Odoki) who had not 
previously been nominated to the Diocese. Whether this rumour is true, or whether it 
reflects the actual process of appointing bishops, mattered little to residents of Ediofe: 
in essence, this rumour suggested that Odoki had been illegitimately appointed due to 
internal inconsistencies, thereby challenging his moral authority from the outset. 
 
 
As Drandua’s health declined in 2010, Odoki was installed to replace him. Unlike 
Drandua, a Ma’di speaker who hailed from Uleppi, Odoki arrived from Gulu. 
According to the national press, it was his status as an Acholi outsider that made his 
rejection likely from the outset, given “tribal” enmities between Lugbara and Acholi 
groups. Commentators re-politicised West Nile’s history of conflict, resuscitating 
accounts of Acholi vengeance for Amin’s atrocities. Whilst Lugbara elders did, on 
occasion, explain war in these terms, inherent “tribal” grudges were never mentioned to 
me as motivation for the uprising.808 Indeed, as one civil-society leader who supported 
 
808 Uganda Christian News, ‘By the time you throw a stone at your Bishop, you have lost Christianity—Odoki’, 27 
September 2016. Available at < https://www.ugchristiannews.com/by-the-time-you-throw-a-stone-at-your-bishop-
you-have-lost-christianity-odoki/>.  
 395 
the protestors explained, “Generally the people in Arua like foreigners more than they 
[like] themselves…when people keep quiet, the same bishop does more ugly things day 
after day after day after day.”809 For this leader, Odoki’s status as an outsider 
encouraged silence rather than condemnation of his administration. Lugbara people who 
opposed the new bishop gave more personal reasons for their dissatisfaction, but it is 
important to place these grudges within the context of the changes Odoki ushered in, 
and how these changes were communicated to the laity. 
 
It is important to note that Drandua’s “NGO-ised” approach to development was 
undergirded by decentralised administrative structures, and the devolution of financial 
accounting to parishes outside of Ediofe. White Fathers who had previously headed 
parishes were reassigned to administrative roles, and Lugbara priests took on leadership 
roles in parish and financial affairs, gaining new access to resources and authority. 
Drandua’s approach also made appointments in prosperous parishes even more 
comfortable. These roles matter deeply in local church governance, as priests serve on 
the frontline, and can communicate (in Lugbarati) positive or negative perceptions of 
the bishop to their flocks.  
 
Under Odoki’s administration, these roles changed. Odoki undertook a radical 
restructuring of the administration that he inherited, most notably re-centralising 
activities that had been divested to parish councils and priests back to central control in 
Ediofe (recreating the structure under the White Fathers and Bishop Tarantino). 
Whereas, under Drandua, priests could apply for funding for development projects 
 
809 I, Activist, Arua, 18/05/2017  
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within parishes, these powers were retracted under Odoki. According to Odoki, these 
measures sought to promote accountability for Diocesean finances, finances which he 
found in disarray. From below, however, this restructuring was viewed as an effort to 
centralise finances around the bishop himself—rather than the Diocese. As one 
opponent explained,  
His [new] management is different and it doesn’t match with the expectations of 
the Christians. He came up, in his wisdom everything was centralised, 
everything is focus[ed] on me [Odoki]—not on sacraments. Me. Everything, me, 
which is not the way we are brought up. He was the wrong choice for this 
Catholic community of Arua diocese.810  
 
Backlash was almost inevitable. A handful of priests who had been close to Drandua 
challenged Odoki’s centralisation. Odoki responded by limiting priests’ powers, 
establishing, for example, a decree that banned lay congregants from giving gifts to 
priests without first notifying the bishop’s office. Priests resisted, and on July 4, 2012, 
Odoki filed a case at Arua Central Police Station, accusing four priests of hatching a 
plan to assassinate him. After police investigations found no evidence for the plot, the 
case was thrown out.  
 
Retaliation continued. “Troublesome” priests were reassigned away from “home” 
parishes where they had long served, to “remote” posts, parishes which were either 
located in rural areas, or less well-funded.811 Though reassignment notices were issued 
by Ediofe Cathedral Parish Pastoral Council, priests understood these orders as coming 
directly from the bishop.812 Since those individuals who faced transfer were often close 
 
810 Red Pepper, The Untold Story: Why Christians Want Bishop Odoki Dead ASAP, 23rd September 2016. 
811 Red Pepper, The Untold Story: Why Christians Want Bishop Odoki Dead ASAP, 23rd September 2016. 
812 Red Pepper, ‘Odoki Priest Dragged to Police’, 12 February 2017. For this and all subsequent Red Pepper citations, 
online versions of the article are unavailable (the news outlet does not post all its stories online). All articles 
referenced henceforth exist as physical clippings in the possession of the author. 
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confidants of Drandua, and were either from Terego or from a single parish (Kamaka) 
in Maracha, claims arose that the bishop’s management was indicative of tribalism.813 
When priests resisted these orders, moreover, they were either threatened with 
suspension or locked out of their clerical offices, in events that priests described to 
journalists as “evictions.” Furthermore, in several cases when priests refused to leave 
after the notice period, police summons replaced pastoral ones. Faced with these new 
summons, priests turned themselves in to the magistrate’s court, arguing that pastoral 
councils were impotent in the face of police eviction notices.814  
 
Though many of Arua’s 103 priests supported Odoki, those who opposed him made 
public their discontent in these first years after his installation. What ensued were cases 
where priests contested their evictions through the courts, resulting in complex webs of 
resolution whereby judges often sent cases back to church councils, or to the Diocese 
for mediation. One priest, who had been implicated in the 2012 assassination claims, 
was subsequently reassigned to Micu Parish: upon refusing to go he was suspended, 
after which he sued the bishop for unlawful suspension and defamation. The Papal 
Nuncio dismissed the case, as did Arua Court in January 2017, the judge ruling that the 
church was an independent institution in which the state should not interfere.815 Another 
priest contested his eviction from Ediofe by appealing to Arua police as well as to local 
media. Though in fact both bishop and priests had engaged the court, publicly priests 
lamented being “dragged” to court by the bishop. Of one hearing—which the bishop 
declined to attend, on account of it being in the court, rather than the church—the 
 
813 Red Pepper, People at the Centre of Bishop Odoki Woes Named, Northern Feature, October 16th 2016. 
814 Red Pepper, The Untold Story: Why Christians Want Bishop Odoki Dead ASAP, 23rd September 2016. 
815 Radio Pacis Online, ‘Arua High Court has dismissed case against Bishop Sabino Odoki and the Trustees of Arua 
Diocese by Father Nakari Adiga’, 12 January 2018, available at <https://www.radiopacis.org/?p=10175>. 
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salacious Red Pepper newspaper (associated with the opposition party to the NRM), 
reported that the bishop “snubbed” these meetings and was not interested in 
mediating.816 In essence, Odoki was painted as a hypocritical leader, who used worldly 
means (the court) instead of following ecclesiastical channels to resolve disputes. This 
depiction gained traction, since for many Lugbara people turning to the court is a sign 
of guilt: one goes to court when such cases cannot be handled “at home,” through 
familial or embedded forms of justice that rest on truth-telling (cf. Chapter Two).  
 
As opposition grew, several priests even requested to be buried in their home villages 
and parishes, rather than at the mission in Ediofe, as was the norm. The vitriol of 
affected priests is critical to explaining how popular perceptions regarding the bishop’s 
character spread. In an interview, one of these “evicted” Lugbara priests amply 
illuminated these tensions:  
Right now he lives alone in the bishop’s house with soldiers. There are no 
priests with him. Sometimes he receives these young men, these deacons—that 
is just a camouflage—if you see the life of Jesus Christ, he was always with his 
apostles. If a bishop chooses to stay alone, you must put a question mark. 
Bishop Sabino is deep inside government, he is half-hearted in the church. That 
is why he is given soldiers. I am not spoiling his name, these are facts. If 
someone wants to prove [this] go and ask—who are these people in the 
compound? This bishop is very dishonest, he tells a lot of lies. Like my 
suspension. If scientific investigation is done you will find he has made many 
mistakes. We look forward to God’s intervention here. Rome may not be 
aware.”817 
 
During the interview, the priest tied his own mistreatment to judgements of Odoki’s 
character: conflating his individual suffering with wider ideas about the militancy of the 
bishop, and condemning Odoki’s tenure not only as contradicting Christian values of 
 
816 Red Pepper [Amvesi Cohen], ‘Bishop Odoki Snubs Talks Again’, 15 January 2017. 
817 I, Catholic Father, Ediofe Mission, 25/12/2017. 
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mercy, but as too secular. His critique was carefully structured to portray the bishop as 
violating normative Lugbara ideals, as being dishonest and isolated, both characteristics 
of the oleu. 
 
Granted, conflicts between bishops and priests have a long history in both the Anglican 
and Catholic Dioceses in Arua. The personal accrual of wealth and sectarian 
appointments have long been difficult territories for bishops, reflecting tensions 
between the hierarchical structure of the church and the varying autonomy of parishes 
(or Archdeaconries in Anglicanism). In the case of one former Anglican bishop, 
documents held in the Ma’di-West Nile archive revealed allegations of clergy holding 
collections and violating clerical oaths, which then led to transfers and suspensions. One 
inflammatory message from an urban Archdeaconry condemned the militant aspects of 
this bishop: “You [Bishop] fear because of their education, frankness and popularity 
amongst their Christians.”818 The letter too accuses the bishop of appropriating 
Diocesean property. Verifying these conflicts in an interview, one retired urban 
reverend commented on the similarity between trials faced by Catholics and previous 
episodes in the post-war Anglican Diocese.819  
 
In Odoki’s case, his use of clerical powers was a stark contrast to his predecessor’s, as 
Drandua had courted more participatory relations with priests and with laity alike. That 
said, whilst these priests’ disillusionment could easily inculcate negative perceptions 
among their flock, disillusionment alone could not incite mass violence. To understand 
 
818 Correspondence from Church of Uganda to The Rt. Rev. Enock Lee Drati, Bishop of Madi/West Nile Dicoese, 
27/03/2001. From Madi-West Nile Archive, Mvara 
819 I, Pastor, Onzivu, 10/06/2017 
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this escalation, it is necessary to consider why lay Christians were guarding the grave, 
and the web of suspicions that the police eviction of mourners confirmed.  
  
9.5 Death and its Discontents 
 
 
Drandua’s death was perceived as a collective loss. As one elder lamented, “If human 
beings had the power, they would not [have] let this Bishop Drandua die, but they had 
no power.”820 Drandua’s loss was managed through exploring the injustices that 
preceded his passing, even as anxieties about Odoki’s moral leadership were transmuted 
into critiques of his care towards Drandua.  
 
In the aftermath of his death, both Drandua’s relatives and area priests voiced their 
concern, testifying that Drandua’s retirement benefits had been suspended prior to his 
death. As a bishop, it was expected that Drandua would receive medical care outside 
Uganda, yet for most of his illness Drandua had been treated within Maracha District, 
being moved to Nsyamba Hospital in Kampala only weeks before his death.821 Priests 
alleged that funds for life-saving treatment had been denied, and Bishop Odoki himself 
corroborated the claim, releasing a public statement confirming delays in Drandua’s 
treatment.  
We changed our plans and resorted to India. I instructed Fr Alfred Asiku and he 
got a hospital in India. They asked for CT scan of the late Bishop Emeritus 
Drandua which was sent, they described his sickness and put a cost of US 
$25,000 (Shs82m) which we had by then. They put a condition for a guarantor 
to sign that in any case the cost of treatment rises, that person will pay and I said 
I will sign for the Bishop… The hospital administration put another condition 
 
820 I, Elder, Ediofe, 01/2017. 
821 J. Driliga, ‘Arua Bishop Drandua Airlifted to Kampala for Treatment’, New Vision, 25 September 2014. Available at 
< https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1431788/arua-bishop-drandua-airlifted-treatment-kampala>.  
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that we had to first carry out a medical test on the Bishop for a particular 
disease, which was [too] technical for me to understand, before he could be 
flown for treatment. The test was to be carried on September 1, 2016, but 
unfortunately the Bishop died. This issue that I never cared about the Bishop is 
totally wrong. I catered for the (hospital) bill all amounting to Shs15 million 
from the diocese.”822 
 
While Odoki attributed these shortcomings to global Catholic bureaucracy, ordinary 
people spoke of his neglect in intrapersonal terms. Even ordinary people who could not 
know the dynamics of Diocesean finances expressed scepticism of these accounts. One 
activist explained,  
The bishop emeritus left some money in an account in Rome. It was for the 
benefit of the public, it was supposed to be for a hospital. This was a hospital 
saving lives, it gave the public something. The past bishop valued human life. 
But now this one goes and grabs the money off, chews it, it doesn’t reach the 
hospital—he has no respect for human life. If you can eat money that is meant to 
save your own, then you don’t value human life. What else do you value? Dead 
people? Are you going to be a shepherd of dead Christians?823 
 
As with local discourses of the supposed corruption of government agents, the diversion 
of money for personal gain would be tolerated. But in the context of Drandua’s death, 
perceptions of greed or selfishness became instead insinuations of personal 
malevolence.  
 
After Drandua’s death, the burial committee, which included local government officials 
and civil society activists, participated in the discontents previously levelled at the 
Bishop by priests. As in family burial evaluations, these meetings provided a moment 
for those close to Drandua to discuss the circumstances of his death, and responsibilities 
of care. New rumours spread across Ediofe that Odoki planned to lay Drandua to rest 
not in the cathedral, but in Dondino Orphanage Centre, where he had been living before 
 
822 Uganda Christian News, ‘By the time you throw a stone’. 
823 Interview, Activist [Anonymised]. 
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his death. Drandua’s family confirmed these intentions, publicly insisting on burial 
within the Cathedral. As tensions grew, a meeting of the Burial Committee on 
September 5, 2016, ended in violence, when Odoki (along with the Archbishop of Gulu 
and the Vicar General of Arua Diocese) disrupted the meeting, reportedly to demand the 
sacking of the committee’s chair. According to a local newspaper, the Christians present 
rejected the request, shut off the lights and “started thumping the men of God.”824 
Stones were thrown at the bishop, who was taken away in a waiting police car. 
 
Odoki reacted by making a direct appeal to Museveni during a public address on 
September 12, 2016, at Muni University, where the president was in attendance. 
Recalling the events of the meeting, Odoki publicly branded his opponents as “a group 
of terrorists” who wanted to kill him.825 Odoki’s public claims were also reproduced in 
a letter (addressed from the Bishop’s office to the President) which was “leaked” and 
published in the Red Pepper newspaper.826 In this letter, Odoki alleged that a terrorist 
group led by Martin Andua and Patrick Pariyo (of Arua Catholic Centre) had adopted 
militant tactics and threatened his life. Following Odoki’s address at Muni, Museveni 
ordered a legal investigation, and nine members of the burial committee were 
summoned to Arua Central Police Station to give statements. At this point, the police 
called for dialogue to solve the violence, which Odoki reportedly rejected.827 Not only 
did his militancy confirm Odoki’s position as an “arm of the government” to many 
Lugbara people, but it also confirmed his lack of remorse. Publicly, Odoki derided these 
 
824 Red Pepper, ‘Shocking: Police Calls for Bishop Odoki’s transfer’, 21 September 2016. 
825 Red Pepper, ‘Police Calls for Bishop Odoki’s transfer’, 21 September 2016. 
826 Red Pepper, ‘Shocking: Bp Odoki’s Secret Letter to M7 Leaks’, 19 September 2016. 
827 Daily Monitor, ‘Reconciliation is key in pastoral work’, 29 October 2016.  
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actions as anti-Christian: “By the time you throw a stone at your Bishop, you have lost 
Christianity. Arua is a persecuted Diocese. We have to pray to God to deliver us from 
this persecution.”828  
 
Reflecting the divided tapestry of political allegiance within Arua, public officials 
differed in support for Odoki or the burial committee (interpreted by laity as supporters 
of the NRM or the opposition, respectively). The former Maracha MP, Alex Onzima 
warned all those attacking priests, saying: “Should any person in whatever position you 
hold continue to character assassinate a bishop or any other priest, I as an individual, 
will apply the law and you will be prosecuted.” At that same time other Lugbara people 
condemned the bishop’s approach, and the “disharmony” between him and Christians of 
Arua.829 Within this divisive landscape, Odoki remained protected by the government, 
against a rising tide of influential priests and officials. Ultimately, it was due to these 
events that Odoki’s residence was guarded by soldiers on the night of the riot. The 
military presence revived memories of the war that Drandua’s passing had reawakened; 
because of Bishop Odoki, Ediofe residents found themselves under a new occupation. 
 
Christians of Ediofe encapsulated these conflicts not in political terms of terrorism or 
assassination, but in terms of responsibility for death. Though it is customary for 
gravesites to be guarded, the young men stationed at Drandua’s grave were in fact 
guarding his body, given the rumours of attempts to move the body for burial outside 
the Cathedral. But other rumours both fuelled and emerged from this watch that 
implicated Odoki directly in Drandua’s death. On the one hand, youths of Ediofe—loyal 
 
828 Uganda Christian News, ‘By the time you throw a stone’. 
829 ibid. 
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to Drandua—voiced concerns that Odoki intended to steal valuable objects from 
Drandua’s casket, including the jewels and the orb. Allegedly, these items were to be 
sold outside the district, to raise funds for Odoki’s home diocese in Gulu.830 Others 
thought that the bishop intended to steal the objects as a sacrifice to a powerful 
witchdoctor, who would exchange them for prestige and popularity equal to that of his 
predecessor. Still other youths alleged that Odoki had been seen jumping over 
Drandua’s grave, a sign known as aripe that connotes rejoicing in someone’s death, as 
well as a personal involvement in it. One friend explained that she had heard reports 
that the “Bishop was doing strange things late at night and he might be a wizard.” In 
one interview conducted for this research, a priest loved by Ediofe residents repeatedly 
referred to Odoki as a “witch,” indicating that authorities shared in these concerns.831 
These rumours provided a common currency to describe both Drandua’s death and 
Odoki’s “corrupt” tenure: one neighbour summarised that in these rumours, the bishop 
looked “less than human”.  
 
Testifying to the power of these fears were declarations prior to the riot that mourners 
might attempt to evict, or even kill, the bishop. Though ultimately that did not take 
place, evicting mourners from Drandua’s grave essentially confirmed these fears, 
serving as an example of moral aberration across Arua. One male resident of Ediofe 
explained to me,  
The thing this Bishop did is wrong. After our dear Bishop died… in Lugbara 
culture, people must be allowed to sit at the graveside, for one week, even for 
one month—but he chased them away after just one day. And he called for the 
police to come and get them, not during the day but at 12 or 1 at night, when it 
 
830 In this, powerful comparisons were made to Gulu being a post-conflict beneficiary, i.e. there were comparisons 
between the bishop and aid.  
831 Commentary from Ediofe Residents, I, Catholic Father, 25/12/2017. 
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was dark. If you do not allow people to sit by the grave, in our culture, that 
means you have caused it.832  
 
Many Aruans participated in occult rumours to describe relations between the two 
bishops. Multiple times, for instance, the details of Drandua’s care offered opportunities 
for enyata (poisoning). These stories had multiple versions, and often engendered 
disbelief. One version relayed to me by friends in Maracha illustrates the intimacies of 
these stories: allegedly, Bishop Odoki had employed an Acholi or Langi nurse to 
administer poison to Drandua in his food, whilst he was admitted at Ovujo Hospital. 
Since the nurse hailed from the same ethnic group as Odoki, her collusion was more 
believable. According to the story, the nurse gave Drandua porridge, since that was all 
he could eat on account of his throat cancer. When this porridge burnt his oesophagus, 
Drandua reportedly said, “I hope that is not going to kill me.”  
 
9.6 The aftermath  
 
In February 2017, the renovated Ediofe Cathedral reopened. At the ceremonial event the 
Arua Resident District Commisioner urged the Christians of Arua to “leave the ashes of 
the past and look for better things ahead”.833 Presiding over his first public mass, 
including the ordination of five priests and six deacons, Odoki emphasised the 
importance of obedience to priests.834 At a later Palm Sunday mass, he preached on the 
need for discipline among the youth, who should not be “waylaid by those more 
 
832 Commentary, Ediofe Resident 22/09/017 
833 Observer, Feb 26, 2017  Sacred heart of Jesus Cathedral Ediofe reopened  




powerful than them who are actively seeking to deceive them, the youth should not 
follow those who are doing the work of Satan.”835 
 
Yet for local residents, grievances were far from forgotten. The rioters detained for 
“disturbing the peace of the dead”, a charge that revealed the capacity of the law to 
transcend distinctions between life and death, remained in jail. One female detainee, an 
Anglican woman who explained she had no involvement in the riot, lamented that her 
internment had put significant strain on her household: since she lived apart from her 
husband, her children had been cared for by her neighbours. During their internment, I 
was told this group was continually remanded to court for sentencing. The above 
detainee could not remember what the exact charges against her were, and mysteriously, 
the group were eventually released without charge (apparently papers were lost). I did 
not interview anyone involved in this process, but a priest suggested the release was 
mandated because of a lack of evidence as to particular individuals’ involvement. 
 
Their release eased the sense of injustice among Ediofe residents, but the matter was not 
forgotten, particularly since the bishop remained in power. To demonstrate continuing 
protest of his legitimacy, local Christians attempted other forms of action. One group of 
Ediofe residents gathered at Drandua’s grave to curse the bishop, inverting ritual 
traditions of the elders.836 Other Christians avoided the Cathedral, and many refused to 
give offertory as well. Across religious lines, Ediofe residents took to calling 
themselves the “United States of Ediofe,” indicating their unified stance against Odoki. 
A further group of longstanding area residents mounted a claim to relinquish land that 
 
835 Palm Sunday Mass 9th April 2017, Cathedral, from Field notes.  
836 Red Pepper, Andrew Amvesi, March 7th 2017, ‘Youth Curse BP Odoki at Dandua’s Grave, North/ Eastern News 
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their ancestors had leased to the Diocese, to contest the “occupation of the Bishop.” All 
of these responses demonstrated continuing frustration at a leadership deemed to lack 
moral authority.  
 
To date, Odoki remains the bishop of Arua Diocese, but throughout the duration of my 
fieldwork, his residence continued to be guarded by the Ugandan army. The presence of 
security served as a powerful reminder of the perceived illegitimacy of this 
appointment, and continued to evoke the protections of the past. Ediofe residents spoke 
of the new “occupation” that resembled the insecurities of the war era, reporting 
sporadic violence and rapes that came with this military presence. Whilst violence 
became a focal point for national media, and came to be a defining feature of the 
recounting of events locally, Ediofe residents used their moral power collectively and 
creatively to oppose the bishop long after the September 2016 riot—no matter how 
effective their efforts might be.  
 
9.7 Death and Reconstituting Life? 
 
Whilst these events were exceptional in scale, the riot provides a means to reflect more 
widely on experiences of post-war transitions in managing collective loss. Indeed, the 
politicisation of Drandua’s death by priests and urban elites evoked the processes for 
managing death—namely, through allocating responsibility—described in the preceding 
chapters.  
 
Among Lugbara people, death has long marked a moment of cosmological and social 
confusion. Lugbara elders recalled the centrality of death dances, known as ongo (also 
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‘song’), in managing death. Rituals over life events were the purview of elders, but 
death dances were collective affairs, with roles assigned to both men and women, a 
performance that elucidated the complementarity between genders. Whilst men danced, 
discussed matters of the sub-clan and lineage, and enacted mock fights, women covered 
their faces in white ash and chalk, and publicly wailed as a display of mourning. But 
men and women also danced together, running out into the fields and mimicking the 
shooting of arrows whilst making cere calls—a means of threatening “revenge” on the 
forces of Adro which cause death, demonstrating defiance and the fact that “kinsmen 
and women stand together to protect the homesteads.”837 Such rites too reflected 
moments of moral confusion, when men and women normally prohibited from sexual 
relations would have sexual intercourse in the bushlands, regarded as dangerous spaces 
beyond compounds.  
 
Middleton described death as representing the “unforeseeable and unavoidable intrusion 
into society of an external and suprahuman power, that of Divinity.”838 Death was an 
event beyond human comprehension, whose uncertainties were controlled by elaborate 
funerary rites. For Middleton, these rites were a means to ensure “the perpetuity of their 
own society, by ensuring the continuing fertility of its members living with a sense of 
order and authority”.839 Middleton was writing in a 1982 edited volume, Death and the 
Regeneration of Life, where the editors, Bloch and Parry, advocated for an 
understanding of death as recreating social-forms: “overcoming individual biological 
 
837 Dalfovo, Logbara Dances and Songs, p. 149. 
838 Middleton, ‘Lugbara Death’, p. 135. 
839 ibid. p. 135. 
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mortality by reasserting lasting fundamental social values”.840 Dalfovo shared these 
assessments with his Lugbara interlocutors in the 1970s, who, rather than emphasising 
the structural-functional aspects of funerary rites, explained that ritual proceedings and 
dances were a means of managing collective grief.841 Several elders explained that death 
dances were not directly orientated towards appeasing “spirits”, or forces of Adro, but, 
rather, “it was just to show their sadness for what had happened.”842. In essence, death 
rituals provided opportunities to manage loss within the lineage—symbolically 
domesticating dangerous forces, as well as providing moments of cathartic release.  
 
Elaborate rites and dances that followed death even after the return from exile have met 
with condemnation by Christian evangelists—one born-again Anglican elder recalled 
preaching and disrupting clan dances in Terego during the late 1980s, after being saved 
during the war. In the present-day, people rarely dance at funerals. As dancing was 
prohibited, rites increasingly incorporated violence, with relatives being involved in the 
violent destruction of the property, and crops and around the compound of the deceased, 
to memorialise the symbolic loss of a pillar of the family.843 In these instances, 
destruction is a culturally recognised performance of grief – serving a similar function 
to death dances of former days. 
 
One common jibe, an external comment, which Lugbara people now offer of 
themselves goes that “Lugbaras love a dead body”. This indicates perceptions that great 
 
840 L. Meinert and S.R. Whyte, ‘Creating the New Times: Reburials after War in Northern Uganda’, in R. Willerslev 
and D.R. Christensen (eds.), Taming Time, Timing Death: Social Technologies and Ritual. London: Routledge, 2013, 
pp. 175-193. 
841 Dalfovo, Logbara Dances and Songs. 
842 I, Elder, Abrici, 10/06/2017 (OJ). 
843 Dalfovo, Logbara Dances and Songs, p. 11. 
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energy continues to be invested in burial and funerary proceedings, which contrasts the 
abrogation of care among living clan members. Funerary rites involve bringing the dead 
“home”, and are attended by many relatives and associates. The events are significant in 
many ways: in accounting for care for the dead, in symbolising kinship ties, and 
ensuring future prosperity for the relatives of the dead: any disruption of bad words 
spoken during funerals can instigate misfortunes to “follow the living”. As noted by 
Meinert and Whyte, burial marks the “creations of temporal beginnings and 
continuities”.844  
 
Understanding the violence at Ediofe necessitates a grounding not only in the past, but 
in the violence disruption to rites of mourning on the part of the Diocese, and the police. 
As discussed in previous chapters, it was from these post-mortuary evaluations that 
violence against suspects emerged. In the case of Drandua, the burial committee—and 
his relatives (a term defined flexibly since many Lugbara people consider Drandua a 
“father” or a “brother”)—had served as the evaluators of death.845 Clan proceedings 
were extended to the public level, “localising” the death amongst officials close to 
Drandua. Doubtless this meeting was disrupted by the Bishop because of the sensitivity 
of these events.  
 
Violence was precipitated by the removal of graveside-mourners. In usual practice, 
relatives may site at the graveside for days or even a week, but for a public figure – 
loved as Drandua was – this process could extend for months. The violation of 
 
844 Meinert and Whyte, ‘Creating the New Times’, p. 175. 
845 See M. Bloch, The Moral and Tactical Meaning of Kinship Terms, Man, 6(1), (1971), pp.79-87 
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mourning processes, a fundamental right, served as the primary catalyst for revolt. 
Almost unanimously, lay Christians described this as a moral aberration. Whilst 
violence is usually contained within clans, this symbolic violence that denied mourners 
the right to grieve precipitated resistance well beyond clan limits: death, and the denial 
of right to moral ordering, translated to political dissent. In resisting this act, Lugbara 
people responded with physical violence to an act which was symbolically violent. In 
similar ways, since the return from exile, witchcraft has emerged as another means of 
coping with death through the allocation of responsibility: reordering human relations in 
relation to an expanded and ever-changing cosmos.  
 
In part, this attribution could result from a number of different factors: the erosion of 
coping mechanisms, the emphasis on human responsibility through Christian teachings, 
or participation in new forms of evidence through charismatic healers and other 
specialists (see Chapter Seven). But it also pertains to the need to account for deaths 
that defy explanation, and the continual witness to tragedies within everyday life. In 
explaining death, Lugbara people seek to exert control over circumstances through the 
resources and logics available to them: moral, economic and political. The riot at Ediofe 
made these grievances explicitly politically, excavating memories of violent pasts 
usually hidden below the surface of the everyday. Yet in the previous chapter too, 
Lugbara people responded to suffering beyond their control through allocating 
responsibility, and actioning violence within their means.  
 
9.8 Violence as Repair? 
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In West Nile, Allen has argued for a recognition of the violence of healing. 
Through observing violence, Allen notes a recognition of the potential for torture and 
killing to serve as a means of “establishing of interpersonal accountability and the re-
emergence of viable communal life.”846 To make this argument, Allen draws on 
Girard’s controversial theory of the “scapegoat”: an individual exiled from the 
community, “sacrificed” to preserve the cohesion of the wider society. As Allen himself 
has noted, this position risks invoking a relativist stance which excuses violence. Taking 
a post-structural approach, Leopold deals historically with the interplay of these forces 
on West Nile, but suggests instead that historical waves of violence enacted upon West 
Nilers is reproduced in post-independence militancy.847 Between these two theories, 
West Nilers are positioned as either victims of themselves, or victims of their history. 
  
De Faveri, in an ethnographic discussion of Kinshasa, connects witchcraft-related 
violence to the extreme harships of economic poverty of urban life, and militancy of the 
Congolese state: “intersecting relations” through which violence enters everyday life 
through the acts of soldiers and the insecurity of everyday commerce.848 In this analysis, 
violence is neither solely communal nor historical, but is entangled in a politics of 
neglect refracted through everyday life. In a similar way, the uprising against Odoki 
elucidates how violence exists as a response to injustices perceived to accrue to West 
Nilers as a group, as well as through military occupation in the present. For Lugbara 
rioters, memories of the past, revived through the death of a ‘hero’ and his subsequent 
 
846 Allen, ‘The Violence of Healing’, p. 101. 
847 Leopold, Inside West Nile. 
848 S. De Faveri, Witchcraft, violence and everyday life: an ethnographic study of Kinshasa, PhD Thesis, Department 
of Anthropology, Brunel University, 2015, p. 215. 
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mistreatment, along with the presence of soldiers in Ediofe, carried a duty to avenge 
injustices of the present.  
 
Violence, moreover, provided a means to express political critique. Prior to this event, 
Ediofe residents often discussed politics in a ‘quiet’ way. Criticising a bishop perceived 
to be in collusion with the NRM was a means of exercising political citizenship: the 
political was refracted through the personal. In talking about death, West Nilers were 
actively critiquing state neglect, albeit through the language of witchcraft. And the 
violation of their own cultural worlds. But through attempting to overthow—or kill—
Odoki, violence became a call not just to avenge wrongful death, but to re-establish 
moral leadership in the present. Violence can have many purposes. Chapter Seven 
explored violence as an expression of internal dissent, Chapter Eight explores violence 
as a reaction to killers in the midst of communities. In this chapter, violence emrged as 
as a means of exercising polical critique. In the Ediofe riots, this violence of protest 
contrasted starkly with the force applied by state military and armies.  
  
Yet, violence was only one means of participating in this critique, and it involved a 
select group of mourners and nearby Ediofe residents who responded to their call to 
arms. Pariticpating in efforts to explain Drandua’s death were another means of 
exercising political citizienship. These conversations flowed across Arua and Maracha 
for many months after the riot, being powerfully symbolic of the present struggles West 
Nilers face: a dying bishop tricked by those authorities who were tasked with providing 
his care. Discussions over the withholding of Drandua’s pension fund were a means of 
speaking about wider political economies, whereby the West Nile sub-region has been 
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comparatively starved of development funds. Allegations of stolen items taken to Gulu 
echoed the concerns of activists seeking to bring attention to historical suffering in West 
Nile, who averred that funds were being diverted towards Acholiland. In this way, 
discourses of clerical struggles between bishops referenced broader developmental 
inequalities in West Nile, and an everyday politics of life and death wherein care is not 
forthcoming. This politics, critically, also permeates discussions of mazi (detailed in 
Chapter Seven), the term used to describe acquisitions within households—as well as to 
refer to powers acquired by politicians who overstay their terms and fail to bring change 
to ordinary people, by tycoons who prosper without sharing wealth, and by foreign 
contractors who build roads with such haste that ordinary people die in the process. 
Whilst witchcraft is thus a means of discussing power and change more broadly, 
violence arises from the mobilisation of evidence, within communities of action. 
 
In such instances, witchcraft appears as a genuine threat, with violence a reaction to the 
fears of killers dwelling in the midst of communities—be those communities defined by 
clan or other markers. Recently, Bubant has called for an appreciation of confusion, 
obfustication and disbelief in the study of witchcraft.849 In this way, the production of 
witchcraft is best understood as a multi-layered field where doubt and acceptance exist 
in tension. Doubts can be overcome on an individual basis, but they can also be 
overcome against the persistent tide of the social field. Violence was thus the end result 
of that tension of suspense and pontification, where the interventions of different 
interest groups first produce fears, then subsequently confirm the presence of the 
“enemy” within. In Odoki’s case, priests, local elites and members of the burial 
 
849 N. Bubant, The Empty Seashell: Witchcraft and Doubt on an Indonesian Island. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2014. 
 415 
committee actively advanced allegations of suspicious behaviour and mismanagement, 
along with wider judgements as to the bishop’s moral authority. Whilst in public, this 
language took the form of development and financial accountability, to the laity, these 
woes were translated into the language of witchcraft. Occult idioms provide a means to 
act both upon death and upon present injustices, distilling matters into struggles 
between people. Whilst ordinary people could not know the truth of fiscal matters (nor 
in other cases, could they access autopsies), these communities could still identify and 
claim signifiers of witchcraft. In this context, an individual’s actions—namely, those of 
a bishop surrounded by hostile forces—confirms their guilt. In choosing the protection 
of government soldiers, Odoki confirmed ordinary people’s suspicions. In this dynamic, 
any lingering doubts are overcome by the continual production of fear that makes the 
world it describes (evident in claims of mazi, and as has been historically constituted by 
state participation in claims of enyata). Diverse interests contribute both to the 
suspension of belief and to the consensus that nefarious forces are at work. Lingering, 
and multi-layered fields of tension precipitate violence. 
 
For Lugbara people, oppositional binaries between peace and violence do not represent 
lived experience. Violent acts, rather, are assessed according to their context and their 
outcome – according to whether events support or uphold ideas of mutuality embodied 
in tualu. This principle can be extended outwards, and was event in the manner in which 
many Ediofe residents tacitly supported the rioters’ violence, but condemned the force 
of the military. It should be noted too that participation and tacit support are quite 
different things. Indeed, many residents remained in their homes during the riot, fearing 
reprisals from the troops—a reaction which could equally be tied to the traumas of the 
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past. In all the cases discussed in this thesis, attitudes to the moral probity of violence 
evolved over time. After the riot, many residents (and Aruans more widely) shifted their 
solidarity from supporting protestors to condemning violence. Elders explained that the 
events had brought shame on Arua, that violence had not brought matters out in the 
‘proper’ way, and that it was generally deemed to be “un-Christian”. Distant observers 
began to chastise Ediofe not as a place of righteous struggle, but as an immoral, 
undisciplined part of town. Some lamented the “shame” the riot had brought to Lugbara 
people. Elders lamented the instabilities brought to the area in the continued occupation 
of the military by “young people,” which evoked their own memories of theinstabilities 
of war and of exile. Over longer timescales, then, violence did not serve to establish a 




In sum, this chapter has provided an extended account of the revolt against Bishop 
Odoki in West Nile, an instance where seeking redress for misfortune became explicitly 
entangled in political critiques and memories of the past. Whilst previous chapters have 
explored how Lugbara people manage and mediate intimate losses, this chapter has 
shown how these idioms can invoke conflict-ridden pasts to exceptional result, 
engendering forms of violence beyond the boundaries of clans. In a contexts of great 
loss and grief, and outpourings of past trauma instigated by Bishop Drandua’s death, 
moral critique gained new resonance. A key dimension of this riot was how it 
 
850 In a similar way, Allen describes revisiting those involved in violent healing during the late 1980s, and their 
marked silence on the matter: see Allen and Storm, ‘Quests for therapy in Northern Uganda’. 
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demonstrated the different scripts of accusation emanating from different echelons of 
society: state authorities and even priests expressed discontent through the language of 
financial mismanagement, an unusual but effective discourse, whilst other groups levied 
charges of corruption and neglect.  
This exploration has, moreover, provided an entry point to understand witchcraft not as 
a uniform belief, but as a fact produced and subsequently mediated by different interest 
groups—groups that communicate injustice in culturally-recognised ways in order to 
prompt action. As in the poisoning cases described in the previous chapters, where 
communities called for autopsies, besieged priests called from external assistance – in 
“scientific investigations” or the intervention of Rome. Yet, this validification was not 
forthcoming. Ultimately, however, the riot against Odoki only created further injustices 
and insecurity, whereby Ediofe residents lived in fear of the military throughout the 
period of this research. Even if such an outcome was expected, that, too, became a new 









Through a series of historically and ethnographically-informed studies, this thesis has 
charted the endurance of moral ideals, as expressed through cosmology and practice 
among Lugbara populations in West Nile, Uganda. Central to Lugbara ideas of social 
peace are notions of tualu, a term which can refer to mutuality, harmony, or 
togetherness. This thesis has charted how this vision has been enforced and resisted 
over more than a century of therapeutic practice. I have argued how post-war social 
repair has been performed through a revitalisation and contestation of longstanding 
repertories of healing traditions—traditions existent from the early intrusions of the 
Protectorate period up to the present day.  
 
Traversing practices designated as “religious”—practices that have included systems of 
ancestor veneration, spirit-inspired possession movements, and modern evangelical 
Christianity—this thesis has shown how cosmological concepts become resonant when 
applied pragmatically, linking changing patterns of affliction to social changes. Rather 
than conceptualise cosmology as a “system”, recapitulating prior ethnographies, I have 
sought to show how social choreography leads to the production of agents and 
explanations between those who suffer and those who can explain affliction. Though 
explanations of misfortune may appear novel, their production rests on a grafting of 
new emphases onto past histories of healing. 
 
This thesis has focused on processes through which social groups have remade their 
moral worlds against great change. In a borderland territory that scholars have portrayed 
either as violent or as a porous space over which goods and capital flow, this thesis has 
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explored how Lugbara elders draw on “sticky” logics of descent, to recreate family and 
clan structures amidst post-exilie social fragmentation.851 This thesis has also 
undertaken the potentially exclusionary work of defining the limits of community with 
recourse to historical fears of poisoning, and newer fears of mazi. In paying attention to 
the socio-economic complexities and the multiplicity of cosmologies within villages, I 
have sought to avoid ethnographic approaches akin to what Appadurai terms “spatial 
incarceration”, whereby localities and cultures are reified as bounded and closed.852 
Rather, this thesis has explored how the fixity engendered both by colonial policies and 
by post-independence isolation of the West Nile sub-region has interfaced with 
differential mobilities, flows of external knowledge, and efforts to reinforce or severe 
intimate ties and obligations in increasingly fragmented social relations. In Shaw’s 
terms, this thesis reflects the local as the “centre from which the rest of the world is 
viewed”.853 
 
10.2: Cultures of Repair?  
 
Whilst I find that cosmological resources are deeply implicated in post-war repair, the 
evidence suggests that metaphysical resources have been reassembled in particular, 
even unique ways—ways that diverge sharply from the “hybrid” complementarity 
anticipated by experts of transitional justice who laud the restorative potential in socio-
cultural resources. For Lugbara people, socio-cultural resources remain relevant in 
contexts that are continually negotiated and socially contingent. These regimes of 
 
851 Meinert and Grøn, ‘It Runs in the Family’. 
852 A. Appadurai, ‘Introduction: Place and Voice in Anthropological Theory’, Cultural Anthropology 3:1 (1988), pp. 
16-20, p.37   
853 Shaw and Waldorf, ‘Introduction’, p. 5. 
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knowledge are established both through internal moral histories of clans, and through 
encounter with other public authorities. Rather than simply performing ritual “truths”, 
practices to trace and cleanse lingering souls and spirits provide a means for Lugbara 
people to reconcile deeply-divided presents, and alleviate ongoing suffering.  
 
Elders and clans retain central roles in explaining suffering, on account of access to 
archives of knowledge that are deeply personal, composed of historical layers of 
personalities, grievances and wrongdoing that have the power to explain the present. 
Since return from exile, the primacy of clans in tracing “haunting memories” and in 
reinforcing tualu has been challenged by a dynamic landscape of therapy, where an 
emergent class of therapists offers quick solutions through prayer or through payment. 
Suffering is treated in context-specific ways, where the particular faith of individuals is 
held in tension with the rapidly-changing fabric of local institutions. This local mosaic 
of intervention may include the words of elders who sit to resolve issues, the revelations 
of diviner-healers, dreams or visions, or the intercessions of clergy, but many of these 
actors actively contest evidentiary proof in favour of “subjective realities” that yield 
shifting explanations of healing and repair.854 This eclectic, ever-changing landscape 
defies codification: its power lies in its responsiveness to realities of patterns of 
suffering, in tandem with social change. 
 
The socio-cultural landscape of Lugbara people defies rigid categorisation. Through an 
historical exploration of colonial and post-independence processes, this thesis has 
showed that external projects to create “ethnic” groups have been partial, and the locale 
 
854 Neihaus, ‘Witches and Zombies’.  
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of moral ordering continues to reside at the level of the clan. Any coherent importation 
of culture negelcts to consider fluid processes of boundary-making that characterise 
everyday life. Similarly, since return from exile, there has been little formal attempt to 
encourage social cohesion through the institution-building or traditional justice 
interventions that have been popularised in Acholiland. Donors (national or 
international) have not paid for rituals, nor have West Nile’s cultural leaders advocated 
for a coherent vision of Lugbara culture. Indeed, cultural leaders continue to celebrate 
the diversity of customs among Lugbara peoples. In Madlingozi’s words, there have 
been no “transitional justice entrepreneurs” to speak for victims, nor to produce 
particular narratives of victimhood. Ways of being among Lugbara people cannot thus 
easily be formulated into a “toolkit”.  
 
Despite these regional specificites, this thesis contends that the study of everyday, 
ground-level processes in a war-affected region has yielded significant contributions to 
transitional justice, challenging errant assumptions that cosmologies provide shared 
scripts to address the past and to mend broken relationships.  
  
First, the “discovery” of cosmologies by experts of transitional justice and development 
as uniform neglects to the development of these resources in relation to long durees of 
institutional development. Quests to achieve balance deal different fates to different 
peoples. Assuming that cosmologies constitute shared languages disguises continual 
struggles over meaning within terms and concepts. As Finnström (and before him, 
Kapferer) urges, cosmology is not an abstract construct, but is instead produced through 
ongoing human creativity. Precisely because resources are contested, agents, terms and 
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concepts are both “interactive” and in “constant flux”.855 As Behrend notes, there is 
nothing inherent about the meaning of spirits or invisible agents.856 And as Geschiere 
argues regarding witchcraft, the resilience of invisible ideas of harm bespeaks the 
inherent malleability of such concepts, which can serve to reflect any manner of 
changing circumstance.857 Throughout recorded history in Lugbaraland, cosmology has 
been a site of struggle—between chiefs of prophetic cults, Christian converts and elders, 
as well as between urban and rural populations, and between genders and generations 
within them. The malleability of the invisible realm means it can be a medium through 
which both the marginal and the powerful may compete. 858 The metaphysical has long 
provided a meant to contest moral orders; its utility thus persists precisely for its ability 
to carry multiple versions of morality. As Victor and Porter note, if cosmological 
resources serve as a means for post-war healing, it is “not only a matter of metaphysics 
or ontology, but of shifts in worldly power.”859  
 
Second, in seeking to abstract “traditions” or polluting agents, development or justice 
“experts” risk repeating the exercises of state administrators-turned-ethnographers, 
anthropologists and missionaries. Driven by academic rigour or assumptions of other 
religions for Christianity to displace, these exercises sought to delimit concepts that 
were in essence fluid and phenomenological. Even more caution is warranted where 
 
855 S. Finnström, ‘Wars of the Past and War in the Present: The Lord’s Resistance Movement/Army in Uganda’, 
Africa 76:2 (2006), pp. 200-220, p.202 
856 Behrend, Resurrecting Cannibals. 
857 P. Geschiere, Witchcraft, Intimacy and Trust: Africa in Comparison. University of Chicago Press, 2013, p. 13. 
858 In a similar way, during COVID-19 the Virgin Mary appeared in a Maracha homestead, with many villagers 
breaking social distancing to witness the apparition. Contexts of crisis, both local and region, can usher in radical 
changes to healing practice. See: West Nile Web, ‘Security beefed in Maracha to prevent congregation at scene of 
alleged Virgin Mary appearance’, 12 May 2020. Available at <https://www.westnileweb.com/news-a-
analysis/maracha/security-beefed-in-maracha-to-prevent-congregation-at-scene-of-alleged-virgin-mary-
appearance>. 
859 Victor and Porter, ‘Dirty Things’, p. 604. 
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these exercises, particularly when drawn into ongoing Christian evangelical exercise, 
serve to transform and embolden occult fears. As I have documented, spirits once 
understood to reside in nature have been modified into human-mediated killing spirits, 
and relatively benign ancestral forces have been transformed into curses. 
 
Third, ritual practices are inherently related to resource distribution, and often 
constrained because of it. Clan-based diagnostics for misfortune are yoked to strategies 
for village prosperity: through demands for cattle, money and security through the ritual 
system. Middleton’s work reveals this long history: in the late colonial period, sickness, 
understood as ancestral wrath, was instrumentalised to encourage reciprocity as 
capitalist processes eroded village solidarities.860 Throughout the 1950s and 
independence, elders used sickness as an occasion to insist on redistribution from 
migrant workers who had “forgotten” their obligations to those at home. Since the 
return from exile, sickness has been linked variously to outstanding settlements or to the 
disturbed dead, but still necessitates transfers between living parties. As Jeater notes, 
forced levies to encourage reparations can be put on the market, and recruited for 
extortion. Spiritual and material resources are entangled, and for this reason visions of 
social repair in the non-NGO-funded North lie in “rude health”.861 Material inequalities 
of the past and present still obstruct the attainment of balance with recourse to the 
cosmos, and living relations.  
 
 
860 Middleton, Lugbara Religion. 
861 Knighton, ‘Globalizing Trends’. 
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Fourth, in abstracting cosmology from lived relations, scholars miss the deep 
entanglement of resources and human agency. As Kapferer notes, many cosmologies 
are deeply “human-centric”; rather than existing as abstract notions above human 
society, ideas of sorcery (or witchcraft and poisoning) “fetishise human agency”. Post-
return, Lugbara people have become engaged not in managing a world of forces beyond 
themselves, but in discerning human capacities for misfortune.862 Lugbara people have 
long tied the possibility for material gain to individual intent. Post-exile quests to 
explain moral and economic decline have, then, engendered new forms of witch-
finding, which explicitly seek to identify an individual with dri onzi, ‘dirty hands’. In 
highly unequal contexts of reconstruction, notions of killing spirits have been linked to 
communal quests to expel wealthy relatives. As one evicted family lamented, “We are 
refugees”.863 In contexts where death rates remain high, and loss of life is felt 
collectively, post-war transitions as viewed through the socio-cultural lens may not 
reflect the binaries of war and peace that external observers envisage. One might ask, to 
use Keen’s words: what is the difference between war and peace?864 
 
Fifth and finally, in valorising the functions of approaches, the realities of suffering risk 
becoming side-lined. As Whyte noted long ago, functional anthropologists—in negating 
practical action and realities of affliction—made ceremony out of suffering. Within this 
thesis terms have evolved in relation to specific burdens of diseases. In separating 
health and justice as discrete realms of study, when in fact these two concepts are 
inextricably linked, there is a danger that ill-health is pushed to the margins as experts 
 
862 B. Kaperer, Sorcery, Modernity and the Constitutive Imaginary, Social Analysis, 46(3), (2002), pp.105-127, p.105 
863 FG, Evicted Family,  Maracha), 17/02/2017(OJ) 
864 D. Keen. War and Peace: What’s the Difference? International Peacekeeping, 7(4), (2000), p.1-22. p.1 
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valorise social repair. Propelling these quests for explanation is the fact that West Nilers 
continue to die in significant numbers of diseases (such as plague and meningitis) that 
have been eradicated elsewhere, including in the South of Uganda.  
 
Transitional justice may be the latest development project to search for finite meanings 
in Africa’s lifeworlds, assuming authentic expressions of victimhood and notions that 
complement donor-driven notions of repair. Experts on the “rule of law” imagine that 
local justice systems can be pulled into “best-fit” scenarios, where actually-existing 
processes of grassroots justice complement national legal institutions. Yet this external 
gaze continues to create categories and abstractions out of complex realities that defy 
them. As this study has shown, lived realities transgress boundaries between justice, 
reparations, health and well-being.  
 
10.3: The Contributions of this Study 
 
First, this study presents novel empirical evidence for the dynamics of social repair in a 
chronically under-researched sub-region of Uganda. It has adopted a longitudinal 
approach to explore the evolution of quests for therapy through time, building on the 
insights of Middleton, Barnes-Dean and Allen, who described iterations of these 
journeys in West Nile at very different junctures of its history.  
 
Second, whilst previous studies have suggested that post-independence development 
has undermined the authority of elders; and biomedicine has “simplified” quests for 
therapy, the evidence within this thesis suggests that clan-based mechanisms for 
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explaining affliction have endured among Lugbara peoples.865 Contrary to Barnes-
Dean’s suggestion that “[t]he traditional medical system has in a sense been turned 
inside out by culture contact”, this thesis finds that elders have reconstituted their 
authorities following return.866 Reading Middleton’s descriptions through the prism of 
pragmatic agency (cf. Whyte), rather than as representing an empirical and material 
truth, this thesis has explained the enduring power of e’yo (words) long after the 
cessation of direct ancestor veneration. This thesis has too engaged with the evolution 
of alternative healing traditions of divination and herbalism. It has demonstrated that 
diagnostic explanation among these healers has become increasingly siloed post-return 
(diviner-healers managing chronic conditions, and herbalists managing poisoning). 
Amidst this complexity, and changing vocabularies of healing, this thesis demonstrates 
the continued importance of collective approaches to suffering, and the ability of moral 
explanations to override evidentiary logics connected to clinical diagnosis.  
 
Third, this thesis has demonstrated that the process of social repair can serve to entrench 
gendered inequalities. This interplay was demonstrated through an exploration of clan-
diagnostics and divination. It has urged an attention to cultural restraints on voice and 
asking about misfortune, in understanding the options available to individual Lugbara 
people. Individualising studies that focus on particular therapists exclude a 
consideration for the overall structures of society within idioms of repair. Whilst this 
study suggests that aspects of the Lugbara gerontocracy have been weakened, gendered 
distinctions continue to pervade quests for therapy, as they do everyday life. 
 
865 Allen and Storm, ‘Quests for therapy in Northern Uganda’ 
866 Barnes-Dean, ‘Lugbara illness beliefs’, p. 344. 
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Fourth, this study has built on Allen’s insights as to post-return violence, finding that 
patterns of exclusion related to witchcraft and poisoning continue. Yet increasingly, 
those accused are not the marginal, but men, often those who possess significant power. 
This thesis has furthermore established patterns in witch-finding in relation to changing 
traditions in managing and explaining sudden deaths. Anti-witchcraft action continues 
to occur within the framework of clans, since deaths and funerary rites continue to be 
managed at home, and losses are felt collectively within clans. In response, institutions 
have responded to control killings. On the one hand, elders have established new 
restraints on false allegations, and on the other, efforts to manage accusations of 
poisoning through state-like structures. Yet, given the extended duration over which 
evidence is produced, grief and anger following death, and the lack of recognition of 
witches as killers by the state, events continue to result in exclusion (though less often 
in killing).  
 
This study has shown that in the decades following war, explanations and forms of 
“evictions” have been deeply influenced by institutional changes, and have been 
institutionalised as the NRM government has become established. I have urged an 
engagement with the multiplicity of logics through which witches are produced, and the 
internal discord surrounding this evidentiary production: that these are instances where 
communities experienced both state authority and the lack of protection from the NRM 
government. The final three chapters in particular aim to provide an evidence base to 
challenge recent calls to legislate against witchcraft.867 
 
867 Solomon, ‘Witch-Killings and the Law in Uganda’ 
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Finally, this study has elucidated the dynamics of everyday repair. Intentionally, the 
study did seek out the usual subjects of studies, including ex-combatants and abductees. 
Whilst this approach responded to the dynamics of conflict amid Lugbara populations 
(where ex-combatants do not receive high levels of stigmatisation), it also sought to 
engage with ordinary healing—how civilians perceive cosmology and repair. These 
findings diverge significantly from scholars who have reified particular cleansing 
performances in relation to ex-combatants. This study has highlighted how the ordinary 
politics of “boundary-making” and violence involves civilian populations, as well as 
“intimate enemies”.868 Adopting this social perspective, causal links between customary 
authorities, socio-cultural resources and the reconstruction of everyday normality 
become less apparent.  
 
10.4 A Forgotten Past? 
 
Within development policy, priorities in West Nile continue to be framed according to 
the mantra of transitional justice. Yet this characterisation is at ill-odds with the actual 
measures to address the wounds of the past. War and exile of the 1980s preceded the 
explosion in the international transitional justice industry; accordingly, there has been 
little interest in gathering data on testimonies, atrocities and fatalities in this region. 
Unlike in Luwero or Acholiland, or with the rebel groups active in the region following 
return, the horrific events of the 1980s and the sporadic attacks of the 1990s remain 
unaddressed.869  
 
868 MacGinty, ‘Boundary-Making’; Theidon, Intimate Enemies. 




In everyday life, people do not seek their bearings in conflict, nor necessarily in projects 
to overtly critique state neglect that has endured since then. This is partly a function of 
what Buckley-Zitzel terms “chosen amnesia”, where people put aside their grievances 
to get on with everyday relations.870 This politics has been encouraged not only by the 
lack of state acknowledgement of the past, but also by religious actors who have 
silenced overtly political narratives of revenge. Before his death, at an Ombaci 
commemoration organised by an NGO, even the revered Bishop Drandua urged those 
present that “There is need for all of us to rise above the bad days and forge ahead by 
doing good, forgiving and forgetting”.871 This consciousness was reproduced when 
elders explained conflict as a curse: localising national sentiments of the violence of 
Amin’s regime back onto themselves.  
 
In the wake of legacies of violence inflicted upon them, West Nilers have undertaken 
repair using the resources available. This has often involved the fierce policing of moral 
adherence, and harsh punishment for those who violate norms of tualu (social 
harmony)—whether prophets, poisoners, witches or even bishops. In lieu of political 
settlement, Lugbara people continue to pursue moral ordering themselves: as one elder 
once commented, “People evict based on power”.872 In regulating their moral 
surroundings, moreover, many Lugbara people comment on the “witchcraft” of 
politicians, development experts and tycoons: idioms of witchcraft represent a means of 
 
870 S. Buckley-Zistzel, ‘Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda’, Africa 76:2 (2006), pp. 131-150, p. 131. 
871 S. Ssenkaaba, ’34 years later: more questions on Ombaci’, Justice and Reconciliation Project [online], 8 August 
2015, available at: <https://www.justiceandreconciliation.org/media/newsroom/in-the-news/2015/34-years-later-
more-questions-on-ombaci/>.  
872 Commentary, co-worker, March 2017. 
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comprehending continuing economic exclusion, the neglect by their own president, and 
the violence of development projects. These ideas extend far beyond locality, yet people 
reorganise their lifeworlds within the framework of clans that have historically 
governed moral responsibility and the enactment of violence.  
 
Yet as the Ediofe riots indicate, shared ideas of cosmology can easily be politicised to 
result in violence, violence that seeks to reorder political accountability for those 
perceived to be immoral. Activated by wrongful death, underlying grievances spill out 
into public articulations of the past. The sense of injustice contained in the everyday is 
such that communal memories can be politicised into mass violence, by elites cognisant 
of—and embroiled in—idioms of socio-cultural responsibility. Seemingly apolitical 
scripts of souls and spirits are mobilised to political ends. In this respect, MacDonald 
asks whether in conflating social repair with transitional justice, experts are “making a 
virtue out of the necessary resources populations draw on to survive?”873 Whilst this 
thesis has encouraged a grounding in the logics and institutions which produce repair, 
the events at Ediofe indicate that local level-social processes do not necessarily 
constitute justice for the mass atrocities of the past. 
 
The struggles described within this thesis clearly highlight that, in recovering from 
political crisis, Lugbara communities pursue quests for accountability that diverge from 
the discrete domains of justice typically of interest to outsiders. Where everyday life is 
lived without the predictable accountability and welfare assured by state institutions, 
 
873 A. Macdonald, ‘From the ground up: what does the evidence tell us about local experiences of transitional 
justice?’, Transitional Justice Review 1:3 (2015), pp. 72-121. 
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Lugbara people continue to draw upon the resources available to them to construct 
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Appendix B: List of Interviews & Focus Groups 
 
Footnotes include an abridged reference to interviews (I), focus groups (FG) and 
introductory meetings (IM). Where interviews were translated from Lugbarati, the 
translator reference is included in the quote (OJ, PN, DA). The full reference to the 
interviews is included in the list below. 
 
List of Interviews and Focus Groups 
 
Phase 1 
Interview, Nelson Abiti, Uganda Museum (Kampala), 15th March 2016, English 
Interview, Civil Servant (Arua), 30th April 2016, English 
Interview, Deputy RDC, Toko Shuaib, (Arua), 2nd April 2016, English 
Interview, RDC, Peter Debele, (Arua), 2nd May 2016, English 
Interview, Deputy Commissioner of Local Government, 2nd May 2016, English 
Introductory Meeting, Officer in Charge of Police and District Commissioner of Police, 
Jonathan Musinguzi, (Arua) 2nd May 2016, English 
Meeting, Ayivu Elders, (Arua), 3th May 2016, English and Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Introductory Meeting, ZOA (NGO), (Arua), May 3th 2016, English 
Introductory Meeting, RICE (NGO), (Arua), May 3th 2016, English 
Introductory Meeting, SNV (NGO), (Arua), May 3th 2016, English 
Introductory Meeting, Uganda Law Society, (Arua), May 3th 2016, English 
Introductory Meeting, Pastoral Coordinator, Ediofe Diocese, (Ediofe, Arua), May 3th 
2016, English 
Introductory Meeting, Ma’di and West Nile Diocese, (Mvara, Arua), May 3th 2016, 
English 
Interview, Chief Magistrate, Arua Court, (Arua), May 4th 2016, English 
Interview, Father Louis, Ediofe Diocese, (Arua) May 4th 2016, English 
Interview, Father Tonino (Italian Missionary), Radio Pacis, (Arua), May 4th 2016, 
English 
Interview, Legal Officer, Arua Court, (Arua), May 4th 2016, English 
Interview, Samsa, Uganda Law Society (Arua), May 4th 2016, English 
Interview, Jonathan Musinguzi, District Commissioner of Police, (Arua), May 4th 2016, 
English 
Interview, Bosco, Human Rights Commission, (Arua), May 4th 2016, English 
Interview, Juliet Logose, Human Rights Commission, (Arua), May 4th 2016, English 
Interview, Hilda, SNV Programme Manager, (Arua), May 5th 2016, English 
Focus Group, Ayivu Elders Association, (15 participants), May 6th 2015, Lugbara/ 
English (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Lecturer at MUBS, May 8th 2016, English 
Informal Focus Group, Abrici Households, Onzivu, Arua, May 9th 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Informal Meeting, Nelson Abiti, Uganda Museum, (Arua), May 9th 2016, English 
Interview, Mary, Elderly Lady, Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), May 9th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Anglican Elder and wife, Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), May 9th 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
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Interview, Anglican Elder, Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), May 10th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Anglican Reverend and Elder, Mvara, (Arua), May 10th 2016, English/ 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Anglican Elder, Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), May 11th 2016, English 
Interview, NGO Worker, CEFORD, (Arua), May 11th 2016, English 
Interview, Drateru Maureen, Druyer, Pajulu, (Arua), May 12th 2016, English 
Interview, Cristine, Local Speaker, Druyer, Pajulu, (Arua), May 12th 2016, English 
Interview, Elder and eldest son, Aroi, (Arua), 14th May 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2 Elder (clan elder, Catholic Catechist), Aroi, (Arua), 15th May 2016, 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Introductory Meetings, LC and elders of Druyer, (Arua), 16th May 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder (Anglican Church Teacher, Clan elder), Druyer, (Arua), 17th May 
2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, LC Druyer, Druyer (Arua), 17th May 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder and son, Druyer, (Arua), 17th May 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Youth Association of Druyer, (Arua), 18th May 2016, English/ Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder at home, Druyer (Arua), 18th May 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elders at Druyer (Arua), 18th May 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Christian Women’s Association, Vurra, 19th May 2016, Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Focus Group, Druyer Community, 19th May 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, Elderly Lady, Druyer, 19th May 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Informal Interviews and Observations, Ombaci Memorial Mass, 20th May 2016 (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group 2 Youth Association of Druyer, (Arua), 23rd May 2016, English/ Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder at home, Druyer (Arua), 23rd May 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Interview, Drateru Maureen, Druyer, Pajulu, (Arua), May 23rd 2016, 
English 
Observations and informal Interviews, Development Meeting, Ediofe Diocese, May 
25th 2016 
Interviews, LCIII Court Officials, (Arua), May 25th 2016, English 
Interview, Survivor, Ombaci Massacre, May 25th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Representative, West Nile Kony Victims Association, May 25th 2016, 
English 
Introductory Meeting, DPC Nyadri (Maracha), May 26th 2016, English 
Interview 3 Elder, Aroi, (Arua), May 27th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Elder, Druyer (Arua), May 30th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, LC and elders of Ovujo Trading Centre (Maracha), May 30th 2016, 
English/ Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, 2, Lecturer, MUBS, (Arua) May 30th 2016, English 
Focus Group, Elders of Irivu Clan, (Maracha), May 31st 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy/ 
Afuonzi Charles) 
Focus Group, Elders of Kimeru Clan, (Maracha), May 31st 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy/ Afuonzi Charles) 
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Interview, elder and man accused of mazi, (Arua), June 1st, 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Ovujo Community, (Maracha) June 2nd, 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Informal Interviews, Ayivu Elders, (Arua) June 4th, 2016, English/ Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, LC/ Medical Student of Ovujo, (Maracha), June 5th, 2016, English 
Focus Group, Jua Kali Youth Group, Ovujo, (Maracha), June 5th, 2016, English/ 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Elders of Adongo-Ayika Clan, (Maracha), June 7th 2016, English/ 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy/ Afuonzi Charles) 
Interview, Resident of Onzivu, (Arua) June 7th 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Focus Group, Terego Elders Association, (Arua) June 8th 2016, English/ Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Man accused of mazi at home in Onzivu, (Arua)June 13th 2016, Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Focus Group x4, Christians of Ovujo, (Maracha) June 13th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, LC Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua) June 13th 2016, English/ Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Observations and Informal Interviews, Ayivu Elders Association at Cultural Gathering, 
Ondramacu, (Arua) June 13th June 2016 
Interview, Victims, Ovujo, (Maracha) June 15th, 2016, English 
Focus Group, Teachers at Buramali School, (Maracha) June 15th 2016, English 
Interview, Headteacher at Buramali School, (Maracha) June 15th 2016, English 
Interview, Man accused of mazi, (Arua), June 16th 2016, English 
Interview, family members of accused, (Arua), June 16th 2016, English 
Focus Group 2, Jua Kali Youth Group, Ovujo, (Maracha), June 19th 2016, English/ 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, elder Aroi, (Arua), June 23rd 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, elder Druyer, (Arua), June 24th 2016, Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, LC Council, Buramali, (Maracha), June 27th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Maracha Elders Association, (Maracha) June 28th, 2016, English 
Focus Group, Elders, Nyarire Clan, (Maracha), June 29th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy/ 
Afuonzi Charles) 
Focus Group, Teachers at Buramali School, (Maracha) July 1st 2016, English 
Focus Group, Teachers, (Arua), July 1st 2016, English 
Interview, Elder of Buramali (Maracha), July 2nd 2016, Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Terego Chief, (Arua), July 3rd 2016, English 
Focus Group 2, Maracha Elders Association, (Maracha) July 4th, English/ Lugbara, 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, elder Druyer, (Arua), July 5th 2016, Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Buramali Community, (Maracha), July 9th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group 2, Teachers, (Arua), July 9th 2016, English 
Focus Group 2, Nyarire Clan, (Maracha), July 10th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy/ 
Afuonzi Charles) 





Interview, Elder of Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), September 18th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview 4, Elder of Aroi, (Arua), September 19th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, Maureen, Druyer, Pajulu, (Arua), September 19th 2016, English 
Focus Group 3, Druyer Youth Association, (Arua) September 19th 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 5, Elder of Druyer, Pajulu, (Arua), September 19th 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Introductory meeting, Community of Jacinto Cell, September 20th 2016, English/ 
Lugbara (Patricia) 
Focus Group 3, Ayivu Elders Association, (Arua), September 21st 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Leader of Maracha Elders Association, (Arua), September 21st 2016, English 
Observations/ informal interviews, Ediofe Riot and aftermath, September 22nd - 24th, 
English/ Lugbara 
Interview 2, Tony Odda, Civil Servant (Arua), 24th September 2016, English 
Interview, LC Ediofe, (Arua), 24th September 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group 3, Teachers, (Arua), 24th September 2016, English 
Focus Group, Residents of Jacinto Cell, 25th September 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview 2, Elderly woman, Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua) 25th September 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Elder of Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), 25th September 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Leader of Maracha Elders Association, (Arua), September 26st 2016, 
English 
Focus Group 2, Residents of Jacinto Cell, 27th September 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Introductory Meetings and Interviews in Maracha’s 8 sub-counties, (Maracha), 28-30th 
September 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy in the presence of Anzilo Angelo) 
Interview, Female Resident, Aroi, (Arua) 30th September 2016, English 
Interview 2, Man accused of mazi on farm in Vurra, (Arua) 3rd October 2016, Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Interview, Family Members of accused on farm in Vurra (Arua), 3rd October 2016, 
Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, Elder of Ayivu Elders Association, (Arua), 4th October 2016, English 
Interview, Youth President of Elders Ayivu Association, (Arua), 5th October 2016, 
English 
Interview 2, Anglican Elder and wife, Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), 5th October 2016, 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Introductory Meeting, Jason Avutia, Lugbara Agofe, at his home in Mvara, 5th October 
2016, English 
Interviews with Residents of Jacinto Cell, 6th October 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview with LCI of Jacinto Cell, 6th October 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, Mike Agondua, Leader of Ayivu Elders, 6th October 2016, English 
Interview, Elder of Ayivu Elders Association (Former WNBF), 6th October 2016, 
English 
Focus Group 4, Teachers, (Arua), 6th October 2016, English 
Interview, Miria Charles, Elder of Nyadri (Maracha), 7th October 2016, English  
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Interview, Elder of Nyadri at S/C HQ, (Maracha), 7th October 2016, English  
Informal Interview, Jason Avutia, Lugbara Agofe, at his home in Mvara, 7th October 
2016, English 
Interview 2, Elder of Ayivu Elders Association (former WNBF), in Ediofe, (Arua) 8th 
October 2016, English 
Interview 2, Leader of Maracha Elders Association, (Arua), 8th October 2016, English 
Interview 3, Elder of Abrici, (Arua), 8th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Elders of Tara, (Maracha), 11th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder of Tara, (Maracha), 13th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Pentecostal Preacher (Arua), 13th October 2016, English 
Focus Group, Residents of Jacinto Cell, 14th October 2016, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, LCI, Kenya Cell, 14th October 2016, English/ Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview 4, Elder of Druyer, 17th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, LCI Oleba Trading Centre, (Maracha), 17th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Victim of Witchcraft Oleba, (Maracha), 17th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Young Man, Oleba, (Maracha), 18th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Young men of Oleba, (Maracha), 18th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Female Catechist, Buramali, (Maracha), 18th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview 2, LCI Oleba Trading Centre, (Maracha), 19th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview 4, Elder of Abrici, (Arua), 19th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2 (informal), Mike Agondua, Leader of Ayivu Elders, 20th October 2016, 
English 
Interview 3, Elder of Ayivu Elders Association, in Ediofe, (Arua) 20th October 2016, 
English 
Focus Group, Young Man, Oleba, (Maracha), 21st October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Man Accused of Mazi, (Maracha), 21st October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Jason Avutia, Lugbara Agofe, at his home in Mvara, 26th October 2016, 
English 
Interview, Haruna Ndema, Lugbara Kari Prime Minister, Mvara (Arua), 26th October 
2016, English 
Interview 2 LCI Ovujo, (Maracha), 30th October 2016, English 
Interview, Teacher, Ovujo, (Maracha), 30th October 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, Elder of Ayivu Elders Association (Former WNBF), (Arua), 31st October 
2016, English 
Interview, Elder of Nyadri (Former Soldier of Amin), (Maracha), 1st November 2016, 
English/ Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, LCI Etoko, (Maracha), 1st November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Etoko Clan, (Maracha), 1st November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Aree Clan, (Maracha), 2nd November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder, Aree Clan, (Maracha), 2nd November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, Drateru Marueen at home in Druyer, (Arua), 3rd November 2016, English 
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Interview 1, Hon. Dick Nyaai, Mvara, (Arua), 3rd November 2016 (English) 
Interview 4, Elder of Ayivu Elders Association (Former WNBF), (Arua), 3rd November 
2016, English 
Interview, Political Mobiliser, Maracha, 8th November 2016, English 
Interview, Elder of Etoko Clan, 9th November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Security Wing of Etoko Clan, 9th November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Man accused of mazi, Maracha, 9th November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, LCI, Paranga Clan, Maracha, 10th November 2016, English/ Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, LCII Etoko Parish, 11th November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Anglican Theologian, Ma’di and West Nile Diocese, English, 21st November 
2016, English 
Interview, Diocesean Coordinator, Ma’di and West Nile Diocese, English, 21st 
November 2016, English 
Interview, Youth Coordinator, Oleba, (Maracha), 21st November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Son of elder, Etoko Clan, (Maracha), 21st November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Young men of Etoko Clan, (Maracha), 22nd November 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Household in dispute, Etoko, (Maracha), 22nd November 2016, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder Ediofe, (Arua), 24th November 2016, English 
Interview 5, Elder of Abrici (Arua), 24th November 2016, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Sub-County Chief, Oleba, (Maracha), 25th November 2016, English 
Interview, Elder, Catholic Oleba, (Maracha), 25th November 2016, English 
Interview, Herbalist Oluffe, (Maracha), 27th November 2016, Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy 
and Chris) 
Interview, Ezatia Susan (Lugbara Kari), (Arua), 30th November 2016, English 
Interview, Tuku Ismael (Lugbara Kari), (Arua), 2nd December 2016, English  
Interview, Dick Nyaai, Social Centre, (Arua), 2nd December 2016, English 
Interview, Alequa Jaffery, (Arua), 3rd December 2016, English 
Interview, Pastor Justin, (Arua), 3rd December 2016, English 
Interview 6, Gad, Druyer, (Arua), 5th December 2016, Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, Mike Agondua, (Arua), 5th December 2016, Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Catholic Action, Oluvu Mission, (Maracha), 7th December 2016, 
Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Wilson Onzama, Lugbara Intellectual, (Arua), 8th December, English 
Interview 3, Mary, Elderly Lady of Abrici, Onzivu, (Arua), 9th December, Lugbara, 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Young men of Etoko Clan, (Maracha), 14th December, Lugbara, (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Young men of Etoko-Aree Clan (Maracha), 14th December, Lugbara, 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, young man, Etoko clan, (Maracha), 14th December, Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, By-law writers, Etoko-Nico Clan (Maracha), 15th December, Lugbara, 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
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Interview, LC, Etoko-Nico Clan, (Maracha), 15th December, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Trader, Oleba, (Maracha), 15th December, English/ Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Onzima Gabriel (teacher and elder of Maracha), 16th December 2016, 
English 
Interview, David Avaga, Ambiriambati Parish, (Arua), 16th December 2016, English 
Interview, Ronnie Oja, Pastor of Lifeline Ministries, (Arua), 21st December 2016, 
English 
Interview, Father John, Spiritual Healing Centre (and Policeman), (Arua), 22nd 
December 2016, English 
Interview, Female Catechist, Onzivu, (Arua), 22nd December 2016, Lugbara (David 
Angualia)  
Interview, Male Catechist, Christ the King, (Arua), 22nd December 2016, Lugbara 
(David Angualia)  
Interview, Ambrose, Elder of the Catholic Church and Church Teacher, 23rd December 
2017 
Interview, LCI Paranga Village, (Maracha), 23rd December 2016, Lugbara (Jimmy 
Osuta) 
Interview, (Acting) Head of Paranga Clan, (Maracha), 23rd December 2016, Lugbara 
(Jimmy Osuta) 
Interview, Isrum, Elder, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua) 8th January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua) 8th January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder Lady, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua) 8th January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Herbalist, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua), 9th January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Young man, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua), 9th January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Family, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua) 10th January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Elderly Women, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua), 10th January 2017, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Recovered Accident Victim, Ediofe, (Arua), 16th January 2017, English 
Interview, Resident of Jacinto Cell, (Arua), 16th January 2017, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, Engo Alfred, Ediofe, (Arua), 21st January 2017, English 
Interview, LCI Oleba, (Maracha), 21st January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder, Kebir Cell, (Arua), 23rd January 2017, English/ Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview 2, LCI of Ediofe (and family), 24th January 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Adigaa Bernard, Anglican Healer, (Arua) 25th January 2017, English 
Interview, Water Engineer/ Upcoming Cultural Leader, (Arua), 26th January 26th 2017, 
English 
Interview, Vincent Omba, Elder of Ediofe, (Arua) 26th January 2017, English 
Interview, Catholic Alur Catechist, (Arua), 27th January 2017, Lugbara (David 
Angualia) 
Interview, Female Trader, Ewata, (Arua), 27th January 2017, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, Female Trader, Ewata, (Arua), 27th January 2017, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview 2, Dick Nyaai, (Arua), 27th January 2017, English 
Introduction Interview, Vivian Ambe, Ewata, (Arua), 29th January 2017, English/ 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
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Interview, Vivian Ambe, Ewata, (Arua), 7th February 2017, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, Zaitun, Ewata, (Arua), 7th February 2017, Lugbara (Patricia) 
Interview, Elders of Clan A, (Maracha), 12th February 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Male Catechist, (Maracha), 12th February 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, LCI of Worubo, (Maracha), 12th February 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Clans in Border Dispute, Odramacacu, (Arua), 13th February 2017, 
Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Evicted Man, (Maracha), 17th February 2017, (Maracha), Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Evicted Family, (Maracha), 17th February 2017, (Maracha), Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, LC Alivu B, (Maracha), 17th February 2017, (Maracha), Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy)  
Focus Group, Young Men of Alivu B, 17th February 2017, (Maracha), Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, LCIII Nyadri, (Maracha), 18th February 2017, English 
Interview, Elders of Lujje Clan, (Maracha), 18th February 2017, (Maracha), Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Alequa Jaffery, (Arua), 18th February 2017, (Arua), English 
Interview, Sharon, Ewata, (Arua), 19th February 2017, (Arua), Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, LCIII Nyadri, (Maracha), 20th February 2017, English 
Interviews, Vivian Ambe’s Disciplines, Ewata, (Arua), 20th February 2017, Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Interview 2, Sharon, Ewata, (Arua), 19th February 2017, (Arua), Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Parish Chief, Nyadri, (Maracha), 28th February 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Elders of Pio Clan, (Maracha), 2nd March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder of Pio Clan, (Maracha, 3rd March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elders of Worubo, (Maracha), 3rd March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Elders of Pabora Clan, (Maracha), 4th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Man affected by Adro, (Arua), 5th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Elders of Ombavu Clan, (Maracha), 7th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Elder of Alipi Clan, (Maracha), 7th March 2017 
Interview, Vivian Ambe’s congregation, Ewata (Arua), 21st March 2017, Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Focus Group, Christian Leaders of Maracha Archdeaconary, (Maracha), 8th March 
2017 English/ Lugbara, (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Miria Charles, (Maracha), 8th March 2017, English/ Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Headmaster, Oluffe Secondary School, (Maracha), 9th March 2017, English 
Interview, Accused Herbalist, (Maracha), 9th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, LCI, Pio Clan, (Maracha), 9th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Parish “Security Officer” Pio Clan, (Maracha), 9th March 2017, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Mama Faith, Oli Division, (Arua), 10th March 2017 Lugbara (Patricia) 
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Interview Obetia, Oli Division, (Arua), 10th March 2017 Lugbara (Patricia) 
Focus Group, Elders of Araka Clan, 13th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group 3, Nyarire Clan, (Maracha), 13th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Anglican Pastor of Kimeru Clan, (Maracha), 13th March 2017, English 
Interview, Elder, Azipi Clan, (Maracha), 14th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Clan Elder, Emvua Clan, (Maracha), 14th March 2017, Lugbara (Osuta 
Jimmy) 
Interview, Herbalist, Kijomoro Sub-County, (Maracha), 15th March 2017, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Lawrence Ariga, LCV, Nyadri Sub-County, (Maracha), 16th March 2017, 
English 
Interview 2, Elder/ LCI Alivu B, (Maracha), 16th March 2017, English 
Introductory Meeting, Ezaru Mary, Vurra, (Arua), 18th May 2017, Lugbara, (Angualia 
David) 
Interview, CCR Counsellor, Nysambia, (Arua), 27th March 2017, Lugbara (David 
Angualia) 
Interview, Natalia, CCR Member, (Nsyambia), (Arua), 27th March 2017, English/ 
Lugbara (Angualia David) 
Interview, Agnes, Female CCR Member, Arua town (Arua), 28th March 2017, English 
Interview, Male Catholic, Arua town (Arua), 28th March 2017, English 
Interview, Female Catechist, Nsyamic, (Arua), 28th March 2017, Lugbara (David 
Angulia) 
Focus Group, Galenji Clan, Ayivuni, (Arua), 29th March 2017, Lugbara (David 
Angulia) 
Interview, Haruna Ndema, Social Centre (Arua), 10th April 2017, English 
Interview 6, Catholic Elder, Aroi, (Arua) 10th April 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Ezatia Susan, (Arua), 11th April 2017, English 
Interview, Bosco, Chief Discipline of Vivian, (Arua), 12th April 2017, Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Interview, Female CCR Member, Vurra, (Arua), 13th April 2017, Lugbara (Zonette) 
Interview, Female CCR Member, Vurra, (Arua), 13th April 2017, Lugbara (Zonette) 
Interview, Female CCR Member, Vurra, (Arua), 13th April 2017, Lugbara (Zonette) 
Interview 7, Anglican Elder, Druyer, (Arua), 14th April 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Jailed Protestor, (Arua), 28th April, 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, Alequa Jaffery, (Arua), May 1st 2017, English 
Interview, Reverend of Koyi Church (Maracha), May 2nd 2017, English 
Focus Group, Members of Koyi Anglican Revival (Maracha), May 2nd 2017, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Elders, Koyi Revival and Lujje Clan, May 3rd 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Elders of Worubo Clan, (Maracha), May 3rd 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 3, Vincent Omba, Ediofe, (Arua), May 5th 2017, English 
Introductory Meeting, Father Castro, Ediofe Diocese, (Arua), 9th May 2017, English 
Interview, Elder of Lujje, (Maracha), 12th May 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy 
Interview, Father Castro, Ediofe Diocese, (Arua), 16th May 2017, English 
Interview, Father Simon, Bethany Centre, (Arua), 16th May 2017, English 
Interview, Hon Malon Avutia, Sub County Chairperson, Pajulu, (Arua), 17th May 2017, 
English 
Interview, Catholic Leaders, (Arua), 17th May 2017, English 
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Interview, Father Stephen, Arivu Parish, Vurra, (Arua), 18th May 2017, English 
Interview, Zefa Joseph, Nsyambia, (Arua), 18th May 2017, Lugbara (David Angualia) 
Interview, Civil Society Activist, Cafeteria, (Arua), 18th May 2017, English 
Interview, Father Lazarus, Ediofe Diocese, (Arua) 19th May 2017, English 
Interview 2, Natalia Etoru, CCR Leader, Nsyambia, (Arua), 20th Mary 2017, English 
Interview, Ezaru Mary, Vurra, (Arua), 22nd May 2017, Lugbara (David Angualia/ 
Zonette) 
Interview, Methodist Minister and Wife, Vurra, (Arua), 24th May 2017, (w Tom 
Lowman) 
Interview, Isrum, Elder of Terego, (Arua) 2nd June 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Assistant Clan Leader, Odravu, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua), English/ Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 2, Isrum, Elder of Terego, (Arua) 7th June 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Resident of Biliage, Terego, (Arua), 7th June 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Retired Female Teacher, Lujje, (Maracha), 8th June 2017, English/ Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy) 
Focus Group, Lujje Elders, (Maracha), 8th June 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview 6, Anglican Elder, Abrici, 9th June 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
Interview, Captain Aleni, Onzivu Church, 10th June 2017, English 
Interview, Dick Nyaai, (Arua), 13th June 2017, English 
Interview, Former Trader, (Arua), 14th June 2017, Lugbara (David Angualia) 
Interview, Outgoing Director ARRH, 14th June 2017, English 
Interview, Obanya James, Anglican Pastor/ CHW, Ediofe, 14th June 2017, English 
Interview, Charles Asiki, Former Mayor of Arua Municipality, (Arua), 15th June 2017, 
English 
Interview, Reverend Kefaloli, Ambiriambati Church, (Arua), 16th June 2017, English 
Interview, Relative of Zefa Joseph/ Public Health Officer, 15th June 2017, English 
Interview, 18th June, Medical Doctor at ARRH, (English) 
Focus Group, Elders of Kamaka, 19th June 2017, (Maracha), Lugbara (David Angualia) 
Interview, Officer, AIDS Information Centre, 20th June 2017, English 
Interview James Acidri, MP, Maracha East Constituency, (Arua), English 
Interview, Vivian Ambe, Ewata, (Arua), 22nd June 2017, Lugbara/ English (Patricia) 
Interview, Vivian Ambe’s congregation, Ewata, (Arua), 22nd June 2017, Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Interview, Elder of Biliafe, Terego, 24th June 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
 
Phase 3. 
Interview, (informal), Vivian Ambe’s congregation, Ewata, (Arua),19th December 
2017, Lugbara/ (Patricia) 
Interview, Ezaru Mary, Vurra, (Arua), 22nd December 2017, Lugbara (David Angualia) 
Interview, Zefa Joseph, Nsyambia, (Arua), 22nd December 2017, Lugbara (David 
Angualia) 
Interview, Vivian Ambe, Ewata, (Arua), 23rd December 2017, English/ Lugbara 
(Patricia) 
Interviews (informal), Vivian Ambe’s congregation, Ewata, (Arua), 23rd December 
2017, Lugbara/ (Patricia) 
Interview, Catholic Elder, Aroi, (Arua), 28th December 2017, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
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Interview, Jennifer, Pentecostal Pastor, Ediofe, (Arua) 29th December, 2017, English/ 
Lugbara (Patricia) 
Follow-up interviews, families of Maracha, (Maracha), 1-3rd January 2018, Lugbara 
(Osuta Jimmy with Afuonzi Charles) 
Focus Group, Families of Odravu Clan, Biliafe, Terego, (Arua), 4th January 2018, 
English 
Interview, Hon Dick Nyaai, Mvara, (Arua), 5th January 2018, English 
Interview, Vivian Ambe, Ewata, (Arua), 5th January 2018, Lugbara/ English (Patricia) 
Interview, Anglcian Elder, Abrici, (Arua), 6th January 2018, Lugbara (Osuta Jimmy) 
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Plate One: Mike Agondua, appointed chief of the Ayivu elders, and descendant of a chiefly lineage, displays the 
agreed structure of the association. The association had an extensive written manifesto as well, and had registered 





























Plate Three: Clan Feast between clans of Maracha and Logiri (in Maracha), to celebrate the marriage of a wealthy 
clan member (20/05/2017).  
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Plate Four: Men of a Maracha clan slaughter a female cow, transferred as part of an ali (bridewealth) payment, to 




Plate Five: Sitting convened in Maracha, close to the Congo border, concerning a false allegation of poisoning made 








Plate Seven: Poisons that a community handed to sub-county police (Chapter Nine, Case A). The ojo is a bulb long 
connected to divine power, which today retains a certain ambiguity. The bulb can be used by herbalists to cure 








Plate Nine: Land Dispute, Terego Clan. The meeting was attending by two sub-clans, descended from the overall 
Yole clan. Land was gifted from the original inhabitants to members of the sub-clan during the war. Subsequently, 
the new arrived clan had increased in size, encroaching on boundaries agreed through sittings post-war. The meeting, 
attended by state officials as “witnesses”, descended into disarray, with young men representing the encroaching clan 





Plate Ten: Vivian Ambe and her newly-constructed “altar” within her compound. Vivian is surrounded by a selection 
of her intercessors and her regular followers, mostly drawn from the neighbourhood (21/02/2017). 
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Plate Eleven: Vivian Ambe lays hands on an afflicted woman in her compound (07/02/2017). 
 
 
Plate Twelve: Holy Water brought by Vivian’s followers. Over the course of my observations, Vivian innovated in 
her practice to incorporate praying over water brought from home. Attendants then sprinkled this water on damaged 




Plate Thirteen: Ezaru Mary, a Catholic inspired diviner-healer, pictured in her hut in Vurra, in her natal home, where 











Plate Fifteen: Revival Service in Koyi Maracha. At the service, women present were chastised for failing to spread 
the movement to their husbands. 
 482 
 
Plate Sixteen: The stand-off in Ediofe 22/09/2016. Here, the rioters have regrouped, and as this photo was taken, it 






Appendix D: Cases 
 
Date Details Location Notes 
May 2016 Sickness and misfortunes accrued to 
family because of unpaid dowry 
Arua Resolved through collective meal 
May 2016 Curse from disowned auntie Arua 
 
May 2016 Disputes over wealth Arua Elders not trusted, family collectively 
managed below them 
May 2016 Curse from elder to son who did not 
share wealth 
Arua Ongoing 
May 2016 Curse over marriage away from clan Arua Death of child, awaiting sitting 
May 2016 Daughter cursed by father for wrong 
marriage 
Terego Reparations made, recovery 
May 2016 Prominent Uncle curses marriage after 
not being appreciated 
Arua/ Terego Reparations made after c-section 
May 2016 Elders intervene in murder case, 
preventing police charges 
Arua 
 
May 2016 Misfortunes, unpaid avuta following 
death of mother 
Arua Ongoing reparations, elders 
inattentive  
May 2016 Poisoning of wife and husband Arua Rumours of daughter-in-laws 
involvement, no allegation 
May 2016 Disciplining of a neglectful son/ father Terego canes 










Curse of mazi suspect Arua Two accusers died, accepted 
allegation was false, man 
reintroduced to community 
May 2016 
(historic) 
Accusation of wizardry after death of 
girlfriend. Man placed under community 
surveillance 
Arua Suspect fled into self-imposed exile 
May 2016 
(historic) 
Curse arising from intermarriage Arua 
 




Curse following children of a mother 
who had lied before elders 
Arua Resolved recently, curse passed in 
1960s 
May 2016 Cases of shock in men following female 
adultery 
Arua Ritual meal 
May 2016 Bewitching of family member Arua Victim relocated from Terego to Arua 
May 2016 Chronically ill man Arua, attributed to 
jealousy of brother 
Arua Verbal forgiveness 
May 2016 Poisoning eviction Maracha Five deaths, suspects (outsiders) 
selected by ballot and evicted 
May 2016 Women defecated in home, elders sat and 
demanded payment from father 
Maracha 
 
June 2016 Mazi curse Arua Cursed, reintegrated 
June 2016 
(historic) 
Mazi curse Arua Cursed deceased 
June 2016 
(historic) 
First allegation of mazi Arua Cursed, reintegrated 
June 2016 Allegation of mazi Arua Suspect moved from countryside to 
town 
June 2016 Strangling at school in Buramali Maracha Ongoing, prayers 
September 2016 Disturbed Funeral rites Terego pending 
September 2016 Sickness in children following unpaid 
dowry 
Arua Ongoing, intervention at funeral 









September 2016 Allegations against Catholic Bishop 
  
September 2016 Poisoning case Maracha Family evicted 
October 2016 
(historic) 
Poisoning case  Maracha Police man killed 
October 2016 Bewitching of women in trading centre Maracha prayers 
October 2016 
(historic) 
Case of mazi Congo border 
(Maracha) 
Clan discipline (visions/ no deaths) 
October 2016 Case of mazi Congo border 
(Maracha) 
Cross-border force formed 
October 2016 Suspicion of mazi in Onzivu Arua 
 
November 2016 - 
January 2017 
Suspicion of mazi in home Maracha Prayers for home in January 
December 2016 Home under siege from mazi Maracha 
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December 2016 Reclaiming bride-wealth across Congo 
border 
Maracha Cross-border raid to seize cattle 
January 2017 Unpaid bridewealth Arua 
 
January 2017 Sitting over false allegation of poisoning Maracha apology 
February 2017 Poisoning Case Maracha Police involvement 
February 2017 Poisoning Case Maracha Elders’ sitting 
February 2017 Poisoning Case Maracha Elders’ sitting 
March 2017 Adultery Case Maracha  Curse placed on wife 
March 2017 Poisoning Case Maracha Houses destroyed 




Mysterious house fires Marcha 
 
April 2017 Clan Feud Arua 
 
May 2017 Mua case Maracha 
 
May 2017 Misfortunes from unpaid bridewealth 
  
May 2017 Unpaid avuti Arua 
 




June 2016 Diocesan Development meeting Arua 
June 2016 Crowning of Aringa King Yumbe 
May 2016 Miracle Crusade, mass casting out of “witchcraft” by visiting Pentecostal pastor Arua  
September 2016 International Peace Day Arua 
September 2016 Funeral, Terego Terego 
September 2016 Swearing in of Anglican Bishop Arua 
October 2016 Independence Day Celebrations  Arua/ Maracha 
October 2016 Funeral rites in Onzivu Arua 
October 2016 House burning in Onzivu Arua 
October 2016 Thanks-giving post recovery in Onzivu Arua 
October 2016 Pentecostal Conference, Ediofe Arua 
November 2016 Funeral, Aroi Arua 
November 2016 Funeral Ediofe Arua 
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November 2016 Thief Parade, Ediofe Arua 
November 2016 Marriage Introduction, Yole Clan Terego (Arua) 
December 2016 Mass Baptism, Onzivu Church Arua 
December 2016 LCV Thanksgiving Maracha 
December 2016 Annual Pilgrimage to Lodonga Minor Basilica Yumbe 
January 2017 Transfer of Ali, Buramali, Maracha Maracha 
January 2017 Sitting over false allegation of poisoning Maracha 
January 2017 Healing Mass, Simbili Eucharist Centre Maracha 
January 2017 New Dawn Crusade, Bethany Centre Arua 
January 2017 By-Law Writing, Terego Arua 
February 2017 Funeral, Adumi Arua 
Feb 2017 (-Jan 2018) Healing Ministry, Vivian Ambe’s Compound, Ewata Arua 
February 2017 Prayerful intervention, mysterious fires Arua 
February 2017 Ediofe Cathedral Consecration Arua 
March 2017 Mazi accusation against herbalist Maracha 
March 2017 Adultery Case Maracha 
March 2017 Vivian Ambe plus disciples, prayer pilgrimage to Goli Nebbi 
March 2017 Bethany weekly healing mass Arua 
April 2017 Easter Celebrations Arua 
May 2017 Healing Ministry, Ezaru Mary’s Hut, Vurra Arua 
May 2017 Marriage Feast, Maracha Maracha 
May 2017 By-Law reading, Terego Arua 




Case Date Diviner Explained by 
diviner or 
consultant 
Affliction Cause Outcome 






2 Jan 17 Vivian  Grace sister mother-in-law 
tried to send 
away, and for 
husband to marry 
an Alur  
 
Prayers peace 
2 Jan 17 Vivian Bosco (C) Fires in home Unpaid avuta Clan 
reparation
s made 




Sharon (C) Mysterious fire, 
boda boda 
accident 














because of visiting 
witchdoctors (spent 
5M). Vivian 
instructed him to 
give 350,000 – 1/10 
of the amount given 
to witchdoctors to 








Could not walk, 










husband    
 
Prayers Job  in 
Rwanda 
7 Feb 17 Vivian  Female 
consultation 
General sickness Prayers over water, 
settle dispute with 



















“too much trouble 
here” 
n/a 














6 March 17 Vivian Amanio Rose 
(C) 
 
No money in 
home, causing 
“heart to burn” 
Prayers Peace in 
heart, still 
no money 
7 March 17 Vivian Testimony (C) Tension in home Unspecified Change in 
behaviour
s  






Prayers - cause 










Prayers – not open 
to God 
recovery 
























April 17 Vivian Testimony 
Elder Woman 
Daughter’s child 
had oral thrush, 
temperate 







12 April 17 Vivian  Testimony 
Matea (male) 
Lameness, leg 








13 April 17 Vivian Scovia 
Testimony 
Unable to sell 
produce 
Sprinkled holy 
water  on foods 
Began to 
sell 
14 April 17 Vivan Female 
Testimony 






15 April 17 Vivian Female 
testimony 
Infertility Prayers reveal 





16 April 17 Vivian Elderly Woman Daughter bed-
ridden for 5-
months 
Prayers Can walk  
17 April 17 Vivian Patricia (C) Breakdown of 
marriage, lack of 
job 








18 April 17 Vivian Phillip (C) Back pain, X-ray 
showed “bones 
were locking”. 
Took medicine for 
1.5 years, no 
change 
 
Anointing oil placed 
on back 
No pain  
18 May 17 (H) Mary 
(personal 
experience) 









19 May 17 (H) Mary Mary (D) Deaths and 
mysterious 








20 May 17 Mary Rucu Jessica 
(C) 
Unspecified Sacrificed to mazi; 














22 June 17 Vivian Zaitun (C) Lameness Bridewealth debts Mobility 
restored 
25 Dec 17 Mary Mary (D) – 
personal vision 
Brother tried to 
chop with panga 
No visions, payers 
















Mary Mary (D) Stepping on thorn, 
mysterious 
sickness 
Aruba, curse results 
when family 
members take each 





Mary Mary (D) Female school 
pupil, vomiting 
blood 




d to Mary 
28 December 
2017 
Mary Mary (D)  Possession of 
pupils in Manibe 
school 




Mary Mary (D) “deadly sickness” 










Mua acquired by 
grandmother 
Stomach 
swelling 
decreased 
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